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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Environmental Law
The most significant development in environmental law in 1981 was the
passage of the Waste Management Act.' Less comprehensive measures en-
acted by the General Assembly included the following: increased penalities
under the Pesticide Law of 197 1;2 realignment of control over water districts;
3
amendment of procedural provisions of the Water Use Act of 1967;4 and clas-
sification of sea turtles as an endangered species.5 In a statement referring to
the General Assembly as a "trustee for future generations," the legislature
symbolically affirmed its commitment to environmental protection.
6
1. Waste Management Act
"The General Assembly of North Carolina.. .[found].. .that the safe
management of hazardous wastes7 and low-level radioactive wastes,8 and par-
1. Law of June 26, 1981, ch. 704, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1010 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 143B-216.10 to -216.15 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). See text accompanying notes 7-32 infra.
2. Law of June 17, 1981, ch. 592, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 861 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 143-440 to -470 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). The major amendments to the Pesticide Law in-
cluded the authorization of the board, when it deems necessary, to "require the manufacturer or
distributor of any pesticide, for which registration has been refused, cancelled, suspended or vol-
untarily discontinued, or which has been found adulterated or deficient in its active ingredient, to
remove such pesticide from the marketplace," N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-442(e) (Cum. Supp. 1981),
and the provision for the board to levy a civil penalty of not more than two thousand dollars
against anyone who violates any one or more often enumerated prohibitions. Id. § 143-469(b).
3. Law of May 4, 1981, ch. 326, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 366 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 139-35 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). This Act made watershed improvement districts subject to
supervision by the Soil and Water Conservation Commission, thus placing them on equal footing
with counties operating watershed improvement programs.
4. Law of June 16, 1981, ch. 585, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 851 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 143-215.13 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). See text accompanying notes 33-45 infra.
5. Law of July 8, 1981, ch. 873, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1306 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 113-189 (Cum. Supp. 1981)) ("It is unlawful to willfully take, disturb or destroy any sea
turtles including green, hawksbill, loggerhead, and leatherback turtles, or their nests or eggs.").
6. Law of June 22, 1981, ch. 658, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 953:
The General Assembly of North Carolina recognizing the profound influence of
man's activity on the natural environment, and desiring, in its role as trustee for future
generations, to assure that an environment of high quality shall be maintained for the
health and well-being of all, declares that it shall be the continuing policy of the State of
North Carolina to conserve and protect its natural resources and to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony. Further, it
shall be the policy of the state to seek, for all its citizens, safe, healthful, productive and
aesthetically pleasing surroundings, to attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without degradation, risk to health or safety; and to preserve the historic
and cultural elements of our common inheritance.
7. "Hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of
its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may:
a. Cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or in serious irreversible
or incapacitating reversible illness; or
b. Pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130-166.16(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981). For purposes of the Act, "solid waste" in-
cludes "solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, institu-
tional, commercial, and agricultural operations, and from community activities." Id. § 130-
166.16(16).
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ticularly the timely establishment of adequate facilities for the disposal and
management of hazardous wastes and low-level radioactive wastes is one of
the most urgent problems facing North Carolina."9 In response to this prob-
lem, the legislature passed the Waste Management Act of 198110 to provide for
the uniform management of hazardous waste and to prevent local govern-
ments from interfering with this management. "1
To effectuate uniform hazardous and low-evel radioactive waste man-
agement, the General Assembly specifically preempted the authority of local
governments-county, city, or otherwise-to adopt ordinances that prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting properly approved hazardous or low-level radio-
active waste facilities and landfills.' 2 Although preemption is a little-used
power, there should be no bar to its exercise by the legislature. 13 The counties,
cities, towns or other governmental subdivisions are creations of the legisla-
ture.' 4 Consequently, the legislature "may give such powers and duties to
[them] as it may deem advisable."' 15 A necessary corollary to this principle is
that the legislature may restrict or abrogate any power previously conferred.16
Endowed with this authority, the legislature's preemption of local powers
should be beyond question.
17
A second of the Act's requirements for implementing uniform manage-
ment of hazardous and low-level radioactive waste is the proclamation that
the State shall be the sole owner of these facilities. All land presently used as a
hazardous or low-level radioactive waste facility or landfill must be conveyed
in fee simple to the State.'8 As consideration for the conveyance, the State will
then lease the facility to the operator for a nominal yearly fee. 19 In an appar-
ent attempt to comply with federal constitutional requirements of just com-
pensation,20 the General Assembly set the term of the lease as the estimated
life of the facility.2' Whether the constitutional requirements are satisfied,
8. "Low-level radioactive waste" is defined in the negative as "radioactive waste not classi-
fied as high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel as defined by the U.S. Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, transuranic waste, or byproduct material as defined in Section 1 l(e)(2) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended." Id. § 104E-5(9a).
9. Id. § 143-216.10(a) (footnotes added).
10. Law of June 26, 1981, ch. 704, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1010 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 143B-216.10 to -216.15 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
11. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-216.10(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
12. Id. §§ 104E-6.2(a), 130-166.17B(a).
13. Federal preemption hardly can be doubted due to the supremacy clause of article VI,
section 2 of the United States Constitution.
14. N.C. Const. art. VII, § 1; In re Martin, 286 N.C. 66, 209 S.E.2d 766 (1974).
15. N.C. Const. art. VII, § 1.
16. Town of Saluda v. County of Polk, 207 N.C. 180, 176 S.E. 298 (1934) (decided under a
similar provision in N.C. Cost. art. VIII, § 4).
17. See 49 N.C. Att'y Gen. Rep. 178 (1979) (city or county cannot prohibit establishment of a
hazardous waste facility) (opinion provided under statute with no specific preemption).
18. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 104E-6.1(a), 130-166.17A(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). The North Carolina
Department of Administration was authorized to purchase any land "necessary for the construc-
tion" of these facilities. Id. § 146-22.1(14).
19. The annual rent will be fifty dollars. Id. §§ 104E-6.1(a), 130-166.17A(a).
20. U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV.
21. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 104E-6.1(a), 130-166.17A(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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however, is open to dispute. The State may terminate the lease upon the
lessee's failure to remedy violations of applicable law.22 Arguably, in view of
this power, the consideration given is not just compensation for the loss.
The lease requirement provides that the State, or anyone authorized by
the State, shall have "at all times the right to enter without a search warrant or
permission. . . any and all parts of the premises for monitoring, inspection
and all other purposes necessary to carry out the provisions of G.S. Chapter
130, Article 13B" and Chapter 104E.2 3 The validity of this warrantless search,
although subject to question, should be upheld. Although the Supreme Court
has held that, in general, warrantless searches of businesses are unreasona-
ble,24 the Court has recognized exceptions for pervasively 25 or closely regu-
lated industries that have long been subject to close inspection and
supervision.
26
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 27 the Court explained: "The reasonableness
of a warrantless search... will depend upon the specific enforcement needs
and privacy guarantees of each statute. Some. . .statutes. . . apply only to a
single industry, where regulations might already be so prevasive that a [an]
exception to the warrant requirement could apply."28 Analysis under this ap-
proach leads to the conclusion that the warrantless search provision of the
Waste Management Act is valid. Unlike the provisions of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act involved in Barlow's, the Waste Management Act is
limited to one type of industry-the management of hazardous and low-level
radioactive waste. In addition, controls imposed on toxic and radioactive
waste are certainly pervasive. More important, as the General Assembly's
findings indicate, the mangement of waste is essential to the public health and
safety.29 Given this strong governmental interest in controlling hazardous and
low-level radioactive waste, the authorization of warrantless searches does not
seem unreasonable.
30
Another noteworthy aspect of the Waste Management Act is the creation
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
25. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
26. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
27. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). Barlow's was a case involving a general grant to the Secretary of
Labor to authorize agents to search, without a warrant, all employment facilities within the Act's
purview. Id. at 309. The Court held that warrantless searches under the Act violated the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement. Id. at 311.
28. Id. at 321.
29. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-216.10(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
30. See Marshall v. Sink, 614 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1980), reviewing Camara, See and Barlow's
and concluding that warrantless and unannounced inspections of coal mines do not violate the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment "because of the strong governmental interest....
the limitations placed on the search by the statutes, and the pervasive governmental regulation of
the mining industry." Id. at 38. The court in Sink also relied on the lack of criminal penalties for
violations to support its decision. This rationale should apply ejually to the Waste Management
Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104E-24 (Cure. Supp. 1981) (administrative penalties and judicial
review).
19821
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of a nonreverting Hazardous Waste Fund to defray the costs of monitoring the
hazardous waste facilities and landfills and, more importantly, to ensure the
care of these facilities long after they have ceased operating.31 This innovative
and long-term approach to effective waste management should be encouraged
to carry out the environmental policies of the State.
32
2. Water Use and Management
Significant developments in the area of water use and management in-
cluded amendment of the Water Use Act of 196733 and judicial interpretation
of the Environmental Policy Act of 1971.34 The amendment to the Water Use
Act of 1967 was a legislative response to court decisions interpreting the Act.
Although the amendment is solely procedural, it nevertheless is useful in se-
curing or protecting rights of parties affected by administrative action.35
The facts36 that gave rise to the judicial-legislative interplay are as fol-
lows. As part of its investigation of the feasibility of a proposed Duke Power
nuclear power plant, the Environmental Management Commission 37 held a
public meeting to declare the site a capacity use area.38 "As a result of the
public meeting, 'the Commission decided to hold two public meetings to con-
sider whether a capacity use [area] should be declared and/or an order issued
to Duke [Power] pursuant to N.C.G.S. 143-215.13(d).'-39 Subsequently, the
Commission announced a resolution refusing to issue the order pursuant to
G.S. 143-215.13(d) or to declare the site a capacity use area.40 High Rock Lake
Association sought to have this resolution reviewed by the superior court. On
appeal from an order dismissing the case,41 the court of appeals held that the
resolution issued by the Commission refusing to stop Duke Power from con-
structing the nuclear power plant was not an "order" within G.S. 143-
215.13(d) requiring judicial review.42 The court also pointed out that judicial
review would not be appropriate until all administrative avenues had been
foreclosed.4
3
31. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 104E-19(b), 130-166.19A (Cum. Supp. 1981).
32. See note 6 supra.
33. Law of June 16, 1981, ch. 585, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 851 (codified as amended
at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.13(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
34. In re Environmental Management Comm'n, 53 N.C. App. 135, 280 S.E.2d 520 (1981).
35. This is because the review procedures of Environmental Management Commission ac-
tions now are prescribed fully by the Water Use Act rather than by the independent procedures of
the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150A (Cum. Supp. 1981).
36. High Rock Lake Ass'n v. Environmental Management Comm'n, 39 N.C. App. 699, 252
S.E.2d 109 (1979).
37. Hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
38. 39 N.C. App. at 701, 252 S.E.2d at 111.
39. Id. (footnote omitted).
40. Id. at 702, 252 S.E.2d at 111.
41. Id. at 702, 252 S.E.2d at 112.
42. Id. at 704, 252 S.E.2d at 113.
43. Id. at 707, 252 S.E.2d at 114. The Administrative Procedure Act permits a party to seek a
declaratory ruling from the appropriate agency, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150A-17 (1978), and these rul-
ings are subject to judicial review. Id. § 150A-43.
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Subsequently, the General Assembly responded to the court of appeals'
holdings, both the interpretation of an "order" and the need to exhaust all
administrative remedies, by rewriting G.S. 143-215.13(d):
Any person who is adversely affected by a rule of the Environ-
mental Management Commission issued pursuant to this subsection
shall be entitled to an administrative hearing before the Environ-
mental Management Commission to contest the rule or the applica-
tion of the rule to such person. . . . Any person who is aggrieved by
a final decision of the Environmental Management Commission in a
contested case shall be entitled to judicial review of such decision in
accordance with Article 4 of Chapter 150A of the General Statutes.
44
Thus, the strict requirement of an "order" has been diminished to a "rule,"
and the subsection clearly directs the party through the steps necessary for
judicial review.45
A second significant development in the area of water use and manage-
ment was the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in In re Environmental
Management Commission,46 in which the court of appeals, for the first time,
interpreted part of the Environmental Policy Act of 1971.47 The issue before
the court was whether authorization to the Orange Water and Sewer Authority
to acquire the necessary water rights and land for the Cane Creek reservoir
project had to be preceded by an environmental impact statement prepared by
the Environmental Management Commission.48 The court held that the Envi-
ronmental Policy Act requires the Commission to prepare an environmental
impact statement before it could authorize the Orange Water and Sewer Au-
thority to proceed.4
9
The Environmental Policy Act requires State agencies, to the fullest ex-
tent possible, to "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and actions involving expenditure of public monies for projects sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the environment in this State, a detailed
statement" of all environmental impacts, proposals and alternatives.50 Focus-
ing on this section of the Act the court concluded that the certification by the
Commission to proceed was sufficient state action to require the Commission
to prepare an environmental impact statement. To reach this result the court
44. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.13(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
45. Following the suggestion of the court of appeals, 39 N.C. App. at 708, 252 S.E.2d at 115,
the High Rock Lake Association sought administrative review and then appealed the decision
affirming the prior Commission ruling. A different three-judge panel of the court of appeals up-
held the Commission's decision to allow Duke Power to proceed. High Rock Lake Ass'n v. Envi-
ronmental Management Comm'n, 51 N.C. App. 275, 276 S.E.2d 472 (1981).
46. 53 N.C. App. 135, 280 S.E.2d 520 (1981).
47. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 113A-1 to -10 (1978).
48. 53 N.C. App. at 138-39, 280 S.E.2d at 525.
49. Id. at 145, 280 S.E.2d at 527. The court rejected the Commission's contentions that the
public hearings held before certifing the authorization or the environmental impact statement to
be filed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were adequate alternatives. Id. at 144, 280 S.E.2d at
526-27.
50. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-4(2) (1978). The section specifically requires the responsible offi-
cial to cover six separate topics in the statement.
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relied not only upon analogous requirements at the federal level,51 but also
upon the function of the Commission.5 2 The court reasoned that the legisla-
ture intended the Commission to consider the effect of "development on pres-
ent beneficial users within the watershed.153 In conclusion the court stated,
"[Ilt becomes apparent that the certification action by the Commisssion is
State action which, if it significantly affects the environment, necessitates an
impact statement."
54
B. Health and Medical Law-
5
1. Domiciliary Home Residents' Bill of Rights
On July 10, 1981, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the
Domiciliary Home Residents' Bill of Rights.56 "It is the intent of the General
Assembly that every resident's civil and religious liberties, including the right
to independent personal decisions and knowledge of available choices, shall
not be infringed and that the facility shall encourage and assist the resident in
the fullest possible exercise of these rights." 57 The protection afforded extends
not only to residents of a domiciliary home58 but also to residents of family
care homes,5 9 homes for the aged and disabled,60 and group homes for devel-
51. 53 N.C. App. at 141, 280 S.E.2d at 525. The National Environmental Policy Act requires
all federal agencies to include an impact statement on "major Federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment . . " 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
52. Id. at 142-43, 280 S.E.2d at 525-26.
53. Id. at 143, 280 S.E.2d at 526.
54. Id.
55. The General Assembly passed legislation dealing with several specific aspects of health
and medical law. Law of June 17, 1981, ch. 600, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 873 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-236 to -255 (Cum. Supp. 1981)) (provides new regulations for opticians);
Law of July 8, 1981, ch. 859, § 29.8, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1275-76 (creates a fund for the
care of certain mentally, emotionally or neurologically disabled minors); Law of June 16, 1981, ch.
586, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 854 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130-9(e)(1) (Cum. Supp.
1981)) (provides for increase in access to nursing home patients' records).
56. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 923, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1416 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 131D-19 to -33 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). In 1974 the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare issued similar regulations to define and protect the rights of nursing home residents re-
ceiving either Medicaid or Medicare benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 405.112(k) (1976). These rights were
defined further in 1976. 45 C.F.R. § 249.12(a)(1)(ii)(B)(1) to (15) (1976). With projected cuts in
Medicaid and Medicare benefits, the local bill of rights assumes greater importance.
57. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131D-19 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
58. A "domiciliary home" is defined as
any facility, by whatever name it is called, which provides residential care for aged or
disabled persons whose principal need is a home with the sheltered or personal care their
age or disability requires. Medical care at a domiciliary home is only occasional or inci-
dental, such as may be required in the home of any individual or family, but the admin-
istration of medication is supervised. Domiciliary homes are to be distinguished from
nursing homes subject to licensure under G.S. 130-9(e). The three types of domiciliary
homes are homes for the aged and disabled, family care homes and group homes for
developmentally disabled adults.
Id. § 131D-20(2).
59. A "family care home" is a domiciliary home housing two to five residents. Id. § 1311D-
20(5).






The primary section of the Act sets forth the sixteen rights that every fa-
cility must ensure. The more important of these rights are: "to be free of
mental and physical abuse, neglect and exploitation"; 62 to be generally "free
from chemical and physical restraint";63 "[tlo have his or her personal records
kept confidential and not disclosed if he or she objects in writing"; 64 "[t]o asso-
ciate and communicate privately and without restriction with people or groups
of his or her own choice on his or her own or their initiative at any reasonable
hour";65 and "to participate by choice in accessible community activities and
in social, political, medical, and religious resources and to [be free] to refuse
such participation. ' 66 Also included in these sixteen rights are broader, more
vague policy statements such as the right "[to be treated with respect, consid-
eration, dignity and full recognition of his or her individuality and right to
privacy" 67 and to "receive care and services which are adequate, appropriate,
and in compliance with relevant federal and State laws and rules and regula-
tions." s68 Several other privacy rights, such as the right to access to a private
telephone, to prompt receipt of unopened mail and to access to writing sup-
plies, are also guaranteed.
69
The Act contains several other important substantive provisions, although
not specifically referred to as "rights." Among these is a provision that pro-
hibits any facility from requiring a waiver of the sixteen enumerated rights.
70
A second important feature of the Act is the extensive body of notice require-
ments:71 "A copy of the declaration of the residents' rights shall be posted
61. A "group home for developmentally disabled adults" is a domiciliary home with two to
nine developmentally disabled adult residents. Id. § 131D-20 (6).
62. "Neglect" is defined as "the failure to provide the services necessary to maintain the
physical or mental health of a resident." Id. § 131D-20(8). "Exploitation" is defined as "the illegal
or improper use of a disabled adult or his resources for another's profit or advantage." Id. § 108A-
1520) (recodified at id. § 108A-101(j)).
63. Id. § 131D-21(5). This right may be suspended during emergencies or pursuant to a phy-
sician's authorization when the restraint, physical or chemical, is for a specified period and ac-
cording to clear and indicated medical need.
64. Id. § 131D-21(6). This right in practice may provide little protection for the resident.
The onus is on the resident, an aged or disabled adult, to assert the right of privacy through a
written objection. To provide more substantial protection, the General Assembly could have
made the right to private medical records absolute, subject only to written waiver and state and
federal law exceptions.
65. Id. § 131D-21(8).
66. Id. § 131D-21(15).
67. Id. § 131D-21(l).
68. Id. § 131D-21(2). Although broader in their sweep than the other enumerated rights,
these rights are the touchstone for the entire Act. Privacy, respect, and adequate and appropriate
care are basic concerns of the elderly. It can be argued that it is from these basic rights that more
specific rights emanate.
69. Id. § 131D-21(10).
70. Id. § 131D-23.
71. Id. § 131D-24. Notice to the resident is an important aspect of the Act. In addition to the
public notice requirement, the resident also has the right to receive a copy of the Domiciliary
Home Residents' Bill of Rights upon admission. If requested, a copy of the declaration of resi-
dents' rights is to be furnished to the resident's responsible family member or guardian. Moreover,
should someone have been designated to manage the resident's affairs, that person may receive a
copy of the Bill of Rights. Id. § 1311D-24(a).
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conspicuously in a public place in all facilities."'72
The last major part of the Act contains enforcement provisions and reme-
dies.73 Primary enforcement responsibility lies with the Department of
Human Resources and county social services departments. 74 Every resident
also has the right to bring a civil action but is limited to injunctive relief.
75
Apart from any injunction that a resident may pursue, the Department of
Human Resources has the authority to revoke licenses for substantial
noncompliance. 7
6
2. North Carolina Biologics Law
A second major development related to the field of medicine was the
North Carolina Biologics Law of 1981. 77 The Act's purpose is twofold: "to
provide for the production and sale of biologics for the prevention or treat-
ment of disease in animals other than man;" and "to establish controls for the
sale and use of biologics in North Carolina."
78
The major effect of the Act is to prohibit the production of biologics ex-
cept in a facility licensed by the North Carolina Department of Agriculture79
or the United States Department of Agriculture,8" or in an "establishment pro-
ducing biologics only for use by the owner or operator. . . for animals owned
by him, if the biologics are registered with the Commissioner of Agricul-
72. Id. The address and telephone number of the appropriate section of the Department of
Human Resources responsible for enforcement and the address and telephone number of the
county Social Services Department also is to be posted.
73. Id. §§ 131D-26, -30.
74. "The director of the county Department of Social Services shall monitor the implementa-
tion of the declaration of the residents' rights and shall also investigate any complaints or griev-
ances pertaining to violations of the declaration of rights." Id. § 13 1D-26(a). The administrator
of each facility is responsible for implementing the Domiciliary Home Residents' Bill of Rights,
id. § 131D-25, but the Act does not specifically provide how total enforcement shall occur. It is
clear that the Department of Social Services and the Department of Human Resources have au-
thority to investigate complaints. This, however, is not adequate protection for the residents, who
may be reluctant or even unable to complain. To correct for this shortcoming, the "monitoring"
provision of the Act should be read to sanction periodic yet irregular investigations of facilities.
75. Id. § 131D-28. The absence of any explicit provision for remedies other than injunctive
relief suggests that none were intended. Nevertheless, a resident may be allowed to sue under
common law tort principles for assault, battery or false imprisonment for some of the more egre-
gious violations, such as unauthorized or nonemergency chemical or physical restraints. Addi-
tionaly, since many of the provisions of the Domiciliary Home Residents' Bill of Rights track the
Patients' Bill of Rights under federal regulations, federal relief also may be available.
76. Id. § 131D-29.
77. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 552, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 822 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 106-707 to -714 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
78. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-707 (Cum. Supp. 1981). "'Biologics' means preparations made
from living organisms and their products, including serums, vaccines, antigens and antitoxins
which are used for the treatment or prevention of diseases." Id. § 106-708(2). "Animal" is defined
as all birds and mammals, excluding man, to which biologics may be administered. Id. § 106-
708(l). This seems to be an unduly narrow definition. See text accompanying notes 87-89 infra.
79. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-710(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981). License approval shall be based on
rules and regulations adopted by the Board of Agriculture, id. § 106-710(b), which is authorized to
adopt any "rules and regulations necessary for the implementation and administration" of the
Act. Id. § 106-709.
80. Id. § 106-710(a)(2).
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ture." 1 Moreover, the Act prohibits any sale or use of unregistered biologics
within the State. The registration forms are supplied by the Commissioner of
Agriculture and must, under the statute, request information showing that the
biologic is produced under approved procedures; "safe and noninjurious toanimals when used as directed;" labeled for proper handling, use and contents;
produced in a facility licensed pursuant to the Act; and "not in violation of
this [Act] or any rule or regulation" adopted under the Act.
82
Violation of the Act or any rules or regulations promulgated under it is
punishable in a variety of ways. For example, the license of any facility 3 or
the registration of any biologic84 may be revoked or suspended.85 Violation of
the Act also is punishable as a misdemeanor with a fine ranging from not less
than one hundred dollars to no more than one thousand dollars, or imprison-
ment for no less than sixty days nor more than six months, or both.
86
There are several questionable aspects of the Act, one of which is its rela-
tively narrow focus. The Act is limited to the use of biologics that are used
"for the prevention or treatment of disease in animals other than man."
8 7
This limitation excludes from the scope of the Act the production, sale or use
of biologics intended to clean the environment 8 rather than to treat disease,
but apparently production, sale or use of such biologics is prohibited in North
Carolina.
89
3. Nursing Practice Act
A third major piece of health and medical legislation enacted in 1981 is
the Nursing Practice Act.90 The Act completely rewrites and restructures the
81. Id. § 106-710(a)(3).
82. Id. § 106-712(a)(1) to (5). "The application for registration shall also include a protocol
of methods of production in detail which is followed in the production of the biologic, a sample of
the label to be placed on the biologic, and any other information prescribed by the board as
necessary" to implement the Act. Id. § 106-712(b).
83. Id. § 106-711.
84. Id. § 106-713.
85. The suspension or revocation must be in accord with the North Carolina Administrative
Procedure Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150A.
86. Id. § 106-714(a). Injunctive relief is also available irrespective of other adequate or appli-
cable remedies. Id. § 106-714(b).
87. Id. § 106-707.
88. See Diamond v. Charkrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), in which the Supreme Court held
that man-made microorganisms are patentable. Charkrabarly involved man-made microorga-
nisms able to limit the adverse environmental effect ofoil spills. See Note, Patent Law-Diamond
v. Charkrabarly: The Supreme Court Rules that Living Matter is Patentable, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1001
(1980).
89. A liberal reading of the statute can produce an opposite result. "'Biologics' means prepa-
rations made from living organisms and their products, including serums, vaccines, antigens and
antitoxins which are used for the treatment or prevention of diseases in animals other than
humans, or in the diagnosis of diseases." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-708(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981). It is
arguable that this definition does not bar biologics from environmental use by including this use
within the "prevention of diseases" category. The definition of "animal," however, would have to
be expanded correspondingly to cover the situation clearly.
90. Law of July 1, 1981, ch. 360, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 397 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 90-171.19 to -171.47 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
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prior Nurse Practice Act.91 The Act redefines nursing92 and the practice of
nursing by a registered nurse and by a licensed practical nurse.93 In addition,
the Act reconstitutes the compositional requirements for the Board of
Nursing.
9 4
Under the definition provided by the new Act, nursing is a dynamic con-
cept that encompasses all aspects of patient care, including prevention, conva-
lescence and rehabilitation.95 Although this definition may be a proper
characterization of nursing, legally the definition may impose a heavy burden
on individual nurses. For example, under the Act, nurses' duties include "vig-
ilant and continuous care"96 for the acutely or chronically ill. This standard
would appear to be higher than that applied to other patients, possibly increas-
ing exposure of nurses dealing with such patients to liability.97 A second im-
portant factor concerning the nursing definition under the Act is that,
consistent with its total patient care approach, nurses are reqiured to recognize
the attainment of a dignified death as an important patient need.
98
The "practice of nursing by a registered nurse" has been divided into nine
components. 99 Some of the more basic functions are: "[a]ssessing the physical
and mental health of the patient, including reactions to illnesses and treatment
regimens; [p]lanning, initiating, delivering, and evaluating appropriate nursing
acts;" ° recording the nursing plan, the care given and the patient's response;
and "[p]roviding teaching and counseling about the patient's health care." 10'
The section defining the role of licensed practical nurses, which is broken
91. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-158 to -171.18 (1981), repealing Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 712,1977
N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 901.
92. Under the new act, "nursing" is defined as:
a dynamic discipline which includes the caring, counseling, teaching, referring and im-
plementing of prescribed treatment in the prevention and management of illness, injury,
disability or the achievement of a dignified death. It is ministering to; assisting; and
sustained, vigilant, and continuous care of those acutely or chronically ill; supervising
patients during convalescence and rehabilitation; the supportive and restorative care
given to maintain the optimum health level of individuals and communities; the supervi-
sion, teaching, and evaluation of those who perform or are preparing to perform these
functions; and the administration of nursing programs and nursing services.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-171.20(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Cf. id. § 90-158(3) (repealing Law of June 23,
1977, ch. 712, § 3, 1977 N.C. Seas. Laws, 1st Sess. 901). See also text accompanying notes 99-104
infra.
93. See text accompanying notes 99-104 infra.
94. See text accompanying notes 105-09 infra. Another change from the prior Act is the
enumeration of seven clearly specified prohibitions that can cause revocation, suspension, or de-
nial of licensure. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-171.37 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Examples include engaging in
conduct that endangers the public health or that deceives, defrauds or harms the public in the
course of professional activities or services and unfitness or incompetence due to deliberate or
negligent acts or omissions, regardless of the actual injury to the patient.
95. See note 92 supra.
96. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-171.20(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981). See note 92 supra.
97. The strictness of such a standard may well depend on what is considered an acutely or
chronically ill patient; regrettably, the Act does not provide such a definition.
98. See note 92 supra.
99. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-171.20(7)(a)-(i) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
100. Id.
101. Id. Apparently this information is to be provided both to the patient and to those respon-
sible for the patient or especially interested in the patient's well-being.
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down into five components, 10 2 merely provides that licensed practical nursing
"means the performance for compensation of selected acts in the care of per-
sons who are ill, injured, or experiencing alterations in normal health
processes." 10 3 The major difference between the registered nurse and the li-
censed practical nurse under the new Act is that discretionary functions re-
quiring greater education in the sciences have not been vested in the licensed
practical nurse. 104
Another major change in the Nursing Practice Act is the new composition
of the Nursing Board.10 5 The most important aspect is the attempt to free the
* nursing profession from the influence of physicians and hospital administra-
tors.10 6 Allowing nurses to control their profession is consistent with the defi-
nition of nursing as a dynamic discipline.10 7 Thus, as the medical needs of
society evolve, nurses will be able to define independently their role to meet
those needs. Nonetheless, the Nursing Board is not totally free to prescribe the
areas in which a nurse legitimately may practice. "The Board is empowered to
. . . [a]ppoint and maintain a subcommittee of the Board to work jointly with
the subcommittee of the Board of Medical Examiners to develop rules and
regulations to govern the performance of medical acts by registered nurses
.... ,1o Hence, the Board of Medical Examiners may still have a degree of
control over certain areas of nursing practice.' 0 9
4. Involuntary Commitment
Three cases 10 reached the North Carolina Court of Appeals under the
State's involuntary commitment statute.111 The cases evidence the judiciary's
102. Id. § 90-171.20(8)(a)-(e).
103. Id. § 90-158(3)(b) (repealing Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 712, § 3, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st
Sess. 901). This more detailed listing of components is also evident in the definition of nursing by
a registered nurse. Compare id. § 90-158(3)(a) (repealing Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 712 § 3, 1977
N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 901), with id. §§ 90-171.20(7)(a)-(i).
104. Examples of the functions of a, licensed practical nurse include: participating in assess-
ments of the physical and mental health of a patient, participating in the implementation of the
health care plan developed by a registered nurse by performing delegated tasks under supervision
of a registered nurse, and reinforcing the counseling and teaching of a registered nurse, licensed
physician or dentist. Id. § 90-171.20(8).
105. Compare id. §§ 90-171.21(a)-(d) with id. §§ 90-159(a)-(c) (repealing Law of June 23,
1977, ch. 712, § 3, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 901).
106. The new board has been expanded to fifteen members-nine registered nurses, four li-
censed practical nurses and two public representatives. The old board consisted of twelve mem-
bers-five registered nurses, two physicians, two hospital administrators and three licensed
practical nurses. The licensed practical nurses, however, were able to participate only on matters
pertaining to the education, licensure and examination of licensed practical nurses. Thus, nurses
did not have the cofitrol of their profession provided by the new Act. Note also that the nurses on
the board are elected from the profession rather than appointed by the Governor. Id. § 90-
171.21(a)-(d).
107. See note 92 supra.-
108. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-171.23(b)(14) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
109. Id. § 90-171.20(7)(e).
110. The three cases, each decided by a different three-judge panel, were In re Crainshaw, 54
N.C. App. 429, 283 S.E.2d 553 (1981); In re Guffey, 54 N.C. App. 462, 283 S.E.2d 534 (1981); In re
Holt, 54 N.C. App. 352, 283 S.E.2d 413 (1981).
111. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 122-58.1 to -58.26 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
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goal of simplifying involuntary commitment proceedings.' 12
"To support a commitment order, the court is required to find, by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally ill or inebri-
ate, and dangerous to himself or others."113 Thus, there are two distinct re-
quirements for commitment: (1) mental illness or inebriety, and (2)
dangerousness to self or others.' 14 The dangerousness element of this test was
the focus of the 1981 decisions." 5
Within the definitions of dangerousness to self 1 6 or dangerousness to
others," 7 the court adhered to a strict burden of proof. InIn re Crainshaw,"t8
respondent exhibited the following behavior characteristics: she burned pots
and countertops by forgetting to turn off the stove; she was generally forgetful;
she frequently talked to walls; and she was disoriented with her surround-
ings.119 The court conceded that such behavior showed an inability to con-
duct daily affairs or exercise self-control or judgment, but it nevertheless failed
to find evidence of a "serious physical debilitation. . . in the near future."'
120
112. The present version of the North Carolina involuntary commitment statute has been de-
scribed as "an attempt to expedite commitment of the mentally ill to the state's mental health
facilities." Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1979-Administrative Law, 58
N.C.L. Rev. 1185, 1219-20 (1980). For a discussion of civil commitment in North Carolina see
Hiday, The Attorney's Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 985 (1982); Miller,
Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The Results of the 1979 Statutory Changes, 60
N.C.L. Rev. 985 (1982).
113. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.7(i) (1981).
114. In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 271 S.E.2d 72 (1980).
115. In both Holt and Crainshaw the issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support
the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent was dangerous to self. The issue in Guffey in-
volved the same conclusion with respect to dangerousness to others.
The mental illness standard typically has been met at the trial court level by having an expert
diagnose the respondent as mentally ill. In Gtuffey, for example, "the State presented evidence in
the form of testimony from an expert witness showing that the respondent suffered from a manic
depressive condition, manic phase, which was manifested by overtalkativeness and poor judg-
ment." 54 N.C. App. at 466, 283 S.E.2d at 536. The respondent, on the other hand, offered evi-
dence that he was quite capable of providing himself with all of the basic necessities. The court
was willing to accept the doctor's conclusion that the respondent was "mentally ill" and exercised
"poor judgment."
116. From the statute the court has established a two-pronged test for dangerous to self: (1)
inability for self-care regarding one's daily affairs; and (2) "a specific finding of a probability of
serious physical debilitation resulting from the more general finding of lack of self.caring ability."
In re Crainshaw, 54 N.C. App. at 430-31, 283 S.E.2d at 554 (1981).
117. Dangerousness to others is manifested by three necessary elements:
(I) Within the recent past
(2) Respondent has
(a) inflicted serious bodily harm on another, or
(b) attempted ;o inflict serious bodily harm on another, or
(c) threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or
(d) has acted in such a manner as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm
to another, and
(3) There is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.
In re Monroe, 49 N.C. App. 23, 30-31, 270 S.E.2d 537, 541 (1980).
118. 54 N.C. App. 429, 283 S.E.2d 553 (1981).
119. Id. at 432, 283 S.E.2d at 555.
120. Id. Compare the dissenting opinion of Judge Webb:
I. . . believe the facts recorded support a conclusion that the respondent's behavior was
'grossly inappropriate to the situation.' This creates aprimafacie inference that the re-
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In short, the court was unwilling to infer a physically dangerous condition
from a showing of an inability to exercise self-control or judgment.
In two other cases reaching the court of appeals in 1981, In re Guffey'
2 1
and In re Holt,'22 the court demonstrated a different concern. The court paid
particular attention to the requirement imposed on the trial court to record the
specific facts supporting its conclusions.123 This required the trial court to do
more than simply mark the appropriate box in the commitment form.124 In
each case the court of appeals was not content merely to rubber stamp the
decision of the trial court. Rather, in both Holt and Guffey the court engaged
in a close review of the record to determine whether the findings and conclu-
sions were warranted by the evidence.
C State and Local Government
1. Sunset Law
Hailed as one the most significant achievements of the 1977 General As-
sembly, 125 the North Carolina Sunset Law fell to the legislative ax in 1981.126
The State's sunset program, in line with similar laws in other jurisdictions,1 27
provided for automatic review of programs and functions operated under 100
licensing and regulatory laws. The Act authorized repeal of approximately
one-third of the statutes biennially over a six-year period and provided a re-
view procedure for each program before its proposed repeal date.128 The
North Carolina program, however, apparently was unique. Rather than set-
ting up a permanent sunset process, the statute established only a temporary
review agency, 129 the Government Evaluation Commission, itself subject to
spondent was not able to care for herself which satisfies the requirement that there was a
probability of serious physical debilitation to the respondent if she had not been treated.
Id. (%Vebb, J., dissenting).
121. 54 N.C. App. 462, 283 S.E.2d 534 (1981).
122. 54 N.C. App. 352, 283 S.E.2d 413 (1981).
123. See In re Guffey, 54 N.C. App. 462, 463, 283 S.E.2d 534, 535 (1981); In re Holt, 54 N.C.
App. 352, 354, 283 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1981); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.7(i) (1981).
124. In re Jacobs, 38 N.C. App. 573, 248 S.E.2d 448 (1978).
125. See, e.g., N.C. Inst. of Gov't, North Carolina Legislation 1977, 293.
126. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-34.10 to -.21 (1978) (repealed by Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 932,
1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1431).
127. Starting in 1976, at the behest of the citizens' lobby Common Cause, states began enact-
ing sunset programs. These devices consisted of legislation mandating the end of particular gov-
ernmental programs, agencies or functions by a certain date. A program would terminate unless
the governing body specifically provided statutory reauthorization. The mechanism was viewed
as a useful technique for reversing the normal incentive of programs to delay change, eliminating
inactive and ineffective programs, and consolidating or eliminating overlapping or duplicative
governmental functions. See generally N.C. Inst. of Gov't, supra note 125, at 293-94; Sunset Re-
view-Effective Oversight Tool or New Political Football?, 32 Ad. L. Rev. 209 (1980); Schwartz,
Administrative Law: The Third Century, 29 Ad. L. Rev. 291 (1977); Survey of Developments in
North Carolina Law, 1977-Administrative Law, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 867-69 (1978).
128. N.C. Inst. of Gov't, supra note 125, at 294.
129. The temporary character of the North Carolina program was grounded in both constitu-
tional considerations, avoidance of establishing an additional state department within the 25 al-
lowed by the state constitution, and practical considerations, thus giving to the program a chance
to prove itself before tackling all of state government. Id.
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the sunset procedure.' 30
The 1981 repealing statute131 set up a temporary Committee on Agency
Review composed entirely of legislative members.' 32 The Committee will
conclude evaluations on sixty laws and programs still remaining on the sunset
list. 133 The laws and programs, however, are no longer subject to automatic
termination dates.
134
Repeal of the North Carolina program comes in response to legislative
criticism that the program was too expensive in its previous form.' 35 Legisla-
tors also viewed the procedures as too time-consuming in light of the results
achieved.' 36 Finally, with only five agencies abolished during the program's





Upon recommendation of the Social Services Study Commission, 139 the
General Assembly completely recodified the State's public assistance and so-
cial service statutes. The Recodification Act 140 rewrites and reorganizes all
welfare statutes "while retaining the basic concepts and requirements of ex-
isting laws and practice in Chapter 108."'141 New Chapter 108A brings State
law into conformity with current federal law and policy while repealing refer-
130. The Commission was a ten-member body with six gubernatorially-appointed citizens and
six legislators appointed by the Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the House; termination of
Commission authority was set for June 30, 1983. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-34.15(a), -34.15(f) (1978).
131. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 932, §§ 1-3, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1431 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-34.25 to -.27 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
132. Id. § 2 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-34.25 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). The Committee's
authority is to terminate on July 30, 1983, the same date the Commission's authority would have
ceased.
133. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-34.25 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
134. Id.
135. N.C. Inst. of Gov't, North Carolina Legislation 1981, 328.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 312. The criticism aimed at the North Carolina program appears to confirm one
commentator's misgivings during the era of initial enthusiasm for sunset programs:
The sunset concept is the type of "gimmick" which all too often appeals to Americans as
a facile solution to complex problems. It may, however, be doubted that sunset statutes
will really resolve the problem of the agency life-cycle. Legislative review en masse of
agency existence will, more likely than not, lead only to perfunctory renewal of agency
mandates. Can we really expect more, given the ineptitude of our legislatures and the
time pressures to which they are subjected?
Schwartz, supra note 127, at 294.
138. The social services program of North Carolina is based on the constitutional mandate
that "[b]eneficent provision for the poor, the unfortunate, and the orphan [is] one of the first duties
of a civilized and Christian State...." Social Services Study Comm'n, Internal Report 2 (May
1980).
139. The Social Services Study Commission was created in 1979 as a legislative commission
consisting of twelve members appointed by the Governor, Speaker of the House and President of
the Senate. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 992, §§ 1-13, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1329.
140. Law of April 27, 1981, ch. 275, §§ 1-11, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 239 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
141. Id. (preamble). For a detailed outline of the recodification, see N.C. Inst. of Gov't, supra
note 135, at 262-70.
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ences to obsolete federal or State programs. The Act also places public assist-
ance and social services into two separate statutory sections, with specific
authority provided for each program category. Finally, the Department of
Human Services now has statutory authority to apply for any available federal
welfare programs; previous authority was limited to Social Security
programs.142
The appellate process for termination or modification of welfare pay-
ments also underwent clarification in 1981.143 In accordance with previous
law, termination or modification of payment is ineffective until ten working
days after notice is issued. Immediate termination, however, is now available
under certain specified conditions. 144 Recipients also are granted specific au-
thority to examine their case files and any other documentary material to be
used at an appellate hearing, provided such files and materials are not classi-
fied as confidential under federal law.145 A denial of access is subject to judi-
cial review. 146
3. Public Employees' 4 7
Laws relating to the state's public servants underwent modification and
clarification in 1981. InAppeal of North Carolina Savings and Loan League 14 8
the North Carolina Supreme Court denied local government employees mem-
bership in the State Employees' Credit Union. 149 The case arose from an
142. New legislation also expands the authority of the Department of Human Services to
charge fees "to help defray the costs of service." Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 562, §§ 1-9, 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 828 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-173, -175, -176, -179, -184 (Cum. Supp.
1981)).
143. Law of May 19, 1981, ch. 419, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 507 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 108A-120 to -121 (Cum. Supp. 1981)); Law of May 19, 1981, ch. 420, 1981 N.C. Sess.
Laws, Ist Sess. 508 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-120 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
144. Termination or modification of assistance may be effective immediately:
(1) When the modification is beneficial to the recipient; or
(2) When federal regulations permit immediate termination as soon as the notice is
mailed or delivered and the Social Services Commission or Department of Human Re-
sources has developed regulations that adopt the federal law or regulations. When fed-
eral or state regulations permit immediate termination or modification, the client has no
right to continue assistance at the present level pending the local appellate hearing
before the social services director or his designee.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-120(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Additional Developments: The legislature, in an attempt to enhance membership in
independent employee associations, authorized voluntary payroll deductions for membership
dues. The authority, however, is limited to domiciled state employees' associations that do not
engage in collective bargaining. Law of July 8, 1981, ch. 869, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1305
(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 147-62 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). One commentator points out that the
latter provision is to allay fears that the legislation is a first step toward state employee
unionization; constitutionality of the limitation probably will have to be decided by the courts.
N.C. Inst. of Gov't, supra note 135, at 256.
148. 302 N.C. 458, 276 S.E.2d 404 (1981).
149. The State Employees' Credit Union, the third largest in the world, is a state-chartered
financial institution with membership traditionally limited to State employees and public school
teachers. Because of their favored legal status, credit unions receive numerous tax advantages
including exemption from State excise and intangible taxes. The organizations also are exempt
from federal income taxes. Credit unions also are free from many burdensome statutory require-
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amendment to Credit Union bylaws. The bylaws change allowed for an ex-
pansion of the membership field to include employees of local government
units who participate in state-administered retirement programs.1 50 After the
North Carolina Credit Union Commission affirmed the change, the North
Carolina Bankers Association, the Savings and Loan League and the Burke
County Savings and Loan Association petitioned for judicial review. Petition-
ers contended that the members added by the amendment lacked a "common
bond" with the previous membership in violation of G.S. 54-109.26.1 s 1 The
trial court held in favor of petitioners, but the court of appeals reversed.
Through narrow statutory interpretation, the supreme court held against the
Commission and reversed the court of appeals, 152 affirming the trial court de-
cision that the expanded membership lacked the statutorily required common-
ality. The justices specifically rejected the court of appeals' finding of requisite
similarity in occupation. According to the court of appeals, "public employees
are united by the common bond of similar occupation for the simple reason
that they are employed in the service of the community .... 153 The
supreme court held, however, that the statute required similarity in actual oc-
ments imposed on private institutions. For example, credit unions are not subject to the State's
usury laws. Services offered through the State Employees' Credit Union, however, are identical to
those offered in the private sector. Available to credit union members are consumer loans, mort-
gage loans, consumer financing, counseling, draft accounts, personal money orders, travelers'
checks, U.S. Government bonds and share and passbook savings accounts. Finally, the organiza-
tion is free to pay higher interest on savings than the savings and loan associations, which are
bound by federal insurance regulations. Id. at 462 n.1, 276 S.E.2d at 407-08 n.l.
150. Id. at 460-61, 276 S.E.2d at 406-07, The State administers eight retirement systems in-
eluding the Local Government Employees' Retirement System. Within this system fall all em-
ployees of local government units, including employees of various cities, counties, housing
authorities, airports, ports, and ABC boards. Id. at 463 n.l, 276 S.E.2d at 408 n.l.
151. This statute, the source of the common bond requirement, provides:
(a) The membership of a credit union shall be limited to and consist of the subscribers to
the articles of incorporation and such other persons within the common bond set forth in
the bylaws....
(b) Credit union membership may include groups having a common bond of similar
occupation, association or interest, or groups who reside within an identifiable neighbor-
hood, community, or rural district, or employees of a common employer, and members
of the immediate family of such persons.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 54-109.26 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
152. In accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, a reviewing court's power to af-
firm an agency decision and to remand for further proceedings is unlimited. A court, however,
may reverse or modify only ifi
the substantial rights of the petitions may have been prejudiced because the agency find-
ings, inferences, conclusions, or decision are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence...; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150A-51 (1978). The trial court relied on the first, second, fifth and sixth stan-
dards in reversing the Commission decision; the supreme court, while affirming the trial court's
results, found the fourth standard to be the sole applicable provision. 302 N.C. at 463-64, 276
S.E.2d at 409.
153. 45 N.C. App. 19, 23, 262 S.E.2d 361, 364 (1980).
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cupational duties and responsibilities. 154 The court also rejected respondents'
contention that the limitation of membership to local government employees
covered under a state-administered retirement system provided a common
bond of similar interest.' 55 The court reasoned that the only commonality
shared by all persons covered by the eight separate state-administered retire-
ment systems was that bookkeepers for each system shared a common em-
ployer, the State.' 56 The court deemed this connection remote and
insubstantial.
In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice Exum concurred with the court of ap-
peals' determination that public employees are united by the common bond of
occupation.' 57 He accused the majority of protectionism, noting that the com-
mon bond requirement is for the protection of the credit union itself.58 The
requirement is not intended to restrict size and operations to protect private
financial institutions with which credit unions may compete, as the majority
implied.' 59 The effect of the majority's decision, he concluded, is denial of
credit to a group whose only collateral is the income derived from a steady job
merely on the basis of an unsubstantiated threat to the private sector.' 60 Both
majority and dissent, however, failed to recognize that many local public em-
ployees are already members of credit unions or are free to form new ones.' 6 '
Several actions taken by the General Assembly in 1981 also affected pub-
lic employees.' 62 The most important of these actions was the relaxation of
political activity restrictions.' 6 3 Provided they do not use their positions to
154. 302 N.C. at 469, 276 S.E.2d at 412.
155. Id. at 472, 276 S.E.2d at 413.
156. Id. at 472-73, 276 S.E.2d at 414.
157. Id. at 474, 276 S.E.2d at 415.
158. "The acid test, as the majority correctly notes, is whether the common bond is sufficient
'to promote the financial stability of credit unions by requiring that the members possess substan-
tial unity of character and interest. Only with some assurance of stability can the purpose of credit
unions be achieved.'" Id. at 476, 276 S.E.2d at 416 (Exum, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id. The dissent points out that although the State Employees' Credit Union is large in-
comparison with others of its type, size and operational potential, even with the enlarged member-
ship, it is small compared to the private sector. At most, the membership field would be expanded
from 200,000 to 250,000 eligible members. Finally, North Carolina credit unions, including the
State Employees Credit Union, account for only 4.5% of total state consumer savings. Id.
161. In fact, employees of county, municipal, and related government units (excluding em-
ployees of county departments of Social Services, Health, Mental Health and Civil Defense), who
had a credit union chartered by North Carolina or by the federal government and who were
included in that field of membership, were not eligible for membership in the State Employees'
Credit Union even under the amended bylaws. Bylaws of the State Employees' Credit Union, art.
II, § I (as amended Sept. 15, 1977).
162. For legislative developments in the area of public records affecting public employees, see
notes 196-211 and accompanying text infra.
163. Law of June 5, 1981, ch. 520, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 795 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 143B-13(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981)). As originally written, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-13(c) (1978)
provided:
No member of any State Commission may (i) use his position to influence any election
or the political activity of any person, (ii) serve as a member of the campaign committee
of any political party, (iii) interfere with or participate in the preparation for any election
or the conduct thereof at the polling place, or (iv) be in any manner concerned with the
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influence "any election or political activity of any person,"'164 state commis-
sion, board, council or committee members now are free to engage in partisan
politics. The legislature also relaxed political activity restrictions on correc-




During 1981 both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the General
Assembly focused their attention on the rights of access to, and confidentiality
of, the State's public records. The court undertook to interpret the Public
Records Act 167 for the first time in the Act's forty-five year history.168
In Advance Publications, Inc. v. City ofElizabeth Cty169 plaintiff corpora-
tion sought to compel disclosure 170 of a letter to defendant city from a consult-
ing engineer who was employed to inspect construction work on the City's
water treatment plant. The court held the letter to be a public record within
the meaning of G.S. 132-1.171 In light of defendant's status as a State subdivi-
sion authorized as a public enterprise to improve and maintain a water supply
and distribution system, 172 the court held that the letter was received pursuant
to law "in connection with the transaction of public business."'173 The court
demanding, soliciting, or receiving of any assessments, subscriptions, or contributions,
whether voluntary or involuntary, to any political party or candidate.
164. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-13(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
165. Law of April 24, 1981, ch. 260, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 224 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 148-52.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). Since 1973, corrections employees have been subject to the
same limitations as members of State commissions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-52.1 (1978). See lan-
guage of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-13(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981), note 163 supra.
166. N.C. Gen. Stat. §126-13 (1981).
167. The North Carolina Public Records Act was originally enacted in 1935. Law of May 2,
1935, ch. 265, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 288.
168. One commentator attributed the previous absence of legal development in the public
records area to a degree of public official indifference and lack of public awareness. Comment,
Administrative Law-Public Access to Government-Held Records: A Neglected Right in North
Carolina, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 1187, 1188 (1977). Indeed, indifference to the Act's passage is evidenced
by total lack of reference in this publication's 1935 survey issue. 13 N.C.L. Rev. 355-449 (1935).
For an excellent attempt to provide guidelines in the face of the interpretive vacuum, see
Johnson & Lawrence, Interpreting North Carolina's Public Records Law, 10 Local Gov't L. Bull.
1 (1977). See also Note, Public Access to Public Records in North Carolina, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 853
(1982).
169. 53 N.C. App. 504, 281 S.E.2d 69 (1981).
170. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9 (1981) provides that "[alny person who is denied access to public
records for purposes of inspection, examination or copying may apply to the appropriate division
of the General Court of Justice for an order compelling disclosure, and the court shall have juris-
diction to issue such orders."
171. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1 (1981) provides in pertinent part that " '[p]ublic record' or 'public
records' shall mean all... letters... made or receivedpursuant to law or ordinance in connection
with the transaction Ofpublic business by any agency of North Carolina government or its subdidv-
sio ..... " (emphasis added).
172. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 160A-311 to -312 (1976).
173. 53 N.C. App. at 505, 281 S.E.2d at 70. For other cases in which courts found engineering
reports, orders, plans and documents concerning public works projects to be public records, see
Coldwell v. Board of Pub. Works, 187 Cal. 510, 202 P. 879 (1921) (engineering documents con-
cerning construction of city water system); Egar v. Board of Water Supervisors, 205 N.Y. 147, 98
N.E. 467 (1912); In re Thring, 181 A.D. 865, 169 N.Y.S. 273, afrd sub. nom. Ihring v. Williams,
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rejected the City's contention that public policy considerations compel the
court to create an exception to mandatory disclosure of these types of commu-
nications.174 The court reasoned that the General Assembly intended no ex-
ceptions to the Act other than those set forth in G.S. 132-1.1---communications
by legal counsel to governmental bodies.1 75 In addition to its deferral to this
"clear" manifestation of legislative intent, the court viewed the basic national
policy of unencumbered access 176 as a bar to judicially created exceptions ab-
sent some compelling state policy consideration.' 7 7 The court also rejected the
contention that the purpose of the Act is to provide for record preservation
and not disclosure: "Preservation for its own sake, absent access, would be an
absurdity." 178 Finally, the court found the corporate plaintiff to be a "person"
entitled to access within the meaning of the statute.179 The Justices believed
that the General Assembly did not intend to exclude corporate entities from
the scope of the statutory phrase "any person,"180 especially when the function
of the corporation seeking access to public records was to inform the public.
181
In News and Observer Publishing Co. v. Wake County Hospital'8 2 the
court of appeals upheld a decision compelling disclosure of settlement terms
reached in three breach of contract actions against Wake County Hospital Sys-
tem, Inc.183 Expense account records of the System's president and board of
223 N.Y. 670, 119 N.E. 1050 (1918) (engineering report on burst water main); District of Colum-
bia v. Bakersmith, 18 App. D.C. 574 (1901) (orders, plan and documents related to construction
and repair of culvert).
174. 53 N.C. App. at 506, 281 S.E.2d at 70.
175. A number of other state statutes, however, declare various records confidential. See, e.g.,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-259 (1979) (tax records of Dep't of Revenue); id. § 105-259 (business records
used for property appraisal); id. § 163-171 (ballots); id. § 130-200 (autopsy reports available only
upon court order); id. §§ 153A-98, 160A-168 (limited access to local public employee personnel
records).
The 1981 General Assembly also added another specific exemption of the Public Records Act
concerning public employees' insurance records. See note 196 and accompanying text infra.
176. "[G]ood public policy is said to require liberality in the right to examine public records."
53 N.C. App. at 506, 281 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws § 12,
at 349 (1973)). "While some degree of confidentiality is necessary for government to operate
efficiently, the general rule in the American political system must be that affairs of government be
subject to public scrutiny." Id., 281 S.E.2d at 70-71 (quoting Comment, supra note 168, at 1188).
177. As a result of the proliferation of government-held information on private citizens, some
courts have begun to recognize legitimate private interests and have created judicial exceptions
where disclosure otherwise would result in an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Minneap-
olis Star & Tribune Co. v. State, 282 Minn. 86, 163 N.W.2d 46 (1968); Wisher v. News-Press
Publishing Co., 310 So.2d 345 (Fla. App. 1975). See Industrial Foundry v. Texas Indus. Accident
Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976). See generally Johnson and Lawrence, supra note 168, at 4-7.
178. 53 N.C. App. at 507, 281 S.E.2d at 71.
179. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6 (1981) provides that "[elvery person having custody of public
records shall permit them to be inspected and examined at reasonable times and under his super-
vision byanyperson, and he shall furnish certified copies thereof on payment of fees as prescribed
by law" (emphasis added).
180. At common law, a person was entitled to inspect a particular public record only if he had
a legal interest in the document. Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299 (1882); State ex rel. Ferry v.
Williams, 41 N.J. 332 (1879); State v. Harrison, 130 W. Va. 247, 43 S.E.2d 214 (1947); see also
Newton v. Fisher, 98 N.C. 20, 3 S.E. 822 (1887).
181. 53 N.C. App. at 505, 281 S.E.2d at 70.
182. 55 N.C. App. 1, 284 S.E.2d 542 (1981), disc. rev. denied, - N.C. _ 291 S.E.2d 151
(1982), appeal pending, 50 U.S.L.W. 3984 (U.S. June 1, 1982) (No. 81-2213).
183. The court found dispositive G.S. 143-318.1 1(a)(4), which requires a public body to report
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directors were also subject to revelation. In granting access, the court con-
strued the phrase "pursuant to law or ordinance in connection with the trans-
action of public business"' 8 4 to include "in addition to those records required
by law, those records that are kept in carrying out lawful duties."'
8 5
A more important aspect of the decision was the court's interpretation of
the agency requirement of the public records statute.' 8 6 The System argued
that its status as a "private, non-profit corporation" and "independent contrac-
tor" removed it from the definition of agency under the statute.18 7 While not-
ing that several courts have found similar corporate entities to be agencies of
government for jurisdictional and tort liability purposes,' 88 the court did not
find these decisions dispositive in interpretating the statute. 18 9 Instead, the
court examined the nature of the relationship between the System and the
county and failed to find that the System's independent authority so overshad-
owed the county's supervisory responsibility as to foreclose a conclusion that
the System was an "agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions,
ie. Wake County."1 90 Through an examination of the System's articles of
incorporation, 19 1 lease' 92 and operating agreements 193 in congruence with ju-
dicial interpretation of the Municipal Hospital Facilities Act, 194 the court con-
cluded that the System's "independent authority" was so intertwined with the
its consideration of settlement terms in executive session by entry "into its minutes within a rea-
sonable time after the settlement is concluded." The court also reasoned that the public has a
right to know settlement terms, because the funds from which the settlement is paid must be
considered county, and thereby public, funds. 55 N.C. App. at 13, 284 S.E.2d at 549.
184. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1 (1981). See note 171 supra.
185. 55 N.C. App. at 13, 284 S.E.2d at 549.
186. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1 (1981) provides that:
Agency of North Carolina Government and its subdivision shall mean and include every
public office, public officer or official (State or local, elected or appointed), institution,
board, commission, bureau, council, department, authority or other unit of government
of the State or of any county, unit, special district or other political subdivision of
government.
187. 55 N.C. App. at 9, 281 S.E.2d at 547.
188. See, e.g., Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hosp., Inc., 287 N.C. 14, 213 S.E.2d 297 (1975)
(county authority to levy special tax to operate and maintain hospital and substantial control of
operations by county board of commissioners results in agency status for purposes of tort liabil-
ity); Coates v. Sampson County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 264 N.C. 332, 141 S.E.2d 490 (1965) (hospi-
tal organized as a non-stock, non-profit corporation deemed an agency of county for venue
purposes).
189. 55 N.C. App. at 11, 281 S.E.2d at 548.
190. Id.
191. The System's articles of incorporation provided "1) that upon its dissolution, the System
would transfer its assets to the county; and 2) that all vacancies on the board of directors would be
subject to the Commissioners' approval" Id.
192. The lease agreement provided that I) the System occupy premises owned by the county
under a lease for $1.00 annually; 2) the Commissioners review and approve the System's annual
budget; 3) the county conduct a supervisory audit of the System's books; and 4) the System report
its charges and rates to the county. Id.
193. The operating agreement provided that 1) the System be financed by county bond orders;
2) revenue collected pursuant to the bond orders be revenue of the county; and 3) the System
would not change its corporate existence nor amend its articles of incorporation without the
county's written consent. Id., 281 S.E.2d at 548-49.
194. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131-126.28 (1981) states that operation of a county hospital is a "public
and governmental" function exercised "for a public purpose" and is therefore a county function.
See Coates v. Sampson County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 264 N.C. 332, 141 S.E.2d 490 (1965).
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county that agency status was an inescapable conclusion. 195
Legislative action in 1981 also affected the public records area. A major
focus was access to public employment records. Information obtained from an
insurer of teachers and state employees now statutorily is held confidential and
exempt from the Public Records Act.19 6 Changes in the Personnel Privacy
Act 197 also afford greater protection to local public employees as well as re-
sponsible public officials.19 8 By expanding the definition of "employee" under
the Act, the legislature has provided former local civil servants the same confi-
dentiality as that afforded current public employees. 199
The new law also creates certain exceptions to the nondisclosure rules. It
allows public officials to defend their specific personnel decisions by providing
that otherwise confidential personnel information may be released upon con-
currence of the local governing body if disclosure is deemed essential to main-
taining public confidence.200 A governing body now may also authorize
access to personnel files for statistical, research and reaching purposes pro-
vided the investigator certifies that employee identification will not be re-
leased.201 The legislation also requires malice202 as an essential element in
any criminal prosecution resulting from unlawful release of confidential per-
sonnel information.203 Finally, the statute makes it clear that an employee
may authorize written release of otherwise confidential information.2 0 4
The recodification of the State's social service laws incorporated two new
public records components.205 Social services board members now have au-
thority to inspect social service records.206 Previously, access of board mem-
bers was limited to public assistance records.207 In addition, confidentiality of
195. 55 N.C. App. at 12, 281 S.E.2d at 549.
196. Law of May 11, 1981, ch. 355, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 395 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 135-37 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
197. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-168 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (municipal employees); id. § 153A-98
(county employees).
198. One commentator notes that the new legislation unfortunately does not help district
health and mental health directors to determine whether they are subject to the Personnel Privacy
Act or still are operating under G.S. § 132. N.C. Inst. of Gov't, supra note 135.
199. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 926, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1424 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 153A-98, 160A-168 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
200. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 153A-98(c), 160A-168(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
201. Id. §§ 153A-98, 160A-168.
202. Legal malice does not necessarily mean a malicious or malevolent purpose, personal ha-
tred or hostility toward another, it is a state of mind that shows a heart unmindful of social duty
and fatally bent on mischief, or that prompts a person to do an injurious act willfully to the injury
of another. It sometimes is defined as any willful or corrupt intention of mind. 22 C.J.S. § 31(2)
(1961).
203. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 926, §§ 4, 8, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1424 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 160A-168, 153A-98 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). The previous criminal standard incor-
porated "willfully" and "knowingly" only. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 160A-168(e) (1976), 153A-98(e)
(1978).
204. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-98(b)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
205. Law of April 27, 1981, ch. 275, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 239 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 108A (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
206. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-I1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
207. Id. § 108-16 (repealed by Law of April 27, 1981, ch. 275, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st
Sess. 239).
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public assistance and social service records now is mandated,208 with the ex-
ception of a recipient check register made available monthly to each county
auditor.209 The law, however, specifically prohibits the use of such lists for




Appellate courts scrutinized actions by various North Carolina munici-
palities in 1981. In Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem212 the North
Carolina Supreme Court narrowly interpreted G.S. 160A-514213 to limit se-
verely municipalities' discretionary powers in accepting redevelopment bids
from private developers. The court affirmed a court of appeals decision that
the city was not free to reject the higher bid on a redevelopment parcel in
favor of a lower cost proposal deemed to comply more closely with the area
redevelopment plan.214 The court specifically rejected the contention that by
use of the word "responsible" the legislature intended to give municipal gov-
erning boards discretion to accept a lower bid if the body determines the pro-
posal would make a more effective contribution to the redevelopment plan.2 15
The court held that the statutory language gave a municipality discretion only
to the extent of determining whether a bidder has the resources and financial
ability to carry out his proposed project. 216 In an effective dissent, Justice
Carlton condemned the majority decision as seriously impairing the ability of
municipal officials to manage responsively a city's business affairs.217 The re-
sult denigrates bid approval virtually to a ministerial and mechanical act per-
208. Id. § 108A-121.
209. Id. A recipient check register is a public record open to inspection.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 302 N.C. 550, 276 S.E.2d 443 (1981).
213. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-514 (1976) governs property sales to private developers by local
redevelopment commissions:
(c) A commission may sell, .. real property or any interest therein in a redevelopment
project area to any redeveloper for residential, recreational, commercial, industrial or
other uses or for public use in accordance with the redevelopment plan. .. provided
that such sale. . . may be made only after, or subject to, the approval of the redevelop-
ment plan by the governing body of the municipality and after public notice and award
as specified in subsection (d) .... Subsection (d) sets forth the process for advertising
sale and receipt of bids, and states that "[a]fter receipt of all bids, the sale shall be madeto the highest responsible bidder. All bids may be rejected. All sales shall be subject to
the approval of the governing body of the municipality. . . ... (emphasis added).
214. Defendant city received two acceptable bids on a parcel of land in the Crystal Towers
Redevelopment area. Plaintiff builder submitted a bid of $6550 with a proposal to move a single
family dwelling onto the parcel in question. Although the local planning staff concluded that both
proposals satisfied the area's residential purpose, the lower bid proposal more nearly complied
with the redevelopment plan. 302 N.C. at 551-52, 276 S.E.2d at 444.
215. Id. at 554,276 S.E.2d at 445-46. The trial court, on the other hand, found that defendant-
city had statutory authority to consider the plan of each bidder, city housing needs and policies
and long term revenues to be derived from each proposal, as well as the dollar amount of each
bid. Id., 276 S.E.2d at 445.
216. Id., 276 S.E.2d at 446.
217. Id. at 557, 276 S.E.2d at 447 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
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formable by a city employee simply comparing bid amounts.
218
In Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette2 19 an action by plaintiff town to re-
cover sewer service charges, the court of appeals confirmed a municipality's
authority to charge higher rates for treatment plant facilities under construc-
tion.220 Defendant user denied the indebtedness claiming that the higher rates
were unjust and illegal because the new facility was not open during the time
covered by his bill.22 1 The court chose to follow the great weight of author-
ity222 upholding a municipality's right to include in its water and sewer
charges not only operating expenses and depreciation but also the capital costs
associated with actual or anticipated growth or improvements of facilities nec-
essary to provide adequate service.223 The court deemed the proper test to be
not whether any particular customer has directly benefited from the use of a
particular component of a utility plant, but whether municipal authorities
have acted arbitrarily in establishing rates.
224
The courts also reviewed several annexation decisions2 25 by local North
Carolina municipalities. 226 The supreme court in In re Annexation Ordinance
No. 300-X 2 27 set forth judicial guidelines for the content of annexation reports
218. Id. at 558, 276 S.E.2d at 448.
219. 53 N.C. App. 210, 280 S.E.2d 490 (1981).
220. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-314(a) (1976) grants authority to North Carolina municipalities
to set rates and charges for water and sewer services: "A city may establish and revise from time to
time schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services funished by
any public enterprise."
221. 53 N.C. App. at 212, 280 S.E.2d at 491.
222. See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 1236 (1975).
223. 53 N.C. App. at 213, 280 S.E.2d at 492.
224. Id.
225. The purpose of annexation is to provide urban areas with governmental services needed
therein for public health, safety, protection and welfare. Abbot v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C.
App. 69, 73, 277 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1981).
North Carolina has five methods of annexing urbanly-developed areas: (1) By art Act of
the General Assembly (before 1947 this was the only method available, and all annexa-
tions were by special legislative acts), G.S. § 160A-21; (2) By referendum, G.S. § 160A-
24; (3) On petition of 100% of real property owners in the area sought to be annexed,
G.S. § 160A-31; (4) By city ordinance if the territory meets the statutory standards of
urban development and if the city demonstrates its ability to provide services to the area
to be annexed, G.S. § 160A-33 [to -55]; (5) On petition of 100% of the real property
owners in non-contiguous satellite areas, G.S. § 160A-58.1.
Id.
226. The General Assembly also focused on municipal annexation in 1981 with a series of
bills designed to restrict cities' powers to annex property. The League of Municipalities, however,
repelled attacks on the 1959 laws by agreeing to a full-scale legislative sudy by the Legislative
Research Commission. N.C. Inst. of Gov't, supra note 135, at 46, 215. Only two technical changes
in the state's annexation laws resulted from the 1981 legislative session. Through amendment of
G.S. 143-341(4), the Department of Administration now may petition for annexation of state-
owned lands to municipal boundaries. Law of May 1, 1981, ch. 300, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st
Sess. 350 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-341 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). In addition, appeals from
superior courts in annexation proceedings involving cities over 5000 are to be made to the court of
appeals rather than to the state supreme court as currently is required with smaller city proceed-
ings. Law of June 25, 1981, ch. 682, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 979 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 160A-50(h)-(i) (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
227. 304 N.C. 549, 284 S.E.2d 470 (1981). The issue of the level of specificity required also
was raised in In re Annexation Ordinance 301-X, 304 N.C. 565, 284 S.E.2d 475 (1981), but sum-
marily was disposed as resolved in the previous case.
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required by G.S. 160A-47(3). 22 8 Plaintiffs contended that any plan is deficient
unless it specifies the number of personnel and amount of additional equip-
ment required to extend municipal services to the annexed area.229 The court
disagreed, holding that a report need contain only (1) information on the level
of services then available; (2) a commitment to provide this same level of serv-
ices in the annexed area within the statutory period of one year; and (3) the
method by which the city plans to finance extension of the services.230 The
court reasoned that the central purpose of the report procedure is to assure
that, in return for the added financial burden of municipal taxation, residents
will receive all major services available to current residents. Thus, the city
need provide only the information necessary to allow for a public and judicial
appraisal of the city's commitment to provide a non-discriminatory level of
service and to allow a reviewing court to determine after the fact whether the
municipality has timely provided such services.231 Regarding the required
disclosure of financial data, the court found no problem with the City of Char-
lotte's report statement that services would be paid out of general revenues.
G.S. 160A-47(3)(d) requires only that the method be disclosed, not that the
precise source of each dollar be pinpointed.
232
In Food Town Stores, Inc. v. City of Salisbury233 plaintiffs challenged the
power of the Salisbury City Council to amend an annexation report and ordi-
nance pursuant to court instructions.234 The court determined that when the
changes are purely administrative in nature and necessitated by the lack of
authority of a court to make the necessary corrections, the city is not required
to make new findings of fact and hold additional public hearings prior to
amendment.
235
Legislative action in 1981 also affected local governments. 236 A statute of
limitations now is set for all actions challenging the validity of any zoning
228. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-47(3) (1976) requires a municipality's annexation report to con-
tain "a statement setting forth the plans of the municipality for extending to the area to be an-
nexed each major municipal service performed within the municipality at the time of annexation."
229. 304 N.C. at 554, 284 S.E.2d at 474.
230. Id. at 555, 284 S.E.2d at 474.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 556, 284 S.E.2d at 475.
233. 303 N.C. 539, 279 S.E.2d 557 (1981).
234. Id. at 540-41, 279 S.E.2d at 558. See Food Town Stores, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 300
N.C. 21, 265 S.E.2d 123 (1980). In this previous proceeding, the City failed to meet its statutory
burden under the annexation laws. The annexation area did not meet the statutory test requiring
that there be a 60% concentration of qualifying urban uses since only 37 of the 62 lots or tracts
(59.6%) mentioned in the ordinance and report were being used for the required purposes. The
court found that it had no authority to add a 63rd lot even though the City presented evidence
establishing that a mere error in the tax map resulted in failure to include the additional qualify-
ing lot. The ordinance and report were remanded to the City to incorporate the change.
235. 303 N.C. at 541, 279 S.E.2d at 558.
236. One minor piece of legislation enabled local governments to expend local tax funds in
support of the arts. Law of March 2, 1981, ch. 66, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 49 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 153A-149(c), 160A-209(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981)). In light of federal cutbacks for




ordinance.237 Petitioners must bring their charge within nine months of enact-
ment or amendment.2 38 Another statute specifically mandates that local gov-
erning bodies follow procedures applicable to boards of adjustment when
issuing special or conditional use permits. 3 9
D. Utilities Regulation
In Utilities Commission v. Intervenor Residents240 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals considered the validity of certain expenses claimed by a pub-
lic utility as a basis for a rate increase request. The utility, Carolina Water
Service (CWS), claimed as expenses services that it had received from Water
Service Corporation (WSC). CWS and WSC were both subsidiaries of Utili-
ties, Inc., a holding company that was the parent company of public utilities in
several states. 24 1 The controversy arose when during the course of hearings on
a rate increase request, it was discovered that CWS had failed to obtain the
Commission's approval of its service contracts with WSC as required by G.S.
62-153.242 The court of appeals held that, although G.S. 62-153(b) prohibits
payments to affiliated companies under contracts not approved by the Com-
mission, the statute does not prohibit the Utilities Commission from consider-
ing fees owed to affiliated corporations under such unapproved contracts as
the public utility's expenses for purposes of ratemaking. 243 Such fees, how-
ever, must be just and reasonable, and may not be for the purpose of conceal-
ing or diverting profits from the public utility to its affiliate. 244 In remanding
237. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-364.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (municipal zoning enactments); id.
§ 153A-348 (county zoning enactments).
238. Petitioners challenging county and city zoning enactments effective before July 9, 1981
must bring action within nine months of June 26, 1981 and September 1, 1981, respectively. Id.
239. Id. §§ 153A-340 (counties), 160A-381 (municipalities). Boards of adjustment are bound
by a four-fifths voting requirement; local governing bodies may grant permits via a simple major-
ity. For procedures applicable to boards of adjustment, see id. §§ 153A-345 (counties), 160A-388
(municipalities).
240. 52 N.C. App. 222, 278 S.E.2d 761 (1981).
241. According to the evidence, CWS provided some operating, engineering and administra-
tive services in connection with providing water and sewer service to residents of the Bent
Creek/Mt. Carmel area of Carteret County. The remainder of the management, administrative,
engineering, legal and personnel services were provided by WSC, whose headquarters were in
Illinois. Id. at 223-24, 278 S.E.2d at 761.
242. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-153 (1975) provides:
(a) All public utilities shall file with the Commission copies of contracts with any
affiliated or subsidiary holding, managing, operating, constructing, engineering, financ-
ing or purchasing company or agency, .... The Commission may disapprove, after
hearing, any such contract if it is found to be unjust or unreasonable, and made for the
purpose or with the effect of concealing, transferring or dissipating the earnings of the
public utility. Such contracts so disapproved by the Commission shall be void and shall
not be carried out by the public utility which is a party thereto, nor shall any payments
be made thereunder...
(b) No public utility shall pay any fees, commissions or compensation of any
description whatsoever to any affiliated or subsidiary holding, managing, operating, con-
structing, engineering, financing or purchasing company or agency for services rendered
or to be rendered without first filing copies of all proposed agreements and contracts with
the Commission and obtaining its approval. ...
243. 52 N.C. App. at 229, 278 S.E.2d at 766.
244. Id. In determining whether to grant a rate increase, the Commission must give a major
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the case to the Utilities Commission, the court held that the Commission must,
in performing its statutory duty to establish reasonable rates, examine each
component of a utility's expenses. More specifically, the utility must sustain
the burden of showing that the price it paid its affiliate was reasonable.245 The
court recognized as evidence relevant to the determination of reasonableness
such factors as the costs of such services on the open market,246 the costs simi-
lar utilities pay their service companies 247 and the books and records of corpo-




The General Assembly enacted several statutes modifying the Workers'
Compensation system in 1981. These new statutes relate to interest on com-
pensation awards, medical payments, limitations periods, and minimum and
maximum benefits.
Newly enacted G.S. 97-86.2249 provides that an employer or insurance
carrier who appeals a workers' compensation award made pursuant to a hear-
ing must pay interest in the event the award is sustained on appeal. The
amount of interest shall be determined in accordance with G.S. 24-12-5 and is
payable only on the part of the award that remains unpaid pending appeal.
Interest must be paid in full to the claimant and may not increase or become a
part of attorneys' fees.
Another statute modifying the Workers' Compensation system deals with
medical payments. G.S. 97-59 requires employers to pay medical treatment
expenses for disability or damage to organs resulting from occupational dis-
ease when the treatment "may reasonably be required to tend to lessen the
period of disability or provide needed relief."25'I The statute requires Indus-
trial Commission approval of bills for such treatment before payments can be
made, and in the event of a controversy between employer and employee re-
consideration to the utility's profits. Deducting expenses for services rendered reduces profits and
makes a rate increase appear justified. Yet the effect where the company paying these expenses is
affiliated with the company receiving the payments may be merely to afford the utility the appear-
ance of a lower level of profits than is actually the case. Because utility rates are based upon a
certain guaranteed level of profit than is permissible, "inflated charges to operating companies may
be a means to improperly increase the allowable revenue and raise the cost to customers of utility
service as well as an unwarranted source ofproflt to the ultimate holding company." Id. at 231, 278
S.E.2d at 767 (citing Utilities Comm'n v. Telephone Co., 281 N.C. 318, 346, 189 S.E.2d 705, 723
(1972) (emphasis in original)). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-153 (1975), note 242 supra.
245. 52 N.C. App. at 232, 278 S.E.2d at 767.
246. Id., 278 S.E.2d at 768.
247. Id. Presumably, such costs paid by similar utilities are for the same or similar services.
248. Id. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-51 (Cum. Supp. 1981) authorizes the Commission to inspect the
books and records of corporations affiliated with public utilities.
249. Law of April 23, 1981, ch. 242, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 212 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-86.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
250. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides that the legal rate of interest shall be
eight percent per annum.
251. Id. § 97-59.
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garding continuation of treatment, the Commission has the discretion to deter-
mine whether the treatment shall be continued.252
The General Assembly also modified G.S. 97-58(a) by extending the time
limits for filing claims for Workers' Compensation benefits in asbestosis and,
most likely, silicosis actions.253 The time limit for filing a claim for asbestosis
is extended to ten years by the Act, but the time limit for lead poisoning claims
remains at two years.254 Although the title of the bill purports to extend the
time limit for both asbestosis and silicosis claims, the new statute,25 5 unlike the
one it replaces, 256 makes no mention of silicosis. Given the apparent intent of
the legislature to extend the time limit for silicosis claims and the distinct pos-
sibility that omission of silicosis from the new statute was merely an oversight,
courts should have little difficulty construing the new statute accordingly.
257
Another modification of the Workers' Compensation Act is the revision
of nminimum and maximum benefits. The minimum amount of weekly work-
ers' compensation benefits as provided in G.S. 97-13(c), -29, -38, and -61.5(b)
has been increased from twenty to thirty dollars.258 Senate Bill 205 clarifies
the law on maximum benefits allowable.259 The ceiling of eighty dollars
weekly compensation awarded pursuant to G.S. 97-29, -30, -38, -61.5(b) and
61.6 is replaced by a maximum amount established annually to be effective
October 1 as provided in G.S. 97-29.
252. Apparently, this enactment is to ensure the Commission's authority to give broad relief,
because the statute now specifically authorizes "[mledical, surgical, hospital, nursing services,
medicine, sick travel, rehabilitation services and other treatment as may reasonably be required"
in the discretion of the Commission. Id.
253. Law of June 29, 1981, ch. 734, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1066 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-58(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
254. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-58(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in G.S. 97-61.6, an employer shall not be liable for
any compensation for asbestosis unless disablement or death results within 10 years after
the last exposure to that disease, or, in case of death, unless death follows continuous
disablement from such disease, commencing within the period of 10 years limited herein,
and for which compensation has been paid or awarded or timely claim made. An em-
ployer shall not be liable for any compensation for lead poisoning unless disablement or
death results within two years after the last exposure to that disease, or, in case of death,
unless death follows continuous disablement from such disease, commencing within the
period of two years limited herein, and for which compensation has been paid or
awarded or timely claim made.
255. Id.
256. Id. § 97-58(a).
257. The former statute limited the time for filing claims for asbestosis, silicosis, and lead
poisoning to two years. The new section mentions both asbestosis and lead poisoning and their
now different limitations periods. Given the title of the Act, An Act to Extend Time Limitations
for Proof in Asbestosis andSillcosis Claims (emphasis added), and the context of the new section,
it appears that mention of silicosis was intended to be made, and the conclusion that silicosis was
intended to be accorded the same treatment as asbestosis seems likely.
258. Law of May 13, 1981, ch. 378, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 423 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 97-13(c), -29, -38, -61.5(b), -61.6 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
259. Law of April 27, 1981, ch. 276, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 269 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 97-29, -30, -38, -61.5(b), -61.6 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
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2. Judicial Action
a. Procedure
In Poythress v. JP. Stevens and Company260 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that the time limit for filing claims for occupational diseases
under G.S. 97-58(c) "is a condition precedent with which claimants must com-
ply in order to confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Commission to hear" such
claims, and is not in the nature of a statute of limitations, which, if not raised
as a defense, is waived.261 Accordingly, the burden rests upon the claimant to
show timely application for a Workers' Compensation award.
2 62
In Shore v. Chatham Manufacturing Co. 263 claimant challenged the dep-
uty commissioner's authority to order, on his own motion, the taking of a dep-
osition of claimant's physician to provide evidence necessary to a
determination of claimant's entitlements. The court of appeals recognized the
deputy commissioner's authority to act based on the Commission's authority
to make rules for carrying out provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act.2 6 4 The court upheld the Commission's rule XXA, which authorizes the
hearing officer to order deposition of medical witnesses "[w]hen additional tes-
timony is needed to the disposition of a case."
265
b. Terminology
Several decisions considered the meanings of particular terms in the
Workers' Compensation Act. The courts construed the meanings of "acci-
dent,"26 6 "disfigurement ' 267 and "injury to the leg"268 under the schedule of
payments provided by the Act.
Since recovery under the Act must be based on an "accident," courts fre-
quently have been called upon to define that term for workers' compensation
purposes.269 Three cases decided by the North Carolina Court of Appeals de-
260. 54 N.C. App. 376, 283 S.E.2d 573 (1981).
261. Id. at 382, 283 S.E.2d at 577.
262. Id. The two year limitation for review of a compensation award due to change of condi-
tion pursuant to G.S. 97-47, however, has continued to be construed as a statute of limitations,
which, if not timely raised as a defense, is waived. Gragg v. W. M. Harris & Son, 54 N.C. App.
607, 609, 284 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1981). The court in Gragg expressly recognized that the limitations
period in G.S. 97-47 is distinct from that in G.S. 97-58(c), which is a condition precedent. Id. at
609, 284 S.E.2d at 185.
263. 54 N.C. App. 678, 284 S.E.2d 179 (1981).
264. "Our legislature has empowered the Industrial Commission to make rules 'not inconsis-
tent with this Article, for carrying out the provisions of this Article.' G.S. § 97-80(a)." Id. at 680,
284 S.E.2d at 180.
265. Id. at 680-81, 284 S.E.2d at 181.
266. See Lochlear v. Robeson County, 55 N.C. App. 96, 284 S.E.2d 540 (1981); Trudell v.
Seven Lakes Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 55 N.C. App. 89, 284 S.E.2d 538 (1981); Dyer v.
Mack Foster Poultry & Livestock, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 291, 273 S.E.2d 321 (1981).
267. Carrington v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 54 N.C. App. 158, 282 S.E.2d 541 (1981). See
also Weidie v. Cloverdale Ford, 50 N.C. App. 555, 274 S.E.2d 263 (1981).
268. See Gasperson v. Buncombe County Schools, 52 N.C. App. 154, 277 S.E.2d 872 (1981).
269. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides that "'[i]njury and personal injury'
shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." As such,
entitlement to benefits under the Act is predicated upon the occurrence of an "accident."
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fined accident in the context of actions to secure payment of benefits under the
Act. In the first of these cases, Dyer v. Mack Foster Poultry & Livestock,
Inc.,270 an employee brought a workers' compensation claim as a result of
injuries she sustained to her back while working for her employer. Plaintiffs
work duties included packing and grading eggs and lifting boxes. Because of
the absence of other employees at work one day, plaintiff was assigned a task
"which involved a greater volume of ifting than [her] ordinarily assigned
task."271 The court held that even though plaintiff was performing the work
of two other employees, there was competent evidence supporting the hearing
Commissioner's conclusion that there was no interruption of plaintiff's "nor-
mal work routine" or the introduction of some new circumstance not part of
the usual work routine.272 Thus, there was no "accident" causing plaintiff's
injury.
In another back injury case, Locklear v. Robeson County,273 plaintiff em-
ployee, an ambulance attendant, suffered a ruptured disc while removing an
accident victim from her automobile for transportation to a hospital. The evi-
dence showed that while plaintiff and another ambulance attendant were re-
moving the woman from her car, they experienced a sudden, unexpected jerk.
The court held that "[s]uch sudden jerking and near loss of load support[ed]
the conclusion that plaintiffs injury resulted from an unlooked for and unto-
ward event not expected or designed by the employee" and affirmed the In-
dustrial Commission's award to plaintiff.
2 7 4
The third of these "accident" cases also involved a back injury. The court
apparently adhered to the doctrine that injuries due to ordinary exertion, as in
Dyer, are not compensable, while injuries resulting from unusual exertion, as
in Locklear, are. Plaintiff in Trudell v. Seven Lakes Heating & Air Conditioning
Co. 275 was employed to install air conditioning systems. Because one of his
duties involved installation of air ducts, plaintiff worked in low, confined areas
where it was necessary for him to crawl. Plaintiff, although he had been work-
ing for his employer performing similar tasks for more than two and one-half
years, testified that the crawl space in the current project was the lowest in
which he had worked. The court, noting that evidence disclosed that "plain-
tiffs task involved no unusual exertion or twisting, '276 nevertheless held that
plaintiff's ailment was not the result of an accident. Because plaintiff had been
working on the new project for one to two weeks before he experienced his
back pain, the court agreed with the Commission that the low crawl space had
become part of plaintiffs "normal work routine.
' 277
270. 50 N.C. App. 291, 273 S.E.2d 321 (1981).
271. Id. at 293-94, 273 S.E.2d at 323 (emphasis in original).
272. Id.
273. 55 N.C. App. 96, 284 S.E.2d 540 (1981).
274. Id. at 98, 284 S.E.2d at 542.
275. 55 N.C. App. 89, 284 S.E.2d 538 (1981).
276. Id. at 91, 284 S.E.2d at 540.
277. Id.
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The courts also interpreted the term "disfigurement." 2 78 In Carrington v.
HousingAutharity of Durham279 the court of appeals held that the loss of the
tip of plaintiff's finger, where "no area below the end of the nail. . . [was]
gone but the very fleshy part of the end ... [was] gone ... [and plaintiff had]
some small linear scars, not really very discolored" did not constitute "disfig-
urement" within the meaning of the Act, and accordingly, plaintiff was denied
recovery.280 In Weidle v. Cloverdale Ford2 8 the court of appeals addressed
the question whether a slight scar resulting from a cut finger constituted disfig-
urement. The evidence showed that the nail and the area just beneath the nail
were scarred and the fingernail itself had a "roughish appearance" and some
deformity.2 8 2 The injury, however, did not cause plaintiff embarrassment or
impair him in any way in the performance of his duties as an automobile body
repairman. The court held that plaintiff had suffered no "serious bodily disfig-
urement" entitling him to recovery.
283
Finally, the court of appeals was called upon to define the scope of the
limited schedule recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act.284 In Gas-
person v. Buncombe County Schools 28 5 the court was willing to be flexible
with the schedule and held that an injury to the hip can be considered an
"injury to the 'leg,' which is a 'scheduled injury' under G.S. 97-31."286
c. Causation and Apportionment 2
87
Perhaps the most significant issue presented to the courts in 1981 was
278. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31(22) (1979) provides:
In case of serious bodily disfigurement for which no compensation is payable under any
other subdivision of this section, but excluding the disfigurement resulting from perma-
nent loss or permanent partial loss ofuse of any member of the body for which compen-
sation is fixed in this section, the Industrial Commission may award proper and
equitable compensation not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
279. 54 N.C. App. 158, 282 S.E.2d 541 (1981).
280. Id. at 159-60, 282 S.E.2d at 542.
281. 50 N.C. App. 555, 274 S.E.2d 263 (1981).
282. Id. at 556, 274 S.E.2d at 263.
283. Id. at 557, 274 S.E.2d at 264.
284. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31 (1979).
285. 52 N.C. App. 154, 277 S.E.2d 872 (1981).
286. Id. at 157-58, 277 S.E.2d at 875.
287. The courts decided several other cases in 1981 in which causation was at issue. In
Humphries v. Cone Mills Corp., 52 N.C. App. 612, 279 S.E.2d 56 (1981), the court of appeals
affirmed a Commission award for total disability even though the evidence suggested the
conditions of employment were not the exclusive cause of the disease because the plaintiff was a
cigarette smoker.
In Anderson v. A.M. Smyre Mfg. Co., 54 N.C. App. 337, 283 S.E.2d 433 (1981), the court of
appeals held that, in the absence of evidence of any disability other than plaintiff's occupational
disease, Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981), did not apply,
making apportionment unnecessary. See notes 288-94 and accompanying text infra.
In McKee v. Crescent Spinning Co., 54 N.C. App. 309, 284 S.E.2d 175 (1981), medical
testimony indicated that plaintiff suffered from chronic obstructive lung disease, chronic
bronchitis and probably byssinosis. The court held that because evidence established that both
disorders were related to plaintifi's exposure to cotton dust, the Commission's failure to find that
plaintiff's chronic bronchitis contributed to his disability was not an error that would preclude
plaintiff's award for total disability.
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whether the Workers' Compensation Act requires apportionment of the award
when neither the occupational disease nor the preexisting disease alone pro-
duce total disability, but the combined effect of the two does.283 This issue was
decided by the supreme court in Morrison v. Burlington Industries.
289 In Mor-
rison plaintiff contracted the occupational disease byssinosis, which, when
combined with her existing ailments-bronchitis, phlebitis, varicose veins and
diabetes-rendered her totally disabled. Fifty-five percent of her disability
was found to be the result of her occupational disease, and the remaining
forty-five percent was the result of her preexisting infirmities. The Commis-
sioner ordered full recovery. The full Commission reduced the award to com-
pensate only for the byssinosis. The court of appeals, however, reversed and
remanded, ordering the Commission to grant total recovery. On appeal to the
supreme court, the case was ordered remanded for further findings of fact con-
cerning "the interrelations, if any, between the cotton dust exposure and
claimant's other infirmities. 29 0 After additional evidence was taken, the
Commission ordered recovery for fifty-five percent partial recovery and again
this award was appealed to the supreme court. A majority of the supreme
court held:
(1) An employer takes the employee as he finds her with all her pre-
existing infirmities and weaknesses. (2) When a pre-existing, non-dis-
abling, non-job-related condition is aggravated or accelerated by an
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment or
by an occupational disease so that disability results, then the em-
ployer must compensate the employee for the entire resulting disabil-
ity even though it would not have disabled a normal person to that
extent. (3) On the other hand, when a pre-existing, non-disabling,
non-job-related disease or infirmity eventually causes an incapacity
for work without any aggravation or acceleration of it by a compen-
sable accident or by an occupational disease, the resulting incapacity
so caused is not compensable.
29'
Finally, the court expressly authorized apportionment:
When a claimant becomes incapacitated for work andpart of that
incapacity is caused, accelerated or aggravated by an occupational
288. In particular, resolution of this issue requires interpretation of G.S. 97-29 and other rele-
vant sections.
289. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).
290. Id. at 3,282 S.E.2d at 461 (quoting Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 301 N.C. 226, 231,
271 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1980)). In the earlier case, the court specified the evidence necessary for
"effective appellate review:"
(1) what percentage, if any, of plaintiffs disablement, i.e., incapacity to earn wages, re-
sults from an occupational disease; (2) what percentage, if any, of plaintiffs disablement
results from diseases or infirmities unrelated to plaintiffs occupation which were acceler-
ated or aggravated by plaintiffs occupational disease; and (3) what percentage, if any, of
plaintiffs disablement is due to diseases or infirmities unrelated to plaintiffs occupation
which were not accelerated or aggravated by plaintiffs occupational disease.
301 N.C. at 231, 271 S.E.2d at 367 (emphasis in original). These three questions, needed to clarify
the medical evidence, were noted in the second Morrison opinion. 304 N.C. at 3 n.l, 282 S.E.2d at
461 n.l.
291. 304 N.C. at 18, 282 S.E.2d at 470.
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disease and the remainder of that incapacity for work is not caused,
accelerated or aggravated by an occupational disease, the Workers'
Compensation Act of North Carolina requires compensation only for
that portion of the disability caused, accelerated or aggravated by the
occupational disease.
292
Justice Exum, in a vigorous and lengthy dissent joined by Justice Carlton,
argued that if an occupational disease combines with preexisting infirmities so
as to render a worker totally incapacitated to work, the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act permits an award for total disability when the preexisting, non-job-
related physical infirmities in themselves, absent the occupational disease, are
insufficient to cause incapacity to work.293 The majority, although recognizing
this argument, apparently believed that such an expansive interpretation of the
Act was more appropriately a matter for the legislature.
294
In Hansel v. Sherman Textiles2 95 the court of appeals found that the nec-
essary causal connection between plaintiffs alleged exposure to disease-caus-
ing agents during employment and her disabling condition was absent.
Plaintiff already suffered from chronic bronchitis and asthma before working
in the weave room of defendant's textile plant, where she allegedly was ex-
posed to cotton dust. A medical expert testified that he was unable "to sepa-
rate out any specific symptoms related to byssinosis that . . . [plaintiff] has
that cannot be explained by the other two conditions that . . . [were] pres-
ent."2 96 The expert also noted that he "was unable to repose much confidence
in a diagnosis of byssinosis" because of the absence of "information about the
extent of [plaintiffs] exposure to cotton dust."297 The court held that this ab-
sence of specific findings could not support a conclusion that plaintiff was dis-
abled as a result of her contracting an occupational disease and vacated the
award of the Commission.298 "[P]roof of a causal connection between the dis-
ease and the employee's occupation is an essential element in proving the
existence of a compensable 'occupational disease.' "299 In a lengthy dissent300
Judge Wells contended that there was sufficient evidence to support the find-
ing by the Commission that plaintiff contracted byssinosis as a result of her
employment. In the view of Judge Wells, "when the evidence shows that it is
probable that plaintiff has byssinosis," despite "uncertainties" and "the possi-
bility of other contributing causes," the Commission is justified in making a
finding that plaintiff has contracted an occupational disease, which finding a
292. Id. (emphasis added).
293. Id. at 19, 282 S.E.2d at 470 (Exum, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 18-19, 282 S.E.2d at 470: "It is our duty to interpret the Act as it exists. This court
is not philosophically opposed to the result sought by Mrs. Morrison, but expansion of the law to
permit such recovery is the legislature's prerogative, not ours."
295. 49 N.C. App. 1, 270 S.E.2d 585 (1980), rev'd, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981).
296. Id. at 3, 270 S.E.2d at 586.
297. Id. at 7, 270 S.E.2d at 589.
298. Id. at 8, 270 S.E.2d at 589.
299. Id. at 6, 270 S.E.2d at 588.
300. Id. at 8, 270 S.E.2d at 589 (Wells, J., dissenting).
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court should not disturb.301
The supreme court reversed, finding that there was competent evidence to
support the findings of the Commission.302 The court, however, was unable to
say that the Commission's findings justified its conclusion that the disability
was entirely work related: "Because of the presence of [plaintiffs] . . .other
infirmities [which were non-occupational in their origin] and because this
[was] . . a case of partial disability as opposed to one of total disability, it
must be determined what percentage of claimant's disability [was]. . .due to
her occupational disease."303 Accordingly, the supreme court remanded the
case to the Industrial Commission to make the necessary findings. In reaching
this conclusion, the court focused on the same lack of medical specificity that
had led the court of appeals to deny compensation altogether.
304
In Buck v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Company30 5 the court of ap-
peals considered the type of expert testimony that will support a finding that
an accident created or contributed to a physical injury leading to disability.
Plaintiff fell at work while performing her normal work duties. Subsequently
she experienced back pain, which surgery revealed was the result of a protrud-
ing disc. Testimony about the cause of the disc protrusion suggested that
plaintiffs condition may have been the result either of her fall at defendant's
plant or of her preexisting degenerative back condition. A medical expert tes-
tified that he could not choose which "was the single most probable cause
without engaging in speculation. '306 The court held that an expert need only
"express an opinion that aparticular cause was capable of producing the inju-
rious result."307 Accordingly, the Commissioner, in making an award to
plaintiff, did not engage in impermissible speculation.
d. Benefits
In Chinault v. Floyd S. Pike Electrical Contractors30 the court of appeals
reviewed the amount of compensation to which a deceased worker's widow
301. Id. at 13-14, 270 S.E.2d at 592 (Wells, J., dissenting).
302. 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981).
303. Id. at 54-55, 283 S.E.2d at 107 (citing Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282
S.E.2d 458 (1981)).
304. Id. at 54-58, 283 S.E.2d at 107-09. The court had previously stated:
In passing upon an appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission, the review-
ing court is limited in its inquiry to two questions of law, namely: (1) whether or not
there was any competent evidence before the Commission to support its findings of fact;
and (2) whether or not the findings of fact of the Commission justify its legal conclusions
and decision.
Id. at 49, 283 S.E.2d at 104 (quoting Inscoe v. DeRose Indus., 292 N.C. 210, 216, 232 S.E.2d 449,
452 (1977)); Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 479, 57 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1950).
The deficiency, with respect to Hansel, consisted of the Commission's failure to make specific
findings as to the relative contributions of the occupational and nonoccupational causes of the
claimant's disability.
305. 52 N.C. App. 88, 278 S.E.2d 268 (1981).
306. Id. at 95, 278 S.E.2d at 273 (emphasis in original).
307. Id. (emphasis in original).
308. 53 N.C. App. 604, 281 S.E.2d 460 (1981).
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and three daughters were entitled under the Worker's Compensation Act.30 9
The court held that the Act fixed each recipient's share at the death of the
worker. The weekly compensation award was divided four ways and remained
fixed for the duration of the compensation period, which would be 400 weeks
for the widow and the period of minority for each child. Although the
younger children would receive compensation for a longer period, the court
held that this was an anomaly under the Act for the General Assembly to
resolve.310 The statute did not require a redistribution of the widow's share
after 400 weeks or a non-minor child's share upon her reaching majority to
meet the requirement that the "entire compensation" be paid.
F Insurance
1. State Regulation 311
In separate actions, the Commissioner of Insurance challenged two rate
provisions proposed by the North Carolina Rate Bureau. In Commissioner of
Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau312 the court of appeals faced the
issue whether the Rate Bureau may withdraw a proposed rate revision without
the Commissioner's consent. The Rate Bureau withdrew a proposed rate in-
crease after the Commissioner had set a hearing date. The court allowed with-
drawal of the proposal without the Commissioner's consent because the
withdrawal of a proposed rate increase benefits the public. The court found no
indication that the General Assembly did not intend such a power.
In a second rate revision challenge, Commissioner of Insurance v. North
Carolina Rate Bureau,3 13 the Commissioner had disapproved a rate increase
proposed by the Rate Bureau because, even with the proposed increase, an
inadequate rate would have been put into effect in violation of G.S. 58-124.19,
which prohibits "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory" rates.314
The court of appeals reversed and vacated the Commissioner's disapproval of
the rate increase,315 observing that the terms "inadequate" and "excessive," as
309. Id. at 605, 281 S.E.2d at 462. The relevant portion of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38 (1979 &
Cum. Supp. 1981) is as follows:
"If death results proximately from the accident... the employer shall pay.., to
the person or persons entitled thereto as follows:
(1) Persons wholly dependent for support upon the earnings of the deceased shall be
entitled to receive the entire compensation payable share and share alike to the exclusion
ofall other persons. If there be only one person wholly dependent, then that person shall
receive the entire compensation payable.
310. 53 N.C. App. at 606-07, 281 S.E.2d at 462.
311. The legislature enacted G.S. 58-41.5 to enable the licensing of entities other than
individuals as life insurance agents provided they maintain a place of business in North Carolina.
Law of July 7, 1981, ch. 845, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1211, and amended G.S. 58-155.72 to
limit liabilty to $300,000 for any one individual under the Life and Accident and Health Insurance
Guaranty Association Act, Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 569, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 838.
312. 52 N.C. App. 79, 277 S.E.2d 844 (1981).
313. 54 N.C. App. 601, 284 S.E.2d 339 (1981).
314. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-124.19(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
315. 54 N.C. App. at 606, 284 S.E.2d at 343. For the scope of appellate review, see N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 150A-51 (1978).
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they are used in the statute, are intended to assure the insurance companies of
adequate rate levels and that disapproval of the rate increase would have left
even more inadequate rates in effect.
316
The supreme court addressed the issue whether G.S. 58-155.60 could be
applied retroactively in State ex rel Ingram v. Reserve Insurance Co. 317 This
statute, called the Quick Access Statute, provides that an insolvent insurer's
deposit with the state Treasurer can be advanced to the North Carolina Guar-
anty Association3 18 to pay claims against the insolvent insurer. Retroactive
application of the Quick Access Statute might have conflicted with G.S. 58-
185, which grants certain rights, including liens on the insolvent insurer's de-
posit, to the company's policyholders. The court held that G.S. 58-155.60 ap-
plied retroactively but did not affect the policyholders' rights under G.S. 55-
185.
In State ex rel Ingram v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Insurance Agency,
Inc.319 the court of appeals was asked to interpret G.S. 58-53.3, which requires
any unlicensed insurance agency that "procures insurance" to remit five per-
cent of the premium revenues to the Commissioner. Defendant had formed an
agency to place with the North Carolina Farm Bureau Insurance Company
types of insurance and participating risks that the North Carolina Farm Bu-
reau's insurance agents could not place. Defendant then sent applications for
insurance to potential customers, billed insureds and collected premiums but
transmitted all monies to an out-of-state insurance company. Defendant ar-
gued that its role was merely administrative and presented evidence that it
actually had not received any applications for insurance. The court of appeals
held that the agency had."procured" insurance within the meaning of the stat-
ute and was liable for the statutory amount. The dissent,3 20 however, argued
that defendant's action was insufficient to constitute the procurement of insur-
ance and asked the legislature for an amendment to tax the "collection" rather
than the "procurement" of premiums paid to companies not licensed to do
business in North Carolina.
The 1981 General Assembly enacted the Insurance Information and Pri-
vacy Protection Act 3 21 to establish standards for the collection, use and disclo-
sure of information gathered in connection with insurance transactions. The
Act is a regulatory scheme to enable persons to obtain access to this informa-
tion and to allow an applicant or policyholder to obtain the reasons for any
adverse underwriting decision.322 Information that is incorrect must be either
316. The Rate Bureau's filing proposed an average increase of 12.4% in the overall level of
workers' compensation rates but still projected an underwriting loss of $19,672,124. 54 N.C. App.
at 605-06, 284 S.E.2d at 341.
317. 303 N.C. 623, 281 S.E.2d 16 (1981).
318. The North Carolina Guaranty Association was a third-party plaintiff in this case. Id.
319. 50 N.C. App. 510, 274 S.E.2d 497 (1981).
320. The decision was 2-1 with Judge Hill writing for the majority and Judge Arnold
dissenting.
321. Law of July 7, 1981, ch. 846, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1211 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 58-380 to -404 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
322. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-381 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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corrected or noted in the insurance records as disputed,323 and notice must be
sent to anyone who received the erroneous or disputed information.3 24 Disclo-
sure of information in the insurance records may be made only with the in-
sured's permission, with limited exceptions, which include disclosure to
medical professionals and actuarial or research study groups if certain condi-
tions are met.3 25 In addition, an adverse underwriting decision may not be
based on a previous adverse underwriting decision or previous coverage
through a residual market mechanism unless -further information regarding
that decision or coverage was first obtained.
326
The Commissioner has the power to investigate and to hold hearings on
alleged violations of the Act.327 He then may issue a cease and desist order or
apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for an order directing payment of a
monetary penalty.328 Any person whose rights have been violated also may
bring suit for compensatory damages.3 29 An immunity is provided for those
acting in compliance with the Act and for those persons furnishing personal or
privileged information to a government institution, agent or support organiza-
tion unless the disclosure is made with malice or willful intent to injure any
person.
330
The General Assembly also enacted several changes affecting life insur-
ance and annuity contracts. The standard valuation and nonforfeiture provi-
sions, which concern minimum standards for these contracts, were amended
substantially. 331 Several of the valuation tables were changed and, with re-
gard to certain policies and contracts, a choice of tables was allowed.
In addition, Article 22B of Chapter 58 was enacted to allow for periodic
adjustment of interest rates on loans against life insurance policies. 332 The
ceiling on the chargeable interest rates is the higher of the prevailing yield on
corporate bonds 333 or the rate used for determining the policy's cash surrender
323. Id. § 58-390.
324. Id. Notice to the applicant or policyholder of insurance information practices is required
pursuant to G.S. 58-385.
325. Id. G.S. 58-394 sets the disclosure limitations and conditions. Subsection (1) requires the
written authorization of the individual; subsection (4) sets forth the limitations on disclosure to
medical professionals; and subsection (9) sets forth the limitations on disclosure for actuarial or
research studies, including the destruction of the materials as soon as they no longer are needed.
326. Id. § 58-393(1).
327. Id. §§ 58-395, -396.
328. Id. §§ 58-398, -399. The Commissioner may issue a cease and desist order or apply to a
court of competent jurisdiction for an order directing payment of a monetary penalty. The court
may impose a penalty of up to $500 for each violation, not to exceed $10,000 in the aggregate for
multiple violations. If the cease and desist order is violated, the court may impose fines of up to
$10,000 for each violation or up to $50,000 if the violations are found to constitute a general
business practice or suspend or revoke the insuraiice institution's or agent's license. Id. § 58-399.
329. Id. § 58-401. The monetary award may not exceed the actual damages sustained as a
result of a violation of G.S. 58-394.
330. Id. § 58-402.
331. Law of July 1, 1981, ch. 761, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1100 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 58-201.1 to -201.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
332. Law of July 7, 1981, ch. 841, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1207 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 58-213.18 to -213.21 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
333. This rate is the monthly average of the composite yield on seasoned corporate bonds for
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value plus one percent per annum.334 This provision was designed to protect
insurance companies from policyholders borrowing at interest rates dispropor-
tionately lower than prevailing market interest rates. There also is a prohibi-
tion against the termination of a policy solely because of a change in the
interest rate during that year.335
2. Policy Coverage
The 1981 General Assembly enacted two statutes requiring certain insur-
ance policy provisions. The first statute requires continuation and conversion
privileges in group health insurance plans.336 If a group member is termi-
nated or no longer employed, he may continue coverage in the group plan, at
his option, for up to three months. After three months, the terminated mem-
ber retains a conversion privilege that requires the same issuer to issue him an
individual health policy with provisions meeting the minimum statutory stan-
dards. The second statute requires policies that insure property against direct
loss by fire, lightning or other perils to include available coverage for direct
loss resulting in physical damage caused by the weight of ice, snow or sleet.
337
The General Assembly also enacted a statute allowing interest to accrue
from the date of the institution of actions for compensatory damage claims
covered by liability insurance.338 In actions not covered by liability insurance,
interest accrues from the date of the verdict. This could be an important incen-
tive for insurers to settle, especially in actions posing potentially large damage
amounts.
3. Note, State ex rel Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility:
Recoupment Surchargest
For more than a decade, the North Carolina courts have been embroiled
in a series of disputes between the insurance industry and the Commissioner
of Insurance.3 39 In State ex rel Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility
3 4 °
the calendar month ending two months before the date on which the rate is to be determined, as
published by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-213.19, -213.20(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
334. Id. § 58-213.20(b).
335. Id. § 58-213.20(f). Subsection (e) requires reasonable notice of changes made in the ap-
plicable interest rates for both cash and premium loans.
336. Law of June 26, 1981, ch. 706, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1027 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 58-254.42 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
337. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 550, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 820 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat § 58-180.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
338. Law of May 5, 1981, ch. 327, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 369 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 24-5, -7 (Cure. Supp. 1981)).
t The section on Recoupment Surcharges was written by Debra Whited.
339. See, e.g., State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269
S.E.2d 547 (1980) (appeal from Commissioner's finding that ten percent rate differential for in-
sureds ceded to Facility was unfairly discriminatory); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Caro-
lina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 269 S.E.2d 538 (1980) (appeal from Commissioner's order
disapproving a filing involving proposed automobile insurance premium rates); State ex reL
Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 474,269 S.E.2d 595 (1980) (appeal from
Commissioner's order disapproving a filing involving revised premium rates for homeowners' in-
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the North Carolina Supreme Court again resolved such a controversy-a con-
flict over whether recoupment surcharges imposed by the automobile insur-
ance industry on certain policyholders constituted "rates" that the industry
had to file with the Commissioner pursuant to statutory requirement 4 1 Bas-
ing the decision on strict statutory construction, the court held that the term
"rates" did not include the challenged surcharges.3 42 The court then refused
to entertain a different result based upon the State's public policy argument
indicating that the proper forum for a policy dispute is the General Assem-
bly.343 Thus, the case announced the State judiciary's intention to withdraw
from the center of the controversy between the insurance commissioner and
the insurance industry.
In July, 1979 the North Carolina Reinsurance Facility Board of Gover-
nors (Facility) voted, pursuant to statutory authority,344 to recoup 1978's
heavy losses 345 through an 18.6% surcharge imposed on all motor vehicle in-
surance policies transferred to the Facility between December 1979 and No-
vember 1980.346 At the same time, the Board of Governors voted to
implement a separate 1.1% surcharge3 47 on all private passenger policies,
whether in the Facility or in the voluntary market, to collect the losses that
resulted because "clean risks" 348 insured by the Facility could not receive rates
higher than those charged "clean risks" in the voluntary market.349 Following
this action by the Board of Governors, plaintiffs--the Governor, the Commis-
sioner of Insurance, and the Attorney General-filed a complaint seeking de-
claratory relief and a preliminary injunction against the Facility, the North
Carolina Rate Bureau, and about 300 of the Bureau's member companies.
Plaintiffs challenged the recoupment surcharges as "rates" that had not been
surance); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 485, 269 S.E.2d
602 (1980) (appeal from Commissioner's order disapproving a filing involving revised premium
rates for workers' compensation insurance).
340. 302 N.C. 274, 275 S.E.2d 399 (1981).
341. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
342. 302 N.C. at 290, 275 S.E.2d at 406.
343. Id. at 297, 275 S.E.2d at 410.
344. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.34(t) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
345. During the first few years of its operation, the Facility suffered tremendous financial
losses-a net cumulative operating loss of over $62,000,000 between 1973 and 1976. Losses for
fiscal years 1977 and 1978 were $15,600,000 and $31,400,000, respectively. 302 N.C. at 286, 275
S.E.2d at 404.
346. Id. at 286-87, 275 S.E.2d at 404.
347. This surcharge was imposed pursuant to a separate statutory requirement, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
348. The statutory definition of a "clean risk" is as follows:
any owner of a motor vehicle classified as a private passenger non-fleet motor vehicle
... if the owner and the principal operator and each licensed operator in the owner's
household have two years' driving experience and if neither the owner nor any member
of his household nor the principal operator have had any chargeable accident or any
conviction for a moving traffic violation... during the three-year period immediately
preceding the date of application for motor vehicle insurance or the date of preparation
for a renewal motor vehicle insurance policy.
Id. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
349. 302 N.C. at 287, 275 S.E.2d at 404.
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filed with the Commissioner for his prior approval.350
After the trial court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, plain-
tiffs appealed. In a relatively short opinion, the court of appeals held that
defendant should have filed the surcharges as rates. Relying primarily on
public policy, the court reasoned that, absent review by the Commissioner,
policy holders who paid the surcharges would suffer irreparable loss if they
were unable to recover excessive charges paid by them.
35 1
On appeal, the supreme court reversed and held that the surcharges did
not constitute rates within the meaning of the insurance laws. The court based
its decision largely on principles of statutory construction and concluded, after
a careful analysis of the applicable statutes, that the legislature did not intend
to subject these recoupment surcharges to review by the Commissioner.
352
The North Carolina Motor Vehicle Reinsurance Facility Act353 was
passed in 1973 as a replacement for the unworkable Assigned Risk Plan.
354
The Facility derived from a similar plan instituted in Canada in 1967355 that
also has served as the prototype for reinsurance facilities in other states.
356
Organized as a nonprofit, unincorporated entity, the Facility consists of all
insurers licensed to write motor vehicle insurance 357 in the State, and insures
those "eligible risks" whom the individual companies determine they do not
want to insure.35 8 After issuing coverage, an indvidual company has the dis-
350. Id. at 280, 275 S.E.2d at 400-01.
351. State ex reL Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 49 N.C. App. 206, 214, 271
S.E.2d 302, 306 (1980).
352. 302 N.C. at 289, 275 S.E.2d at 406.
353. Law of May 24, 1973, ch. 818, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1207-15 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 58-248.26 to -248.40 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1981)). For an analysis of the structure of the Facil-
ity as promulgated in 1973, see Lee & Formisano, The North Carolina Plan: Blueprint for an
Automobile Reinsurance Facility, 1973 Ins. L.J. 559.
354. The basic theory behind the Assigned Risk Plan is "to assign specific risks or exposures to
individual carriers. With this procedure each insurer would assume only the risks which they
were assigned." D. Reinmuth & G. Stone, A Study of Assigned Risk Plans 2 (1970) (Report of the
Division of Industry Analysis Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission to the Depart-
ment of Transportation). For a general discussion of the Assigned Risk Plan as it was in North
Carolina, see Governor's Study Commission on Automobile Liability Insurance and Rates, Re-
port to the Governor of North Carolina 53-69 (1971).
355. See generally D. Reinmuth & G. Stone, supra note 354, at 71-78.
356. Massachusetts and South Carolina have similar Reinsurance Facilities. See Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 175, § 113H (Michie/Law. Co-op. Cune. Supp. 1981); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 38-37-710 to -
790 (Law. Co-op. 1976). For a comparison of the coverages available under the different Facility
systems, see Lee & Formisano, Automobile Insurance Markets: Developments in the Reinsurance
Facility Technique, 1975 Ins. U. 9.
357. The statutory definition of "motor vehicle insurance" is "direct insurance against liability
arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.., for bodily
injury including death and property damage and includes medical payments and uninsured mo-
torist coverages." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.26(7) (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1981). Reinsurance by the
Facility, therefore, does not include physical damage coverage.
358. Lee & Formisano, supra note 353, at 562. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.31(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1981). An "eligible risk" is defined as
a person who is a resident of this state who owns a motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state or who has a valid driver's license in this state or who is required to
file proof of financial responsibility... ; or a nonresident of this state who owns a motor
vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state. ...
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.26(4) (1975).
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cretion to retain the policy as part of its voluntary business or to cede the
policy to the Facility. In turn, the Facility provides for the equitable distribu-
tion of the results of these cessions-profits or losses-among all participating
insurers.359 The Facility operates on a zero profit basis, and the rates for
ceded drivers must reflect this fact.
360
The 1977 General Assembly enacted several amendments to the original
1973 legislation,361 including a procedure to make the Facility self-sustaining.
Under the amendment, the Facility could recoup its losses pursuant to specific
guidelines: "[L]osses may be recouped. . *. through surcharging persons rein-
sured by the Facility .... *362 A final provision of the recoupment procedure
stated, "[The amount of recoupment shall not be considered or treated as
premium for any purpose."
363
In 1979 the legislature amended Article 25A, requiring equal treatment of
policies acquired through ceded and voluntary business. 364 Included within
these amendments was a statutory definition for "clean risks," to account for a
group of good drivers whose policies had been ceded to the Facility and who
had been classified separately within the Facility since 1977.365 The same
amended subsection provided that rates for "clean risks" in the Facility should
not exceed those for voluntarily insured "clean risks." Finally, the 1979
changes stated that the Facility could recoup any resulting loss caused by this
rate scheme in a manner similar to general Facility losses-through a network
of surcharges and assessments.
366
In State v. Reinsurance Facility the North Carolina Supreme Court exer-
cised its first opportunity to interpret the surcharge provisions of the recent
amendments to the Facility Act. The court rendered a very narrow opinion
that emphasized sound principles of statutory construction. By confining the
issue to whether recoupment surcharges constituted "rates" and by using a
conservative approach, the court developed a convincing decision.
The court's primary task involved construing the intent of the legisla-
ture.367 The court found it "patently clear" that the General Assembly had no
359. Lee & Formisano, supra note 353, at 562-63.
360. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
361. In addition to the changes mentioned in the text, the legislature provided for a "clean
risk" subclassification in the Facility. See note 349 and accompanying text supra.
362. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.34(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
363. Id. § 58-248.34(3)(f).
364. One of the 1979 amendments stipulated that each insurance company would provide the
same type of service to its ceded customers that it provided to its voluntary customers. Id. § 58-
248.31(b). When a policy is ceded to the Facility and the premium for the policy is higher than
normally would be charged, the insurer must inform the policyholder (1) that his policy has been
ceded, (2) that the coverage is written at the Facility rate, (3) the reason(s) for the cession, (4) that
the specific reason(s) for cession will be provided upon written request of the policyholder to the
insurer, and (5) that the policyholder may seek insurance through other companies who may
choose not to cede his policy. Id.
365. Id. § 58-248(1). See note 348 supra for the statutory definition of "clean risk."
366. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
367. 302 N.C. at 287-88, 275 S.E.2d at 405. See Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300,
188 S.E.2d 281 (1972); State ex rel. N.C. Milk Comm'n v. National Food Stores, Inc., 270 N.C.
323, 154 S.E.2d 548 (1967); In re Dillingham, 257 N.C. 684, 127 S.E.2d 584 (1962).
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intention of representing surcharges as rates. In reaching this conclusion, the
court focused on the explicit language in G.S. 58-248.34(f) that refused to treat
recoupment as a premium for any purpose. By examining the statutory lan-
guage of the 1977 and 1979 amendments to the original legislation, the court
also discovered that the statute employs the terms "rate" and "premium" in-
terchangeably, and that nowhere does the statute use the terms "surcharge"
and "recoupment" concomitantly with rate provisions. 3 68 After making these
initial observations, the court again emphasized its faithfulness to the intent of
the Facility Act 369 and remained firmly persuaded that such intent appre-
hended recoupment surcharges as clearly separate from rates under the State's
insurance laws, including the provisions for filing and review by the
Commissioner.
370
Relying on the long-established maxim that courts may determine the
meaning of words in a statute by reference to dictionaries,37 1 the court found
that the court of appeals had misconstrued the common definitions of "rates,"
"premiums" and "surcharges. ' 372 After noting several similar definitions of
"rate" and "premium," 373 the court focused on the proposition that ratemak-
ing connotes a prospective process, whereas recoupment implies a retroactive
process designed to recover mathematically verifiable losses.374 While the
18.6% surcharge in question did involve reclaiming heavy losses already in-
curred by the Facility, the 1.1% surcharge involved recovery of a loss not yet
368. 302 N.C. at 290, 275 S.E.2d at 406.
369. The court found this comment on the 1977 insurance law amendments especially
significant:
Under the old law the participating companies could not transfer more than 50% of their
risks to the Facility, had to share Facility losses, and could not charge higher rates for
automobile liability policies ceded to the Facility. House Bill 658 changed all of that by
eliminating the 50% limitation on cessions, by permitting higher rates or surcharges to
recover losses of the Facility, and by providing for distribution of Facility gains to poli-
cyholders reinsured by the Facility. The apparent intent behind the new provisions is to
make the Facility self-sustaining, whereas under the old system the insurance industry
subsidized the Facility by absorbing its losses.
North Carolina Legislative Research Comm'n, Report to the 1979 General Assembly of North
Carolina, Insurance Laws 12-13 (1979).
370. 302 N.C. at 294, 275 S.E.2d at 409.
371. See State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 532, 173 S.E.2d 47 (1970).
372. 302 N.C. at 291, 275 S.E.2d at 407.
373. The court relied on this passage:
The rate is the price per unit of exposure that is charged a particular insured for a partic-
ular contract of insurance. The unit ofexposure is a unit of insurance measure similar to
the foot ... or the pound. . . .For the great majority of insureds, the product of the
rate times the number of units of exposure equals thepremium--the total price paid for
the insurance.
C. Kulp & J. Hall, Casualty Insurance 765 (4th ed. 1968) (emphasis in original). The court also
mentioned the dictionary definition of "rate": "the amount of premium per unit of insurance or
exposure." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1884 (1971) (emphasis added). For
cases establishing different definitions of "rate" and "premium," see Utilities Comm'n v. Edmis-
ten, 291 N.C. 327, 340, 230 S.E.2d 651, 659 (1976); American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Gold,
249 N.C. 461, 464, 106 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1959).
374. 302 N.C. at 291, 275 S.E.2d at 407. See also State ex rel. Comn'r of Ins. v. North Caro-
lina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C. 60,241 S.E.2d 324 (1978); In re Filing by Fire Ins. Rating
Bureau, 275 N.C. 15, 165 S.E.2d 207 (1969).
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incurred.375 Although the court recognized this consideration and attempted
to explain it on the ground that simple arithmetic could determine the smaller
surcharge as well,3 7 6 this explanation begs the question: the court's correlation
between "mathematical" and "retroactive" is misleading, because even pro-
spective rates derive from a mathematical formula. Nevertheless, the court's
basic premise concerning the common definitions of "rates" and "recoup-
ment" remains sound.
By utilizing another principle of statutory construction, the court further
buttressed its conclusion. Statutes inparimateria command harmonious con-
struction;377 however, when the court hypothetically enlarged the definition of
"rates" to include surcharges and then applied that expanded definition to
other rate provisions, the term "rates" clearly did not encompass
surcharges. 378 For example, the court looked at the statute placing a six per-
cent cap on annual insurance rate increases.379 Given that the Facility oper-
ates on a no profit-no loss basis and that the Facility might recoup its losses to
that end, the court could not assume that "rates" included surcharges, because
placing a six percent cap on surcharges would thwart the goal of no-profit/no-
loss status.
380
Having decided this case on statutory grounds, the North Carolina
Supreme Court relegated the policy considerations that were so persuasive to
the court of appeals to dicta, discussing them only briefly in the opinion. By
choosing this tack, the court may have taken a myopic view of the problem.
The justices, however, did not totally ignore the State's policy arguments. The
court, for example, summarily responded to the lower court's reasoning that
failure to file surcharges with the Commissioner would deny to the public the
protection of the laws. Finding no support for this conclusion, the supreme
court asserted that the statutory scheme within which the Facility had to oper-
ate provided ample public protection against excessive surcharges.
381
The State raised two other policy arguments that the court refused to rec-
ognize in its opinion. The State first characterized the 18.6% surcharge on
Facility policyholders as an unfairly discriminatory382 violation of G.S. 58-
248.33(), which states that "[r]ates shall be neither excessive, inadequate nor
375. Computing this surcharge involved subtracting the income that would have been gener-
ated had "clean risks" been charged the actuarially sound rate. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.33(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
376. 302 N.C. at 292, 275 S.E.2d at 407.
377. See Redevelopment Comm'n v. Security Nat'l Bank, 252 N.C. 595, 610, 114 S.E.2d 688,
698-99 (1960).
378. 302 N.C. at 292-93, 275 S.E.2d at 408.
379. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-124 to -26 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
380. 302 N.C. at 293, 275 S.E.2d at 408.
381. The court noted that the Facility must operate on a no-profit-no-loss basis so that any
excess surcharges over losses in one collection period would be offset by a reduction in surcharges
during the next period. The court also mentioned the availability of independent audits of the
Facility's annual statements as an indication of protection against excessive surcharges. 302 N.C.
at 294-95, 275 S.E.2d at 409.
382. Brief for Appellee at 29.
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unfairly discriminatory." 383 Because the statute revealed no prescribed stan-
dards defining which insureds the industry should or should not cede to the
Facility, the State argued that there is the potential for unjust discrimination
when a ceded insurance customer must pay not only high rates but also a
surcharge that an unceded insurance customer would not pay for the same
insurance policy.384 Plaintiffs also asserted that the imposition of surcharges
without adequate procedural safeguards resulted in an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power to the Facility in violation of the State constitu-
tional provision385 vesting such power in the General Assembly.386 The State
pointed to several important public policy choices left to the discretion of the
Facility without adequate guiding standards to assure that the Facility would
not make arbitrary or unreasonable decisions.387 The Facility may not law-
fully exercise an otherwise legislative power, the state contended, in the ab-
sence of such safeguards.388 By dismissing these issues so quickly, the court
again remained faithful to the legislative intent of the statute and refused to
speculate about any far-reaching effects of the Facility Act.
The court justified its conservatism by openly criticizing the North Caro-
lina General Assembly for careless drafting of the insurance laws. Taking no-
tice of the numerous judicial insurance disputes in the past few years, the court
attributed this problem to the ambiguous statutes confronting the industry.389
Without more legislative guidance, the court felt inadequate to address these
recurring policy issues for fear of misconstruing the drafters' intent in these
areas. Consequently, the court resorted to strict construction of the existing
statute. The court suggested that the General Assembly would be the appro-
priate forum for solution of these issues, admonishing that body "to rewrite
the insurance laws in question in clear and unmistakable language.
' 390
In discussing the "apparent inequities in our insurance laws,"391 the court
expressed concern that the Facility forced "clean risks" and insureds outside
383. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.33(1) (Cune. Supp. 1979).
384. See Carolina Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Kinston, 32 N.C. App. 588, 233 S.E.2d 74
(1977).
385. N.C. Const. art. 2, § 1.
386. Brief for Appellee at 41.
387. The State viewed the Facility as making several important policy decisions:
(I) The [Facility's] agents have been given the responsibility to determine whether to
charge applicants for insurance rates at the voluntary level or at the Facility level
(2) The Facility has been delegated the authority to decide whether to impose recoup-
ment surcharges only on drivers in the Facility or to assess member companies which
will result in a loss recoupment from all drivers in the State.
(3) The Facility has been delegated the authority to determine whether to recoup losses
by adding a flat dollar amount to each driver's policy, in which case all drivers would
share losses equally, or to use a percentage of premium, in which case, the recoup-
ment drivers will pay will vary with the driver's insurance classification and the
amount of coverage purchased.
Brief for Appellee at 42.
388. See Adams v. Department of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d
402 (1978) (guidance as to what constitute adequate safeguards).
389. 302 N.C. at 297-98, 275 S.E.2d at 410.
390. Id.
391. Id., 275 S.E.2d at 411.
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the Facility to subsidize, through payment of recoupment surcharges, the costs
of insuring those with poor driving records within the Facility. The court,
however, refused to offer a solution; instead, it stated, "Such a grievance is best
remedied by bringing it to the attention of the legislative branch." 392 The
court's suggestion apparently has had an impact on the legislature. Since the
date of the opinion, the 1981 General assembly has enacted several amend-
ments to the Facility Act.393 Most important, the legislature amended the
surcharge provision of the statute to provide that "recoupment of losses sus-
tained by the Facility. .. may be recouped only by surcharging policies...
to which one or more points have been assigned. . . -394 This change has
eliminated the application of recoupment surcharges to "clean risk" drivers'
policies.
In State v. Reinsurance Facility the North Carolina Supreme Court pro-
duced an internally consistent although narrowly drawn opinion deciding that
recoupment surcharges are not "rates" subject to review by the Insurance
Commissioner. With the undercurrent of pressing policy concerns in this case,
however, the result may leave many persons unsatisfied. Because of the uncer-
tainty surrounding the policies furthered by the statute, the court rightly con-
cluded that these political problems must be submitted for solution by the
elected lawmakers of the state. Given this conclusion, the court's strict hold-
ing deserves no more criticism than does the legislature's poor drafting.
G. Employment
1. Unemployment Compensation
The court of appeals decided two cases395 under G.S. 96-14(2), defining,
what type of "misconduct" justifies denial of unemployment compensation
benefits for discharged employees. Consistent with the previously adopted
definition of "misconduct" as "wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's
interest," 396 the court in Yelverton v. Kemp Furniture Industries397 affirmed
the Employment Securities Commission's denial of benefits. Claimant's
harassing of a fellow employee, threatening him with a wooden post, and sub-
sequently striking him with the post were sufficient to disqualify claimant from
any unemployment compensation benefits. 398
392. Id.
393. See Law of July 2, 1981, ch. 776, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1139 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 58-248.26(7) to -248.33(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981)) (inclusion of insurance limits in the
Facility as required by the United States Department of Transportation); Law of June 16, 1981,
ch. 590, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 859 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-248.34(0 (Cum.
Supp. 1981)) (compensation to insurance agents for assistance with recoupment surcharges).
394. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 916, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1378 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 58-248.34(0 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
395. Intercraft Indus. Corp. v. Morrison, 54 N.C. App. 225, 282 S.E.2d 555 (1981); Yelverton
v. Kemp Furniture Indus., Inc., 51 N.C. App. 215, 275 S.E.2d 553 (1981).
396. 51 N.C. App. at 218-19, 275 S.E.2d at 557 (quoting In re Collingsworth, 17 N.C. App,
340, 343-44, 194 S.E.2d 210, 212-13 (1973)).
397. 51 N.C. App. 215, 275 S.E.2d 553 (1981).
398. Id. at 220, 275 S.E.2d at 556. The claimant was denied benefits not only for the deliberate
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In a later case, Intercraft Industries v. Morrison,399 the court of appeals
expanded the definition of "misconduct." The court held that ten unexcused
absences for scheduled overtime work within a twelve-month period did not
constitute "misconduct." Claimant's absences caused by her inability to ob-
tain child care for those days were found to constitute "good cause" and thus
were justifiable and reasonable under the circumstances.
4 ° °
Two legislative enactments 40 1 also affected the area of unemployment
compensation benefits. G.S. 96-14(3) was amended to expand the disqualifica-
tion of claimants who refuse suitable work without good cause.4°2 In addition,
G.S. 96-14 was amended to permit a party before the Employment Securities
Commission to be represented either by an attorney or by any person super-
vised by an attorney.
4 °3
2. Dismissal and Demotion of Public Employees
Chapter 115 of the North Carolina General Statutes governing elemen-
tary and secondary education was repealed and replaced by the comprehen-
sive statutory enactment of Chapter 115C.
404
G.S. 115C-325(e)(1) now sets forth the grounds for dismissal or demotion
of a career teacher. G.S. 115C-325(e)(1)(d) is identical to the former provi-
sion, G.S. 115-142(e)(1)(d), under which the supreme court defined "neglect of
duty" as a "failure to perform some duty imposed by contract or law."405 A
1981 case illustrates the application of that definition. In Overton v. Goldsboro
City Board of Education a tenured teacher was dismissed for failing to report
for work. Plaintiff teacher had requested the school principal to hire a substi-
tute teacher as soon as he had learned that he had been indicted on felony
drug charges. Subsequently, plaintiff met twice with the school superinten-
disregard of the reasonable rules of his employer of which he had knowledge, but also for the
intentional disregard of the interests of his employer in the safety of his fellow employees.
399. 54 N.C. App. 225, 282 S.E.2d 555 (1981).
400. Id. at 227-28, 282 S.E.2d at 557-58.
401. Law of July 1, 1981, ch. 762, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1121 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 96-17(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981)); Law oflune 17, 1981, ch. 593, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess.
863 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-14(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
402. Law of June 17, 1981, supra note 401. The time period for measuring the disqualification
of benefits once a claimant has refused suitable work now begins on the first day of the first week
in which the disqualifying act occurs. Prior to the amendment, the period was measured from the
first day of the first week after which the disqualifying act occurred.
403. Law of July 1, 1981, supra note 401. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-17(b) now reads: "(b) Repre-
sentation-Any claimant or employer who is a party to any proceeding before the Commission
may be represented by (1) an attorney; or (2) any person who is supervised by an attorney, how-
ever, the attorney need not be present at any proceeding before the Commission." N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 84-4 (1981) was also amended by Law of July 1, 1981, to reflect the change in G.S. 96-17(b).
404. Law of May 20, 1981, ch. 423, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 510 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 115C-1 to -578 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). One change under Chapter 115C not relating to
employment regulation, but which should be noted, is the expansion and consolidation of the
statutes on special education, now collected in Article 9 of Chapter 115C. A new provision for
special education in private or out-of-state schools is included, and procedures for appeal of deci-
sions regarding children with special needs are established. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-115 to -116
(Cum. Supp. 1981).
405. Overton v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 304 N.C. 312, 318, 283 S.E.2d 495, 499 (1981).
Neglect of duty was not defined in the previous statute or in the newly-enacted statute. Id.
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dent, informed him of the charges, and professed his innocence. Plaintiff was
not given any indication that he was expected to report to work. Instead, he
understood that the superintendent felt it would be in the best interests of the
students if he did not return to work until the matter was settled. Plaintiff even
requested he be granted a leave of absence without pay. The school board
responded with a dismissal based on plaintiff's unexcused absences from
work.
4 06
The supreme court concluded after a review of the entire record that the
decision of the Board of Education to dismiss plaintiff for "neglect of duty"
was not supported by the evidence. 4°7 The court noted that plaintiff did have
a basic duty to appear for work but held that "dismissal under the statute on
this ground alone cannot be sustained unless it is proven that a reasonable
man under these same circumstances would have recognized the duty and
would have considered himself obligated to conform."
408
H. Professional Standards andAdministration of Justice
There have been only eight recommendations to the supreme court to
censure or remove a judge for "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute" or for "wilful misconduct
in office" 4 09 since the Judicial Standards Commission was created in 1973.410
.In the latest case, In re Martin,411 the supreme court, upon independent review
406. Id. at 313-14, 283 S.E.2d at 496-97.
407. The supreme court in Overton examined the case under the "whole record" test instead of
de novo or the "any competent evidence" standard of review. G.S. 150A-2(1) of the Administra-
tive Procedures Act (APA) expressly excludes city school boards from the coverage of the Act.
The supreme court, however, adopted the same review standard, the "whole record" test, for
school boards as found in the APA and applied it in Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292
N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977), to promote uniformity.
The "whole record" test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the Board's judg-
ment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court justifiably may
have reached a different result had the matter been before it defnovo . . . . On the other
hand, the "whole record" rule requires the court, ir determining the substantiality of
evidence supporting the Board's decision, to take into account whatever in the record
fairly detracts fiom the weight of the Board's evidence. Under the whole evidence rule,
the court may not consider the evidence which in and of itselfjustifies the Board's result,
without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting
inferences could be drawn.
304 N.C. at 317-18, 283 S.E.2d at 498-99 (quoting Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292
N.C. at 410, 233 S.E.2d at 541).
408. Id. at 319, 283 S.E.2d at 499-500.
409. In re Martin, 302 N.C. 299,275 S.E.2d 412 (1981); In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d
890 (1978); In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978); In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240
S.E.2d 367 (1978); In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977); In re Stuhl, 292 N.C. 379,
233 S.E.2d 562 (1977); In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976); In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C.
497, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
410. Law of June 17, 1971, ch. 590, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 517 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 7A-375 to -377 (1981) (effective 1973)). See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law,
1979-Administrative Law, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1244 (1980); Note, Judicial Discipline-The Power of
North Carolina Supreme Court to Remove State Judges-In re Hardy, 14 Wake Forest L. Rev.
1187 (1978). The Commission has the power to recommend to the supreme court after a due
process hearing the censure or removal of ajudge. The supreme court alone has the actual power
to censure or remove after an independent review.
411. 302 N.C. 299, 275 S.E.2d 412 (1981).
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of the findings of the Judicial Standards Commission,4 12 concluded that sex-
ual advances made by the judge toward female defendants warranted his re-
moval from office. In addition, censure was warranted by the judge's failure
to excuse himself from hearing a case in which he was the defendant.
4 13
In his defense, Judge Martin argued that the conduct complained of was a
matter of his private, as opposed to his public, life. Dismissing this contention,
the court held that "wilful misconduct in office" was not "limited to the hours
of the day when a judge is actually presiding over court."'4 14 The judge's claim
that his post-transgression reelection indicated forgiveness by the electorate
and required immunity from judicial process also was rejected.
4 15
In analyzing the conduct of attorneys, the court of appeals held a that
lawyer must have the express authority of his client before acting in any way
that affects the client's substantive rights.416 An attorney's oral agreement to
additional terms of insurance and an escalator clause in a child support agree-
ment did not bind his unknowing client.417 Another case dealing with attor-
ney misconduct resulted in the suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law
for six months for procuring false testimony of a witness at a deposition.
418
As of October 1, 1981, Chapter 8B, a rewriting of Chapter 8A of the Gen-
eral Statutes, requires that a qualified interpreter be provided for deaf persons
appearing as a party or a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding.419 The
guarantee applies to juvenile proceedings and appearances before magistrates,
legislative committees, agency or board hearings. Upon arrest for an alleged
violation of the criminal law, a deaf person is entitled to an interpreter at an
interrogation or any preliminary proceeding. 420 To ensure the appointment of
an interpreter, any statement or admission obtained without the presence of a
qualified interpreter or a waiver of the right to have an interpreter present, is
412. Id. at 310-11, 275 S.E.2d at 418. The court exercised independent judgment in determin-
ing if there was "proof by clear and convincing evidence" to remove or censure the judge. Id. at
310, 275 S.E.2d at 418.
413. Id. at 310-11, 275 S.E.2d at 418.
414. Id. at 315-16, 275 S.E.2d at 421.
Whether the conduct in question can fairly be characterized as "private" or "public" is
not the inquiry; the proper focus is on, among other things, the nature and type of con-
duct, the frequency of occurrences, the impact which knowledge of the conduct would
likely have on prevailing attitudes of the community, and whether the judge acted know-
ingly or with a reckless disregard for the high standards of the judicial office.
Id. at 316, 275 S.E.2d at 421.
415. Id. at 318-20, 275 S.E.2d at 422-23. The court struck down two lines of authority
presented to support the argument that the electorate through reelection had pardoned the judge.
The first argument, supported by State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1974), was
based on a reelection wiping his record clean. The second, supported by In Matter of Carrillo, 542
S.W.2d 105 (Texas 1976), was not applicable to these facts. In Carrilo the court held that a
reelection pardoned an official of misconduct known to the public at the time of the reelection. In
.Mfarlin the acts of the defendant were not "public knowledge" at the time of the reelection. Id. at
318-20, 275 S.E.2d at 422-23.
416. Stevens v. Johnson, 50 N.C. App. 536, 274 S.E.2d 281 (1981).
417. Id. at 539, 274 S.E.2d at 283.
418. North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 52 N.C. App. 1, 277 S.E.2d 827 (1981).
419. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 937, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1437 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 8B-1 to -9 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
420. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8B-2 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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excluded from use for any purpose at trial.421
I Election Law
A major issue confronted by the North Carolina General Assembly dur-
ing its 1981 session was legislative redistricting. An attempt was made to for-
mulate a redistricting plan. The plan, however, met with substantial
opposition.422 Consequently, the General Assembly delayed final action on
redistricting until 1982.
Other legislation enacted in 1981 dealing with elections relaxed regula-
tions on campaign contributions and the reporting thereof.
423
J. Alcoholic Beverage Control
. Recent changes in the state alcoholic beverage control laws and a per-
ceived need for reorganization of alcoholic beverage regulation prompted the
replacement of General Statutes Chapter 18A, governing the mechanism for
alcohol regulation, with the new Chapter 18B.424 In addition to several organi-
zational changes, 425 Chapter 18B contains a new section providing penalties
for violations of alcohol laws.426 Under this section, the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Commission may, in lieu of suspending or revoking a permit, accept
at the permit holder's option "an offer in compromise" made by the permit
holder to pay a penalty of up to $5000.427 The Commission may either revoke
a permit or accept a "compromise," but not both.428 In the absence of ade-
quate guidelines for determining when the Commission should accept a com-
421. Id. §§ 8B-2(d), -3. Waiver of a qualified interpreter must be made in writing either by the
deaf person's attorney or by the appointing authority.
422. The legislative districts drawn by the 1981 General Assembly were challenged by the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund because the plan allegedly violated the "one man,
one vote" principle set forth in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), and the 1965 Voting Rights
Act. After North Carolina Justice Department lawyers reported that the plan could not withstand
a court challenge, the plan was withdrawn and the problem of redistricting was left for the 1982
session. The News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 9, 1981, at I, col. 1; The News and Observ-
ers (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
423. The General Assembly raised both the limit on contributions for which names of contrib-
utors must be reported and the general limitation on individual campaign contributions. Law of
July 3, 1981, ch. 814, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1183 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.8
(Cum. Supp. 1981)); Law of April 22, 1981, ch. 225, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 200 (codified
at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.13 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). In addition, reporting procedures for munic-
ipal office candidates were simplified. Law of July 7, 1981, ch. 837, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess.
1200 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 163-278.6, -278.9, -278.27, -278.40 to -278.40H (Cur. Supp.
1981)).
424. Law of May 18, 1981, ch. 412, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 438 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 18B (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
425. Many of the technical words used in the statute were redefined, id. (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 18B-101 (Cum. Supp. 1981)), and the name of the state agency for alcohol control was
changed. Id. (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18B-200 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). Also, rules governing
elections on city and county alcohol sales were revised and consolidated. Id. (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 18B-600 to -605 (Cune. Supp. 1981)).
426. Id. (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18B-104 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
427. Id. (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18B-104(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
428. Id.
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promise in a case in which a permit could be revoked, the dangers of an
arbitrary application of this provision seem evident.
JONATHAN A. BERKELHAMMER









In Speizman Knitting Machine Co. v. Terrot Strickmaschinen1 the United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina held a foreign
corporation subject to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina on two separate
grounds. Plaintiff, a division of a North Carolina corporation, alleged that it
had agreed to act as defendant's "exclusive agent in the United States."
'2
Plaintiff sold and serviced defendant's machines in North Carolina and
throughout the United States. Thus, defendant was potentially subject to
North Carolina's long-arm jurisdiction under G.S. 1-75.4(5)(a) and (b).
3
Judge McMillan held that jurisdiction existed because defendant had sufficient
"minimum contacts" 4 with North Carolina as a result of the agency relation-
ship between plaintiff and defendant.5 Since the cause of action arose directly
out of the agency contact in North Carolina, it was fair and reasonable for
defendant to have to defend in North Carolina.
6
The court found a second basis for jurisdiction in defendant's contacts
with its wholly owned subsidiary, Terrot Initting Company, Inc. Judge Mc-
Millan's ruling touches on an unsettled and interesting question of law:
7
1. 505 F. Supp. 200 (W.D.N.C. 1981).
2. Id. at 202.
3. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(5) (a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides that a North Carolina
court has jurisdiction over a person in any action which:
(a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff. . . by the defendant. . . to
pay for services to be performed in this State by the plaintift or
(b) Arises out of... services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff
within this State if such performance within this state was authorized or ratified by the
defendant ....
Plaintiff's verified complaint alleged that its agreement with defendant was partially negotiated in
North Carolina and was entered into in North Carolina, and that plaintiff substantially performed
the agreement in North Carolina, a result which must have been contemplated by defendant. 505
F. Supp. at 201. See generally The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Exceeds Its Reach: A Com-
ment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 407
(1980).
4. [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
5. 505 F. Supp. at 202.
6. "If there is a minimum of contacts, and the cause of action arises out of the contacts, it
will normally be fair and reasonable to sustain jurisdiction." 2 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Prac-
tice § 4.25(5), at 4-266 (2d ed. 1981). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[I]t is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws."); 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1067, at 239 (1969).
7. Indeed, defendant thought Judge McMillan's ruling involved such a controversial ques-
tion of law as to merit an immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) (allowing interlocu-
tory appeals when an "order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a
substantial ground for difference of opinion").
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"whether a parent corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with the State
of North Carolina for jurisdictional purposes when its only contact with North
Carolina is that it has a wholly-owned subsidiary which is doing business in
this state. ' 8 As an alternative basis for the assertion of jurisdiction by the
state, Judge McMillan held that the subsidiary provided sufficient contacts. 9
Mabry v. Fuller-Shuwayer Co. 10 concerned a somewhat related jurisdic-
tional issue. A foreign corporation, Fuller-Shuwayer Co., Ltd., organized
under the laws of Saudi Arabia, was seventy percent owned by a California
corporation, George A. Fuller Company. The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held Fuller-Shuwayer subject to in personam jurisdiction of the North
Carolina courts by virtue of the acts of its agent, George A. Fuller Company,
in recruiting an employee in North Carolina for employment with the Fuller-
Shuwayer Company in Saudi Arabia.1 1 In 1978 defendant advertised in the
Charlotte Observer for prospective employees for construction work in Saudi
Arabia, listing the George A. Fuller Company's New York telephone number
as the number to call for information. Upon calling the listed number, plaintiff
was informed that a representative would visit Charlotte to conduct inter-
views. Plaintiff interviewed with an employee of the George A. Fuller Com-
pany in a Charlotte hotel room and was later flown to New York for a
physical examination at defendant's expense. 12 While in New York, plaintiff
signed the employment contract that was the subject of his action. Except for
a similar 1975 recruiting trip to North Carolina, this was the only contact that
8. 505 F. Supp. at 201 (emphasis in original).
9. Id. at 202. One rationale that might justify such a ruling is agency. See PPS, Inc. v.
Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding a foreign corpora-
tion subject to personal jurisdiction in New York because of its agency relationship with a local
corporation).
Another rationale might be developed from Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267
U.S. 333 (1925). In Cannon the Supreme Court upheld a dismissal for want of personal jurisdic-
tion over a Maine corporation, the sole stockholder of an Alabama corporation doing business in
the forum state, North Carolina. Defendant created the subsidiary to market its products in North
Carolina. "The existence of the Alabama company as a distinct corporate entity is, however, in all
respects observed." Id. at 335. The Court refused to look beyond the corporate veil and hold the
foreign corporation subject to the jurisdiction of North Carolina. See also J. Moore, supra note 6,
§ 4.25(6), at 4-269; C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 6, § 1069, at 250. The Speizman court could
arguably have pointed to factors existing in the parent-subsidiary relationship between defendant
and Terrot Knitting Co., Inc. to support a finding under the Cannon rationale that no bona fide
separate corporate relationship existed between defendant and Terrot Knitting.
Instead, Judge McMillan relied on neither an agency nor a Cannon (piercing the corporate
veil) theory. He relied instead on the reasoning in Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Mohasco Corp., 442 F.
Supp. 424 (M.D.N.C. 1977), which questions whether the Cannon rationale is mandated by due
process. Id. at 429. The court in Mohasco said that mere stock ownership in a local corporation is
not necessarily sufficient to subject the foreign parent to local jurisdiction, and that the foreign
corporation must still be found to have the requisite "minimum contacts" in the forum state. The
court found that a manufacturer-distributor relationship existed between the foreign parent and
local subsidiary in Mohasco. As a result the parent's dealings with the subsidiary furnished the
"minimum contacts" necessary for the forum's assertion ofjurisdiction. Id. at 430-31. Judge Mc-
Millan found that the same relationship existed in Speizman and that the foreign parent's dealings
with the local subsidiary met the "minimum contacts" test. 505 F. Supp. at 202.
10. 50 N.C. App. 245, 273 S.E.2d 509, disc. rev. denied, 302 N.C. 398, 279 S.E.2d 358 (1981).
11. Id. at 250-51, 273 S.E.2d at 512-13.
12. Defendant paid for the flight, and the George A. Fuller Company paid for the physical.
Id. at 247, 273 S.E.2d at 510.
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the George A. Fuller Company had with the State.1 3
Finding that the George A. Fuller Company had "'broad executive re-
sponsibility on a continuing basis' for the hiring of employees to work for
defendant,"'14 the court held that the contacts of the George A. Fuller Com-
pany with North Carolina were sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts"
test 15 and that those contacts could be attributed to defendant under agency
principles in order to bring defendant under the jurisidiction of the North Car-
olina courts.
16
This case demonstrates that when the defendant's contacts with the forum
state are very limited, but the cause of action arises out of those contacts,
courts may hold that it is not a violation of due process to require the defend-
ant to defend in the forum state. 17 If a contract is the basis of the action, it is
enough if the contract has a "substantial connection" with the forum state
either through negotiation'8 or performance.19 The exercise of jurisdiction is
13. Between fifteen and twenty-two applicants were interviewed in Charlotte in 1978. How
many were flown to New York or signed employment contracts, however, is not clear. Id.
14. Id. at 246, 273 S.E.2d at 510.
15. Id. at 250, 273 S.E.2d at 512.
16. Id. See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (jurisdiction ex-
isted even though defendant's only contact with the state was in issuing plaintiffs insurance policy
and receiving payments from plaintiff).
Since the court in Mabry found that an agency relationship existed between the George A.
Fuller Company and the Fuller Schuwayer Co. regarding recruitment of employees, little diffi-
culty arises in attributing the acts of the agent to defendant. Had the court not found an agency
relationship in Mabry, bringing defendant Fuller-Schuwayer Co. under the jurisdiction of the
North Carolina courts would have been more difficult. If the Cannon rationale were applied to
these facts, see note 9 supra, defendant would be immune from service of process, because defend-
ant and the George A. Fuller Company maintained separate corporate existences. Under the
more liberal Mohasco rationale, see note 9 supra, plaintiff would still have to show that defendant
had the necessary "minimum contacts" with North Carolina. One possibility, absent a finding of
agency, would be a showing that defendant and the George A. Fuller Company worked so closely
together on recruitment of employees for defendant as to justify attributing the contacts of the
George A. Fuller Company to defendant on a joint venture or subsequent adoption theory. Re-
gardless, Speizman and Mabry illustrate that, while there is more than one way to attribute the
acts of one corporation to another for jurisdictional purposes, the least problematical approach, if
the facts allow, is through agency.
17. Hardy v. Pioneer Parachute Co., 531 F.2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1976) ("A simple transaction
is a sufficient contact to satisfy this standard [minimum contacts] if it gives rise to the liability
asserted in the suit.").
18. Chemical Bank v. World Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); By-
ham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965) (holding a foreign corpo-
ration subject to in personam jurisdiction in North Carolina in an action for fraud arising out of
negotiations conducted in North Carolina).
19. Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 229, 176 S.E.2d 784, 788 (1970) (hold-
ing that "the contract in question clearly met the requirement of 'substantial connection' with
North Carolina," because it was made and performed in this State). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § I-
75A(5)(a)-(b)(Cum. Supp. 1981); id. § 55-145(a)(1) (1975) (every foreign corporation shall be sub-
ject to suit in North Carolina on any cause of action arising out of any contract made or to be
performed in the state).
In General Time Corp. v. Eye Encounter, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 467, 274 S.E.2d 391 (1981), the
court of appeals held a California corporation subject to in personam jurisdiction in North Caro-
lina on an action for payment for goods delivered, because the last act necessary to the making of
the contract was performed in North Carolina and because the goods delivered were manufac-
tured in North Carolina pursuant to the contract. See also Johnston v. Gilley, 50 N.C. App. 274,
273 S.E.2d 513 (1981), discussed at notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra.
In Russell v. Tenore, 55 N.C. App. 84, 284 S.E.2d 521 (1981), however, the court of appeals
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further supported when the state has a special interest in entertaining the ac-
tion, as when the action involves a resident whose claim may not be large
enough to justify the expense of traveling to a distant state (or country) to
prosecute it.20 This would seem to be the case in Fuller-Shuwayer. It might
well have proved to be a prohibitive burden on plaintiff to have to bring an
action in New York, California or Saudi Arabia.
In a third 1981 case, Johnston v. Gilley,21 the question arose whether
defendant, a nonresident of North Carolina at the commencement of the ac-
tion, could be brought under the jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts on a
claim arising from his activities as a former resident of North Carolina and as
an officer, director and principal shareholder of The Washington Group, Inc.,
a North Carolina corporation. In 1973 the corporation's subsidiary, Washing-
ton Mills-Retail, Inc., also a North Carolina corporation, acquired substan-
tially all of the assets of the Johnston Mills Company and entered into an
employment contract with plaintiff Johnston lasting eighteen years. The con-
tract also included an agreement with Johnston to maintain ties between local
banks and Johnston Mills Company. Defendant personally guaranteed the
employment contract on which Johnston sued.
The court of appeals found that under G.S. 1-75.4(5)(a) the trial court had
jurisdiction over defendant because the claim arose out of a promise, made
anywhere to the plaintiff by the defendant to pay for services to be performed
in this state by the plaintiff.22 Further, the court found that the assertion of
jurisdiction was consistent with due process. 23 Given that at the time this
transaction took place defendant was a North Carolina resident; that he was
an officer, director and principal shareholder of the parent of the corporation
that incurred this obligation; that both corporations were organized under the
laws of North Carolina; that defendant personally guaranteed the obligation;
and that the claim arose directly out of the obligation, the decision in Johnston
undoubtedly is sound.
24
found the contacts insufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over a resident of California in an
action to recover plaintiff's portion of the purchase price of a restaurant located in Chicago. No
evidence existed that plaintiff was either a resident of North Carolina at the time the contract was
made or that it was made in North Carolina.
20. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950) (holding that Virginia
had personal jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company operating a mail-order health insur-
ance business because "[h]ealth benefit claims are seldom so large that Virginia policyholders
could afford the expense and trouble of a Nebraska law suit").
21. 50 N.C. App. 274, 273 S.E.2d 513 (1981).
22. Id. at 277-79, 273 S.E.2d at 515-16. The court rejected defendant's argument that he
made not "a promise ... to pay for services to be performed in this state," but rather a promise
"to pay the debt of another," and that therefore his activities did not fall within the scope of the
"long-arm" statute. Id. at 279, 273 S.E.2d at 516.
23. Id. at 278-79, 273 S.E.2d at 516.
24. As indicated earlier, in personam jurisdiction is more likely to be upheld when the claim
arises directly out of defendant's contacts with the forum state. See note 17 and accompanying
text supra. Facts similar to those in Johnston were considered in United Buying Group, Inc. v.
Coleman, 296 N.C. 510, 251 S.E.2d 610 (1979). In that case, defendant, a Virginia resident, gave a
note securing his indebtedness to plaintiff for goods delivered from plaintiff in North Carolina to
defendant in Virginia. Defendant had also attended a number of trade shows in North Carolina
and had made numerous contacts with plaintiff in connection with buying merchandise for his
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The court of appeals resolved a factual dispute concerning a defendant's
contacts with North Carolina in favor of plaintiff on a motion to dismiss for
lack ofjurisdiction.25 In Fungaroli v. Fungaroli26 plaintiff alleged that her son
had been removed from the state by the child's father and paternal grandpar-
ents in violation of a 1978 custody decree. The child's grandfather, a Virginia
resident, moved to dismiss. He supported his motion with an affidavit saying
he had absolutely nothing to do with the child's removal from North Carolina
and was therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the North Carolina
courts. 2 7 Relying on plaintiffs affidavit saying that the child's grandfather had
told her over the telephone, "We brought the child back to Virginia,'" 28 the trial
court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, saying simply, "[W]e
must assume that the trial court after reviewing the pleadings and affidavits of
both parties decided to take as true plaintifi's contentions.
29
Thomas v. Poole30 illustrates that a foreign corporation may waive its de-
fense of lack of in personam jurisdiction. The attorney for defendant signed a
"proposed final pre-trial order" 31 that was fied with the clerk of court and
contained a stipulation "that all parties are properly before the Court and that
the Court has jurisdiction of the parties." 32 Even though the judge never
adopted the proposed order, the court of appeals held that "the stipulations
were nevertheless judicial admissions and binding on the parties."'33 The
retail shoe outlets in Virginia. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that defendant's contacts
in North Carolina were sufficient to subject him to jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that in
UnitedBuying Group the supreme court held that defendant's brother, a codefendant and resident
of New York, who also gave plaintiff a note to secure the indebtedness merely as a favor to his
brother, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts. The court characterized
his contacts with North Carolina as "isolated [and] fortuitous." Id. at 517, 251 S.E.2d at 615. For
further comment on United Buying Group, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law
1979-Civil Procedure, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1261, 1277-82 (1980).
25. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
26. 51 N.C. App. 363, 276 S.E.2d 521, disc. rev. denied, 303 N.C. 314, 281 S.E.2d 651 (1981).
27. Jurisdiction was alleged under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981): "A court
of this State. . . has jurisdiction over a person. . . (3) [i]n any action claiming injury to person or
property or for wrongful death within or without this State arising out of an act or omission within
this State by the defendant." Since plaintiff alleged no injury to herself and certainly no wrongful
death, one might conclude from this case that plaintiff considered her son's removal an interfer-
ence with her "property." However, the court of appeals has held that
the term "injury to person or property". . . should be given a broad meaning consistent
with the legislative intent to enlarge the concept of personal jurisdiction to the limits of
fairness and due process, which negates the intent to limit the actions thereunder to
traditional claims for bodily injury and property damages .... We hold that an action
for alimony on the grounds of abandonment is a claim of "injury to person or property
Sherwood v. Sherwood, 29 N.C. App. 112, 115-16, 223 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1976). The result is that,
while courts still go through the motion of locating a subsection of the State's "long-arm" statute
for legislative support, the words of the statute will nct preclude the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion so long as due process is not offended. See Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C.
674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977).
28. 51 N.C. App. at 366, 276 S.E.2d at 523 (emphasis original).
29. Id. at 367, 276 S.E.2d at 524.
30. 54 N.C. App. 239, 282 S.E.2d 515 (1981).
31. Id. at 240, 282 S.E.2d at 516.
32. Id. at 241, 282 S.E.2d at 517.
33. Id. at 242, 282 S.E.2d at 517. J. Strong, North Carolina Index, Trial § 6, at 354 (3d ed.
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court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow defendant to with-
draw the stipulation because there was no allegation of the attorney's lack of
authority, mistake or "any other just cause for withdrawal."'34 The court also
held that defendant's attempt to withdraw the stipulation was ineffective, rea-
soning that the proper procedure is by motion;35 defendant merely filed a pa-
per captioned "Withdrawal of Stipulation '36 that purported to nullify the
prior admission.
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Ingle v. Allen37 the court of appeals ruled that in an action alleging
improprieties in the management of an estate, plaintiffs claims of breach of
fiduciary duties, negligence and fraud are "justiciable matters of a civil na-
ture"38 and thus are within the jurisdiction of the superior court.39 The court
also ruled that it was proper for the clerk of superior court to entertain claims
for an accounting and distribution from a coexecutrix and for her removal; for
an accounting from cotrustees and their removal; for appointment of a new
trustee; for return of compensation received by defendants; for reimbursement
by defendants for any benefit received that rightfully belonged to the estate;
and for an award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs counsel from the estate and
from defendants. The court held that all of these were matters concerning
"the administration, settlement, and distribution of estates."
'40
In Journeys International v. Corbett4 the court of appeals considered
whether a superior court judge had original jurisdiction to hear a special pro-
ceeding under G.S. 45-21.34 when no issue of fact had been raised.42 Judg-
ment creditors of Atlantic Manufacturing, Ltd., sought to require Corbett, who
allegedly had foreclosed on real estate owned by Atlantic Manufacturing as
trustee under a deed of trust, to pay the surplus of the sale beyond the amount
of indebtedness to the clerk for determination of ownership.43 Corbett moved
1978), states very succinctly the judicial attitude towards stipulations in North Carolina: "Where
the stipulations of plaintiff and defendant are entered of record, and there is no contention that the
attorney for either party was not authorized to make the stipulations and admissions, the parties
are bound thereby."
34. 54 N.C. App. at 242, 282 S.E.2d at 517.
35. See Napoli v. Philbrick, 8 N.C. App. 9, 173 S.E.2d 574 (1970).
36. 54 N.C. App. at 242, 282 S.E.2d at 517. The court did not reach the question of whether
defendant's four-year, seven-month delay in attempting to withdraw the stipulation constituted a
waiver of the lack ofjurisdiction defense. Id. at 242, 282 S.E.2d at 518. See Napoli v. Philbrick, 8
N.C. App. at 12, 173 S.E.2d at 576 (holding that failure "seasonably" to apply to set aside a
stipulation may defeat the right to have the stipulation stricken).
37. 53 N.C. App. 627, 281 S.E.2d 406 (1981).
38. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-240 (1981).
39. Superior Court was the proper division because the amount in controversy was greater
than $5,000. 53 N.C. App. at 629 n.2, 281 S.E.2d at 407 n.2; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-243 (1981).
40. 53 N.C. App. at 629, 281 S.E.2d at 408. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-2-1 (1976).
41. 53 N.C. App. 124, 280 S.E.2d 5 (1981).
42. A special proceeding to determine the ownership of any surplus resulting from the sale of
real property is properly heard by the clerk unless an "answer is filed raising issues of fact as to the
ownership of the money," in which case the matter "shall be transferred to the civil issue docket of
the superior court for trial." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.32(c) (1976).
43. According to plaintiffs allegations, the deed of trust secured a $250,000 note given to
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to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction.44 The matter was then cal-
endared for hearing before a judge of the superior court over the objection of
the plaintiff, who contended that the matter was properly to be heard before
the clerk. The court of appeals ruled that it was improper for the superior
court judge to hear the matter because no issue of fact had been raised.
45
B. Voluntary Dismissal-Effective Date in Diversity Actions
In Shuford v. Kawamura Cycle Co. ,46 a diversity of citizenship action,
plaintiff moved for and was granted a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
Under North Carolina law, the plaintiff may reinstitute his action within one
year after the dismissal, and the reinstituted action will relate back to the filing
date of the original action.47 In Shuford, after the statute of limitations had
run and more than a year after the judge orally granted plaintiff's motion for
voluntary dismissal, but less than a year after the judge issued his written or-
der dismissing the action, plaintiff sought to reinstitute his action. Plaintiff
argued that under federal law a party can take a voluntary dismissal after
defendant has answered only by order of the court;48 since defendant had an-
swered, the effective date of the dismissal should be when the judge issued his
written order. In Danielson v. Cummings,49 however, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that under the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
the one-year period begins to run when the plaintiff announces his intention to
take a voluntary dismissal in open court.50 Thus, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Shuford was confronted with an Erie question. 51
Superior Machine Shop, Inc. Superior bought the real estate at the foreclosure sale, paying
$325,505.49. 53 N.C. App. at 124, 280 S.E.2d at 6.
44. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
45. 53 N.C. App. at 125-26, 280 S.E.2d at 6-7. The court distinguished Redevelopment
Comm'n of Washington v. Grimes, 277 N.C. 634, 178 S.E.2d 345 (1971), which held that "when a
proceeding before the clerk is brought before the judge in any manner, the superior court's juris-
diction is not derivative but it has jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters in controversy as
if the case was originally before him." Id. at 638, 178 S.E.2d at 347. Grimes involved a premature
appeal from the clerk who had not yet approved or disapproved a report of an appraisal commis-
sion. Appeal was only appropriate after such action by the clerk. Nevertheless, the court held that
the superior court judge had jurisdiction to decide the matter. In Corbel! the defendant did not
purport to appeal from the clerk since there was no ruling, tentative or otherwise, to appeal from.
The court followed Becker County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Taylor, 269 N.C. 617, 153 S.E.2d 19
(1967). The Becker court held that a superior court had no jurisdiction to set aside an order of the
clerk when there was no appeal by "a party aggrieved." See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-272 (Cum. Supp.
1981). The rule seems to emerge that whether or not there is a final order of the clerk, a party is
properly before the superior court judge if he gets there by means of a formal appeal.
46. 649 F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1981).
47. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l).
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(2) By order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this
rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintifi's instance save upon order of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.
49. 300 N.C. 175, 265 S.E.2d 161 (1980).
50. Id. at 180, 265 S.E.2d at 164.
51. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that in diversity of citizenship cases,
state substantive law and federal procedural rules govern).
[Vol. 601220
CIVIL PR O CED URE1
Applying the reasoning of Walker v. Armco Steel Co. ,52 the court of ap-
peals held that state law governs the effective date of a voluntary dismissal
because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 does not purport to cover that
question.53 Because the effective date of the voluntary dismissal is an "'inte-
gral' part of the statute of limitations," 54 and because there is no "'direct colli-
sion' between the Federal Rule and the state law,"55 state law must govern.
C. Service of Process
Long v. Cabarrus County Board of Education5 6 demonstrates vividly how
the unwary may be trapped by the tangle of technical rules for service of pro-
cess contained in the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.5 7 Rule 4 pro-
vides for service of process on county boards of education "by personally
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer or director
thereof.' 58 Process was directed to Stuart Black, Chairman of the Cabarrus
County Board of Education. The return of service indicated, however, that
the deputy "left copies with Mrs. Stuart Black who is a person of suitable age
and discretion and who resides in the defendant's house or usual place of
abode."'59 While service on most individual defendants is sufficient under
these circumstances, 60 the provision for service on a county board of education
does not allow similar service on an officer or director of the board.61 Because
process servers may not always be aware of such distinctions, attorneys should
scrutinize the form of process and return of service to determine whether stat-
utory guidelines, which are strictly construed,62 have been met.
52. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). Walker concerned whether an action, filed within the statute of
limitations, is commenced within the statute of limitations when state law requires service of pro-
cess to commence the action and the defendant was not served within the statute of limitations.
The Court held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 does not purport to control the time of commencement for
purposes of the state statute of limitations and that, since the service requirement is an "integral"
part of the statute of limitations, the action is not commenced (for statute of limitations purposes)
until the defendant is served. Only when there is a direct conflict between a federal rule and state
law will the federal rule prevail. Since Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 does not purport to dictate when a
voluntary dismissal is effective, state law prevails.
53. 649 F.2d at 263. See generally Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693
(1974).
54. 446 U.S. at 752. The court in Danielson concluded that to interpret N.C.R. Civ. P. 41 to
allow one year from the date of filing the notice of dismissal to reinstitute a voluntarily dismissed
action would defeat the intention of the legislature in enacting rule 41. 300 N.C. at 180, 265
S.E.2d at 164.
.55. 446 U.S. at 749.
56. 52 N.C. App. 625, 279 S.E.2d 95 (1981).
57. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4.
58. Id. 4(j)(5)(c)(i).
59. 52 N.C. App. at 625-26, 279 S.E.2d at 96.
60. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1)(a) (Cure. Supp. 1981).
61. It generally should be unnecessary to serve the chairman of the board of education at
home; he presumably could be located easily at the board's offices. The rule also authorizes serv-
ice on the North Carolina Attorney General if an officer, director or agent cannot be located or
served by registered mail.
62. "Statutory provisions prescribing the manner of service of process must be strictly con-
strued, and the prescribed procedure must be strictly followed;, and unless the specific require-
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In Southern Athletic Bike v. House of Sports, Inc.,63 plaintiff obtained a
judgment against House of Sports, Inc., the entity primarily liable for the debt
upon which plaintiff sued. Plaintiff then attempted to obtain a judgment
against A.C. Burgess, Jr., guarantor of the debt. Plaintiffs attorney persuaded
Judge Kirby to enter an order requiring Burgess "to appear and show cause
why judgment ... should not be entered against him individually." 64 The
order was served on Burgess, but he did not appear at the hearing, and judg-
ment was entered against him as guarantor of the debt. Burgess had never
been served with a summons and complaint on the original action. The court
of appeals held that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him,
and that the "show cause" order was not a substitute for service of process.
Therefore, "[t]he judgment entered against him [was] a nullity."
'65
D. Appeal and Error
A party generally has a right to appeal a judgment only if that judgment
is final;66 a final judgment is one that disposes of all claims against all parties
in the action, so that no issues remain for judicial determination.67 There are,
however, three exceptions to this requirement of finality.68 First, in multiple-
claim or -party cases, a judge has authority to enter final judgment against one
or more, but fewer than all, of the claims or parties if he expressly states in the
record that there is "no just reason for delay."' 69 The two other exceptions arise
when the court's order affects a substantial right of a party and would work an
injury to that party if not corrected before an appeal from a judgment.70
ments are complied with, there is not valid service." Broughton v. DuMont, 43 N.C. App. 512,
515, 259 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1979), disc. rev. denied, 299 N.C. 120, 262 S.E.2d 5 (1980).
In Russ v. Russ, 50 N.C. App. 553, 274 S.E.2d 259 (1981), the court of appeals held that
service by registered mail on a North Carolina defendant was insufficient under a Florida law that
required service by the county sheriff. The court therefore refused to recognize the Florida judg-
ment purportedly rendered against defendant, because the Florida court had not obtained per-
sonal jurisdiction.
Service of other papers in a lawsuit is not so problematical. For example, in Macon v. Edin-
ger, 303 N.C. 274, 278 S.E.2d 256 (1981), an action for partition of land held in tenancy in com-
mon, respondent claimed that she had the right to appeal from the report of the commissioners,
even though the 10-day appeal period had passed, because she had not received actual notice of
the filing of the report. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 46-19 (1976). The supreme court, in reversing the court
of appeals, ruled that respondent did not have a right to actual notice as a matter of due process or
statutory construction. The court held that the clerk's findings indicated that "substantial compli-
ance" with N.C.R. Civ. P. 5(b) had been achieved by mailing a copy of the report to an address at
which respondent admitted receiving a copy of the report's confirmation two weeks later. Rule
5(b) requires mailing the paper to the "last known address" of the person to whom it is directed.
63. 53 N.C. App. 804, 281 S.E.2d 698 (1981).
64. Id. at 805, 281 S.E.2d at 699.
65. Id. at 806, 281 S.E.2d at 699.
66. Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377 (1950).
67. See Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 270 S.E.2d 431 (1973); Hinson v. Hinson, 17 N.C.
App. 505, 195 S.E.2d 98 (1973). The policy behind prohibiting interlocutory appeals is the preven-
tion of fragmentary appeals, which delay unnecessarily the progress of the litigation. Waters v.
Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
68. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (1969); id. § 7A-27(d) (1969).
69. N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b).
70. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (1969); id. § 7A-27(d) (1969). As noted by commentators and
courts, the substantial rights test for appealability of interlocutory orders is more easily stated than
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One circumstance in which substantial rights may be affected occurs
when a judge issues an order that, if improperly issued, could force the parties
to litigate twice.71 In Roberts v. Hefner,72 for example, plaintiffs and defend-
ants had entered into a written agreement in which defendants agreed to con-
struct a house on property owned by defendants and subsequently to convey
both the land and the completed building to plaintiffs. Various disagreements
arose between the parties before the house was completed, and plaintiffs filed a
complaint seeking specific performance of the contract or, in the alternative,
money damages and a temporary restraining order granting them exclusive
possession of the premises. The court issued a temporary restraining order,
and the parties then reached a partial settlement providing that defendants
would convey title to the property to plaintiffs in return for the contract price
of $80,000. Plaintiffs then ffied an amended complaint seeking $20,000 in ac-
tual damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. Defendants counterclaimed,
alleging breach of contract and requesting the various overages incurred in the
construction of the house. Plaintiffs then pleaded the settlement as a defense
to the counterclaim.73 The trial court held a hearing on plaintiffs' plea and
entered a judgment in plaintiffs' favor that defendants were not entitled to any
overages per se, but that defendants would be allowed to assert their counter-
claim as a set-off to the principal claim. Defendants appealed, and the court
of appeals held that an appeal did rightfully lie from the trial court's order,
because this order substantially affected the rights of defendants and could
inure to their detriment if wrongly issued.74 The court designated as a "sub-
applied. While the attorney can discern some general trends by examining the cases, it is usually
necessary to consider the specific facts of each case, particularly the procedural context of the trial
court's order. See W. Shuford, North Carolina Civil Practice and Procedure § 54-5, at 419 (2d ed.
1981); Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
71. Conversely, if the denial of the right to appeal would result in only one trial, no substan-
tial right is shown, as illustrated in a series of 1981 cases. See Eubanks v. Eubanks, 54 N.C. App.
363, 283 S.E.2d 397 (1981) (entry of partial summary judgment in favor of ex-wife in an action to
enforce a support order); Shaw v. Pederson, 53 N.C. App. 796,281 S.E.2d 700 (1981) (order setting
aside default judgment); Williams v. East Coast Sales, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 565, 274 S.E.2d 276
(1981) (order denying defendant's motion for dismissal of plaintifi's claim for punitive damages).
See also Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 270 S.E.2d 431 (1980) (order setting aside default judg-
ment); Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978) (order setting
aside a summary judgment); Hankins v. Somers, 39 N.C. App. 617, 251 S.E.2d 640, disc. rev.
denied, 297 N.C. 300, 254 S.E.2d 920 (1979) (denial of motion to dismiss).
In another 1981 case, Shaver v. North Carolina Monroe Constr. Co., 54 N.C. App. 486, 283
S.E.2d 526 (1981), the court of appeals held that defendants were not entitled to appeal from an
order of the trial court denying their motion to dismiss three of plaintifis causes of action on the
grounds of lack of subject matterjurisdiction. The court deemed inapplicable N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
277(b) (1969), which provides that "[a]ny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal
from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defend-
ant or such party may preserve his exception for determination upon any subsequent appeal in the
cause." In so ruling, the court distinguished between jurisdiction over the "person or property of
the defendant" and general subject matter jurisdiction.
72. 51 N.C. App. 646, 277 S.E.2d 446 (1981).
73. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants were "unlicensed contractors" who, pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 87-1, could not enforce the contract or recover for services and materials under the
theory of quantum merit. 51 N.C. App. at 648, 277 S.E.2d at 448.
74. Id. at 651, 277 S.E.2d at 449.
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stantial right" the right of defendants to avoid two trials.75 The absence of a
right of immediate appeal would have forced defendants to undergo a full trial
on the merits of plaintiffs' claim and if they prevailed on the counterclaim,
they would be limited to a set-off against the amount of plaintiffs' recovery.
Moreover, if the jury determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief
prayed for, it would not consider defendants' set-off claim at all. In either
case, if defendants were correct in their legal position and prevailed on appeal,
they would then be forced to undergo another full trial to recover the full
value of their counterclaims. The court stated that "the possibility of being
forced to undergo two full trials on the merits and to incur the expense of
litigating twice makes it clear that the judgment in question works an injury to
defendants if not corrected before an appeal from a final judgment.
'76
The court of appeals again labeled the right to avoid multiple litigation a
substantial right in Briggs v. Mid-State Oil Co. ,77 in which two former em-
ployees sued their employer for severance pay, basing their claims on breach
of contract and fraud. The superior court rendered summary judgment on
behalf of defendants on the fraud claim, and plaintiffs appealed. The court of
appeals allowed the appeal, observing that if summary judgment had been
improperly granted, plaintiffs had a substantial right to have their fraud claim
tried before the same court that tried their breach of contract claim, given that
the two claims arose out of the same core of operative facts. 78
The court of appeals reached a different and arguably inconsistent con-
clusion in Green v. Duke Power Co.79 Plaintiff brought suit against Duke
Power Company to recover for injuries received when she came in contact
with an electrical transformer. Duke Power, pursuant to rule 14,80 impleaded
two other defendants seeking contribution from each as joint tortfeasors. The
third-party defendant then moved for summary judgment, which the superior
court granted. Duke appealed the order, and the third-party defendants
moved to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.81 The court of appeals dis-
missed the appeal, stating that the avoidance of a separate trial by Duke
Power Company against the joint tortfeasors did not constitute a substantial
75. Id. For a discussion of the one trial/two trial distinction see Survey of Developments in
North Carolina Law, 1978-Civil Procedure, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 891, 907 (1979).
76. 51 N.C. App. at 651, 277 S.E.2d at 449.
77. 53 N.C. App. 203, 280 S.E.2d 501 (1981).
78. Id. at 206-07, 280 S.E.2d at 503.
79. 50 N.C. App. 646, 274 S.E.2d 889 (1981).
80. N.C.R. Civ. P. 14 provides, in pertinent part:
At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third party plaintiff,
may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.
A 1981 amendment to N.C.R. Civ. P. 14(a) extended the time to initiate third party suits from 5
days to 45 days. Law of March 13, 1981, ch. 92, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 62 (amending
N.C.R. Civ. P. 14).
81. For discussion of the related topic of the propriety of granting an appeal from an order
dismissing a third party defendant, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1978-
Civil Procedure, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 891, 909 (1979).
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right.82 The court distinguished Oestreicher v. American Arational Stores,
Inc. ,83 in which the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had
a substantial right to have a claim for punitive damages tried together with a
claim for actual damages based on a breach of the same contract. The Green
court interpreted the holding in Oestreicher as involving but one legal right,
with several elements of damages requested; the case before it, on the other
hand, involved multiple parties. The court of appeals may have read Oes-
treicher too narrowly, however, because the supreme court's opinion had
stressed the desirability of adjudicating all interrelated claims in one forum.
8 4
Another 1981 decision by the court of appeals also is arguably inconsis-
tent with Roberts and Briggs and could result in wasteful litigation, an evil the
exception to the rule against interlocutory appeals was designed to prevent.8 5
In Bacon v. Leatherwood8 6 plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine whether a deed from her ex-husband conveyed good title. The husband's
present wife had refused to sign the deed. In a second claim, plaintiff alleged
that her husband had failed to convey a warranty deed to her without excep-
tion upon her tender to him of the agreed-upon price, thereby violating the
terms of their divorce decree. Plaintiff also named the ex-husband's wife as a
defendant, alleging that she contrived with the husband in an attempt to har-
ass plaintiff and cause her additional expense by not joining in the deed. The
superior court granted the ex-husband's motion to dismiss the complaint as it
pertained to him, and plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals deemed the
order from which plaintiff appealed "interlocutory," ruling that the order did
not affect a substantial right of the plaintiff. she had adequately preserved the
question of the propriety of the order by taking exception, so that the issue
could be raised on appeal following a full trial on the merits87 of her claim
against her ex-husband's current wife.
Another situation in which the substantial rights test typically is satisfied
occurs when the trial court orders one of the parties either to act or to refrain
82. 50 N.C. App. at 649, 274 S.E.2d at 891.
83. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
84. The court in Oestreicher stated that:
The causes of action that the plaintiff allege [sic] are related to each other. He seeks
punitive damages in the second cause because of the alleged misconduct of defendant in
the first cause of action. [The trial judge] required plaintiff to try his first cause of action,
relating the alleged fraudulent failure of the defendant to pay proper rental. To require
him possibly later to try the second cause of action for punitive damages would involve
an indiscriminate use of judicial manpower and be destructive of the rights of both
plaintiff and defendant. Common sense tells us that the same judge and jury that hears
the claim on the alleged fraudulent breach of contract should hear the punitive damage
claim based thereon. The third cause of action alleged an anticipatory breach of con-
tract. This arose from the same lease contract that gave birth to the first and second
causes. By the same token, the same judge and jury should hear the third cause along
with the first and second ones, assuming the plaintiffs cause is not subject to summary
judgment.
290 N.C. at 130, 225 S.E.2d at 805.
85. See note 67 supra.
86. 52 N.C. App. 587, 279 S.E.2d 86 (1981).
87. Id. at 591-92, 279 S.E.2d at 89. See also Shaw v. Pedersen, 53 N.C. App. 796, 281 S.E.2d
700 (1981).
1982] 1225
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
from acting.88 InAtkins v. Beasley89 plaintiffs sued to obtain specific perform-
ance of an agreement. The trial court entered partial summary judgment, or-
dering defendants to replace existing concrete pipe in the subdivision in which
plaintiffs resided, and to perform all acts necessary to provide the subdivision
with proper drainage. The court of appeals allowed defendant's appeal from
the order, relying in part on Wachovia Realty Investments v. Housing, Inc. ,90
in which the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a grant of partial sum-
mary judgment for a monetary sum against the defendant affected a substan-
tial right of the defendant, and in part on English v. Holden Beach Realty
Co. ,91 in which the trial court issued an injunction, pursuant to a grant of
partial summary judgment, ordering the defendant to remove a roadway.
The court of appeals in English held that the order affected a substantial right
of the defendant and thus, an interlocutory appeal was appropriate.
92
E Pleading
The North Carolina Supreme Court clarified the pleading requirements
of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure in two 1981 cases,93 citing
with approval the rationale of Sutton v. Duke.
94
In Terry v. Terry95 the supreme court enumerated the requirements for
pleading constructive, as compared to actual, fraud, both of which, under rule
9(b),96 must be "stated with particularity." In that case plaintiff sued his un-
cle, alleging that he had fraudulently obtained plaintiff's signature and the
signature of plaintiffs fatally ill father on a document conveying his father's
business to his uncle for a grossly inadequate sum. More specifically, the
nephew averred that there had been a close business relationship between the
father and defendant; that prior to the father's death defendant took increas-
ing control of the business; that plaintiff and his father signed the agreement
when the father was bedridden, virtually blind and deaf, unable to talk and
suffering great pain; and that the sales price was grossly inadequate. The su-
perior court dismissed the complaint upon defendant's 12(b)(6) motion, and
88. See, e.g., Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 265 S.E.2d 240, appeal
dismissed, 301 N.C. 92, (1980) (entry of partial summary judgment for a monetary sum against
defendant) (citing Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977)).
Cf. Ball v. Ball, 55 N.C. App. 98,284 S.E.2d 555 (1981) (holding that an order requiring defendant
to allow a court-appointed surveyor to enter his land was not immediately appealable; the sur-
veyor was deemed merely a neutral third party).
89. 53 N.C. App. 33, 279 S.E.2d 866 (1981).
90. 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977). See note 88 supra.
91. 41 N.C. App. 1, 254 S.E.2d 223, disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 609, 257 S.E.2d 217 (1979).
92. Id. at 12, 254 S.E.2d at 231.
93. N.C.R. Civ. P. 8.
94. 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
95. 302 N.C. 77, 273 S.E.2d 674 (1981).
96. N.C.R. Civ. P. 9(b), counterpart of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), codifies existing North Carolina
case law on the pleading of fraud, duress and mistake. Ultimate facts constituting the essential
elements had to be set forth affirmatively under North Carolina common law. Lillian Knitting
Mills Co. v. Earle, 237 N.C. 97, 74 S.E.2d 351 (1953). A suggested form for pleading fraud is
provided in N.C.R. Civ. P. 84(7).
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the court of appeals affirmed.97 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, holding that the plaintiffs averments of constructive fraud
were sufficient.
98
The court noted that rule 9(b)'s requirement of particularity must be rec-
onciled with rule 8, which requires only a short and concise statement of
claims.99 The court also looked to the rationale behind the particularity re-
quirement of rule 9(b), which protects a defendant from unjustified injury to
his reputation.100 As the court noted, the requirements for pleading construc-
tive fraud are less stringent than those for pleading actual fraud, because con-
structive fraud is grounded in abuse of a confidential relationship rather than
in specific misrepresentations. 10 1 Therefore, a claim of actual fraud requires
averments detailing time, place, content of the fraudulent representation, iden-
tity of the person making the representation and what the defendant obtained
as the result of the alleged representations; 102 an individual pleading construc-
tive fraud need only allege the circumstances under which the confidential
relationship was created, together with the facts that led up to and surrounded
a breach of that confidence.10 3
In the second 1981 case, Shugar v. Guill,1° 4 the court reiterated the notice
rationale behind the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure pleading re-
quirements.105 In that case, a restaurant customer brought an action against
the owner to recover compensatory and punitive damages for assault and bat-
tery. At the trial defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs claim for punitive
damages on the ground that plaintiff had failed to plead properly or to prove
the claim. 10 6 The trial court denied the motion and submitted to the jury the
issues of liability and compensatory and punitive damages. The jury awarded
punitive and compensatory damages, but the court of appeals reversed, agree-
ing with defendant's contention that plaintiff failed to plead properly, and va-
97. 46 N.C. App. 583, 265 S.E.2d 463 (1980).
98. 302 N.C. at 85-87, 273 S.E.2d at 678-79.
99. Id. at 84-85, 273 S.E.2d at 678.
100. Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Il. 1976).
101. Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971).
102. Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974); Rosenthal v. Perkins, 42
N.C. App. 449, 257 S.E.2d 63 (1979).
103. Rhodes v. Jones, 232 N.C. 547, 61 S.E.2d 725 (1950). In finding plaintiff's allegations
sufficiently particular in Terry, the court distinguished its decision in Mangum v. Surles, 281 N.C.
91, 187 S.E.2d 697 (1972), in which allegations of a mere family relationship, coupled with consul-
tations among family members, were held insufficient to meet the pleading requirement of a confi-
dential relationship. Id. at 96, 187 S.E.2d at 700. According to the court, plaintiff in Terry
pleaded the necessary element of a confidential relationship when he alleged a trusted business
relationship. 302 N.C. at 87, 273 S.E.2d at 679. Cf. Link, in which a husband and wife relation-
ship was held sufficient to meet the requirement of a confidential relationship. 278 N.C. at 193,
179 S.E.2d at 704.
104. 304 N.C. 332, 283 S.E.2d 507 (1981).
105. Id. at 337, 283 S.E.2d at 5 10. See also Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 719, 260 S.E.2d 611,
613 (1979); Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
106. In North Carolina, a claim for punitive damages will lie only upon a showing of either
actual or express malice or sufficient aggravated circumstances, including a reckless disregard of
the plaintiff's rights. Van Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 261 N.C. 539, 135 S.E.2d 640 (1964);
Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31, 134 S.E.2d 640 (1964).
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cated the punitive damage award. 10 7 The supreme court reversed, holding that
the allegations contained in plaintiffs complaint were sufficient to given de-
fendant notice of the events or transactions that produced the claim sufficient
to enable the adverse party to file a responsive pleading.'
08
F Default
Two 1981 North Carolina cases interpreted the technical requirements for
the entry of default and established that a rule 60(b) motion for setting aside a
default judgment is not tantamount to an appeal, in which substitution of
judgment may be proper. In addition, the cases balanced the need for techni-
cal compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, notably rule 55(d), against
the general goal of promoting justice. 10 9
In Peeples v. Moore" 0 plaintiff filed an action to recover for personal
injuries. Defendant answered thirty-seven days after being served with the
complaint, seven days after expiration of the thirty-day limit for filing a re-
sponsive pleading."' More than a month after the answer was filed, the clerk,
upon plaintiffs request, made an entry of default. Defendant then moved to
have the entry set aside, alleging good cause. The trial court denied the mo-
tion and granted plaintiff a default judgment on the issue of liability. The
court of appeals reversed the trial judge, holding that while the clerk had prop-
erly made the initial entry of default despite the presence of a belated answer,
the superior court judge had abused his discretion in failing to set aside the
entry of default. 112 On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court in review
held that a clerk is not permitted to make an entry of default when an answer
is on file, however untimely the filing may have been." 3 The court construed
literally the requirement of rule 55 that a clerk is empowered to enter default
when "a party has failed to plead," interpreting "failure to plead" to mean an
absolute failure to answer at any time prior to the entry of default.'t4 The
court of appeals had differed with this reading of the statute, engrafting upon
it the requirement of a timely answer.
115
107. 51 N.C. App. 466, 277 S.E.2d 126 (1981).
108. 304 N.C. at 337, 283 S.E.2d at 510. Plaintiffs allegations provided, in pertinent part, as
follows: "[O]n or about the 19th day of October, 1978, the defendant, without cause, did inten-
tionally, willfully and maliciously assault and batter the plaintiff, inflicting on him serious and
permanent personal injuries. . . ." 304 N.C. at 335-36, 283 S.E.2d at 509. Under decisions prior
to 1970, the plaintiffwould have been required to state with particularity the facts illustrating such
aggravating circumstances as would justify an award of punitive damages. Clemmons v. Life Ins.
Co. of Ga., 274 N.C. 416, 163 S.E.2d 761 (1968); Cook v. Lanier, 267 N.C. 166, 147 S.E.2d 910
(1966).
109. Peeples v. Moore, 302 N.C. 351, 275 S.E.2d 833 (1981); Whitfield v. Wakefield, 51 N.C.
App. 124, 275 S.E.2d 263, disc. rev. denied, 303 N.C. 184, 280 S.E.2d 459 (1981).
110. 302 N.C. 351, 275 S.E.2d 833 (1981).
111. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). A party can file for enlargement of the time in which an answer
must be filed under N.C.R. Civ. P. 6(b).
112. 48 N.C. App. 497, 507, 269 S.E.2d 694, 700 (1980).
113. 302 N.C. at 352-53, 275 S.E.2d at 836.
114. Id.
115. 48 N.C. App. at 501,269 S.E.2d at 697. The court of appeals had relied on Bell v. Martin,
299 N.C. 715, 264 S.E.2d 101 (1980); and Crotts v. Pawn Shop, Inc., 16 N.C. App. 392, 192 S.E.2d
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According to what the court of appeals deemed the better reasoned view,
the burden would be placed on the defendant either to adhere to the time limit
for answering, upon penalty of an entry of default, or to move the court for a
time extension in which to file a responsive pleading. 1 6 Of course, the entry
of default could always be set aside upon a showing of a good cause. The
supreme court's view, on the other hand, prevents the entry of default ab initio
if the defendant had filed an answer, 1 7 thus placing, in practical effect, a bur-
den on the plaintiff "to race to the courthouse" to request an entry of default
before the defendant files his untimely answer. The clear lesson is that plain-
tiff's attorney should exercise greater vigilance in watching the passage of time
following service of the complaint on a defendant.
In Whifeld v. Wakfield" s8 plaintiff sought damages arising out of his
purchase of books from defendant. Plaintiff filed a complaint, serving a copy
on defendant, a New Hampshire resident. Plaintiff received a letter from de-
fendant acknowledging receipt of the complaint and informing plaintiff that
he believed that the averments constituted nothing but "rhetoric" and that his
lawyer thought the complaint "highly laughable [and] a disgrace."' '9 Plaintiff,
after the time for filing a responsive pleading had expired, requested that the
clerk make an entry of default, and the clerk complied. Plaintiff then moved
for default judgment, which the district court judge granted, expressly ruling
that defendant had not filed a responsive pleading or otherwise appeared.
120
Defendant moved to set the default judgment aside, arguing that he had "ap-
peared" through the letter sent to plaintiff and therefore should have been
given three days' notice of the hearing on plaintiffs application for judgment
by default.'1
2
A different district court set the judgment aside, finding that, contrary to
the prior judge's findings of fact, defendant had "appeared" and therefore
should have been given notice of the hearing.' 22 Plaintiff appealed, and the
court of appeals vacated and remanded, holding that the second judge had no
power to substitute his finding for that of the first judge, even if the first judge
had been wrong; a motion to set aside the default judgment could not be used
as a substitute for appellate review. 123 Moreover, even assuming that the let-
ter did constitute an appearance, the default judgment should not have been
55, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 425, 192 S.E.2d 835 (1972). In Bell the court noted that if the defendant
does not answer within 30 days, without requesting an extension, the plaintiff may move for entry
of default. 299 N.C. at 720, 264 S.E.2d at 105. In Bell, however, no answer had been filed.
116. 48 N.C. App. at 501, 269 S.E.2d at 697.
117. 302 N.C. at 352-53, 275 S.E.2d at 836.
118. 51 N.C. App. 124, 275 S.E.2d 263 (1981).
119. Id. at 125, 275 S.E.2d at 264.
120. Id. An "appearance" contemplates some sort of submission to the court but does not
require that a defendant have actually answered the complaint. See, e.g., Webb v. James, 46 N.C.
App. 551, 265 S.E.2d 642 (1980) (defendant appeared when he negotiated a continuance of the
action).
121. Under N.C.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), a defendant who has "appeared" is entitled to three days'
notice of the hearing on the plaintiffs application for a judgment by default.
122. 51 N.C. App. at 126, 275 S.E.2d at 265.
123. Id.
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set aside despite a technical violation of rule 55(b)(2). 124 In light of defend-
ant's referral to the summons served upon him as "laughable," and his failure
to answer, justice would not have been served by designating the failure to
give defendant notice an extraordinary circumstance of the type that is re-
quired by rule 60(b)(6).
125
G. Rule 60(b): Relie/from Judgment
Rule 60(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that relief may be obtained from a judgment on the grounds of "[m]istake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."' 12 6 Normally, motions made
pursuant to this rule must be made not more than one year after entry of
judgment. 127 In Love v. Moore,128 however, the court of appeals found an
exception to the one-year limit.
The saga of this simple personal injury action spans more than a decade
and has yet to come to a conclusion. On October 30, 1970, plaintiff was in-
jured by one Frank Willard Moore in an automobile accident. After the acci-
dent, plaintiffs attorney entered into settlement negotiations with Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company under North Carolina's assigned risk plan.'
2 9
These negotiations proved unsuccessful, prompting plaintiff's attorney to file a
complaint on October 29, 1973, naming Moore as defendant.' 30 The action
came for trial on April 30, 1975, and defendant Moore failed to appear. Waiv-
ing trial by jury, plaintiff presented her evidence and obtained judgment.
Apparently unable to locate Moore, plaintiff on May 31, 1977, fied a
complaint against Nationwide to collect on her judgment against Moore.
13 1
In that action, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs 1975 judgment was void for
lack of personal jurisdiction over Moore, and for failure to comply with rule
124. Id. at 127, 275 S.E.2d at 266.
125. Id.
126. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
127. Motions for relief "shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and
(3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken." N.C.R,
Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
128. 54 N.C. App. 406, 283 S.E.2d 801 (1981).
129. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.34(2) (1978) provides that the Commissioner of Insurance shall
devise a plan for the "equitable apportionment among... insurance carriers of those applicants
for motor vehicle liability insurance on motor vehicles registered or principally garaged in this
State who are unable to secure such insurance through ordinary means." Participation in the plan
is mandatory for all motor vehicle liability insurance carriers.
130. 54 N.C. App. at 407, 283 S.E.2d at 802. The insurer, which was not unaware of the
insured's identity, or of its potential liability, made no attempt during settlement negotiations to
correct plaintiffs misunderstanding. The court thus rejected the insurer's attack on the plaintiffs
service of process on Moore by publication, reasoning that the risk that Moore would be misled by
name difference was reduced by the notice reference to details of the accident. Id. at 407, 410, 283
S.E.2d at 802, 804.
131. Love v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 45 N.C. App. 444, 445, 263 S.E.2d 327, 338, disc. rev.
denied, 300 N.C. 198, 269 S.E.2d 617 (1980). Nationwide impleaded Moore in that action alleging
that Moore violated the terms of the policy by failing to notify Nationwide of plaintiffs earlier
action and that Moore was therefore liable to Nationwide for any amount Nationwide was found
to be liable to plaintiff. On this third-party complaint, Nationwide obtained a default judgment
against Moore for failure to plead or defend.
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55 on entry of default before seeking judgment. The court of appeals in Love
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 132 reversed the trial court's ruling but
nevertheless affirmed the dismissal of the action. In a case of first impression,
the court determined that plaintiff's 1975 judgment was in effect a default
judgment against Moore, Nationwide's assigned risk.133 The court then held
that the judgment was unenforceable against Nationwide because of plaintiffs
failure to fulfill the notice requirements of G.S. 20-279.21(f)(1).
134
On June 10, 1980, nearly eight years after filing the original complaint,
plaintiff successfully moved in the trial court to vacate the "unenforceable
judgment" 135 and was allowed to serve Nationwide with the required notice.
From a denial of its motion to strike the order to vacate, Nationwide appealed.
In a remarkable about-face, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
rulings. Noting that rule 60(b) allows a movant to set aside its own judg-
ments, 136 the court upheld the trial court's determination that plaintiff fol-
lowed the law when she obtained a judgment against Moore without giving
notice to Nationwide. The court reasoned that because plaintiff did not know
that the judgment obtained would be held to be a default judgment, and be-
cause Nationwide did not inform her that its insured was an assigned risk, she
"acted in compliance with the facts and law as she reasonably understood
them in giving notice only to Moore.':
137
132. 45 N.C. App. 444, 263 S.E.2d 337 (1980)
133. Id. at 448, 263 S.E.2d at 340.
134. Id. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(0(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
As to policies issued to insureds in this State under the assigned risk plan or through the
North Carolina Motor Vehicle Reinsurance Facility, a default judgment taken against
such an insured shall not be used as a basis for obtaining judgment against the insurer
unless counsel for the plaintiff has forwarded to the insurer, or to one of its agents, by
registered or certified mail with return receipt requested, or served by any other method
of service provided by law, a copy of summons, complaint, or other pleadings, filed in
the action.
135. 54 N.C. App. at 408, 283 S.E.2d at 803. Plaintiffs motion to vacate did not specify the
rule number under which she was proceeding, as required by N.C. Gen. R Practice for Superior
& Dist. Cts. 6. Id. at 412, 283 S.E.2d at 805 (Vaughn, J., dissenting).
136. The former statute governing relief from judgments, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-220 (1969), pro-
vided for relief to "a party from a judgment, order, verdict or other proceeding taken against
him." N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b), however, imposes no such restriction and it is now clear that any
party may seek relief under the rule. See Wood v. Wood, 297 N.C. 1, 252 S.E.2d 799 (1979); W.
Shuford, supra note 70, § 60-4, at 478-79.
137. 54 N.C. App. at 409, 283 S.E.2d at 803. This reasoning does not square easily with the
court's earlier statement in Love v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.:
The burden which our holding places onplaintif's counsel, to inquire into the insurance
status of the defendant and in appropriate cases notify the insurer, is slight compared to
the damage which could result to the insurer if it is effectively foreclosed from defending
against the action. The giving of such notice is a condition precedent to maintaining a
subsequent action against the insurer on the judgment, and the plaintiff's failure to pro-
vide that notice here operates as a bar to her action against Nationwide.
45 N.C. App. at 448-49, 263 S.E.2d at 340 (emphasis added). Under this reasoning, it is irrelevant
that plaintiff obtained a default judgment; giving notice to the insurer was the plaintiff's burden
and a condition precedent to any enforceable judgment against the insurer.
Similarly, it is incomprehensible why failure to give the insurer proper notice barred relief in
an independent action, while such failure did not bar relief on a motion in the cause. Rule
60(b)(6) states that "[t]he procedure for obtaining any relief from ajudgment, order, or proceeding
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The court rejected Nationwide's contention that the trial court erred in
vacating the judgment against Moore and authorizing notice to Nationwide
more than seven years after the original complaint.1 38 In reasoning that con-
tradicts its earlier statements in Love v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
13 9
the court observed that "if [G.S. 20-279.21(f)(1)] is construed as placing the
burden on the claimant to ascertain whether an insured is an assigned risk in
order that the claimant may comply with the notice requirements thereby im-
posed, failure to do so is, in all likelihood, a matter of attorney neglect."'
40
The court held that failure to inquire into the status of Nationwide's insured
was excusable neglect under the circumstances and therefore upheld plaintiff's
motion for relief.141
Aside from completely disregarding its earlier holding in Love v. Nation-
wide Mutual.Insurance Co., the court applied a rule that clearly was not avail-
able. As noted earlier, a motion for relief from judgment on the grounds of
excusable neglect must be made within one year from entry of judgment.142
In holding that failure to inquire into the status of Nationwide's insured was
excusable neglect-and thereby upholding plaintiff's motion-the court in ef-
fect granted relief under rule 60(b)(1) more than four years after the time for
filing such motion had expired.
143
Not all rule 60(b) motions, however, are construed so liberally. This is
especially true of motions for relief from consent judgments. t44 The recent
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action." N.C.R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6). In a great majority of cases, the essential inquiry into whether the circumstances sur-
rounding a judgment warrant relief will be identical regardless whether relief is sought by motion
or by independent action. The right to bring an independent action was preserved under rule
60(b)(6) merely to enable courts to grant relief in appropriate cases in which relief under rule
60(b) would not be available. For a discussion of what may constitute an appropriate case, see W.
Shuford, supra note 70, § 60-17, at 490-91.
138. 54 N.C. App. at 409-10, 283 S.E.2d at 803-04.
139. See note 137 supra.
140. 54 N.C. App. at 410, 283 S.E.2d at 804.
141. Id.
142. See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
143. The court arguably upheld relief under rule 60(b)(6), which is available for "[a]ny other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The rule states that such motion
"shall be made within a reasonable time.... " N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The court's emphasis on
excusable neglect, however, together with the lack of reference to rule 60(b)(6), negatives this
contention. Moreover, as Judge Vaughn argued in dissent, plaintiff showed "no reason 'justifying
relief within the meaning of [rule 60(b)(6)] (even if it could be said the motion was made within a
reasonable time)." 54 N.C. App. at 412, 283 S.E.2d at 805 (Vaughn, J., dissenting). Finally, it
would seem that motions cognizable under rule 60(b)(1) which are not made within the one-year
limit should not be entertained under the guise of rule 60(b)(6), absent extraordinary circum-
stances. See, e.g., Norton v. Sawyer, 30 N.C. App. 420,227 S.E.2d 148, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 176,
229 S.E.2d 689 (1976) (refusing to grant relief for excusable neglect on motion made 17 months
after entry of judgment); W. Shuford, supra note 70, § 60-11, at 485 ("when the circumstances
constituting the neglect clearly fall within Rule (60)(b)(l) and there is no showing based on com-
petent evidence that justice requires the vacation of the judgment, Rule 60(b)(6) will not apply").
144. Under the clear meaning of rule 60(b), consent judgments, like all other judgments, may
be attacked either by an independent action or by a motion in the cause. See W. Shuford, supra
note 70, § 60-11, at 485. Formerly, attacks based upon want of consent or irregularity ofjudgment
could be set aside only by a motion in the cause. See, e.g., Overton v. Overton, 259 N.C. 31, 129
S.E.2d 593 (1963). Attacks based upon fraud or mutual mistake could be made only by an in-
dependent action. See, e.g., Becker v. Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964). The North
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case of Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Bounous145 illustrates the stringent bur-
den facing movants requesting relief from consent judgments.
In that case, Wachovia claimed title to property under a will devising a
life estate to defendant's sister, remainder in trust to Wachovia. Shortly after
the death of defendant's sister, Wachovia sought removal of defendant and his
personal property from the land. Upon defendant's failure to move,
Wachovia filed suit.146 Sometime thereafter a consent judgment was entered
which recited that defendant was to relinquish any claim to the property by
executing a quit-claim deed to Wachovia. 14 7 Nine days later, however, de-
fendant moved for relief pursuant to rule 60(b)(6), asserting that he did not
understand the nature and effect of the consent judgment and that the trial
court erred by failing to make an independent determination of the factual
and legal basis for the entry of such judgment.' 48
At the hearing on the motion, defendant's evidence showed that he was
almost eighty years of age and had a severe hearing defect, a first-grade educa-
tion and an incapacity to read or understand some words. Defendant testified
that he did not talk to his lawyers because he was unable to hear them; defend-
ant's attorney, however, testified that he communicated with defendant at all
times and that the documents were explained to defendant in a loud voice.
14 9
Even assuming that defendant's attorney did attempt to explain the nature and
effect of the consent judgment, it is safe to conclude that defendant did not
comprehend the explanation. From a denial of his rule 60(b)(6) motion, de-
fendant appealed.
In response to defendant's contention that relief should be granted be-
cause the trial court failed to conduct an independent hearing on the existence
of actual consent of all parties, the court of appeals held that a judge may
properly rely on the signatures of the parties as evidence of consent to a judg-
ment.150 The court recited "the general rule that one who signs a contract is
presumed to know its contents,"' 15 1 and added that there was no evidence
before the trial judge alerting him to the alleged lack of consent. 152 The court
distinguished Owens v. Voncannon, 153 Lee v. Rhodes'5 4 and Lalanne v.
Carolina Court of Appeals apparently is still operating under the former procedure-notwith-
standing rule 60(b). See, e.g., State ex. rel. N.C. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Eng'rs
& Land Surveyors v. Testing Laboratories, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 344,348,278 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1981)
("The proper procedure to vacate a consent judgment for fraud or mutual mistake is by an in-
dependent action. The proper procedure to set aside the judgment for reasons of want of consent
is by a motion in the cause.") (citations omitted). See also City of Salisbury v. Kirk Realty Co., 48
N.C. App. 427, 268 S.E.2d 873 (1980); Hazard v. Hazard, 35 N.C. App. 668, 242 S.E.2d 196 (1978).
145. 53 N.C. App. 700, 281 S.E.2d 712 (1981).
146. Id. at 701-02, 281 S.E.2d at 713. Defendant claimed title by devise from his sister, who,
defendant asserted, acquired the title by adverse possession of the tract from 1915 to 1977. Id.
147. Id. at 702, 281 S.E.2d at 713.
148. Id. at 703, 281 S.E.2d at 713-14.
149. Id. at 703-05, 281 S.E.2d at 714.
150. Id. at 706, 281 S.E.2d at 715.
151. Id. (quoting Ellis v. Mullen, 34 N.C. App. 367, 370, 238 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1977)).
152. Id.
153. 251 N.C. 351, 111 S.E.2d 700 (1959). In Owens defendant moved to vacate a consent
judgment on the grounds that defendant's attorney of record was not authorized to enter judgment
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Lalanne155 by noting that in "all those cases the lack of assent of one of the
parties to the judgment was manifested to the trial court before the judgment
was signed or one of the parties failed to sign the judgment."' 5 6 Holding that
the record contained competent evidence supporting the trial judge's findings
of fact, the court upheld the denial of defendant's motion.
Although this decision is procedurally correct, it is difficult to envision a
case more deserving of equitable relief. This case thus illustrates that relief
will not be dispensed lightly from rule 60(b)(6)'s reservoir of equity.'
57
H. Rule 50 Motion for Directed Verdict and JNOV
1. JNOV
A motion for JNOV under rule 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure may be granted only "if it appears that the motion for directed
verdict could properly have been granted."' 58 Under the plain meaning of the
rule, a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is an absolute
prerequisite to the right to move for JNOV. 159 The existence of this decep-
tively simple requirement, however, has not yet been fully realized by some
courts and litigants.
In Graves v. Walston,'60 for example, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina reversed the court of appeals on two grounds. Without having moved
earlier for a directed verdict, plaintiffs' counsel made three motions following
an unfavorable jury verdict, one of which was a motion for JNOV.16' The
trial court granted the motion and the court of appeals affirmed. 162 In revers-
ing the JNOV, the supreme court stated that the rationale underlying the pre-
on her behalf. The supreme court reversed the denial of defendant's motion and remanded to the
trial court for findings of fact on the issue of authorization. The only significant difference
between Owens and Bounous is that defendant in Bounous signed the judgment himself while in
Owens defendant's purported agent signed on her behalf. However, because actual consent was
the determinative issue in both motions for relief, this difference should go only towards the suffi-
ciency of the evidence and not towards the right to relief.
154. 227 N.C. 240, 41 S.E.2d 747 (1947) (plaintiff allowed to repudiate previous open-court
consent to judgment prior to the signing and entry of the judgment).
155. 43 N.C. App. 528, 259 S.E.2d 402 (1979) (defendant allowed to repudiate previous open-
court consent to judgment prior to the signing and entry of the judgment).
156. 53 N.C. App. at 706, 281 S.E.2d at 715 (emphasis in original).
157. "While Rule 60(b)(6) has been described as a 'grand reservoir of equitable power to do
justice in a particular case,'... it should not be a 'catch-all' rule." Norton v. Sawyer, 30 N.C.
App. 420,426,227 S.E.2d 148, 153, disc. rev. denied, 291 N.C. 176, 229 S.E.2d 689 (1976) (quoting
7 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.27, at 375 (2d ed. 1975)). The setting aside of a judg-
ment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) "should only take place where (1) extraordinary circumstances
exist and (2) there is a showing that justice demands it. This test is two-pronged, and relief should
be forthcoming only where both requisites exist." Baylor v. Brown, 46 N.C. App. 664, 670, 266
S.E.2d 9, 13 (1980). For the four factors used in determining whether this two-prong test has been
met, see Standard Equip. Co. v. Albertson, 35 N.C. App. 144, 147, 240 S.E.2d 499, 501-02 (1978).
158. N.C.R. Civ. P. 50(b)(1).
159. Id.
160. 302 N.C. 336, 275 S.E.2d 485 (1981).
161. Id. at 336, 275 S.E.2d at 488. Plaintiffs counsel also moved to set aside the jury's answers
to two issues of fact, and for a new trial. The former was expressly denied by the court of appeals;
the latter was never ruled on. Id. at 337, 275 S.E.2d at 488.
162. 46 N.C. App. 606, 275 S.E.2d 570 (1980) (unpublished opinion).
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requisite of a motion for directed verdict is to afford the non-movant the
opportunity to cure defects in proof that might otherwise prevent submission
of the case to the jury.16 3 A motion for JNOV without previous notice of
possible deficiencies of proof would foreclose the possibility of cure except by
instituting a new trial.164
The second ground for the court's reversal was the failure of the trial
court to rule on plaintiffs' postverdict motion for a new trial.1 65 Rule 50(c)(1)
provides that, whenever a motion for JNOV is joined with a motion for a new
trial, and the motion for JNOV is subsequently granted, the trial court must
also rule on the new trial motion. 166 This ruling is necessary to enable the
appellate court to act properly on the trial court's decision if that decision is
vacated or reversed. In Graves, however, the supreme court chose not to re-
mand to the trial court for a conditional ruling on the motion for new trial
because "[ilt would be inappropriate for another superior court judge who did
not try the case to now pass upon plaintiffs' alternative motion- for a new
trial."' 167 The court therefore remanded the case for a new trial
1 68
Graves thus illustrates two simple, but often overlooked, points. First, to
preserve the availability of a motion for JNOV, the movant must first move
for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. Second, when a motion
for JNOV is joined with a motion for a new trial, the trial judge must rule on
both motions, and failure to do so may be grounds for a new trial. 169
2. Directed Verdict
Until relatively recently, a directed verdict in favor of the party with the
burden of proof was rarely allowed. 170 In Paccar Financial Corp. v. Harnett
163. 302 N.C. at 338, 275 S.E.2d at 489 (citing 5A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 50.08
(2d ed. 1980); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2537 (1971)).
164. 302 N.C. at 338, 275 S.E.2d at 489.
165. Id. at 339, 275 S.E.2d at 489. See note 163 supra.
166. N.C.R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict... is granted, the court
shall also rule on the motion for new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds
for granting or denying the motion for the new trial.
167. 302 N.C. at 340, 275 S.E.2d at 490. The court noted that the special superior court judge
who tried the case was no longer on the bench. Id.
168. Id. at 342, 275 S.E.2d at 491.
169. See notes 165-68 and accompanying text supra. See also Hoots v. Calaway, 282 N.C. 477,
193 S.E.2d 709 (1973) (trial court failed to rule on defendants' motion for new trial that was joined
with motion for JNOV; on reversal of JNOV and remand for entry of judgment for plaintiffs,
defendants were allowed to appeal therefrom and to assert errors that entitled them to new trial).
170. Beginning with dictum in Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 421, 180 S.E.2d 297, 314 (1971),
the principle began to emerge in North Carolina that a party with the burden of proof may be
entitled to a directed verdict when the credibility of that party's witnesses is established as a matter
of law. This principle was later recognized in Murray v. Murray, 296 N.C. 405, 250 S.E.2d 276
(1979). It was not until North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524, 537-38, 256 S.E.2d
388, 396 (1979), however, that the supreme court expressly outlined the circumstances in which the
credibility of a movant's witnesses can be established as a matter of law for purposes of directing a
verdict in the movant's favor. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1979-Civil
Procedure, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1261, 1270-73 (1980).
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Transfer, Inc. 17 1 the court of appeals followed the emerging trend172 and up-
held the trial court's granting of a directed verdict in favor of the party with
the burden of proof when that party's evidence did not depend on the credibil-
ity of its witnesses.
173
In Paccar plaintiff brought suit seeking to foreclose on its perfected secur-
ity interest in a truck and moved for a directed verdict at the close of all the
evidence. The trial court submitted three issues to the jury but peremptorily
iistructed them to answer the first issue in the affirmative, which was whether
plaintiff was entitled to possession of the truck. With the jury hung on the two
remaining issues and a mistrial subsequently declared, plaintiff successfully
moved pursuant to rule 50(b) for judgment in accordance with the directed
verdict of plaintiff's right to immediate possession of the truck. 1
74
In its aflrmance, the court of appeals noted that while a verdict may not
be directed in favor of a party having the burden of proof when his right to
recover depends on the credibility of his witnesses, 175 a verdict may be di-
rected when his right to recover does not so depend, and when the pleadings,
evidence and stipulations show that there is no issue of genuine fact for jury
consideration. 176 Applying the above principle, the court found that the
pleadings and evidence established uncontroverted facts that entitled plaintiff
to possession of the truck as a matter of law and therefore upheld the directed
verdict.1
77
This case exemplifies a principle that is now established law in North
Carolina. Optimal utilization of this principle will likely be realized when the
party with the burden of proof moves initially for summary judgment and the
non-movant narrowly escapes this motion. When the action proceeds to trial
the movant may then be in position to call his adversary's bluff with a motion
for directed verdict even though the movant bears the burden of proof.
L Statutory Developments
Rule 4(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure was amended
by the General Assembly in 1981 to require that a summons state that a re-
quest for admission is being served with the summons if a request is to be
171. 51 N.C. App. 1, 275 S.E.2d 243, disc. rev. denied, 302 N.C. 629, 280 S.E.2d 441 (1981).
172. See note 170 supra. This new position had long been recommended by Professor Martin
Louis of the University of North Carolina School of Law. See Louis, A Survey of Decisions
Under the New North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 729, 746-54 (1972).
173. 51 N.C. App. at 5, 275 S.E.2d at 245. Although the court of appeals labeled plaintifi's
motion a motion for directed verdict, id. at 6, 275 S.E.2d at 247, it was technically a motion for
JNOV. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 50(b)(1).
174. 51 N.C. App. at 5, 275 S.E.2d at 245.
175. Id., 275 S.E.2d at 246 (citing Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 417, 180 S.E.2d 297, 311
(1971)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 9-10, 285 S.E.2d at 248-49. In somewhat similar vein, the court of appeals in Carter
v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 52 N.C. App. 520, 278 S.E.2d 893, disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C.
193, 285 S.E.2d 96 (1981), held that the depositions of two doctors concerning the cause of plain-
tiff's injuries were not sufficient as a matter of law to refute plaintifl's contention of a different
cause, and thus summary judgment was not granted.
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served.1 78 Former subdivision 4(j)(9)(c) has been redesignated 401), and the
first sentence has been simplified to read, "A party that cannot with due dili-
gence be served by personal delivery or registered or certified mail may be
served by publication." 179 A new subdivision 402) has been added regarding
proof of service.1 80 Former subdivision 4(j)(9)(d) has been redesignated 4(j3)
and the last sentence has been rewritten.' 81 A new subdivision to rule 4 has
been added, (j4), providing that parties cannot attack judgments by default on
the ground that personal service rather than service by registered mail could
have been made, or on the ground that due diligence to serve personally or by
registered mail was not exercised when service was effected by publication if
the party had actual notice of the pending action.'8 2 Former rule 401) has
been redesignated 05).183 Finally, former rule 4(j)(9), except for subdivisions
(c) and (d), has been repealed. 84
The "amount in controversy" maximum for small claims actions in dis-
trict court has been raised to $1000 from $800.185
DEBRA LEE FOSTER
WILLIAM CLYDE MORRIS, III
JEFFREY NEIL ROBINSON
178. Law of May 14, 1981, ch. 384, § 3, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 427 (N.C.L Civ. P.
4(b)).
179. Law of June 10, 1981, ch. 540, § 3, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 813 (N.C.R. Civ. P.
401)).
180. Id. (N.C.R. Civ. P. 402)).
181. Id. at 814 (N.C.R Civ. P. 403)). The last sentence of the revised subdivision 4(j)(9)(d),
now 403), reads as follows: "Proof of service may be made as prescribed in G.S. 1-75.10, by the
order of the court, or by the law of the foreign country. Proof of service by mail shall include an
affidavit or certificate of addressing and mailing by the clerk of court." Id.
182. Id. (N.C.R. Civ. P. 404)).
183. Id. (N.C.R. Civ. P. 405)).
184. Id. (N.C.R. Civ. P. 469)(a)-(b)).
185. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 555, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 824 (codified at N.C.




1. Interpretation of Insurance Contracts
2
The North Carolina Supreme Court construed provisions of insurance
1. Additional Developments: In United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d
985 (4th Cir. 1981), a diversity action for breach of contract, plaintiff maintained that North
Carolina law imposes a good faith limitation upon a party's exercise of an unconditional right of
contract termination. Stating that the facts did not call for a resolution of the question, the court
decided the case on other grounds. However, Judge Haynsworth indicated that good faith may be
required in certain situations: "When termination is oppressive, when it. would frustrate
expectations reasonably held, though unsecured by express contractual agreements and when it
will impose substantial losses upon the other party, application of the principle may well be called
for .... Id. at 989. The court also rejected the contention that good faith requires a party to
notify the other party promptly of his intent to exercise an unconditional right of termination; they
specifically referred to a tenant's right not to inform his landlord of his intent to end the lease until
notice is required.
In Burke County Pub. Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Juno Constr. Corp., 50 N.C. App. 238, 273
S.E.2d 504, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 304 N.C. 187, 279 S.E.2d 350 (1981), plaintiff
sued for contractor's failure to properly install a school roof. Defendant general contractor was
able to prove that damage to the roof resulted solely from deficiencies in the design and
specifications furnished by plaintiff. The court adopted the general rule that a contractor is not
liable for the consequences of defects in plans and specifications when the contractor is required to
and does comply with the plans and specifications prepared by the owner and his architect. See
also H. L. Coble Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth., 244 N.C. 261, 93 S.E.2d 98 (1956) (allegation that
plaintiff had to correct the settling of floor slabs constructed in accordance with plans and
specifications provided by the defendant's architect stated a good cause of action).
In Brown v. Scism, 50 N.C. App. 619, 274 S.E.2d 897 (1981), cert. denied, 302 N.C. 396, 276
S.E.2d 919 (1981), the court of appeals applied the judicially mandated rule that allows payment
of interest from the date of breach when the amount of damages in a breach of contract action is
ascertained from the contract itself, or from relevant evidence. Id. at 627, 274 S.E.2d at 902; see
General Metals v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 259 N.C. 709, 712, 131 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1963). The judicial
rule expands the statutory language of G.S. 24-5, which requires the payment of interest on the
principal amount recovered in contract suits "from the time of rendering judgment thereon until it
is paid and satisfied." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Despite a 1981 amendment to
G.S. 24-5, which allows interest on money judgments for compensatory damages from the time
the action is instituted when the claim is covered by insurance, the legislature has not incorporated
the judicial rule into the statute. See Law of May 5, 1981, ch. 327, §1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st
Sess. 369.
2. Other decisions involving questions of policy coverage: Norman v. Banasik, 304 N.C.
341, 283 S.E.2d 489 (1981) (sufficient evidence of a forcible burglary to trigger coverage under
term of policy requiring such evidence); First Nat'l Bank v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 303 N.C. 203,
278 S.E.2d 507 (1981) (employee's failure to convert group term life insurance policy constituted
waiver under policy provisions); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 55 N.C. App. 76, 284 S.E.2d
532 (1981) (policy required excess coverage under "temporary substitute automobile" clause);
Moore v. Beacon Ins. Co., 54 N.C. App. 669, 284 S.E.2d 136 (1981) (insured not entitled to collect
medical expenses pursuant to uninsured motorists coverage provision and again under the
medical payments provisions of a liability insurance policy); Caldwell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 54 N.C. App. 346, 283 S.E.2d 415 (1981) (express $500 limitation for loss of watergraft
enforced); Buchanan v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 54 N.C. App. 263, 283 S.E.2d 421 (1981)
(insured adopted answers on life insurance application as own by her signature); Allen v.
American Sec. Ins. Co., 53 N.C. App. 239, 280 S.E.2d 471 (1981) (insurer not liable for failure to
disclose a previous wreck because it neither had possession nor acquired titled to totalled vehicle);
Carethers v. Blair, 53 N.C. App. 233, 280 S.E.2d 467 (1981) (insurance policy an "undistributed
asset" of decedent's estate and available to satisfy claim of judgment creditor of closed estate);
Jerome v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 52 N.C. App. 573, 279 S.E.2d 42 (1981) (plaintiff had insurable
interest when he took a deed of trust from one with an insurable interest); Holcomb v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 52 N.C. App. 474, 279 S.E.2d 50 (1981) (gutter downspout considered part of
plumbing under policy); Smith v. King, 52 N.C. App. 158, 277 S.E.2d 875 (1981) (third party
beneficiary not entitled to statutory treble damages from insurer for unfair trade practice of
contracts in three cases in 1981. In Lovell v. Rowan Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 3
the supreme court decided that an innocent wife could recover under an insur-
ance policy issued to her husband that insured property owned by them as
tenants by the entirety, even though the loss resulted from the husband's inten-
tional burning of the property. After her husband intentionally destroyed their
house by fire, plaintiff brought suit to recover the value of her interest in the
realty from defendant insurance company. The insurance policy named only
the husband as insured and beneficiary, and provided that the entire policy
would be void in case of fraud by the insured.
4
The court first decided that even though only the husband was named as
insured, the wife also was entitled to recover under the policy. The court found
that both case precedent and statutory language gave defendant sufficient no-
tice that "by insuring the interest of the husband it also insured the interest of
plaintiff wife.
' 5
Jurisdictions differ regarding recovery by an innocent spouse of a share of
the insurance proceeds in this situation.6 "Generally speaking, the question
whether an innocent coinsured may recover on property insurance after an-
other coinsured has committed some act of fraud . . . ordinarily depends
upon whether the interests of the coinsureds are joint or severable."'7 The
supreme court found that the interests in the cash proceeds of the insurance
policy are governed by the law of contracts, rather than the law of tenancies by
the entirety, and held that the interest of the coinsureds are severable when
contract principles are applied.8 Interests in the proceeds of an insurance con-
tract are held by the coinsureds in the same way as other personal property.9
The court approved ° the reasoning in Howell v. Ohio Casualty Insurance
Co. , I1 in which the contract rights were treated as severable personal property
that could be possessed by either spouse.
Once the court established that the interests in the proceeds were severa-
ble, it was left with the simple construction of a contract between the wife and
refusing to settle; single refusal to settle did not constitute a general business practice); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allison, 51 N.C. App. 654, 277 S.E.2d 473 (1981) (wife considered a resident of
insured's household despite marital difficulties; parties' intent controlling); McGee v. Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 51 N.C. App. 72, 275 S.E.2d 212 (1981) (summary judgment
inappropriate where evidence of "sole cause" of injury conflicting); Shields v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 50 N.C. App. 355, 273 S.E.2d 756 (1981) (breach of contract without accompanying
tort did not give rise to an action for punitive damages).
3. 302 N.C. 150, 274 S.E.2d 170 (1981).
4. Id. at 150-51, 153-55, 274 S.E.2d at 171-73.
5. Id. at 153, 274 S.E.2d at 172 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-180.1; Carter v. Continential Ins.
Cc;., 242 N.C. 578, 89 S.E.2d 122 (1955)).
6. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 450, 451-52 (1969).
7. Id. at451.
8. 302 N.C. at 152-53, 274 S.E.2d at 171-72.
9. See Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, 85, 192 N.E.2d 20, 22, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50, 52
(1963): "If the insurance proceeds are the logical substitute of anything they are the fruit of the
insurance contract and the premiums paid under it." North Carolina does not recognize an estate
by the entirety in personal property. Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956).
10. 302 N.C. at 152-53, 274 S.E.2d at 172.
11. 124 N.J. Super. 414, 419, 307 A.2d 142, 145 (Law Div. 1973), af'd, 130 N.J. Super. 350,
327 A.2d 240 (App. Div. 1974).
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the insurance company.'2 A party cannot be made to forfeit his separate con-
tractual rights merely because of another's wrongful acts.13 It would therefore
be unjust, in the context of a spouse's separate contractual arrangements, to
hold the wife responsible for the wrongful acts of her husband.
14
The decision in Lovell demonstrates that North Carolina will apply rules
of contract law, rather than notions derived from the nature of tenancies, when
issues arise concerning insurance proceeds from real property. t5 Lovell also
indicates a desire not to treat the holders of personal property as tenants by the
entirety. 16 Although other jurisdictions have split on the issue decided in this
case, North Carolina seems to have opted for the more modem view of the
marital relationship by rejecting the common-law doctrine of marital unity
when spouses enter into insurance contracts that cover jointly held property. It
also seems fairer to allow the innocent spouse to be compensated for the real
loss he has suffered, rather than automatically to hold him accountable for the
acts of the other spouse.
In Maddox v. Colonial Lfe & Accident Insurance Co. 17 the supreme court
also interpreted specific provisions of an insurance policy. The decedent was
insured "against loss resulting directly and exclusively of all other causes from
. . . accidental means."' 8 The policy did not cover suicide, and paid only
one-fifth face value for death resulting from "shooting self-inflicted."' 19 Both
plaintiff-wife and defendant-insurance company agreed that the insured died
as a result of an accidental shooting. All that could be established was that the
gun was fired while in its holster, that the gun was found a few feet from the
insured's body, and that the gun could fire if it struck the ground. Plaintiff
sought to collect the full amount, but defendant claimed only one-fifth was
payable because the shooting was "self-inflicted" within the meaning of the
policy.
The critical issue was the construction of the term "shooting self-in-
flicted." The court held that the reduction clause applied only if "the insured
intended the act of shooting, which shooting ultimately resulted in his death,
but did not intend to kill himself."20 Thus, for a shooting to be self-inflicted,
12. 302 N.C. at 153-54, 274 S.E.2d at 172.
13. Id. at 154, 274 S.E.2d at 172-73 (citing Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398
(Del. 1978)).
14. Id.
15. See Forsyth County v. Plemmons, 2 N.C. App. 373, 163 S.E.2d 97 (1968) (insurance pro-
ceeds resulting from fire are not held in tenancy by the entirety). For further discussion of the
legal status of proceeds from property held in entirety, see this Survey, Property Section, at 1421.
16. The Lovell court recognized and rejected the view reflected in Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Hummel, 219 Va. 803, 250 S.E.2d 774, 776 (1979) that interests in insurance on jointly held
property are also jointly held. 302 N.C. at 154-55, 274 S.E.2d at 173; see also In re Foreclosure of
Deed of Trust, 303 N.C. 514, 279 S.E.2d 566 (1981) (surplus funds generated by a foreclosure sale
are held as tenants in common); see this Survey, Property Section, at 1422, for a discussion of the
implications of these decisions for North Carolina property law.
17. 303 N.C. 648, 280,$.E.2d 907 (1981).
18. Id. at 655, 280 S.E.2d at 911.
19. Id. at 650, 280 S.E.2d at 908.
20. Id. at 652, 280 S.E.2d at 910.
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the insured had to shoot himself with the intent of employing a firearm.21
Because the insurance company could not prove that the decedent had in-
tended to pull the trigger, the company had failed to establish any intentional
employment of the firearm by him.
One questionable portion of the opinion is the majority's construction
that an insured would be covered if he intended the act of shooting, but did
not intend to kill himself. This interpretation raises the issue whether the
death was brought about by "accidental means"; if not, the insured would not
be covered at all. As the dissent pointed out, prior cases held that the insured
could not have been shot by accidental means unless "the causal factor of
pulling the trigger" was "unusual, unforeseen and unexpected."'22 The court
in Maddox appears to have strayed from placing the emphasis on the charac-
ter of the causation in deciding whether death occurred by accidental means,
and instead has focused on the forseeability of result. If it is possible to intend
to pull the trigger and still recover under this policy, one can also argue that
any death not reasonably foreseeable as following from a voluntary act is the
result of accidental means. This implication would represent a broad expan-
sion of the scope of an insurer's liability under policies compensating for death
resulting from accidental means.
23
In a third insurance case decided by the supreme court, Great American
Insurance Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co. ,24 the court held that an insurer
may not deny coverage based on the insured's noncompliance with a notice
provision unless the insurer can prove that it has been prejudiced by the delay
in receiving notice.25 The Tate decision explicitly overruled earlier precedent
that had adopted a strict constructionist view of insurance contract notice
provisions.2
6
In Douglas v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 27 insurance coverage was
provided under an omnibus clause protecting anyone injured by the car if the
driver were acting with the owner's permission. The owner gave his permis-
sion to the driver but was mistaken as to his identity. As the policy did not
define "permission," the court of appeals applied general principles of contract
and tort law and concluded that a unilateral mistake does not negate permis-
sion in the absence of fraud, undue influence, oppression or knowing exploita-
21. See National Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ingalls, 56 Ala. App. 498, 501, 323 So.2d 384, 386 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1975) ("In ordinary parlance, to shoot oneself connotes that the injury results from direct,
immediate, and conscious employment of a firearm by the victim.")
22. 303 N.C. at 656, 280 S.E.2d at 912 (quoting Fletcher v. Security Life & Trust Co., 220
N.C. 148, 150, 16 S.E.2d 687, 688 (1941)).
23. See Fletcher v. Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 16 S.E.2d 687 (1941).
24. 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769 (1981).
25. Id. at 396, 279 S.E.2d at 711.
26. Id. at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 774. The court explicitly overruled Flemming v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964); Munice v. Travellers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116
S.E.2d 474 (1960); and Peeler v. United States Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E.2d 261 (1929).
27. 54 N.C. App 334, 283 S.E.2d 166 (1981).
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tion of the mistake. Since there was no indication of such abuse, the insured's
mistake did not relieve the insurer of its obligations under the policy.
2. Formation
The North Carolina Court of Appeals considered the ramifications of a
three-party contract in Dealer Specialties, Inc. v. Neighborhood Housing Serv-
ices, Inc..28 Defendant Neighborhood Housing Services assisted homeowners
in making home improvements by financing and supervising renovations. To
encourage plaintiff to sell building materials on credit to a building contractor
assigned to one of defendant's projects, defendant told plaintiff that the final
draw on the project would be a check payable jointly to plaintiff and the con-
tractor.29 The contractor left the project prior to completion and, conse-
quently, prior to the final draw without paying plaintiff for the materials
purchased. Plaintiff brought suit against Neighborhood Housing Services on
its obligation to make the last check payable jointly to plaintiff and the
contractor.
The majority of the court upheld the lower court's finding for plaintiff
that the oral contract was a direct unconditional promise between plaintiff and
defendant. 30 Furthermore, the majority indicated that the statute of frauds
was not applicable because the goods were received and accepted by the con-
tractor.31 Judge Becton's dissent agreed with the majority's finding that the
oral communication between plaintiff and defendant "constituted an original,
not a collateral, obligation .... -32 He argued, however, that Neighborhood
Housing Services' promise to make joint payment was conditioned on the oc-
currence of several events. One such event was the payment to the contractor
of the final draw on -the project.3 3 By delivering goods to the contractor on
credit, plaintiff took the risk that the final draw would be made to someone
other than the original contractor. Since the final draw was not paid to the
contractor with whom plaintiff dealt, the dissent argued that Neighborhood
Housing Services' performance should have been excused.
34
In Southern Spindle & Flyer Co. v. Milliken & Co. 3 5 the court of appeals
28. 54 N.C. App. 46, 283 S.E.2d 155 (1981).
29. Plaintiff's testimony indicated that the decision to sell goods to the contractor on credit
was based on defendant's promise that the final draw on the project would be a check issued
jointly to plaintiff and the contractor. Plaintifftook this as assurance that the contractor would not
make his final draw until payment was made. Id. at 51, 283 S.E.2d at 158-59.
30. Id. at 53, 283 S.E.2d at 160. If the contract had not been a direct or original promise, the
contract would fall within G.S. 22-1, which precludes actions on promises to answer for the debt
of another that are not in writing. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22-1 (1965); see 54 N.C. App. at 52, 283
S.E.2d at 159.
31. 54 N.C. App. at 54, 283 S.E.2d 160. G.S. 25-2-201(3)(c) provides that contracts for the
sale of goods at a price of $500 or more do not require a writing ff the goods have been received
and accepted. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-201(3)(c) (1965).
32. 54 N.C. App. at 55, 283 S.E.2d at 161 (1981) (J.Becton, dissenting); see text accompanying
note 30 supra.
33. Id. at 55-56, 283 S.E.2d at 161.
34. Id. at 56-57, 283.SE.2d at 161-62.
35. 53 N.C. App. 785; 281 S.E.2d 734 (1981).
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held that an arbitration term in a commercial form contract forwarded to
plaintiff after oral agreement between the parties did not become part of their
contract. 36 The parties had entered into an oral contract for plaintiff to per-
form services for defendant. After plaintiff had begun performance, defendant
sent plaintiff an unsolicited form titled "Purchase Order," on which defendant
had typed a description of the services that plaintiff was to perform. The
"Purchase Order" form included a provision, among other printed items, re-
quiring submission of all disputes to arbitration.37 Since the parties had al-
ready formed a valid oral contract, and since plaintiff did not sign or otherwise
assent to the form containing the arbitration agreement, the court held that
plaintiff had never accepted defendant's offer to alter the contract. 38 Hence,
the printed terms contained in the "Purchase Order" form, including the arbi-
tration agreement, did not become a part of the contract.
3 9
3. Consideration
In Holt v. Holt40 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that plaintiff's
promise to relinquish his right to litigate the validity of a codicil to a will did
not constitute sufficient consideration to support enforcement of defendants'
promises to plaintiff not to probate the codicil where there was no bona fide
dispute as to the will's validity. Plaintiff and defendants were brothers. Their
mother's will divided her property equally among her three sons; a subsequent
codicil, however, disinherited plaintiff. Defendants alleged that upon the read-
ing of the codicil, plaintiff became enraged and threatened to commence a
lawsuit unless defendants conveyed a share of the estate to him. 4 1 Plaintiff
alleged that defendants had agreed that, in return for plaintiffs promise not to
file a caveat to the codicil, the codicil would not be probated and the dece-
dent's property would descend as provided in the will.42 Due to a dispute over
the distribution agreed to by the parties, defendants offered the codicil for
probate. Plaintiff then brought suit to enforce the family settlement
agreement.
Although family settlement agreements are favored by the law, they can
be enforced only if supported by consideration.4 3 The court noted that lan-
guage in some cases44 seems to suggest that the mere quieting of a family
36. Id. at 786, 281 S.E.2d at 735.
37. Parties "may include in a written contract a provision for the settlement by arbitration of
any controversy thereafter arising between them relating to such contract. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1-567.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
38. 53 N.C. App. at 788, 281 S.E.2d at 736.
39. Id. In order for modification" of a contract to be valid, the new agreement must possess all
the elements necessary for the formation of a new contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 465
(1964). If this had been a contract for the sale of goods, rather than a contract to provide services,
then the arbitration agreement would have become a part of the contract. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-
207 (1965).
40. 304 N.C. 137, 282 S.E.2d 784 (1981).
41. Id. at 148, 282 S.E.2d at 791.
42. Id. at 141, 282 S.E.2d at 787.
43. Id. at 142, 282 S.E.2d at 787.
44. "The agreement was confessedly entered into for the purpose of quieting disputes be-
19821 1243
NORTH CAROLINA LAW.REVIEW
dispute over a will is sufficient consideration for agreements modifying that
will.45 In those cases, however, there was either other sufficient consideration
or a bona fide dispute over the wll.4 6 Relying on ONeil v. O'Nei, 47 the court
held that "in order for a promise not to contest a will to constitute considera-
tion to support a family settlement agreement modifying the will, there must
be a bona fide dispute as to the validity of the will in question. '48
The major significance of Holt may lie in the guidance the court gave in
evaluating whether a bona fide dispute exists. The court expressly rejected
any notion that a party who subjectively believes he has a good claim, but is
unable to show a reasonable basis for it, can argue that a bona fide dispute
exists.49 In order to find that the outcome of a contest is in doubt, "the bona
fides of the dispute must be reasonably apparent from all the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the dispute itself."' 50 If it is clear that the contestant
would have been unable at trial "to show any facts or circumstances from
which it could be reasonably determined" 51 that a real controversy existed,
and there is only "plaintiffs bare allegation that if the codicil were probated
he would contest it, ''52 the family settlement agreement cannot be enforced.
5 3
The Holt decision carefully balances the policies supporting family settle-
ment agreements. If a contestant's evidence does not genuinely put a will's
validity at issue, a court should not allow the threat of vexatious litigation to
upset the decedent's testamentary plan. If, however, there are reasonable
doubts about validity, concerns about "blackmail" and frivolous lawsuits fade
and the family settlement agreement serves to prevent "substantial expense to
the estate, protracted delay in its settlement, and complete disruption of family
harmony."'54
tween the children .... Such arrangements are upheld by considerations affecting the interests
of all the parties, often far more weighty than any considerations simply pecuniary." Bailey v.
Wilson, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 182, 189 (1835).
45. 304 N.C. at 144, 282 S.E.2d at 788.
46. Id. at 143, 144 n.3, 282 S.E.2d at 788, 789 n.3.
47. The mere fact that a caveat has been filed, standing alone, is not sufficient ground for
modification of the dispositive provisions of the will. The outcome of the litigation must
be in doubt to such extent that it is advisable for persons affected to accept the proposed
modifications rather than run the risk of the more serious consequences that would result
from an adverse verdict.
O'Neil v. O'Neil, 271 N.C. 106, 112, 155 S.E.2d 495, 500 (1967).
48. 304 N.C. at 146-47, 282 S.E.2d at 790.
49. Id. at 146 n.4, 282 S.E.2d at 790 n.4.
50. Id. at 147, 282 S.E.2d at 790.
51. Id. at 148-49, 282 S.E.2d at 791.
52. Id. at 149, 282 S.E.2d at 791.
53. Id.; see O'Neil v. O'Neil, 271 N.C. 106, 113, 155 S.E.2d 495, 501 (1967); see also Lenoir
Rhyne College v. Thorne, 13 N.C. App. 27, 33, 185 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1971) (bona fide controversy
existed as to whether a holographic document offered for probate was a valid codicil).
54. Lenoir Rhyne College v. Thorne, 13 N.C. App. 27, 33-34, 185 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1971).
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4. Assignment of Indemnity Judgments 55
In Walker Manufacturing Co. v. Dickerson, Inc. 56 the Federal District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina examined the enforceability
of an assigned judgment of indemnity. Walker Manufacturing brought a di-
versity action against defendant Dickerson, Inc. and won a judgment for
$194,000. Dickerson asserted cross-claims against Edwards Roofing & Sheet
Metal, Piedmont Engineering & Architects, and The Celotex Corporation. In
the trial of the third-party claims, the jury found Dickerson entitled to full
indemnity of $194,000 from Edwards, but none from Piedmont and Celotex.
Edwards, however, was found entitled to indemnity in the amount of $97,000
from Celotex and $48,500 from Piedmont. Edwards had not conducted any
business since 1976 and had no assets other than its indemnity claims; its cor-
porate charter had been suspended as well. Celotex filed a motion for an or-
der modifying the judgment to indicate that the judgment against Celotex was
conditional, and that no execution to collect indemnity would be allowed until
Edwards had made actual payment of the judgment to Dickerson. Edwards
assigned its entire interest in its indemnity judgment against Celotex to Dick-
erson, in partial satisfaction of Dickerson's indemnity judgment against
Edwards.
57
North Carolina follows the general rule regarding collection of indem-
nity: a determination of the indemnitor's liability alone is not sufficient; the
indemnitee must have made payment or otherwise suffered actual loss or dam-
age.58 No previous North Carolina case, however, had decided whether as-
signment of an indemnity judgment under the circumstances in this case
entitles the assignee to collect.
5 9
The court held that the assignment by Edwards of its indemnity judgment
to Dickerson, in partial satisfaction of the indemnity judgment Dickerson had
against Edwards, constituted a loss to Edwards for the purposes of indemnity
collection by Edwards.60 The court noted cases in other jurisdictions that treat
a note given in satisfaction of a judgment against an indemnitee as a loss actu-
55. Huff v. Trent Academy of Basic Educ. Inc., 53 N.C. App. 113, 280 S.E.2d 17 (1981) also
concerned both assignment and indemnity principles. Defendant academy had received fund
embezzled by a bank officer who was also the academy's treasurer. The bank officer pleaded
guilty to embezzlement, and his mother and brother, plaintiffs in this case, repaid the embezzled
funds to the bank and received an assignment of the bank's claims against the academy. The
court rejected the academy's contention that plaintiffs could not maintain the action because they
were under no duty to pay the bank. The academy argued that volunteers cannot seek indemnity
because "[i]ndemnity against losses does not cover losses for which the indemnitee is not liable to
a third person, and which he improperly pays." 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 33, at 723 (1968).
This principle, however, is only relevant when a party seeks indemnity. The court decided that
the plaintiffs' rights as assignees were not affected by the fact that they had volunteered to pay,
and allowed them to maintain their action.
56. 510 F. Supp. 329 (W.D.N.C. 1980), af'd mem., 660 F.2d 494 (1981).
57. Id. at 330.
58. Id. at 331 (citing Heath v. Board of Comm'rs, 292 N.C. 369, 233 S.E.2d 889 (1977)); see
41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 32 (1968); 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 24, at 602 (1944).
59. 510 F. Supp. at 331.
60. Id. at 332.
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ally sustained by the indemnitee. 61 The court in Walker Manufacturing con-
cluded that the assignment of an indemnity judgment should be an actual loss
to Edwards which amounted merely to an alternate method of paying and
satisfying the adverse judgment. Since the problems caused by the maker's
possible insolvency or failure to make a cash payment had also been raised in
cases in which a note had been assigned, the court reasoned that these same
objections should be no more persuasive when there is an assignment of an
indemnity judgment.
62
While the result in Walker Manufacturing is sound, the court stretched
the analogy between notes and assignments too far. The holder of the note
can collect from the maker when the note becomes due by relying solely on the
note.63 In the case of an indemnity judgment, however, the right to collection
is conditional upon an actual loss."a Unlike the holder of a note, Edwards
could levy upon Celotex's property without affirmatively showing that it had
incurred some real loss arising out of its secondary liability.65 In order to find
actual loss or damage to Edwards, the district court engaged in bootstrapping.
An indemnitee who no longer conducts any business and has no assets cannot
satisfy a judgment against it, so the conditional indemnity judgment it holds
can never be collected. Thus, by assigning its indemnity judgment Edwards
would give up something of value and suffer actual loss only if the court al-
lowed the assignee to collect from Celotex. But whether the assignee could
collect, and whether Edwards had suffered actual loss of indemnity rights as
against Celotex, are questions that can only be resolved by answering the
question whether the indemnity judgment could be assigned to Dickerson in
the first place. Use of such circular reasoning does not provide a satisfactory
rationale for the result in Walker Manufacturing.
An alternative approach to the issues that are raised by assignment of
indemnity judgments is to look at the problem in a broad context. The rule
requiring actual loss before an indemnitee can collect is not an end in itself,
but a tool that usually leads to a just result. Although the indemnitee may be
liable to the plaintiff solely by imputation of law, or because of a secondary
duty owed by him, he is a tortfeasor nonetheless, and plaintiff, if he so wishes,
is entitled to seek compensation from him. The purpose of the actual loss rule
then becomes clear; the indemnitee is a wrongdoer, and cannot demand pay-
61. Id.; see, e.g., Seattle & S.F. Ry. & Navig. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 50 Wash. 44, 96
P. 509 (1908); Kennedy v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 100 Minn. 1, 110 N.W. 97 (1907).
62. 510 F. Supp. at 332; see Seattle & S.F. Ry. & Navig. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 50
Wash. at 48, 96 P. at 510.
63. See 50 Wash. at 47, 96 P. at 510.
64. See Heath v. Board of Comm'rs, 292 N.C. 369, 377, 233 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1977) ("[Tihe
[indemnitee] could not have sued [indemnitor] independently of [plaintiff's] suit unless it had first
paid his claim. Nor could [indemnitee] collect from [indemnitor] in this consolidated suit until
both had been found liable and the [indemnitee] had paid the judgment.").
65. "A separate action for indemnity arising from primary-secondary liablity may not be
commenced until after payment and satisfaction of the debt." 12 J. Strong, North Carolina Index,
Torts § 3.1, at 281 (3d ed. 1978) (citing Ingram v. Smith, 16 N.C. App. 147, 191 S.E.2d 390, cert
denied, 282 N.C. 304, 192 S.E.2d 195 (1972)).
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ment from another wrongdoer before he has been forced to pay. Otherwise,
by collecting early, the indemnitee could benefit from his own wrong.
This analysis shows why an assignee of an indemnity judgment should be
allowed to collect on the assignment given to satisfy the judgment against the
indemnitee. There is no need to look for an "actual loss" in this situation,
because the indemnitee has not gained as a result of his wrong. The assign-
ment in satisfaction of the judgment against him has merely set off his right to
collect against his duty to pay.66 If the court allows enforcement of an as-
signed indemnity judgment, the judgment creditor of a financially unsound
indemnitee avoids the risk of loss in collecting from that indemnitee. Instead,
he can collect directly from a party with greater fault, the indemnitor, the
same result as that reached in cases in which all parties in the chain of liability
are solvent. A literal requirement of actual loss would render the assigned
judgment unenforceable and would unfairly allow the primary wrongdoer to
escape liability; it would also prevent an indemnitee further up the chain (or a
completely innocent plaintiff) from collecting on his judgment. The use of an
assignment to collect directly from the indemnitor, as opposed to forcing the
parties to enforce liability through a successive series of actions, also saves
time and expense.
The actual loss rule should not be mechanically applied in actions to col-
lect indemnity. By noting the purpose the rule serves, courts can be flexible in
determining actual loss while achieving just and consistent results in a particu-
lar case. When a major consideration is prevention of gain by the indemnitee
as a result of his wrong, an assigned indemnity claim obtained from an indem-
nitee in financial difficulty should be enforceable. When the indemnitor's sub-
stantive rights would be affected because some policy prevents the assignee
from succeeding in a direct action against the indemnitor,67 courts should be
more cautious in allowing a party to shift the burden of the indemnitee's insol-
vency to an indemnitor by use of an assignment.
5. Agency
In a case of first impression, the supreme court held in Forbis v.
66. It is doubtful that the actual loss rule is designed to ensure the indemnitee suffers some
punishment because of his wrong. Technically, the indemnitee can demand to be completely com-
pensated a fraction of a second after he pays, which seems more consistent with a policy of
preventing unwarranted gain, rather than one which seeks a guarantee of punishment.
67. For example, a different standard for finding actual loss may be appropriate when statute
of limitations problems are involved. When a defendant brings a separate suit for indemnity, his
right of action accrues at the time of his payment. See Heath v. Board of Comm'rs, 292 N.C. 369,
375, 233 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1977) (citing Pittman v. Snedeker, 264 N.C. 55, 57, 140 S.E.2d 740, 742-
43 (1965); American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 260 N.C. 681, 687, 133 S.E.2d 669, 674 (1963)).
Thus, the indemnitee can bring suit even though the statute of limitations would prevent the
plaintiff from proceeding against the indemnitor, since the plaintiff's cause accrues at the time of
the wrong. If the plaintiff failed to sue the indemnitor within the allowed time, however, he
should bear any loss occurring due to the indemnitee's insolvency. If the plaintiff were allowed to
evade the limitations statute by having the defendant-indemnitee assign his indemnity judgment,
the indemnitor would be denied his substantive right to be found liable to the plaintiff only if the
plaintiff brings the action within the prescribed time.
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Honeycutt68 that an exclusive listing agreement does not authorize the real
estate agent to enter into a contract binding the owner to convey. Plaintiffs
executed a written offer and tendered $600 earnest money to the real estate
agent. Although defendant owners had an exclusive listing contract with the
real estate agent, they refused to convey their property. Plaintiffs sought spe-
cific performance based on the exclusive listing contract.
The supreme court determined that the trial court properly dismissed the
action because the language in the listing agreement was insufficient to vest the
authority to convey in the real estate agent.69 In effect, the agreement only
authorized the agent to find a purchaser "with whom the principal is to con-
duct the final negotiations. ' 70 The court's decision was based on the belief
that real estate transactions involve complex decisions which would not read-
ily be entrusted to an agent.7 1 The court recognized that a real estate agent
may be authorized to bind the owner to a contract of sale; but "such authority
must be expressly conferred upon the agent or necessarily implied from the
terms of the particular contract."
72
B. Unform Commercial Code 73
In Preston v. Thompson74 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that
a dentist was not liable under the G.S. 25-2-315 implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose.75 In Preston defendant-dentist had fitted plaintiff with
dentures. When the dentures caused plaintiff pain, she brought suit, alleging
68. 301 N.C 699, 273 S.E.2d 240 (1981). The supreme court's decision is consistent with the
view of the majority ofjurisdictions and of the American Law Institute. Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 53 (1958). See note 70 infra.
69. Id. at 704-05, 273 S.E.2d at 243.
70. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 53 comment b, at 158 (1958)). The court
noted that an agent's authority to buy or sell land did not normally imply the "[aluthority to
accept or to make a conveyance of land for the principal."
71. 301 N.C. at 705, 273 S.E.2d at 243.
72. Id. at 703, 273 S.E.2d at 242. In a related case, Cooper v. Henderson, 55 N.C. App. 234,
284 S.E.2d 756 (1981), the court of appeals interpreted an exclusive listing contract clause provid-
ing for payment of broker's commissions on a sale (within 90 days of the listing contract's termina-
tion) to a buyer with whom the broker had previously "negotiated." The court held that the
plaintiff-broker had not negotiated with the buyer under the terms of the contract. The buyer for
whom the plaintiff claimed commission was the mother of a potential buyer plaintiff had pro-
cured. The broker was aware that the potential buyer whose own offer was rejected by the defend-
ant might seek financial assistance from the mother, but the broker never had any contact with the
mother whose offer was accepted. Id. at 236, 284 S.E.2d at 757.
73. Additional Developments: In Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Logan Tontz Co., 53 N.C. App.
625, 281 S.E.2d 423 (1981), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that in order to recover the
portion of the price paid for nonconforming goods pursuant to G.S. 25-2-71 l(l)(a), it is not
necessary to show "cover." The court did no more than make a straightforward application of the
section. That statute provides that "in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been
paid," the purchaser of nonconforming goods may "cover" and have damages under G.S. 25-2-
712. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-711 (1965).
74. 53 N.C. App. 290, 280 S.E.2d 780 (1981).
75. An alternative ground for the court's holding that the dentist was not liable was G.S. 90-
21.13(d). That statute provides that in order to sue any "health care provider upon any guarantee
* , as to the result of any... treatment," the guarantee must be in writing and signed by the
health care provider. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.13(d) (1981).
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that the transaction constituted a sale of "goods" 76 by a "merchant" 77 and was
therefore covered by an implied warranty under G.S. 25-2-315.78 The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that fitting a patient with a set of dentures is
in essence a service and not a sale of goods as defined by the U.C.C.
7 9
In Rheinberg-Kellerei GMBH v. Vineyard Wine Co. 80 the court of appeals
ruled that where seller did not notify buyer of shipment until after the goods
had been lost at sea, prompt notification of shipment had not been given for
purposes of G.S. 25-2-504(c). 81 Since the prompt notification requirement of
G.S. 25-2-504 had not been met, the goods had not been "duly delivered" to
the carrier pursuant to G.S. 25-2-509(l)(a) and the risk of loss remained with
the seller.
82
The parties had entered a shipment83 contract for the sale of wine. In
such a contract, risk of loss ordinarily shifts to the buyer upon the seller's
delivery of the goods to the carrier.84 Since seller did not notify buyer of ship-
ment until after the loss had occurred, buyer was denied the opportunity to
insure the goods-an event which should occur prior to the risk of loss shifting
to him.8 5 Hence, the risk of loss remained with the seller.
8 6
In Spring Hope Rockwoo, Inc. v. Industrial Clean Air, Inc. 87 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held that a
contractual arbitration agreement that provided for arbitration in a forum for-
eign to buyer was not rendered ineffective by G.S. 24-2-719(2) or (3).88
Rockwool was a diversity action involving a North Carolina corporation as
76. Id. § 25-2-105 (1965).
77. Id. § 25-2-104(1).
78. 56 N.C. App. at 295, 280 S.E.2d at 784. Plaintiff sued under G.S. 25-2-315 because she
alleged that defendant had made oral assurances to her that the dentures would fit. See id. at 290-
91, 280 S.E.2d at 781.
79. The court in Preston analogized the situation of a dentist to that of a physician. Physi-
cians have been held by several courts to be neither merchants nor sellers of goods under the
U.C.C.. See, e.g., Batiste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269, cert.
denied, 292 N.C. 466, 233 S.E.2d 921 (1977); Foster v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 219 S.E.2d 916 (W.
Va. 1975).
80. 53 N.C. App. 560, 281 S.E.2d 425 (1981).
81. Id. at 565-66, 281 S.E.2d at 428.
82. Id.
83. A shipment contract authorizes the seller to send the goods to the buyer, but does not
require him to deliver them at a particular destination. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-504 (1965). By
contrast, a destination contract requires the seller to deliver the goods at a particular destination.
W. Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code § 1.210401, at 103
(1964).
84. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-509(l)(a) (1965).
85. 53 N.C. App. at 565-66 , 281 S.E.2d at 428-29.
86. See W. Hawkland, supra note 157, § 1.21040203, at 106. But see J. White & R. Summers,
Uniform Commercial Code § 5-2, at 181 n.15 (2d ed. 1980). White and Summers argue that the
risk of loss should be on the buyer, since even if he had been given notice, he would have been
unable to prevent the loss. This argument misses the point of the statute; although the buyer could
not have prevented the loss of the goods, if he had been given prompt notice of shipment he could
have insured the goods against such a risk.
87. 504 F. Supp. 1385 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
88. Although in contracts involving commerce, federal law is to be applied in'determining
the validity of an arbitration agreement, the court found reference to the Uniform Commercial
Code appropriate in the absence of well-developed contract law. 504 F. Supp. at 1388.
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plaintiff-buyer, and a California corporation as defendant seller.89 Embodied
in their contract for the sale of goods was a clause providing for arbitration in
the event of dispute, to be held in California.90 When buyer cancelled its
plans and did not purchase or pay for the goods, seller-defendant initiated
arbitration in California. 9 1
Plaintiff sought to enjoin the arbitration on the ground that the arbitra-
tion clause, which was an exclusive remedy under the contract, failed of its
essential purpose because the great expense plaintiff would incur by arbitrat-
ing in California would, in effect, preclude plaintiff from pursuing any rem-
edy; thus,the arbitration clause was ineffective under G.S. 25-2-719(2).92 The
court rejected this argument based on the language of G.S. 25-2-719(2), which
states that "[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail
of its essential purpose" the exclusive remedy will be ineffective and full UCC
remedies will be available.93 The court rejected this argument, noting that the
arbitration agreement had not failed of its essential purpose, which was to
provide defendant-seller with a convenient forum. 94 Whether the limited or
exclusive remedy effects the purpose of the Code or of equity is irrelevant for
purposes of G.S. 25-2-719(2).9
5
Plaintiff-buyer next alleged that the arbitration clause was unconsciona-
ble under G.S. 25-2-719(3),96 which provides that "consequential damages
may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconsciona-
ble." 97 The court held this statute inapplicable because plaintiff did not con-
tend that the arbitration clause excluded consequential damages, but rather
that it excluded all remedies. 98 The court further noted that when the buyer is
a merchant, courts should seldom find remedy-limiting clauses
unconscionable.99
In Paccar Financial Corp. v. Harnett Transfer, Inc. 100 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals examined the interaction between a perfected Article 9 se-
curity interest and a statutory mechanics lien.101 The assignee of a note and
security agreement sued defendant, Hard Times Transfer, Inc., for possession
of the secured property, a truck. Hard Times had purchased the truck, subject
to the security interest, from the original debtor. After making several pay-
89. Id. at 1386.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1387. Plaintiff-buyer sought to escape the arbitration clause by arguing the section
of the Federal Arbitration Act which provides that a written arbitration agreement in a contract
involving commerce "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
92. 504 F. Supp. at 1388.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See J. White & RL Summers, supra note 86, § 12-10, at 465-66.
96. 504 F. Supp. at 1388.
97. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-719(3) (1965).
98. 504 F.Supp. at 1388.
99. Id.; see I White & R. Summers, supra note 86, §12-12, at 485.
100. 51 N.C. App. 1, 275 S.E.2d 243 (1981).
101. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44A-6 (1976).
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ments on the note, Hard Times defaulted. Hard Times then had Harnett
Transfer, Inc., a related corporation,10 2 make needed repairs on the truck.
Hamett Transfer performed the repairs and charged Hard Times $12,638.56,
which Hard Times failed to pay. Harnett Transfer then sold the truck in a
judicial sale to satisfy the mechanic's lien. Hard Times purchased the truck
for $12,758.56, only $120 more than the debt for repairs.
At trial, Hard Times alleged a caim of superior right to possession by
virtue of its purchase of the truck at the foreclosure sale.10 3 Hard Times based
its claim to possession on the statutory mechanic's lien, G.S. 44A-2(d), 1° 4 and
on a provision concerning a bona fide purchaser at a properly conducted sale,
G.S. 44A-6(d).' 05 Thus, Hard Times asserted that Hamett Transfer, having
repaired the truck, was entitled to a mechanic's lien that had priority over the
security interest by virtue of G.S. 44A-2(d).10 6 Further, Hard Times argued
that since it was a "purchaser for value" at the foreclosure sale, it acquired title
"free of any interests over which the lienor (Hartnett Transfer) was entitled to
priority."' 1 7 Since Harnett Transfer had priority over plaintiff's security inter-
est, and Hard Times was a "purchaser for value," Hard Times asserted that it
took the property free of any security interest, pursuant to G.S. 44A-6.
10 8
The court rejected this argument and awarded possession to plaintiff.'0 9
The court noted that Hard Times had purchased the truck at the foreclosure
sale for only $120 more than the account for repairs, which almost certainly
represented the costs of the sale. Thus, the substance of the transaction was
that Hard Times merely satisfied its account for repairs. The court reasoned
that to allow Hard Times to free itself of plaintilfs security interest by means
of this ruse would be to exalt form over substance.1 10 The court found that
plaintiff had a "valid, enforceable, perfected security interest in the truck," and
therefore Hard Times took the truck subject to plaintiffs security interest. 1
The court further found that defendant had defaulted on the secured indebt-
edness. Therefore, plaintiff had a right to take possession of the truck.'
1 2
102. The same man was president of both corporations. 51 N.C. App. at 6, 275 S.E.2d at 247.
103. Id. at 8, 275 S.E.2d at 247.
104. Any person who repairs. . . motor vehicles in the ordinary course of his business
pursuant to... [a] contract with an owner or legal possessor of the motor vehicle has a
lien upon the motor vehicle for reasonable charges for such repairs. . . . This lien shall
have priority overpe.fected and unperfected security interests.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44A-2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
105. A purchaser for value at a properly conducted sale, and a purchaser for value with-
out constructive notice of a defect in the sale who is not the lienor or an agent of the
lienor, acquires title to thepropertyfree of any interests over which the lienor was entitled.
Id. § 44A-6(d) (1976) (emphasis added).
106. 51 N.C. App. at 8, 275 S.E.2d at 248.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 8-10, 275 S.E.2d at 248.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 7, 275 S.E.2d at 247. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-9-203 (1976) for the components of a
valid and enforceable security interest. See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-9-302 (Cum. Supp. 1981); id.
§ 20-58 (1978) for the statutory requirements of a perfected security interest in a motor vehicle.
112. 51 N.C. App. at 7,275 S.E.2d at 247. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-9-503 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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Also in 1981, the North Carolina General Assembly amended G.S. 25-4-
406, the statute dealing with a bank customer's duty to examine items returned
by the bank and to report any alterations or forgeries therein, by adding to the
end of subsection (1) the following sentence: "A customer will be considered to
have acted with reasonable care and promptness if he notifies the bank within
60 days of receipt of the statements of account accompanied by such item."
' 13
It is unclear precisely what effect this amendment will have on the operation of
the statute.
One question raised by the amendment concerns the meaning of "consid-
ered to have acted with reasonable care." The legislature probably intended
"considered" to mean "conclusively presumed," since this would better effec-
tuate the policy ofjudicial economy that was probably behind the amendment.
The bank already had the burden of showing lack of reasonable care on the
part of the customer before the statute was amended.1 14 Thus, if "considered"
means "rebuttably presumed," rather than "conclusively presumed," the
amendment has altered the effect of the statute very little.
Another question raised is the effect of the amendment when the cus-
tomer does not notify the bank within sixty days, but does "exercise reason-
able care and promptness" in examining the statement and items. Literally,
the amendment would not preclude such a customer from asserting his claim
against the bank. 15 Nevertheless, the desire for a bright line test might lead
courts to hold that if the customer does not notify the bank within sixty days
he is precluded from asserting the item against the bank. A better, and more
likely, interpretation would be that after sixty days the customer is presumed
not to have acted with reasonable care. Finally, the courts could follow the
literal language of the statute, which would place the burden of proof of lack
of due care on the bank after the sixty day period.' 16
If "considered" is construed to mean "conclusively presumed,"one virtu-
ally certain effect of the amendment is that it renders the fourteen day period
of subsection 2(b) ineffective.' 17 Since the customer will be considered to have
113. Law of June 17, 1981, ch. 599, § 19(c), N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 870, 872 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-4-406 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
114. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-4-406(2) (1965).
115. The amendment provides that a customer "will be" considered to have acted reasonably
if he notifies the bank within 60 days. It does not provide that a customer will be considered not
to have acted with reasonable care if he does not notify the bank within 60 days. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 25-4-406 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
116. "Ifthe bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an item to comply with
the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1)" then the customer is precluded from assert-
ing certain alterations or forgeries on the item against the bank. Id. § 25-4-406(2) (Cum. Supp.
1981) (emphasis added).
117. Subsections (1), (2), and (2)(b) of G.S. 25-4-406 provide:
(1) When a bank. . . makes the statement and items available to the customer, the
customer must exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the statement
and items to discover his unauthorized signature or any alteration on an item and
must notify the bank promptly after discovery thereof. A customer will be consid-
ered to have acted with reasonable care and promptness if he notifies the bank
within 60 days of receipt of the statement of account accompanied by such items,
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an item to comply
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acted reasonably if he notifies the bank within sixty days, the bank will never
be able to establish that a customer failed to comply with subsection (1) prior
to the completion of the sixty day period. Under this view, subsection 2(b) can
be invoked by the bank only after completion of the sixty day period. The
amendment reduces the fourteen day period of subsection 2(b) to no more
than statutory surplusage.
118
In Maybank v. S. S. Kresge Co.' 19 the North Carolina Supreme Court
strained to find that reasonable notice had been given in a case concerning a
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.1 20 The court held that a
three-year delay in notifying a seller of a breach of warranty was not unrea-
sonable as a matter of law when the buyer was a lay consumer and the delay
did not result in destruction of vital evidence; whether the notice was given
within a "reasonable" period was a question for the jury. 121
What constitutes a "reasonable" length of time has depended largely
upon the circumstances in a particular case.122 Courts are often more liberal
in applying the notice requirement to an individual purchaser than to a com-
mercial buyer.123 Nevertheless, there are time limits generally recognized as
"unreasonable" by courts, even in consumer-buyer cases.124 In many cases
courts have been willing to let the question go to the jury only when the delay
in reporting the injury or defect was less than a year from the time of the
accident.125 The Maybank decision went far in recognizing the differences
between a breach of warranty causing personal injury to a consumer-buyer
with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1) the customer is precluded
... from asserting against the bank.
(b) an unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any other item
paid in good faith by the bank after the first item and statement was available to the
customer for a reasonable period not exceeding fourteen calendar days and before
the bank receives notification from the customer of any such unauthorized signa-
ture or alteration.
Id. § 25-4-406 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
118. The bank must establish that the customer failed to comply with the duties of subsection
(1) in order to preclude him from asserting the item against the bank. Id. § 25-4-406(2); Burnette
v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 48 N.C. App. 585, 269 S.E.2d 317 (1980).
119. 302 N.C. 129, 273 S.E.2d 681 (1981).
120. This cause of action is governed by North Carolina's Sales Act, the state's version of the
Uniform Commercial Code. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-607 (1965). G.S. 25-2-607(3) deals specifi-
cally with the notice requirement in breach of warranty cases.
121. 302 N.C. at 135, 273 S.E.2d at 685.
122. 2A Prod. Liab. §§ 19.0512] (1960 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
123. Id. at 5-160.
124. See, e.g., Wagmeister v. A.H. Robins Co., 64 11. App. 3d 964, 382 N.E.2d 23 (1978) (30-
month delay in notice after delivery of stillborn infant unreasonable as a matter of law); San
Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 248 A.2d 778 (1968) (one year delay in
notice after injury due to broken bottle unreasonable); Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales and
Strict Tort Liability Law: Should There Be a Difference?, 47 Ind. L. Rev. 457 (1972).
125. Indicating that the question is for the jury, appellate courts often reverse lower courts that
hold that a delay of less than one year is unreasonable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (ten months not unreasonable per se
when plaintiff was in hospital and no harm was done to evidence); Bonker v. Ingersoll Prods.
Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955) (four months not unreasonable where plaintiffwas in hospi-
tal and no harm was done to essential evidence).
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and a breach of warranty causing economic injury to a businessman buying
and selling commercial items.
C Unfair Trade Practices
Commercially valuable ideas traditionally have been protected by patent
and trade secret laws. Patent law is governed by a uniform federal statutory
scheme, but trade secret law usually is embodied in common law126 and its
development has thus been more inconsistent among jurisdictions. In order to
harmonize and clarify the law of trade secrets, the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act at their 1979 Annual Con-
ference and recommended its enactment in all the states.' 27 Although there
have been many reported decisions concerning trade secrets in states that are
commercial centers, this is not the case in the "less populous and more agricul-
tural" 28 states such as North Carolina, 129 where trade secrets have been pri-
marily protected as ancillary restraints of trade.' 30 The 1981 North Carolina
General Assembly, in an effort to provide a definitive body of law for the
protection of valuable ideas, adopted the Uniform Act with a few minor varia-
tions as the "Trade Secrets Protection Act."'
3 '
A "trade secret," as defined in G.S. 66-152, must (1) be business or techni-
cal information, (2) have independent actual or potential commercial value
stemming from its secrecy, and (3) have been the object of reasonable efforts
designed to maintain its secrecy.132 In a departure from the common law the
North Carolina Act extends protection to information not "continuously used
in a trade or business"'133 by expanding the definition of "trade secret" to in-
126. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 277, 277 (1980).
127. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. commissioners' prefatory note, at 539-40 (1980).
The Uniform Act derives a substantial amount of its policies and text from the First Restatement
of Torts, which attempted to codify the general principles of trade secrets law. Restatement (First)
of Torts §§ 757-59 (1939). The second edition, however, deleted all provisions concerning trade
secrets. The American Law Institute was of the opinion that trade regulation law (which includes
trade secrets law) had developed into an independent body of law no longer based primarily on
tort principles. Restatement (Second) of Torts 1 (1979).
128. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. commissioners' prefatory note, at 537 (1980).
129. See Comment, Unfair Competition-Law of Unfair Competition in North Carolina, 46
N.C.L. Rev. 856, 881 (1968). The primary types of trade secrets cases that have arisen in North
Carolina involve phonographs or recordings. See id. Accord United Artists Records, Inc. v. East-
ern Tape Corp., 19 N.C. App. 207, 198 S.E.2d 452 (1973).
130. See, e.g., Harwell Enters. v. Heim, 276 N.C. 475, 173 S.E.2d 316 (1970) (restrictive cove-
nant in employment contract upheld to protect employer).
131. Law of July 9, 1981, ch. 890, § 1, N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1326, 1326-28 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-152 to -157 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
132. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152 (1981). See Klitzke, supra note 126, at 284. N.C. Gen, Stat.
§ 66-152(3) provides:
Trade secret means business or technical information, including but not limited to a
formula, pattern, program, device, compilation of information, method, technique, or
process that: a. Derives independent actual or potential commercial value from not be-
ing generally known or readily ascertainable through independent development or re-
verse engineering by persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use;
and b. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
133. The First Restatement of Torts required that a trade secret be "continuously used in one's
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dude information having potential, as well as actual, commercial value. 134
The North Carolina Act differs from the Uniform Act by protecting informa-
tion having "commercial value," whereas the Uniform Act protects informa-
tion having "economic value." 135  The significance of this difference is
unclear. 136 It is interesting to note that the North Carolina Act uses "eco-
nomic value" in its requirement that to qualify as a trade secret, information
must derive its commercial value from not being generally known or readily
ascertainable by persons who can obtain economic value from its use or
disclosure. 137
Information developed by "proper means" is "outside of trade secret pro-
tection, as between the parties with such knowledge."' 138 The North Carolina
Act lists two examples of "proper means" of discovery in its definition of
"trade secret": discovery through "independent development or reverse engi-
neering."'139 The North Carolina and Uniform Acts further require that the
information be the "subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy."' 140 The comments to the Uniform Act state
that "extreme and unduly expensive procedures" need not be taken to protect
trade secrets against "flagrant industrial espionage."'
41
business." Restatement (First) of Torts § 759 comment b, at 24 (1939). This view is also evident in
Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 26 N.C. App. 414, 417, 216 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975), in
which the court said that a "trade secret" is "a secret formula or process, not patented, known only
to certain individuals who use it in compounding or manufacturing some article of trade having a
commercial value." (quoting Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 383, 385 (1951) (citing In re Bolster, 59 Wash.
655, 110 P. 547 (1910)) (emphasis added).
134. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Accord, Uniform Trade Secrets Act
§ 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1980). This broader definition extends protection to one who has "not yet
had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret to use." Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, § 1, 14 U.L.A. commissioners' comment, at 543 (1980). The North Carolina Act explicitly
protects business information by providing that a trade secret is "business or technical informa-
tion." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
135. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981) with Uniform Trade Secrets
Act § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1980).
136. It has been argued that "economic value" is a much broader term than "commercial
value" because a secret could have economic value without having commercial value. Klitzke,
supra note 126, at 289. Professor Klitzke contends that "[i]nformation regarding a future manu-
facturing process may have no present commercial value and yet have economic value, as where
time and effort have been expended in its development." Id. Professor Klitzke goes on to argue
that "the term 'economic value' is elastic enough to include 'negative information,' that is, infor-
mation that a certain process or formula will not work." He adds that "[i]t is unclear whether such
information could be said to have commercial value." Id.
137. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Whether information is "generally
known" or "readily ascertainable" are questions to be resolved by the trier of fact. The Uniform
Act provides little assistance in making this determination. Klitzke, supra note 126, at 290-92.
138. Id. at 289.
139. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act itself
does not provide examples, but the commissioners explain that "proper means" can include not
only the examples given in the North Carolina Act but also (1) "[d]iscovery under a license from
the owner of the trade secret;" (2) "fo]bservation of the item in public use or on public display;"
and (3) "[o]btaining the trade secret from published literature." Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14
U.L.A. commissioners' comment, at 542 (1980). "Reverse engineering" is defined as "starting
with the known product and working backward to find the method by which it was developed."
Id.
140. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981); Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(ii),
14 U.L.A. 542 (1980).
141. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. commissioners' comment, at 543 (1980). See
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In order to secure a remedy there must be a "misappropriation."' 142 The
North Carolina Act defines "misappropriation" as the "acquisition, disclosure,
or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied authority or
consent, unless such trade secret was arrived at by independent development,
reverse engineering, or was obtained from another person with a right to dis-
close the trade secret." 143 The Uniform Act's definition of misappropriation
differs from the North Carolina Act by providing that trade secrets must be
acquired through "improper means" 144 and then supplementing that provision
with a definition of "improper means."'145 The North Carolina Act presumes
that acquisition or disclosure "without express or implied authority or con-
sent" would be an improper means of discovery or use of the trade secret. In
addition, the North Carolina statute relies on examples of proper means of
discovery listed in its definition of trade secret.'
46
The North Carolina Act substantially simplifies the common law trade
secret action through its definition of "misappropriation." "At common law,
misappropriation of a trade secret sounded in either tort or contract, depend-
ing on whether the 'improper means' [of discovery] was an intentional tort,
such as theft, bribery, misrepresentation or espionage, or was a breach of a
contractually-created duty to maintain secrecy."' 147 This distinction has been
eliminated by the North Carolina Act. While a misappropriation may stem
from the breach of a contractual relationship or from tortious or criminal mis-
conduct, the cause of action for misappropriation is independent of the con-
duct out of which it arose.'48 This change eliminates many statute of
limitations 149 and damages questions.150 The North Carolina Act now pro-
vides for a three-year statute of limitations during which an action must be
commenced "after the misappropriation complained of is or reasonably
should have been discovered."''5 The Uniform Act explains further that a
"continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim."'
152
When a trade secret has been misappropriated the North Carolina Act
grants both injunctive relief and damages. 153 The Act permits the enjoining of
E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1024 (1971) (deals with the extent of the efforts necessary to protect a trade secret).
142. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-153 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
143. Id. § 66-152(1).
144. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980).
145. Id. § 1(1).
146. See text accompanying notes 138-39 supra.
147. Klitzke, supra note 126, at 296.
148. Id. The Uniform Act provides: "This Act displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and
other law of this State pertaining to civil liability for misappropriation of a trade secret." Uniform
Trade Secrets Act § 7(a), 14 U.L.A. 549 (1980). The North Carolina Act does not contain the
specific language set forth in § 7 of the Uniform Act; it accomplishes the same result, however,
through implication by way of its unified statute of limitations and damages treatment.
149. Klitzke, supra note 126, at 296, 306-07.
150. Id. at 296.
151. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-157 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Accord, Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 6,14
U.L.A. 549 (1980).
152. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 6, 14 U.L.A. 549 (1980).
153. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(a), (b) (1981). Accord, Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3, 14
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present as well as threatened misappropriation both permanently and tempo-
rarily during the pendency of the action.'5 4 An injunction that issues after
trial shall last for the "period that the trade secret exists plus an additional
period as the court may deem necessary under the circumstances to eliminate
any inequitable or unjust advantage .... ,,155 When it is unreasonable to
enjoin use of a trade secret, use may be allowed upon payment of a reasonable
royalty.156 The North Carolina Act further provides that "[in appropriate
circumstances, affliative acts to protect the trade secret may be compelled by
order of the court."157 This could include return of the "fruits of misappropri-
ation" to the aggrieved party.15 8
The North Carolina statute provides that in addition to injunctive relief,
"actual damages may be recovered, measured by the economic loss or the un-
just enrichment caused by misappropriation of a trade secret, whichever is
greater." 159 The North Carolina Act, unlike the Uniform Act, explicitly pro-
tects a person who in good faith derives knowledge of a trade secret through
inadvertent misappropriation or mistake. Such a person is not required to pay
damages for the period prior to the time the person knows or has reason to
know that he has misappropriated a trade secret; nevertheless, he can be en-
joined from disclosing the trade secret or can be required to pay a reasonable
royalty.
160
If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the North Carolina Act
permits the trier of fact to "award punitive damages in its discretion." 61 "If a
U.L.A. 546 (1980). The Restatement rule did not specify the type of remedy available-only that
liability attached. Restatement of Torts (First) § 757 (1939). The comments to § 757 did state that
four remedies should be available under appropriate circumstances: (1) damages for past harm,
(2) injunction against future harm, (3) accounting of the wrongdoers' profits, and (4) surrender of
the physical things embodying the trade secret. Id. comment e, at 10.
154. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(a)(Cum. Supp. 1981). Accord Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2,
14 U.L.A. 544 (1980).
Except as provided herein, actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret
may be preliminarily enjoined during the pendency of the action and shall be perma-
nently enjoined upon judgment finding misappropriation for the period that the trade
secret exists plus an additional period as the court may deem necessary under the cir-
cumstances to eliminate any inequitable or unjust advantage arising from the
misappropriation.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
155. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Accord Uniform Trade Secrets Act
§ 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980).
156. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Accord Uniform Trade Secrets Act
§ 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980).
157. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Accord Uniform Trade Secrets Act
§ 2(c), 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980).
158. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. commissioners' comment, at 546 (1980).
159. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981). The Uniform Act provides: "In addition
to or in lieu of injunctive relief, a complainant may recover damages for the actual loss caused by
misappropriation. A complainant may also recover for the unjust enrichment caused by misap-
propriation that is not taken into account in computing damages for actual loss." Uniform Trade
Secrets Act § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 546 (1980).
160. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
161. Id. § 66-154(c). The Uniform Act provides that the court may award "exemplary dam-
ages in an amount not exceeding twice any award" of damages allowed for actual loss or unjust
enrichment. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3(b), 14 U.L.A. 546 (1980).
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claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith or if willful misappropriation
exists" the North Carolina Act allows for an award of reasonable attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party.
162
In another statutory development, the North Carolina General Assembly
responded forcefully to the recent discovery of bid rigging on state con-
tracts. 163 G.S. 133-24 provides that any conspiracy, combination or act in re-
straint of trade declared to be unlawful by the provisions of G.S. 75-1 and 75-2
is a felony if the act involves contracts or subcontracts for a governmental
agency.164 A person convicted of violating G.S. 133-24 will be punished as a
Class H felon, and may also be subject to a fine of up to one hundred thousand
dollars for any convicted individual and up to one million dollars for any
convicted corporation. 165 The convicted entity will not be allowed to enter a
contract with any governmental agency for a period of up to three years, to be
determined in the discretion of the court.1 66 The court shall have authority to
direct the contractor's licensing board to suspend the individual's license for
up to three years167 and the court may provide that the individual shall not be
employed by a corporation that engages in public construction or repair con-
tracts with a governmental agency for up to three years.
168
The "governmental agency entering into a contract which is or has been
the subject of a conspiracy prohibited by G.S. 75-1 or 75-2 shall have a right of
action against the participants in the conspiracy to recover damages .... "169
At the governmental agency's election, the measure of damages shall be treble
either the actual damages or ten percent of the contract price. 170 The cause of
162. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(d)(Cum. Supp. 1981). Accord, Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 4,
14 U.L.A. 548 (1980). The Uniform Act also provides for an award of attorneys' fees if "a motion
to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith." Id.
163. See Law of July 2, 1981, ch. 764, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1125, 1125-28
(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 133-23 to -33 (Cum. Supp. 1981)); see also Aycock, North Carolina
Law on Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C.L Rev. 207, 225 (1982).
164. G.S. 133-24 provides:
Government contracts; violation of G.S. 75-1 and 75-2-Every person who shall en-
gage in any conspiracy, combination, or any other act in restraint of trade or commerce
declared to be unlawful by the provisions of G.S. 75-1 and 75-2 shall be guilty of a
felony under this section where the combination, conspiracy, or other unlawful act in
restraint of trade involves:
(1) A contract for the purchase of equipment, goods, services or materials or for
construction or repair let or to be let by a governmental agency;
(2) A subcontract for the purchase of equipment, goods, services or materials or for
construction or repair with a prime contractor or proposed prime contractor for a
governmental agency.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 133-24 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
For developments leading up to the enactment of G.S. 113-24, see Aycock, supra note 237, at
224-29.
165. "Any fine imposed pursuant to this section shall not be deductible on a state income tax
return for any purpose." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 133-25(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
166. Id. § 133-25(b).
167. Id. § 133-25(d). The individual shall not be eligible to serve as a member of any contrac-
tor's licensing board. Id. § 133-26.
168. Id. § 133-25(c).
169. Id. § 133-28(a) ("There shall be no right to contribution among participants not named




action shall accrue from the time the conspiracy is discovered and must be
brought within three years.
17 1
In its efforts to ferret out violations of G.S. 75-1 or 75-2, a governmental
agency is authorized to pay up to twenty-five percent of any civil damages it
collects from the violator to any person with knowledge of such violations who
reports them to the agency.172 In order to prevent violations, the agency may
require all prime bidders to submit noncollusion affidavits, with failure to do
so being grounds for disqualification of a bid. 173 A further attempt by the
legislature to prevent impropriety is set forth in G.S. 133-32, which makes it a
misdemeanor for any contractor, subcontractor or supplier who has, or within
the past year has had, a contract with a governmental agency, to make gifts or
give favors to any officer or employee of a governmental agency that prepares
awards or administers contracts, or inspects or supervises construction.
174
In Hester v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc.175 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals considered the definition of "concerted activity" under section 1 of the
Sherman Act and G.S. 75-1.176 At the time the alleged concerted activity in
Hester took place, the North Carolina Code of Professional Responsibility
provided that an attorney could present brief biographical and other specified
information in a reputable legal directory. A directory was conclusively estab-
lished to be reputable if it was certified by the American Bar Association.
177
Martindale-Hubbell was the only directory listed in the ABA's category of
"general legal directory." Martindale-Hubbell contains a biographical section
in which lawyers may pay to have their advertisements published. In order to
advertise, however, an attorney must have received a certain rating under
Martindale-Hubbell's system or be associated with a firm that has obtained
that rating. Plaintiff Hester's requests for information on advertising in the
directory were denied because he had not yet received a rating. Hester com-
plained to the North Carolina State Bar, which referred him to the ABA. The
ABA stated that Martindale-Hubbell had in no way violated its rules. 178 Hes-
ter then brought an antitrust action alleging that the ABA conspired with Mar-
tindale-Hubbell to restrain trade in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
171. Id. §133-28(c).
172. Id. § 133-29.
173. Id. § 133-30.
174. Id. § 133-32(a), (b).
175. 659 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1981). Another significant case in this area, Marshall v. Miller, 302
N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), was discussed extensively in Survey of Developments in North
Carolina Law, 1980-Commercial Law, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1070, 1070 (1981). See also Aycock,
supra note 163. In Marshall the court determined that bad faith is not an essential element in a
cause of action under G.S. 75-1.1. 302 N.C. at 545, 276 S.E.2d at 401.
In another development, United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985 (4th
Cir. 1981), the court held that "an ordinary breach of contract between two business orgainiza-
tions, although intentional, does not in itself constitute an unfair or deceptive act" under G.S. 75-
1.1. For a discussion of UnitedRoasters, see note 1 supra; Aycock, supra note 163, at 215.
176. 659 F.2d at 433.
177. N.C. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-102(A)(6), I N.C. State Bar, The Green
Book 19 (1979). The Code, however, was amended in 1978 to delete the reference to certification
by the ABA. 659 F.2d at 434.
178. 659 F.2d at 434-35.
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Sherman Act 179 and G.S. 75-1 and 75-1.1.180
Although there clearly existed a restraint of trade in the form of restricted
access to advertising, the dispositive issue was whether that restraint was the
result of the concerted activity of the ABA, the State Bar and Martindale-
Hubbell, or merely unilateral action of Martindale-Hubbell. 181 Hester estab-
lished only that the ABA and State Bar had attempted to set standards regulat-
ing advertisements by attorneys; there was no showing that the ABA required
that Martindale-Hubbell condition the right to advertise in its publication on
the attainment of a certain rating. Such evidence, the court held, "does not
show a concerted refusal to deal within contemplation of the laws invoked."
182
Judge Winter, dissenting, believed this definition of "concerted activity"
was narrower than that approved by the Supreme Court in Aibrecht v. The
Herald Co. 183 Albrecht held that it was "irrelevant that one party unilaterally
formulated a policy restraining trade, if he sought and received the assistance
of another party which acted with knowledge of the restraint."
' 184
D. Securities
The North Carolina Supreme Court was provided with its first opportu-
nity to define and explain the North Carolina Tender Offer Disclosure Act' 85
in Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp *186 The court held that the stock ac-
quisitons at issue in Shefield were open market purchases, which are generally
not considered tender offers, and therefore were not regulated under the Act.
The court noted, however, that some purchases on the open market may fall
179. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
180. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (North Carolina analogue of the Sherman
Act); Id. § 75-1.1 (North Carolina analogue of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(Supp. IV 1980)).
Hester further alleged that defendant North Carolina State Bar cooperated in and condoned
the discrimination against him, and through the adoption and enforcement of DR 2-102 denied
him due process and equal protection of law. 659 F.2d at 435. The constitutional issue, however,
was moot because DR 2-102 was amended to eliminate the process of which he complained. Id.
See note 177 supra.
181. 659 F.2d at 436.
182. Id. It is not clear whether the court based its decision on interpretation of the North
Carolina Act as well as the Sherman Act, although it did affirm the ultimate disposition by the
district court, which found no evidence showing concerted activity in restraint of trade in violation
of the Sherman Act and, therefore, rejected plaintifi's claims under G.S. 75-1 and 75-1.1. See id.
Dissenting in Hester, Judge Winter stated that "[b]ecause N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1 is the state
equivalent of Sherman Act § I, I would reverse the dismissal of Hester's claim under that section
as well." Id. at 436 n. 1 (Winter, J., dissenting).
In Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 655, 194 S.E.2d 521, 530 (1973), the court said
that G.S. 75-1 was based upon section one of the Sherman Act, which "although not binding upon
this court in applying G.S. § 75-1, is nonetheless instructive in determining the full reach of that
statute."
183. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
184. 659 F.2d at 437. (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
185. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78B-1 to -11 (1978).
186. 302 N.C. 403, 276 S.E.2d 422 (1981). Plaintiffs brought suit for alleged violations of the
Act against Consolidated Foods Corporation, a Maryland corporation. Summary judgment was
entered for defendant Consolidated and the case moved directly to the Supreme Court on petition
for discretionary review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31 (1981).
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within the Act's regulation' 8 7 if they involve pressures on stockholders to sell
their stock without sufficient knowledge upon which to base their decision. 18 8
Sheffield concerned the merger of the Hanes Corporation into a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Consolidated Foods Corporation. Over the course of
three months, Consolidated bought more than twenty percent of Hanes' stock,
entirely on the open market. After this time, officers of Consolidated met with
Hanes and negotiated the merger. Plaintiffs, who had sold their stock during
the three month period, claimed that these earlier purchases violated the Act.
Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of all shareholders who had sold during the three
months before the merger without knowledge of Consolidated's plans. Plain-
tiffs alleged that the Tender Offer Disclosure Act should apply, and that the
violation of the mandated disclosure provision' 8 9 caused them to sell their
shares at prices lower than they would have with full knowledge. 190
The accepted definition of a tender offer is "a publicly made invitation
addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for sale at
a specified price."191 Usually there is a premium price offered that remains
open for a limited time, and which may be withdrawn if certain stipulated
conditions are not met. Upon accepting the offer to tender, shareholders relin-
quish control over their shares to a third party depository pending fulfillment
of the conditions.192 An unregulated tender offer allows an offeror quickly
and covertly to purchase controlling shares of a target company, without the
shareholders having adequate knowledge of who is taking over and what effect
this will have on their investment. 193 Congress feared the threat of "unscrupu-
lous corporate raiders" who might force shareholders into hasty, uninformed
sales of stock 194 and enacted the Williams Act' 95 in 1968 to regulate tender
offers. 196 The Williams Act requires disclosure to the Securities and Exchange
Commission at the time the tender offer is first made, including the identity
and background of the offeror, how many shares he currently holds, and what
major changes he contemplates if he assumes control of the target.
197
The North Carolina Act reaches beyond federal law by requiring thirty
days notice to the Secretary of State and the target company before a tender
offer can be made. 198 This requirement responds to the failure of the Williams
Act to require advance notice, thereby avoiding "surprise or blitz tender of-
187. Id. at 426-27, 276 S.E.2d at 437.
188. Id. at 428, 276 S.E.2d at 438.
189. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78B-4(b)(1) (1981).
190. 302 N.C. at 406 n.2, 276 S.E.2d at 425 n.2.
191. Id. at 416, 276 S.E.2d at 431 (quoting Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer"
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250, 1251 (1973).
192. Usually a certain number of shares must be tendered before the offeror will buy.
193. Note, supra note 191, at 1252.
194. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977).
195. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f),
78n(d)-(t) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
196. 113 Cong. Rec. 854, 24664-666 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
198. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78B-4(a) (1981).
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fers."199 The final version of the Act is a compromise between those who
favored the less restrictive federal law and the supporters of even more strin-
gent shareholder protection. 200 While the two acts differ in various other ar-
eas, 201 the prior disclosure provision was the key to plaintiffs' case in
Sheffield.20 2
Plaintiffs' primary argument for labeling defendant's action a tender offer
under the North Carolina Act was that the statutory definition of tender offers,
"an offer to purchase or invitation to tender, °20 3 was an intentionally broad
definition covering both conventional tender offers ("invitations to tender")
and all other offers to purchase. This broad interpretation would encompass
open market acquisitions. The court, looking at the entire Act, found that
plaintiffs' contention was not harmonious with the purpose of the North Caro-
lina Act or with the remainder of the definition of tender offer.2°4 Although
the statute reads "offers to purchase or invitations to tender," it later states that
an offer is made when the "offer. . .is first published or sent or given to the
offerees." 205 Because open market purchases involve no express offer, nothing
exists to be published or sent to the offerees.20 6 The court argued further that
it is common practice to use "offer to purchase" and "invitation to tender" as
"different legislative expressions embracing the same concept of an offeror ex-
pressing a desire to purchase shares of stock."207 The statute also permits, in
some instances, withdrawal of tendered shares and proration of sales of excess
shares, 20 8 actions that could not successfully operate on the open market.
199. R. Robinson, North Carolina Corporation Law and Practice § 7-12, at 17 (2d ed. Supp.
1981).
200. Id. Two proposed bills were rejected before passage of G.S. 78B. The first, H. 307, 1977
Gen. Assembly, Ist Sess., was very burdensome to offerors, because the financial disclosure provi-
sion was more extensive than its counterpart in the final act, and the target company was permit-
ted to request hearings before the Secretary of State. By contrast, H. 406, 1977 Gen. Assembly, 1st
Sess. required much less information from the offeror than the enacted statute and did not require
a filing with the Secretary of State.
201. Other major differences in these Acts include: 1) tendered shares may be withdrawn by
shareholders within seven days of the offer under federal law, while the state allows withdrawal up
to three days before the termination of the offer;, 2) if more shares are tendered than were re-
quested, the federal act provides for those shares tendered in the first ten days to be purchased pro
rata; the state act allows proration of shares tendered at any time.
202. Whether this provision is unconstitutional because it is preempted by federal regulation
of the securities area is very much in question. See Comment, The North Carolina Tender Offer
Disclosure Act: Congenitally Defective?, 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1035, 1043 (1978). The United
States Supreme Court will soon have a chance to rule on this question in Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633
F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), prob. juris. noted sub noma. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 49 U.S.L.W. 3824
(1981), where the lower court held a similar state act to be unconstitutional.
203. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78B-2(14) (1981).
204. 302 N.C. at 421-22, 276 S.E.2d at 434.
205. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78B-2(14) (1981).
206. 302 N.C. at 418, 276 S.E.2d at 432.
207. Id. at 419, 276 S.E.2d at 433. When a tender offer is made, usually the purchaser can
either offer to purchase shares from the shareholders or invite the shareholders to tender their
shares for sale. Little difference exists between the two.
208. The chaos that would result in the marketplace from the application of this require-
ment and the impossibility of administering such a provision in the open market context,
where every transaction is final and is not subject to revision, shows with abundant clar-




Similarly, the thirty-day prior disclosure provision is impractical in open mar-
ket trading.
20 9
Plaintiff next argued that all corporate takeovers must be conducted as
conventional tender offers so that disclosure under the Act would always be
necessary. 2 10 Finding no express legislative intent on this issue, the court de-
clined to construe the Act as placing such severe restrictions on the permissible
means of takeovers.211 Finally, plaintiffs argued that an exemption from the
Act for bids made by a broker212 suggested that all open market purchases
were included in the Act's coverage; otherwise there would be no need to ex-
empt broker bids.2 13 The court disposed of this argument by noting that the
involvement of a broker did not necessarily indicate an open market
transaction.
21 4
Sheffield clearly rejects the notion that open market transactions are cov-
ered by the North Carolina Tender Offer Act. The court noted, however, that
some stock purchases have been found by federal courts2 15 to fall within the
Williams Act even though they are not conducted as conventional tender of-
fers.2 16 The key element in deciding whether an acquisition will be treated as
a tender offer, as noted in Sheffeld, is 'pressure on shareholders to make uni-
formed, ill-considered decisions to sell ,"2 17 This expanded definiton leads to a
case-by-case study by the courts to determine if the pressure is enough to re-
quire regulation.218 In Sheffield the court found that the only pressure on
plaintiffs was normal market pressure.
2 19
Construing the Williams Act to cover non-conventional tender offers car-
ries out the main purpose of that Act-protecting shareholders. 220 When
transactions create pressures on shareholders beyond the normal pressures of
Id. at 420, 276 S.E.2d at 433.
209. Id. at 423, 276 S.E.2d at 435. Senator Williams made this clear in his discussion of the
federal act. Open market and private transactions require disclosure after the purchases in order
to "avoid upsetting the free and open auction market where buyer and seller normally do not
disclose the extent of their interest and avoid prematurely disclosing the terms of privately negoti-
ated transactions." 113 Cong. Rec. 856 (1967).
210. 302 N.C. at 423-24, 276 S.E.2d at 435.
211. Id. at 424-25, 276 S.E.2d at 436. Plaintiffs relied on Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d
1029 (4th Cir. 1980), a Virginia case holding that all takeovers involving 10% of a corporation's
shares were covered by the state act. The Virginia act, however, expressly included open market
transactions, while the North Carolina act is silent on the matter.
212. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78B-2(7)(f) (1981).
213. 302 N.C. at 426, 276 S.E.2d at 437.
214. Id.
215. Noting the state act's similarity to the Williams Act, the court declared that construction
of the state act could be influenced by federal court decisions under the Williams Act. Id. at 427,
276 S.E.2d at 437.
216. See Water & Wall Assocs., Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., [1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 1973); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities
Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
217. 302 N.C. at 428, 276 S.E.2d at 438 (emphasis in original).
218. Note, Cash Tender Offers: A Proposed Definition, 31 U. Fla. L. Rev. 694, 724 (1979).
This approach leads to confusion and uncertainty for offerors who are not sure what will be pro-
hibited, and for the SEC in deciding if the regulations have indeed been violated.
219. 302 N.C. at 435, 276 S.E.2d at 442.
220. The Court in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975), stated that the
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the marketplace, the effect can be the same as if a conventional tender offer
has been made. 22' If only conventional tender offers were regulated, offerors
could easily avoid the inconvenience of the Williams Act by "slight deviations
from the conventional model, thus . . . frustrating . . . congressional
intent." 2
22
Federal courts have been willing to extend the protection of the Williams
Act in certain circumstances. When shareholders are pursued actively in large
numbers by the offeror, most federal courts have applied the Williams Act.223
Public announcements of the proposed offer are the most blatant offenses of
this type. If only a small percentage of the shareholders are pursued actively,
however, the courts usually do not include the offer within the provisions of
the Williams Act.224 Courts and commentators are not in agreement where
the line should be drawn between truly "private" transactions and "public"
transactions. 225 Courts generally have refused to apply the Williams Act when
the investors contacted were professional investors or sophisticated stock deal-
ers.2 2 6 But even these knowledgeable shareholders can be pressured or con-
disclosure provisions assure that investors will have information on which to base their decisions
regarding securities.
221. Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developing Concept of "Tender Offer": An Analysis of the
Judicial and Administrative Interpretation of the Term, 23 N.Y.L. Sdh. L. Rev. 379, 382 (1978).
222. Note, supra note 191, at 1271. The note further states that "a tender offer should include
any offer to purchase securities likely to pressure.., shareholders into making uninformed ...
ill-considered decisions to sell." Id. at 1281.
223. Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972). This was the first
court to extend the Williams Act to public transactions. The offerors contacted almost all of the
shareholders by mail, phone and personal visits prior to the offer. This publication created pres-
sures as great as those of conventional tender offers. Other courts have cited Call/emen's with
approval. See S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978); Loews Corp,
v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co.,. Civ. No. 74C-1396 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1974).
224. In Nachman Corp. v. Haifred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,455 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1973), only 40 shareholders out of 600 were contacted and offered a
premium price. The court found this to be private and not widespread publicity. See also, D-Z
Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,771 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 1974) (only 24 shareholders contacted).
225. The leading commentators in this field view the Catlemen'r decision and its successors as
an attempt to differentiate between public purchases of stock and private actions, such as transac-
tions on the floor of the stock exchange. Private actions assume both parties have access to neces-
sary information and can act freely without time restraints. E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Tender
Offers for Corporate Control 70 (1973); E. Aranow, H. Einhorn, & G. Berlstein, Developments in
Tender Offers for Corporate Control 44 (1977). At what point a purportedly private transaction
involves so many shareholders that it becomes public remains unclear. The suggestion has been
made that Congress should choose a number and create a rebuttable presumption that if more
shareholders than this number are involved, the transaction becomes public and falls within the
Act. E. Aranow, H. Einhorn, & G. Berlstein, supra, at 5; Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer
Provisions of the Federal Securities Law, 43 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 551, 588-89 (1975); Note, Cash
Tender Offers: A Proposed Definition, 31 U. Fla. L. Rev. 694 (1979). Until this advice is followed,
courts will.have very little guidance in this area.
The SEC has proposed a definition to help courts determine if seemingly private or open
market transactions are really tender offers under the federal act. Offers that include direct solici-
tations of more than 10 shareholders in a 45 day period would be tender offers if the offeror seeks
over 5% of that stock. Block offers between brokers at the usual market price may be excluded
from this definition. In addition, even without meeting the above criteria, the SEC would treat as
tender offers all purchases following widespread announcements offering a premium price on of-
fers that are not negotiable. SEC Release No. 34-16,385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349 (Dec. 6, 1979).
226. Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
94, 455 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1973). The court relied on the small number of shareholders contacted
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fused if the offeror denies them sufficient information upon which to base a
wise decision, or imposes a short time limit.
227
The Sheffield opinion outlines the supreme court's interpretation of the
coverage of the North Carolina Tender Offer Disclosure Act. Without legisla-
tive amendments, the North Carolina act will not serve to regulate open mar-
ket purchases of stock, regardless of how large these purchases are or for what
purpose they are made, unless the purchases fall within the exceptions adopted
from the federal courts. Further case law is necessary before the extent of
these exceptions can be discerned.
E. Consumer Finance: Usury
The 1981 General Assembly responded to rising market rates of interest
by raising interest ceilings prescribed in various chapters of the General Stat-
utes.228 The most significant element in these provisions is the introduction
into the usury statutes of a scheme that allows the maximum rate of interest to
vary according to fluctuations in the rate for U.S. Treasury bills.229 This "slid-
ing scale" approach substitutes a less artificial standard for the static maxi-
mum rates heretofore prescribed in the statutes and also reduces the danger of
pressures caused by legislative delay in conforming legal interest ceilings to
market rates.2
30
In Western Auto Supply Co. v. Vick 23 1 the North Carolina Supreme Court
had to determine whether a certain transaction was within the scope of the
usury statutes. Defendant Vick, a retail merchant, financed purchases of in-
ventory by assigning to plaintiff installment sales contracts executed by de-
fendant's customers. As holder of this paper, plaintiff Western Auto received
combined with the sophistication of those shareholders to find this case outside the Cattlemen's
exception. These investors should know enough about stock transactions to avoid being forced
into bad deals. See also D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94, 771 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584
F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities, Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
227. In Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), sophisticated shareholders
were given a premium price offer that expired in less than an hour. The court found that the
denial of necessary information prevented these investors from applying their sophistication and
held that a tender offer had been made. Id. at 819-21. Because of this danger of high pressure and
lack of shareholder access to pertinent information, Aranow suggests little weight should be
placed upon the sophistication of the shareholders. E. Aranow, H. Einhorn, & G. Berlstein, supra
note 5, at 9.
228. Maximum interest rates were raised in amendments to the Retail Installment Sales Act,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25A-15 (Cum. Supp. 1981); the Consumer Finance Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-
173, -175, -176, -179, -184 (Cum. Supp. 1981); and the general interest provisions (usury), N.C..
Gen. Stat. §§ 24-1.1, -1.2, -14 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
229. See, e.g., id. § 241.1(3):
On the fifteenth day of each month, the Commissioner of Banks shall announce and
publish the maximum rate of interest permitted by subdivision (1) of this section on that
date. Such rate shall be the latest published noncompetitive rate for U.S. Treasury bills
with a six-month maturity as of the fifteenth day of the month plus six percent (6%),
rounded upward or downward, as the case may be, to the nearest one-half of one percent
(1/2 of 1%), or sixteen percent (16%), whichever is greater. ...
230. For a discussion of the "sliding scale" approach, see Comment, Usury Legislation-Its
Effects on the Economy and a Proposal for Reform, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 199, 220-21 (1980).
231. 303 N.C. 30, 277 S.E.2d 360, afld on reh'g, 304 N.C. 191, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981).
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payments of the principal due under the contracts and applied the proceeds to
Vick's indebtedness of the merchandise received. Plaintiff also retained sixty-
five or seventy percent of the finance charges due under the contracts, placing
the remainder in a dealer reserve account for Vick.232 The sales contracts
were assigned with recourse, requiring Vick to make good any customer's fail-
ure to maintain installment payments.
As a counterclaim to Western Auto's subsequent action for default, Vick
asserted that Western Auto's practices were usurious. Vick claimed that since
he remained liable for paying off the installment sales contracts even after they
were assigned to Western Auto, there was in effect a forbearance of the debts
he had incurred for the purchase of merchandise. 233 Under this theory, West-
ern Auto's retention of a portion of the finance charge was viewed as the tak-
ing of interest at a usurious rate. In its defense, Western Auto contended the
assignment of the sales contracts was a sale, and therefore not subject to the
usury statutes.2
34
A divided court found the transaction to be a forbearance. Because of
Western Auto's right of recourse, the debts incurred by Vick through the
purchase of inventory were not extinguished but only secured by the assign-
ment of the paper. Thus, until payout, there was a forbearance of those debts,
which implicated the usury statutes. 235 In support of this conclusion the
supreme court relied on the 1857 case of Bynum v. Rogers.236
The court's decision in Vick places North Carolina in the minority of
jurisdictions that hold asignments of chattel paper with recourse subject to the
usury laws.237 Although this result should provide merchants and financiers
with a clear standard for structuring their transactions, it raises some
problems. First, it is clear that Vick would have been viewed more accurately
as a guarantor of his customer's obligations than as a borrower. At least theo-
retically, Vick's debts for the merchandise received from Western Auto were
extinguished by the assignment of the sales contracts, since whatever sum he
had to pay on behalf of a defaulting customer was money he had a right to
232. The percentage deducted depended on the term of Vick's contract with the customer. Id.
at 34, 277 S.E.2d at 364.
233. "Forbearance" was defined in the Vick opinion as "the contractual obligation of a lender
or creditor to refrain for a given period of time from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the
loan or debt which is then due and payable." Id. at 39, 277 S.E.2d at 367.
The categorization of the transaction is important since the usury statutes are applicable only
to loans and forbearances. See Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823
(1981).
234. "If in fact the transaction is a bona fide sale and not a loan of money, it is not usurious."
Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 338, 132 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1963).
235. 303 N.C. at 43, 277 S.E.2d at 369.
236. 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 399 (1857). See also Associated Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Loan & Inv.
Co., 202 F. Supp. 251 (E.D.N.C. 1962), afi'd per curiam, 326 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 830 (1964).
237. Cases holding the usury laws inapplicable to such a transaction include Lake Hiwassee
Dev. Co. v. Pioneer Bank, 535 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn. 1976); A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Inv. Corp.,
421 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Schmitt v. Matthews, 12 Wash. App. 654, 531 P.2d 309
(1975). But see West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Fin. Loans, 2 Cal. 3d 594, 469 P.2d 665, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 793 (1970).
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recover from that customer.238 Indeed, application of the Vick analysis could
lead to a windfall for reatailers, because on a usurious transaction they could
recover the statutory penalty of twice the interest paid from the financier,
239
and then either proceed directly against the customer or enforce a security
interest to recover the balance owed on the contract. Second, by subjecting
recourse assignments to the usury laws, Vick effectively limits the profit
financiers can realize under such an arrangement. A plausible response by
financiers seeking to maintain a higher return, therefore, may be to forego the
guaranty requirement, take on the risk of nonpayment themselves and raise
the discount rate of the paper accordingly. 240 The result could be in an in-
crease in the cost of credit for both retailers and consumers. 24'
F Other Statutory Developments
1. Banks and Banking
In the 1981 legislative session the General Assembly made several statu-
tory changes affecting the banking industry. The most comprehensive change
was the enactment of Chapter 54B242 of the General Statutes, titled "Savings
and Loan Associations," and the subsequent repeal of Chapter 54A 243 and
Subchapter I of Chapter 54.244 This legislation consolidates what had been a
piecemeal statutory approach to the different forms of savings and loan as-
sociations. The legislation brings under one chapter the regulation and ad-
ministration of mutual associations, stock associations, mutual guaranty
associations, and savings and loan holding companies. 245 To provide greater
flexibility in rulemaking and administration of savings and loan associations,
the legislature expanded the powers and authority of the Administrator of the
Savings and Loan Division of the Department of Commerce.24 6 This flex-
238. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-3-415 official comment 5 (1965): "the accommodation party
who pays is subrogated to the rights of the holder paid, and should have his recourse on the
instrument."
239. The penalty for usury is set forth at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-2 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
240. This fear was expressed by Justice Meyer. 303 N.C. at 51-52, 277 S.E.2d at 374 (Meyer,
J., dissenting). Obviously, the lower price a retailer would get for his contracts under this scenario
would be offset to some extent by the retailer's being freed of the obligation to guarantee payment.
As Justice Meyer suggested, however, the fact that of all the financing options available, Vick
chose the assignment with recourse, indicates that the arrangement offered savings that could not
be matched by assigning without recourse.
241. The importance of Vick may be diminished in light of the 1981 amendments to the usury
statutes. See notes 228-30 and accompanying text supra.
242. Law of April 30, 1981, ch. 282, §3, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 272, 272-335 (codified
at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 54B-1 to -262 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
243. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 54A-I to -27 (Cum. Supp. 1980). This chapter involved the regulation
and administration of capital stock savings and loan associations.
244. Id. §§ 54-1 to -44.13 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980). This subchapter dealt with the adminis-
tration and regulation of building and loan associations, building associations, and savings and
loan associations.
245. The legislation refers to all thrift institutions generically as savings and loan associations,
and indicates whether it was organized as a stock or mutual savings and loan by identifying the
association as "stock" or "mutual." Id. § 54B-4(b)(36), (49) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
246. The Administrator's powers were extended to include authorization of new branches, id.
§ 54B-22, taking supervisory control of associations conducting business in an unsafe manner, id.
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ibility will allow the Administrator to respond more readily to change in eco-
nomic conditions and savings and loan practices.
The major substantive changes of the legislation cover a wide variety of
activities. Regarding the organization of a savings and loan, the chapter speci-
fies time limits for completion of various steps in the application process
247
and increases the minimum capital required for approval of a savings and loan
application.248 Operational changes in the statute include granting savings
and loan associations a setoff upon default on an unsecured loan on with-
drawal accounts owned by the customers in default;249 describing the kinds of
loans permitted,250 including certain insider loans; 251 and placing the level of
required reserves in the General Reserve Account at the discretion of the Sav-
ings and Loan Commission. 252 In addition, the chapter provides for civil and
criminal penalties for violation of the Administrator's orders or the provisions
of the chapter.253 It also provides for the Administrator's supervision of merg-
ers or consolidations of savings and loan associations 254 and the formation of
savings and loan holding companies. 255 This legislation should provide
greater administrative control over savings and loans, while making them
more competitive in the financial markets.
Another legislative action that directly affects savings and loan associa-
tions concerns a change in the method of taxation of savings and loans. In lieu
of treating savings and loan associations separately, newly amended G.S. 105-
228.22 through 105-228.27256 will treat savings and loans like other corpora-
tions and tax them on net income.
257
§ 54B-68, temporary removal of officers or directors for any violation of this chapter or unsound
business practice, id. § 54B-69(b), and the authority to promulgate rules and regulations as re-
quired to discharge his duties, id. § 54B-55.
247. Id. §§ 54B-9(b), -11, -12, -14 to -18. The sections ensure that an application for formation
of a savings and loan association is given adequate examination. The disposition of each applica-
tion is monitored until approval or denial, and once approved a savings and loan begins operation
within six months.
248. The minimum required capitalization for stock associations was increased from $700,000
to $1,500,000 in subscribed capital stock, a minimum of $500,000 of which must be set aside as a
permanent capital reserve. Id. § 54B-12(b)(1), (2). Prior to approval of its application, a mutual
association is required to have an operational expense fund determined by the Administrator, but
not less than $75,000. This fund is to cover organizational and corporate expenses. In addition,
the mutual association must have a minimum of pledges for withdrawal accounts of $350,000. Id.
§ 54B-12(a)(1), (2).
249. Id. §54B-131.
250. Id. § 54B-151; see also id. § 54B-153 (prohibiting the use of an association's own capital
stock or its own mutual capital certificates as security for a loan).
251. Id. § 54B-154.
252. Id. § 54B-216. The commission is to base its decision on the degree of risk involved with
the type of assets held by the association. Id.
253. Id. §§ 54B-64 to -66.
254. For the protection of the public, the Administrator is authorized to permit a savings and
loan association to merge with any other state association if he finds that the association is "unable
to operate in a safe and sound manner." Id. § 54B-44.
255. Id. § 54B-261. The Administrator is given the duty of supervising savings and loan hold-
ing companies. Id. § 54B-262.
256. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-228.22 to .27 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Previously, savings and loan
associations had been taxed on their deposits and on net income. See id. §§ 105-228.22 to .27.
257. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-228.26 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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There were also several minor statutory changes that will affect commer-
cial banks.258 The most significant legislative action requires approval of the
Commissioner of Banks prior to effecting a change in bank control.2 59 Prior to
this legislation, the Commissioner had to be informed of any change in bank
control within twenty-four hours.260 The new statute gives the Commissioner
an opportunity to examine the proposed change and to disallow it if he be-
lieves the change would not be in the public interest.
2. Consumer Protection
In the area of consumer protection the legislature passed a bill that regu-
lates the activities of discount buying clubs.261 Discount buying clubs are de-
fined as "any person, firm, or corporation, which in exchange for any valuable
consideration offers to sell or to arrange the sale of goods or services to its
customers at prices represented to be lower than are generally available."
262
The statute requires that contracts between the discount buying club and its
customers be in writing,263 signed by all parties,264 with the customer main-
taining a right to cancel for three business days after signing the contract.2 65
The statute also forbids certain coercive business practices266 and requires that
the club maintain a surety bond to provide funds for injuries caused by the
club's violation of the statute or breach of contract.
267
3. Mobile Home Regulation
The General Assembly also enacted a statute designed "to promote the
general welfare and safety of mobile home residents in North Carolina.
' 2 68
The statute creates the North Carolina Manufactured Housing Board, which is
charged with the duty of providing a comprehensive framework for regulating
258. See Law of June 24, 1981, ch. 671, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 966 (codified in scat-
tered sections of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 53, 65-36.5, 116B-39 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). Sections 12 and 13
of G.S. 53 were rewritten to include merger as an allowable activity. Prior to this legislation
interbank combinations were limited to consolidation with another bank or the transfer of bank
assets and liabilities to another bank. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-12, -13 (1975). See notes 259-60
and accompanying text infra for a review of other significant changes to G.S. 53.
259. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-42.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
260. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-42.1(a) (1975).
261. Law of June 17, 1981, ch. 594, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 863 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 66-131 to -136 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
262. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-131 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The statute does not include groups or
associations in which no person is intended to or actually profits from the organization beyond the
benefit that all members receive from discount purchases.
263. Id. § 66-132.
264. Id.
265. Id. § 66-133.
266. Id. § 66-134. This section forbids certain high-pressure selling techniques, refusal to dis-
close fully price lists and merchandise catalogs to potential customers, and failure to comply with
a customer's request to cancel purchase orders without charge when goods have not been deliv-
ered or services are yet to be performed.
267. Id. § 66-135.
268. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 952, §2, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1459, 1460-68 (codified
at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-143.8 to -151.5 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
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the industry of the manufacture and sale of mobile homes.269 The statute at-
tempts to bring some order to the industry by requiring the licensing and
bonding of all segments, 270 delineating specific warranty requirements, 27' and
providing channels for an enforcement procedure for warranty claims. 2
72 The
statute eliminates the confusion surrounding the definition of a mobile
home,273 sets forth standards for manufacturing and selling,274 and gives the
Commissioner of Insurance authority to promulgate rules to effectuate the in-
tent of the legislature.275
4. State Building Code
The legislature amended the state building code to provide "Special
Safety to Life Requirements Applicable to Existing High-Rise Buildings.
' 2 76
The code as amended categorizes buildings according to height and identifies
safety measures that are applicable to each category.277 The identified safety
measures vary from corridor smoke detectors, required in all buildings over
six stories tall, to special refuge areas required in buildings over twenty-four
stories. 278 Building owners are required to submit plans and specifications
within one year to outline the work necessary to bring buildings into compli-
ance and are given five years to complete the required modifications. 2 79 The
statute may require major modifications to bring some buildings into
compliance.
5. Credit Unions: Confidentiality
Another development in the commercial area was the General Assembly's
passage of an act to ensure the confidentiality of information obtained by the
state credit union division or its agents.280 The primary purpose of the legisla-
tion is to provide privacy to credit unions and their customers by ensuring that
data collected as a result of state or federal information requirements or exam-
inations is not publicly disclosed. Through this statute the legislature affords
269. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-143.10 (Cum. Supp. 1981); see also id, § 143-146.
270. Id. § 143-143.11, -143.12.
271. Id. § 143-143.16; see also id. § 143-143.18.
272. Id. § 143-143.17.
273. See id. § 143-143.9(6).
274. Id. § 143-151.5.
275. Id. § 143-146.
276. Law of June 19, 1981, ch. 713, §1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1038, 1038-51 (codified
at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-138(i) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
277. Id. For purposes of the code, high-rise buildings are divided into three categories: class
I-60 to 120 feet above ground level (6 to 12 stories); class 11-120 to 250 feet above ground level
(12 to 25 stories); and class III--over 250 feet above ground level (more than 25 stories).
278. Id. Class III buildings are required to have refuge areas on every eighth floor above the
twenty-fifth floor, smoke venting, and sprinkler systems.
279. Id. Building officials may permit time extensions beyond the five-year period if the own-
er can show just cause for the extension at the time the plan is approved.
280. Law of June 5, 1981, ch. 512, §1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 789, 789-90 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 54-109.105 (1981)). The statute identifies records of information that are to be
classified as confidential. While disallowing public disclosure, the statute permits disclosure of
specific information when ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
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credit unions a degree of confidentiality similar to that given banking
institutions.281
6. Debtor Exemptions From Money Judgments
The North Carolina General Assembly adopted a new statute dealing
with debtor exemptions from money judgments.282 This statute repeals G.S. 1-
369 to -392.283 The major exemptions provided by the new statute consist of
up to $7,500 in property the debtor uses as a residence, up to $1,000 in one
motor vehicle, up to $2,500 in household goods, plus $500 for each dependent
of the debtor up to $2000.284
The new statute gives debtors a choice between the exemptions provided
therein and the exemptions provided by Article X of the North Carolina Con-
stitution.285 Interestingly, G.S. 1-369 to -392 provided the statutory machinery
for implementing the Article X exemptions. Thus, the new statute expressly
authorizes the debtor to choose the Article X exemptions, but repeals the statu-
tory machinery to implement the Article X exemptions.
The exemptions provided in The Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act are not
applicable to residents of North Carolina under the new statute.28 6 Instead,
the exemptions provided by G.S. IC-1601 shall apply for purposes of the Fed-
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281. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-99(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981) for a comparison of confidential infor-
mation maintained by the Commissioner of Banks.
282. Law of June 2, 1981, ch. 490, §1, 1981 Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 751, 751-58 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ IC-1601 to -1604 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Only the most salient features of the statute
will be dealt with here. For an article expounding on the statute in much greater detail, see
Peeples, New Rules for an Old Game: North Carolina's New Exemption Act, 17 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 865 (1981).
283. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-369 to -392 (1969).
284. Id. § IC-1601(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
285. Id. § IC-1602.




A. Freedom of Speech I
In Rich v. Luther2 the federal district court for the Western District of
North Carolina confirmed the constitutionality of the Department of Correc-
tions' "publisher only rule." This rule states that "[a]n inmate in medium,
close, or maximum security may receive a reasonable number of books, news-
papers, magazines, and other publications directly from the publisher.' 3 The
regulation prohibits an inmate's receipt of literature from any other source.
Plaintiff, an inmate in a North Carolina state prison, claimed that this rule
violated his first amendment rights Because the suit was filed in 1975, reso-
lution of the constitutional issue required the convening of a three-judge dis-
trict court panel.5
The United States Supreme Court held a similar rule constitutional as
applied to pre-trial detainees in Bell v. Wolfsh.6 Thus, the issue facing the
district court in Rich was whether to extend the Wolfish decision to convicted
prisoners.7 Emphasizing the Wolfish conclusion that a regulation must be
evaluated in light of the need for institutional security even when the regula-
tion affects constitutional rights,8 the court held that the "publisher only rule"
represents "a rational and reasonable response to security problems con-
fronting state officials charged with the responsibility of managing the North
Carolina prison system." 9 In support of its conclusion the court noted that the
rule regulated the source and not the content of the materials, that admitting
all books and magazines might increase the flow of drugs and weapons within
1. In State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 284 S.E.2d 437 (1981), the court considered whether
the refusal of the trial court to grant a "gag order" prohibiting attorneys, assistants, investigators,
the county clerk, sheriff, jailer, police and witnesses from talking to the media denied defendant a
fair trial. In balancing the right to free speech and the guarantee of a fair trial, the court relied on
the holding in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), which held that the person
seeking a gag rule carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the prior restraint. The court
found that defendant had not carried his burden, stating that adverse publicity does not have to
lead to an unfair trial.
2. 514 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1981)
(No. 81-296).
3. 5 N.C. Admin. Code 2D.0101(a) (1981).
4. A woman in Durham had sent plaintiff Great Short Works ofMark 1fvain and Don Juan:
A Yaqui Way of Knowledge. Prison officials returned the books to the sender pursuant to the
"publisher only rule."
5. In 1975, challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes were heard in three.judge
courts. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976)).
Currently, three-judge panels are convened only in cases challenging the constitutionality of the
apportionment of Congressional districts or any statewide legislative body, or as otherwise re-
quired by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976). Judge Russell wrote the court's opinion, joined by
Judge Jones, with Judge McMillan dissenting.
6. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In Wofish, pre-trial detainees brought suit to correct conditions at
the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City. The "publisher only rule" was chal-
lenged in one of several constitutional claims.
7. 514 F. Supp. at 482.
8. 441 U.S. at 546.
9. 514 F. Supp. at 483.
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the prison system, and that the inmates had access to prison libraries.' 0
The Rich opinion represents a considerable expansion of the holding in
Wolfish. The Supreme Court had stressed that it was dealing with a limited
restriction: a prohibition against the receipt of hardback books unless mailed
directly from publishers, book clubs or bookstores."1 The North Carolina rule
embraces all reading material, hard- or soft-bound, and excludes bookstores
and book clubs as potential sources. 12 In other words, the North Carolina reg-
ulation is much more restrictive than the one upheld in Wofish. Furthermore,
the Court in Woflish stressed that its conclusion was the result of a considera-
tion of all the circumstances surrounding pre-trial detainees.13 The Supreme
Court found three factors to be compelling: first, the purpose of the rule was
to regulate the source and not the content of the inmate's reading material;
second, the inmates had access to considerable additional material outside of
the restricted hardcover books; and third, the restriction was limited to a maxi-
mum duration of sixty days.
14
Only the first of these factors, the purpose of the regulation, applies to the
situation of convicted prisoners in North Carolina. While the prisons do pro-
vide libraries for their inmates, books obtained from outside sources are the
only reading material available to inmates, whereas more numerous opportu-
nities are available to pre-trial detainees.15 In addition, the North Carolina
restriction's impact is not limited to a short span of time.16 In light of the
factors found to be relevant in Wolfish, the Rich court must be seen as having
embraced the Wolfsh holding without adhering to its rationale.
17
Another significant 1981 decision I8 involved North Carolina's moral nui-
sance statute.1 9 In 1977 the State sought to have the Chateau X Theater and
Bookstore declared a nuisance under Chapter 19 of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes.20 The trial court, finding that Chateau X was in fact a nuisance,
permanently enjoined defendants from showing any obscene films in the fu-
10. Id. (citing as support Cotton v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 670, 672 (8th Cir. 1980)).
11. 441 U.S. at 550.
12. See 5 N.C. Admin. Code 2D.0101(a) (1981).
13. 441 U.S. at 552. See 5 N.C. Admin. Code 2D.0101(a) (1981).
14. Id. at 551-52.
15. The New York facility had a library containing over 8,000 volumes and offered for sale to
the inmates four daily newspapers and several magazines. Since the "publisher only rule" applied
only to hard-bound material, the inmates could also receive paperback books and magazines from
any source. Id. at 552 n.33. North Carolina facilities, as noted by the dissent in Rich, cannot offer
these alternatives. 514 F. Supp. at 484 (McMillan, J., dissenting).
16. The pre-trial detainees usually were kept no more than ten days, while over 85% were
released within 60 days. 441 U.S. at 524-25 n.3.
17. Justice McMillan further questioned whether the "publisher only rule" was necessary
even in light of security risks. He noted that in minimum custody units, where the rule is not
followed, there are no additional security problems. Moreover, reading materials represent only a
portion of the fifth most frequent source of contraband, and an adequate search of a book should
require no more than 30 seconds. 514 F. Supp. at 485 (McMillan, J., dissenting).
18. Chateau X, Inc. v. State, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981).
19. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 19 (1978).
20. Id. §§ 19-1, -2.1 (1978) (making the use of a building for the purpose of illegal possession
or sale of obscene or lewd matter a nuisance and providing for a civil action of abatement perpet-
ually enjoining all persons from maintaining the nuisance).
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ture. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in State ex
rel Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc..21 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari but vacated the decision and remanded 22 for consideration in light
of Vance v. Universal Amusement Co. 
23
On remand 24 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that Vance was
inapplicable and reaffirmed its earlier decision, incorporating the prior opin-
ion into the current decision.25 The court read Vance as declaring a Texas
nuisance statute an invalid prior restraint because it permitted an individual to
be held in contempt for violating an injunction by showing a film, even though
there had been no final adjudication of obscenity and even though the film
was ultimately found not obscene. Nonobscenity was not a defense under the
Texas statute.26 The court pointed out that in contrast, under the North Caro-
lina moral nuisance statute, G.S. 19-4, nonobscenity is always a defense to a
contempt proceeding. 27 The court concluded that because of this safeguard,
the prior restraint of future expression permitted by the nuisance statute is no
more burdensome than a criminal sanction for past acts, and thus is constitu-
tionally permissible.
28
The supreme court's opinion represents a very narrow interpretation of
the Vance decision. In a strong dissent, Justice Exum chose to read Vance
much more broadly and to view it within the context of other Supreme Court
decisions. 29 This approach seems to be a better interpretation of the admit-
tedly confusing Vance decision. The majority's view, that under Vance a court
need only find that a prior restraint is "neither more onerous nor more objec-
tionable than a criminal sanction," 30 does not meet the standards of either of
the Supreme Court decisions in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v Conrad31 or
21. 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979).
22. 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
23. 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam). The Vance Court was considering a Texas nuisance
statute that allowed injunctions for indefinite duration against future exhibitions of films even
though they had not been adjudicated obscene. If an individual did not obey the order, he could
be held in contempt regardless of whether the film was ultimately found to be obscene. The Court
held that this was an invalid prior restraint on communicative activity. 445 U.S. at 316-17.
24. Chateau X, Inc. v. State, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981).
25. Id. at 323, 275 S.E.2d at 445.
26. Id. at 328, 275 S.E.2d at 448.
27. Id. at 328-29, 275 S.E.2d at 448. The court quoted its earlier decision as support:
There is no significant difference procedurally in a criminal action for selling obscenity
and in a contempt action for violation of an injunction. In both proceedings the defend-
ant can always defend on the ground that the material is not legally obscene. The bur-
den is on the State to prove obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt.
296 N.C. at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611 (as quoted in 302 N.C. at 329, 275 S.E.2d at 448).
28. 302 N.C. at 329, 275 S.E.2d at 448.
29. Id. at 330,275 S.E.2d at 449 (Exum, J., dissenting) (citing particularly Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
30. 302 N.C. at 329, 275 S.E.2d at 448.
31. 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (considering the prohibition of a production of the play Hair).
The presumption against prior restraints is heavier--and the degree of protection
broader-than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind
the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the




Near v. Minnesota,32 both of which emphasize that the burden of supporting a
prior restraint is much heavier than the burden of supporting a criminal sanc-
tion.33 Injunctions against future expressions differ from criminal sanctions
because of their potentially chilling effect on first amendment rights.
Justice Exum's dissent suggested that the State's burden may not be met
solely by a showing that nonobscenity is a defense to a contempt proceeding.
34
He noted that contempt and criminal proceedings differ as to certain key pro-
tections: a civil contemnor is not entitled to a jury trial, and the State in a civil
contempt proceeding does not have to prove scienter, as it must to obtain a
criminal conviction.35 Justice Exum's dissent thus viewed Vance as an exam-
ple of only one way in which an injunction against future expression may be
an impermissible prior restraint.
3 6
Fracaro v. Priddy,37 a third 1981 decision, concerned the first amendment
rights of public employees.38  The District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina recognized that the right to free speech is not absolute for
public employees.3 9 Nevertheless, the State must show significant interference
with efficient operations before limiting first amendment rights. 40 Whether
there has been sufficient interference is an issue of fact to be decided by the
jury.
4 1
Id. at 558-59 (emphasis in original).
32. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding invalid a statute making regular publication of a malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper a public nuisance that may be permanently enjoined).
The statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is
permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is pub-
lished with good motives and for justifiable ends. If such a statute, authorizing suppres-
sion and injunction on such a basis, is constitutionally valid, it would be equally
permissible for the legislature to provide that at any time the publisher of any newspaper
could be brought before a court, or even an administrative officer (as the constitutional
protection may not be regarded as resting on mere procedural details) and required to
produce proof of the truth of his publication, or of what he intended to publish, and of
his motives, or stand enjoined. If this can be done, the legislature may provide machin-
ery for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion what are justifiable ends
and restrain publication accordingly. And it would be but a step to a complete system of
censorship.
Id. at 721.
33. The Vance court reiterated this concept: "ITihe burden of supporting an injunction
against a future exhibition is even heavier than the burden of justifying the imposition of a crimi-
nal sanction for a past communication." 445 U.S. at 315-16.
34. 302 N.C. at 331, 275 S.E.2d at 449 (Exum, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Id. The two other courts that have faced the problem of applying Vance to a nuisance
statute did not clearly adopt the interpretation of the Chateau X court, nor did they embrace the
view of Exum's dissent. Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980), afid
mem., 50 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981) (No. 80-1604); Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v.
Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
37. 514 F. Supp. 191 (M.D.N.C. 1981).
38. Plaintiff, a Social Services Eligibility Supervisor, claimed in two television interviews that
social workers mishandled child abuse cases. She was fired because of the statements and brought
suit claiming that this action violated her first amendment rights.
39. 514 F. Supp. at 194.
40. Id. at 196.
41. Id. at 195-96. Defendants had moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plain-
tiffs claim was dismissed pursuant to a statute prohibiting dissemination of confidential informa-
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Finally, in State v. Felmet42 the supreme court held that the free speech
provisions of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions do not pro-
tect an individual from prosecution for trespassing when he solicits signatures
for a petition in the parking lot of a privately owned shopping mall.43
B. Fifth Amendment: Self-Incrimination
In Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc. 44 the North Carolina Supreme Court
considered whether the refusal by defendant in a civil contempt proceeding45
to comply with a court order to produce tax returns was protected by the fifth
amendment's proscription against self-incrimination. 4 6 After a careful study
of several United States Supreme Court decisions addressing the matter,47 the
court concluded that the contents of the documents did not provide the neces-
sary element of compulsion when there was no evidence that the defendant
was under any physical or mental coercion at the time he prepared his tax
returns.48 The court also concluded that the compelled testimony which
would result from defendant's required production of the tax returns did not
merit fifth amendment protection because the documents were only of a semi-
private nature.4
9
C. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection50
In Jones v. McDowell51 the North Carolina Court of Appeals sustained
due process and equal protection attacks on the State's statutory scheme for
tion. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 103-45(a) (1978) (repealed by 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 275, § 1
(effective Oct. 1, 1981)). In refusing to grant all of the State's summary judgment motion, the
court suggested that the statute might not be applicable since it concerned information about
people receiving public assistance and not those providing assistance. 514 F. Supp. at 196.
42. 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981) (6-0 decision; Meyer, J., not participating).
43. Id. at 178, 273 S.E.2d at 712.
44. 301 N.C. 561, 273 S.E.2d 247 (1981).
45. The court found support for the proposition that the privilege against compulsory testi-
monial self-incrimination extends not only to criminal proceedings, but also to civil proceedings in
which a party might be subjected to imprisonment in McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924),
and Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31, 134 S.E.2d 186 (1964).
46. U.S. Coast. amend. V. The court also considered defendant's right not to incriminate
himself under the North Carolina Constitution. N.C. Const. art. I, § 23.
47. The court looked primarily at the Supreme Court's decisions in Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); and Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973).
48. 301 N.C. at 588, 273 S.E.2d at 263.
49. Id. at 590, 273 S.E.2d at 264.
50. In State v. Elam, 302 N.C. 157, 273 S.E.2d 661 (1981), the North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected vagueness and overbreadth challenges to G.S. § 14-202.1, which prohibits the taking of
indecent liberties with children under 16 years of age. The court also rejected defendant's
contention that a strict scrutiny standard should be applied in testing the statute's age
classification, concluding that the classification was reasonably related to the statute's underlying
purpose of protecting children from the sexual advances of adults. 302 N.C. at 162, 273 S.E.2d at
665. See also In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972) (age classification tested by
"rational basis" test). See generally Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Note, The Burner
Court's "Newest" Equal Protection: Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine Rejected-Two-Tier
Review Reinstated, 1977 Wash. U. L.Q. 140.
51. 53 N.C. App. 434, 281 S.E.2d 192 (1981).
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changing an illegitimate child's surname upon legitimation to that of the fa-
ther.52 After holding that the mother has a constitutionally protected interest
in retaining the surname given the child at birth,53 the court concluded that
the statutory scheme providing for notice and hearing was not sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of due process because the scheme mandated a change
in the surname to that of the father.54 Moreover, the court continued, the
statute utilized a gender-based classification for which the State could not ad-
vance an "exceedingly persuasive justification. ' 55 Because the requirement did
not bear a close and substantial relationship to the underlying governmental
objective of establishing the filial relationship between illegitimate children
and their fathers, it was found to deny the mother her right to equal protection
under the law.
56
D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
1. Civil Paternity and Right to Counsel57
In Wake County ex rel Carrington v. Townes,5 8 a case of first impression
in North Carolina,5 9 the court of appeals held that an indigent defendant has a
52. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 49-10, -13 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981) provide that upon legitimation,
the child's birth certificate shall be replaced by one bearing the full name of the father, and on
which the surname of the child is changed to that of the father.
53. The court relied on several cases for this proposition, including Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
54. 53 N.C. App. at 441-42, 281 S.E.2d at 194. See note 52 supra.
55. Id. at 441, 281 S.E.2d at 196.
56. In considering a similar issue, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina recently held that G.S. § 130-53(e), which requires that children born of married parents
be given their father's surname, violated the parents' and the child's right to privacy in making
decisions affecting family life. O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981). Furthermore,
because the statutory scheme distinguishes between legitimate children, who must bear the fa-
ther's name, and illegitimate children, who until legitimated may be given either parent's name,
see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130-50(f) (1981), it fails to provide equal protection under the law. The
court rejected the State's contentions that the scheme was necessary to keep accurate and timely
records of births, and to screen newborns for health problems, concluding that a compelling state
interest justifying the different requirements was not shown. 523 F. Supp. at 496.
57. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. In
State v. McCoy, 302 N.C. 363, 283 S.E.2d 788 (1981), the North Carolina Supreme Court was
presented with the question whether an indigent defendant has a constitutional right under the
sixth amendment to court-appointed counsel in a criminal prosecution for nonsupport of an
illegitimate child under G.S. § 49-2. Defendant had been adjudged the father of the child in an
earlier action for nonsupport in which he had not been offered the assistance of appointed counsel.
The court refused to decide the issue, however, holding instead that the trial judge's ruling on
defendant's motion for appropriate relief was not yet ripe for appellate review because the trial
court had not determined whether defendant's failure to comply with the earlier child support
judgment had been willful. Willful failure to comply with an earlier support judgment, the court
noted, is not presumed from a mere failure to support. Id. at 370-71, 283 S.E.2d at 792. See State
v. Cook, 207 N.C. 261, 176 S.E.2d 757 (1934).
58. 53 N.C. App. 649, 281 S.E.2d 765 (1981).
59. Although the courts of North Carolina had not addressed this precise question, they had
addressed similar ones, the most notable being that of an indigent defendant's right to court-
appointed counsel in a state-instituted parental rights termination proceeding. In re Lasiter, 43
N.C. App. 525, 259 S.E.2d 336 (1979). See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law,
1979-Constitutional Law, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1326, 1345 (1980)). Although the North Carolina
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right to court-appointed counsel in civil paternity suits instituted by the
State.60 The court based the right on the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution6' and of article I,
section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.6
2
Wake County, through its Department of Social Services Child Support
Agency, sought a civil adjudication that defendant was the father of an illegiti-
mate child whose mother was a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) funds. The county also sought an order directing defendant
to make support payments on the child's behalf.63
At a preliminary hearing, the trial judge denied defendant's motion seek-
ing appointment of counsel,64 concluding that neither the due process clause
of the United States Constitution nor article 1, section 19 of the North Caro-
lina Constitution guarantees an indigent defendant the right to court-ap-
pointed counsel in civil paternity actions. 65 On review of defendant's appeal
from the denial of the motion, the court of appeals reversed.66
The court of appeals adopted the analysis set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,67 in which the
Supreme Court affirmed a North Carolina Court of Appeals decision that an
indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to court-appointed
counsel in a civil termination of parental rights hearing. 68 The Court in
Lassiter began its analysis with the presumption that an indigent litigant has a
right to appointed counsel only when an adverse decision might result in the
deprivation of the litigant's "physical liberty."69 A balancing of interests test
was then applied, in which three distinct factors deemed necessary to ensure
fundamental fairness are considered:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's in-
Supreme Court declined to review that decision, 299 N.C.120, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980), the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. Lassiter v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The court of appeals based its decision in Carrington on the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Lassiter.
60. 53 N.C. App. at 650, 281 S.E.2d at 766-67.
61. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
62. N.C. Const. art. I, § 19.
63. 53 N.C. App. at 649, 281 S.E.2d at 766.
64. The defendant had first sought assistance at the local legal services office, but he was
turned away because the office believed that he had a right to court-appointed counsel. The office
did agree to make a limited appearance, however, to ensure that defendant received appointed
counsel. Id. at 649-50, 281 S.E.2d at 766.
65. Id. at 650, 281 S.E.2d at 766.
66. Id.
67. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). See note 58 supra.
68. In re Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 526, 259 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C.
120, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980), afld, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). In 1981 the legislature amended G.S. 7A-
289.23 to provide indigent parents the right to appointed counsel in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights. See this Survey-Family Law, at 1380.
69. 53 N.C. App. at 651, 281 S.E.2d at 767 (quoting from Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27).
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terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
70
After balancing these three factors, the court must then "set their net weight
.. . against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only
where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom."
71
After outlining the analysis, the court of appeals applied the Lassiter test
to the facts before it. Because a paternity action is a civil proceeding, the court
reasoned, it offered no immediate threat to defendant's personal liberty.
72
Nevertheless, a civil paternity adjudication can have criminal ramifications if,
for example, the defendant is found to be the child's father and subsequently
defaults on support payments that he was ordered to make in the paternity
action.73 The court concluded that there is "at best, a weakened presumption
that court-appointed counsel is not necessary in a paternity proceeding."
'74
The court then proceeded to examine the three factors involved, looking
first at those interests of defendant that would be placed in jeopardy absent
assistance of counsel. The court identified two interests: first, defendant's lib-
erty interest, in that the adjudication of paternity would be res judicata in any
subsequent criminal proceeding to enforce any obligations arising out of the
paternity judgment; and second, defendant's personal property and familial
interests.
75
Next, the court evaluated the risk of an erroneous adjudication of pater-
nity in the absence of procedural safeguards such as appointed counsel to pro-
tect defendant's rights. It concluded that without counsel to advise indigent
defendants, many of whom are illiterate and unfamiliar with the judicial pro-
cess, a defendant's constitutional right to a free blood grouping test would be
rendered meaningless, and there would be no effective cross-examination of
the accusing mother; in short, the complexities of a paternity suit would act as
a barrier to an unrepresented indigent defendant's opportunity to be heard.
76
Finally, the court looked at the State's interest in reducing costs and mini-
mizing litigation. While the court conceded that the State's financial and ad-
ministrative interests are important, it found that these interests are
outweighed by the defendant's important private interests.77
70. 53 N.C. App. at 652, 281 S.E.2d at 767 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)). Although the Supreme Court in Mathews set out these three factors for determining what
procedures are necessary to ensure fundamental fairness under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution, the court of appeals concluded that the same
test was applicable in evaluating the due process requirements of the North Carolina Constitution.
53 N.C. App. at 652, 281 S.E.2d at 767.
71. Id. at 652, 281 S.E.2d at 768 (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
72. Id. See also Bell v. Martin, 299 N.C. 715, 264 S.E.2d 101 (1980) (proceeding to establish
paternity not quasi-criminal in nature and thus not deserving of jury trial merely because plaintiff
must prove paternity beyond reasonable doubt).
73. 53 N.C. App. at 652, 281 S.E.2d at 768.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 653-57, 281 S.E.2d at 768-70.
76. Id. at 657, 281 S.E.2d at 771.
77. Id. at 660-61, 281 S.E.2d at 772.
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The court concluded its analysis by balancing the three factors, first
against one another and then collectively against the "weakened presumption"
that no right to counsel attaches unless a defendant's personal liberty is at
stake. As a result of this balancing, the court concluded that the three factors
outweighed the presumption, and thus the indigent defendant was entitled to
court-appointed counsel. 78 That right was based on both the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution and on the law-of-the land pro-
vision of the North Carolina Constitution.79 The court observed that its hold-
ing was not inconsistent with current North Carolina case law,80 and that a
similar result had been reached in several other jurisdictions8 l as well as by
the Uniform Parentage Act.
82
2. Procedural Due Process
North Carolina courts decided several cases in 1981 concerning proce-
dural due process. 83 In State v. Taylor84 the North Carolina Supreme Court
78. "On the imaginary scales of justice, the defendant's substantial liberty, property and fa-
milial interests. . . ; the significant risk of an erroneous adjudication of paternity under the pres-
ent procedures. . . ; and the State's minimal counterveiling monetary interests. . . overwhelm
the already weakened presumption against the right to appointed counsel in cases of this nature."
Id. at 661, 281 S.E.2d at 773.
79. Id. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.C. Const. art. I, § 19.
80. The court looked exclusively at the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Jolly v.
Wright, 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980). The Jolly decision stands for the proposition that
counsel is not automatically required in a civil contempt proceeding; rather, the need for counsel
in each proceeding must be evaluated on its own merits. See 53 N.C. App. at 661, 281 S.E.2d at
773.
81. The court cited two cases holding that an indigent defendant has a right based on the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution to court-appointed counsel in state-insti-
tuted paternity actions. See Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979);
Madeline G. v. David R., 95 Misc. 2d 273, 407 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Family Ct. 1978). Two other courts
have based the right on state due process grounds. Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799 (Alaska
1977); Artibee v. Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 243 N.W.2d 248 (1976). See also Hepfee v. Brad-
shaw, 279 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1979) (right to court-appointed counsel based on court's supervisory
power to ensure fair administration of justice).
82. Uniform Parentage Act § 19(a) (1973).
83. In State v. Roberts, 51 N.C. App. 221,275 S.E.2d 536, further rev. denied, 303 N.C. 318,
281 S.E.2d 657 (1981), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a jury instruction did not
violate defendant's due process rights because the charge contained only a permissive inference of
guilt rather than a mandatory presumption of guilt, as defendant claimed. Id. at 223, 275 S.E.2d
at 537. Since there was "a rational connection between the basic and elemental facts such that
upon proof of the basic facts . . . , the elemental facts . . . are more likely to exist," id., and
because there was other evidence that, when coupled with the inference, was sufficient for the jury
to find the elemental facts beyond a reasonable doubt, the court found that defendant's due pro-
cess rights were not violated. Id.
In State ex rel. Lee v. Penland-Bailey Co., 50 N.C. App. 498, 274 S.E.2d 348 (1981), the court
of appeals held that the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act of 1973, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-50
to -66 (1981), did not apply retroactively to an event that preceded the July 1, 1973 effective date
of the Act but which produced sedimentation and siltation after that date. The court concluded
that the legislative intent behind the enactment of this statute was to control future erosion and
sedimentation. 50 N.C. App. at 502, 274 S.E.2d at 351. Moreover, the statute was still constitu-
tional if retroactively applied in this instance because defendant failed to show that the Act as
applied interfered with any of his vested rights or accrued liabilities. Id. at 503-04, 274 S.E.2d at
352. The position of the court was consistent with that of the supreme court in Wood v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979); and Booker v. Duke University Medical
Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
In State v. Hodges, 51 N.C. App. 229, 275 S.E.2d 533 (1981), the court of appeals held that a
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held that the State's refusal to give defendant notice prior to trial of all aggra-
vating circumstances upon which the State intended to rely in seeking the
death penalty in the event of a conviction for first degree murder was not a
violation of defendant's due process rights. Stating that the factors set out in
G.S. 15A-2000(e)85 are the only aggravating circumstances upon which the
State can rely, the court ruled that the statutory notice is sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of due process.
8 6
In Town of Hudson v. Martin-Kahill Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. 87 the
court of appeals rejected defendant's contention that G.S. 105-366 and -368,88
which provide for the prehearing garnishment of a defendant's bank account
for nonpayment of taxes due on a bulk sale, violated defendant's rights to due
process and equal protection under the United States Constitution. The court
found that the statutory scheme fell within the special circumstances exception
rule that a taking before a hearing violates due process because the govern-
ment's interest in collecting its unpaid revenues outweighs the individual inter-
ests of the defendant involved.89 Moreover, the statutory scheme provides for
a subsequent judicial determination of rights involved.90
defendant's due process rights were violated when the prosecution refused to disclose the identity
of an informant who participated in the sale of marijuana by an undercover S.B.I. agent to the
defendant. The court applied the balancing approach adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). The Court in that case held that no abso-
lute rule of disclosure is applicable when deciding whether an informant's name must be dis-
closed; rather, the court must balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information
from informants by preserving their anonymity against the individual's right to prepare a defense.
Id. at 59. The court of appeals concluded that when the informant was an actual participant in the
crime, disclosure of his identity is compelled, for in that circumstance the significance of the in-
formant's testimony is a matter for the defendant and not for the prosecution to decide. Thus,
failure to disclose the informant's identity sufficiently in advance of trial to permit defendant to
interview the informant and assess the significance of his testimony was a violation of defendant's
due process rights. 51 N.C. App. at 232, 275 S.E.2d at 535. See also State v. Ketchie. 286 N.C.
387, 211 S.E.2d 207 (1975) (when defendant does not contend that informant participated in or
witnessed the alleged crime, he has no constitutional right to discover the name of the informant).
84. 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981).
85. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e) (1981).
86. The court noted that while several states, by statute, have required that such notice be
given before trial, see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(1) (1979), the requirement is only a
statutory one, and the North Carolina General Assembly has not enacted similar legislation. 304
N.C. at 257, 283 S.E.2d at 768.
87. 54 N.C. App. 272, 283 S.E.2d 417 (1981).
88. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-366 & 368 (1979).
89. 54 N.C. App. at 275-77, 283 S.E.2d at 419-20. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, (1981),
the Supreme Court recognized that "the necessity of quick action by the State. . . can, when
coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the
State's action at some time after the initial taking, satisfy the requirements of procedural due
process." Id. at 534. See also Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) ("Where only
property rights are involved, mere postponement ofjudicial inquiry is not a denial of due process,
if the opportunity for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate.").
90. 54 N.C. App. at 275-77, 283 S.E.2d at 419-20. The court also rejected defendant's argu-
ment that because G.S. 105-368 contains no standards for application and its use is therefore left
to the tax collector's discretion, it leaves open the possibility for invidious discrimination in its
application. The scheme involves a permissible delegation of discretionary authority to the tax
collector, the court held, and defendant failed to establish a discriminatory purpose or impact in
its application. 54 N.C. App. at 277, 283 S.E.2d at 421. See also State ex rel. Dorothea Dix
Hospital v. Davis, 292 N.C. 147, 232 S.E.2d 698 (1977).
Several decisions by the United States Supreme Court have dealt with the due process re-
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In State v. Jones91 the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that a
county ordinance regulating the location and appearance of junkyards and
automobile graveyards did not violate article I, section 19 of the North Caro-
lina Constitution 92 even though the ordinance admittedly was enacted to pro-
mote aesthetic values only.9 3 The court expressly declined to follow the North
Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Brown94 that a statute prohibit-
ing the placement of abandoned automobiles within 150 yards of a paved
highway was not within the State's police power because it was intended only
to improve aesthetic qualities. 95 The court of appeals concluded that its deci-
sion in Jones nevertheless was consistent with "the trend in the cases decided
by our Supreme Court."
'96
Finally, in Sheppard v. Moore97 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina dismissed a complaint alleging that a sher-
iff-defendant had violated plaintiffs due process rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 198398 by failing to obey an order requiring him to return a knife and gun
collection that he had confiscated for use as evidence in an earlier trial. Rely-
ing primarily on the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Parratt v. Taylor,99 the district court held that the North Carolina tort action
quirements of attachment proceedings. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (right to
notice and hearing, to be meaningful, must be granted at a time when wrongful deprivation of
property can still be prevented); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971) (pre-depriva-
tion hearing required by due process "except in extraordinary situations where some valid govern-
mental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event"); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (notice and hearing required before termination of welfare benefits);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (hearing required before prejudgement gar-
nishment of wages). But see D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (confession of
judgment provision not per se violative of due process where parties had equal bargaining power,
debtor knowingly waived right to notice and hearing, and applicable state statute defense shown).
See generally Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 521 (1973).
91. 53 N.C. App. 466, 281 S.E.2d 91 (1981).
92. "No person shall be. . .deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the
land." N.C. Const. art. 1, § 19.
93. 53 N.C. App. at 469, 281 S.E.2d at 93.
94. 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959).
95. The supreme court noted that substantive due process requires that a legislature or a
municipality exercise its public power only in ways that promote the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (fourteenth amendment does not
proscribe state action that regulates for aesthetic purposes only).
96. 53 N.C. App. at 470-71, 281 S.E.2d at 94. In support of its conclusion, the court of ap-
peals cited only two cases: A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979)
(upholding a zoning ordinance that regulated building appearances for several reasons, including
for aesthetic purposes); and Cumberland County v. Eastern Fed. Corp., 48 N.C. App. 518, 269
S.E.2d 672 (1980) (holding in a decision limited to the facts of the case, that an ordinance regulat-
ing highway signs could be based on aesthetic considerations). But see Horton v. Gulledge, 277
N.C. 353, 177 S.E.2d 885 (1970), in which the iupreme court recognized the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (state statute that regulated for
aesthetic purposes only not violative of fourteenth amendment), but declined to give a similar
interpretation to article I, § 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.
97. 514 F. Supp. 1372 (M.D.N.C. 1981).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 prohibits deprivations of constitutional privileges
and immunities under color of state law. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is
one such constitutional immunity.
99. 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (state tort remedy provides means of redress for property deprivation
sufficient to satisfy requirements of procedural due process).
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for conversion provided a means of redress for improper deprivation of prop-
erty sufficient to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.100
E. North Carolina Constitution10 1
1. Separation of Powers
In 1981, G.S. 143B-283(d) was amended to increase the membership of
the Environmental Management Commission by four, with two members to
be appointed from the North Carolina House of Representatives and two from
the Senate.10 2 This change raised the question whether legislative member-
ship on the Commission l03 violated the separation of powers clause of the
North Carolina Constitution. 104 In a case of first impression, State ex rel.
100. The district court noted that in Gallimore v. Sink, 27 N.C. App. 65, 218 S.E.2d 181
(1975), the court of appeals had held a sheriff liable for conversion on facts almost identical to
those present in this case. 514 F. Supp. at 1377. Therefore, while the plaintiffs here properly
alleged that they had suffered a deprivation at the hands of defendants, and that the defendantshad acted under color of state law, they failed to satisfy the final prerequisite of a valid fourteenth
amendment claim under § 1983 by showing the absence of an adequate remedy for the violation
under state law. Id. at 1375.
The court also dismissed plaintifi's complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976), because it re-
vealed no racial or other class-based animus, and plaintiffs admitted to having no evidence of such
aniinus. 514 F. Supp. at 1378.
101. Chapter 504 of the 1981 Session Laws amends Article II, sections 2, 4 and 8 of the
Constitution to provide four-year terms for members of the General Assembly. The amendments
will be submitted to the voters at the next statewide election. Law of June 5, 1981, ch. 504, § 1,
1981 Sess. Laws, 1st Sess., 781.
Article VI of the North Carolina Constitution provides that no one convicted of a felony may
be elected to public office. N.C. Const. art. 6, § 2(3). The federal district court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina recently ruled that even though a conviction has been appealed, the
individual still remains ineligible. Wilson v. Goodwyn, 522 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D.N.C. 1981). The
court reasoned that once convicted at the trial level, a defendant is presumed guilty and the trial
court proceedings are presumed regular.
In In re Annexation Ordinance, 303 N.C. 220, 278 S.E.2d 224 (1981), the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of various Winston-Salem annexation ordinances,
relying substantially on its previous decision in In re Annexation Ordinances, 253 N.C. 637, 117
S.E.2d 795 (1961).
In Carnahan v. Reed, 53 N.C. App. 589, 281 S.E.2d 408 (1981), the court of appeals
addressed the issue of plaintiffs standing to seek an injunction against a North Carolina
Department of Corrections regulation that prohibited the release of the psychiatric and
psychological records of plaintiff's deceased husband. See 5 N.C. Admin. Code 2D.0601(b). The
court held that plaintiff did not have standing for several reasons. First, she was not a member of
the class of all present and former prisoners on whose behalf she sought to bring a class action
suit. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-l, Rule 23(a) (1969). Second, plaintiff was decedent's next of kin,
not his personal representative, and therefore did not have standing to sue to enforce the
decedent's constitutional rights under G.S. § 28A-18-1 ("survival of actions to and against
personal representative"). Finally, any property rights that the decedent might have had in the
records passed to the estate's legal representative rather than to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial
court's order dismissing plaintiffs cause for lack of standing was affirmed. 53 N.C. App. at 592,
281 S.E.2d at 410.
102. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-283(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
103. See id. § 143B-282 to -284 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
104. "The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be
forever separate and distinct from each other." N.C. Const. art. 1, § 6. See also State ex rel.
Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 494, 164 S.E.2d 161, 165-66 (1968) ("It is for the State to determine
whether and to what extent its powers shall be kept separate between the executive, legislative and
judicial departments of its government.").
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Wallace v. Bone,10 5 the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the effect
of the separations clause on G.S. 143B-283(d). After an examination of the
history of the doctrine of separation of powers, the decisions of other states
and the specific provisions of the North Carolina Constitution (in conjunction
with the statutory provisions for the Environmental Management Commis-
sion), the supreme court concluded that the amendment was
unconstitutional. 10
6
The court first noted that in each of the three constitutions adopted since
North Carolina's statehood, there had been an express statement of the doc-
trine of separation of powers.10 7 In contrast, the United States Constitution
contains no such explicit provision, but the principle nevertheless has been
carefully protected. s08 While the court could find no North Carolina case law
to support its position, it interpreted the lack of cases as demonstrating the
importance of separation of powers in North Carolina.109 The court con-
cluded "that the principle of separation of powers is a cornerstone of our state
and federal governments.' 110
Second, the court surveyed numerous cases from other states considering
the question of legislative encroachment on executive matters. Its review
showed that a large number of states refused to allow legislators to serve on
executive boards or commissions. I South Carolina and Kansas, on the other
hand, seem to have moved away from strict adherence to the separation of
powers principle; the trial court in Wallace had relied on decisions from these
jurisdictions." 2 The supreme court, however, seemed to reason that since
North Carolina had such a strong tradition of belief in the separation of pow-
ers, it was more appropriate to follow decisions from states with similar
orientations.
In the third section of its opinion, the court considered the application of
105. 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982).
106. Id. at 608-09, 286 S.E.2d at 89.
107. Id. at 595, 286 S.E.2d at 81. North Carolina adopted constitutions in 1776, 1868 and
1970.
108. Id. at 598, 286 S.E.2d at 83. The federal constitution provides only that the legislative
power will be vested in a Congress, the executive power in a president, and the judicial power in a
supreme court. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1; art. 2, § 1; art. 3, § 1.
109. 304 N.C. at 549, 286 S.E.2d at 83-84. The court also pointed out that only in North
Carolina is the governor denied the power to veto legislative enactments. "The clear implication
is that our people do not want the chief executive to have any direct control over our legislative
branch." Id. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 83.
110. Id. at 601, 286 S.E.2d at 84.
Ill. See, e.g., Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912); Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667,
212 S.E.2d 836 (1975); Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273 (1958);
State v. Bailey, 151 W. Va. 79, 150 S.E.2d 449 (1966).
112. The trial court cited State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennet, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976),
and State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977). In the case of South
Carolina, however, the court's analysis may not be completely accurate. McLeod is the most
recent in a line of cases upholding the validity of the composition of th'e state Budget and Control
Board. As to the application of the separation of powers principle to other boards, see Ashmore v.
Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88 (1947) (invalidating an act that estab-
lished a governing board for the erection and maintenance of an auditorium because the board
included a state senator and a member of the house of representatives).
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the principle to the Environmental Management Commission. Although the
parties had stipulated that the Commission "is a quasi-independent regulatory
agency of the State with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers and du-
ties,"'l1 the description of its powers and duties in the General Statutes clearly
indicates that the Commission is primarily administrative or executive in na-
ture. 114 The court ruled that the legislature could not create an organization
to implement legislation and then maintain control over the implementation
by including senators or representatives in the organization's membership.
115
The court did recognize, however, as have many other states, that the com-
plexity of modem governments and the problems they must confront compel
cooperation among the three branches.1 16 While other jurisdictions have sug-
gested that this requires more flexibility in the application of the separation of
powers principle,' 17 the supreme court in dicta implied that it will permit a
mingling of the legislative and executive branches only in the case of study
commissions.11 8
A significant omission in the court's opinion is the lack of any indication
of the effect its ruling of unconstitutionality should have on the existence of
the Environmental Management Commission or the forty-nine other boards
and commissions on which legislators serve. Courts in other states have dealt
with the problem in a straightforward manner. 19 If the board was composed
only partially of legislators, the court severed the portion of the statute provid-
ing for legislative membership and declared the remainder of the statute to be
constitutional. Thus, the board or commission could still perform its duties,
and the legislature later could provide for additional nonlegislative members.
This seems to be the most practical and efficient solution.'
20
2. Access to the Courts
In Bolick v. American Barmag Corp. 121 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
113. 304 N.C. at 593, 286 S.E.2d at 80.
114. The Commission promulgates rules and regulations to be used to protect the State's water
and air resources. The Commission also has the power to grant permits, conduct investigations,
institute actions in superior court, review local programs, declare emergencies, approve dam con-
struction and establish air and water quality standards. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-282 (1978).
115. 304 N.C. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 668, 212 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1975) ("It must be con-
ceded that separation of powers is not a rigid principle."). The United States Supreme Court has
also approved the idea of cooperation. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933)
("[Tlhe branches are] independent not in the sense that they shall not cooperate to the common
end of carrying into effect the purposes of the Constitution, but in the sense that the acts of each
shall never be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive influence of either
of the other departments.").
118. 304 N.C. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
119. See Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667,212 S.E.2d 836 (1975); State v. Bailey, 151 W. Va. 79, 150
S.E.2d 449 (1966).
120. While the cited courts were acting in the absence of severability clauses, the North Caro-
lina General Assembly has provided for such a clause. Law of June 28, 1977, ch. 771, § 22, 1977
N.C. Sess. Laws 1012.
121. 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981).
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peals declared the Products Liability Act 122 unconstitutional as violating arti-
cle I, section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution, which guarantees
individuals a right to seek redress in the courts.123 The State argued that the
Act, which set the date of purchase as the time at which the statute of limita-
tions began to run, was a valid statute of limitations.' 2 4 The court responded
by noting that a statute of limitations cannot begin to run until a cause of
action accrues, and that there can be no accrual until there has been an in-
jury.'25 In working to bar some actions before any injury occurred, the Act
could have denied some injured individuals access to the courts for otherwise
perfectly valid claims, thus violating the constitutional protection.
3. Right to Jury Trial
In In re Ferguson 126 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a
party does not have a right to trial by jury in a parental rights termination
proceeding. The court noted that article I, section 25 of the North Carolina
Constitution 27 guarantees the right to jury trial only in those cases in which
the right existed at common law or by statute at the time the Constitution was
adopted.1 28 The present statute, G.S. 287.30,129 which provides for a nonjury
hearing in parental rights termination proceedings, was not enacted until 1969,
subsequent to the adoption of the present state constitution. 130 Thus, the stat-
ute did not violate the party's right to a jury trial.
13 1
122. "No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property
based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product shall be
brought more than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption." N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-50(6) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
123. N.C. Const. ait. 1, § 18.
124. 54 N.C. App. at 593, 284 S.E.2d at 191.
125. Id. at 594, 284 S.E.2d at 191-92.
126. 50 N.C. App. 681,274 S.E.2d 879 (1981). Cf. In re Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 259 S.E.2d
336 (1979), affd sub nom. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that
the United States Constitution does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in
every parental rights termination proceeding). See note 58 supra.
127. N.C. const. art. I, § 25.
128. See In re Wallace, 276 N.C. 204, 147 S.E.2d 922 (1966).
129. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-2897.30(a) (1981).
130. 50 N.C. App. at 684, 274 S.E.2d at 880.
131. The court on its own motion raised and then summarily rejected the argument that the
right to jury trial in this case was guaranteed under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Its reasoning was the
same as that rejecting the claim under the North Carolina Constitution; namely, that neither the
common law nor any statute provided for a jury trial in such cases at the time the Constitution
was adopted. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 894 (1962) (any legal issue, whether or not
incidental, for which jury trial is properly and timely requested must be submitted to a jury);
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (if case presents both legal and equitable
claims, legal claim should be tried first in order to preserve party's seventh amendment right to
jury trial on common issues); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524, 256 S.E.2d
388 (1979) (right to jury trial under article I, § 25 of North Carolina Constitution requires initial
determination by trial court that case includes factual determinations requiring jury trial). See
generally McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1967);




In Kiddie Korner Day Schools, Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed-
ucation 132 the court of appeals rejected several constitutional challenges to an
extended day care program conducted by the school board at a local elemen-
tary school. 133 Plaintiffs, owners and operators of various commerical day
care centers, had sought an injunction prohibiting the school board from oper-
ating the program.
134
The court first ruled that the program did not violate the requirement of
the North Carolina Constitution that there be a "general and uniform system
of free public schools." 135 That mandate, said the court, "does not require
every school ... throughout the State to be identical in all respects." 136 The
court also held that charging participants a tuition fee did not violate the pro-
vision's requirement of a free public education, because the fee covered sup-
plemental services rather than the students' basic education.
137
The court next rejected plaintiffs' argument that the use of school funds
13 8
in the program violated the constitution's requirement that all expenditures of
tax dollars be for a "public purpose." 139 It reasoned that in so far as the pro-
gram furthers the education of participating students, it furthers society's




132. 55 N.C. App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981).
133. The program was designed to alleviate the problem of "latch key" children---that is, chil-
dren left unsupervised from the time that school closes to the time that their parents return home
from work. Id. at 135 n.1, 285 S.E.2d at 112 n.l. It is open to all children enrolled at the school,
but there is a $15 per month tuition fee to cover the program's operating costs.
134. The superior court had granted summary judgment for the defendant; the court of ap-
peals affirmed that judgment.
135. N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1).
136. 55 N.C. App. at 138, 285 S.E.2d at 113 (citing Board ofEduc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 174
N.C. 469, 93 S.E. 1001 (1917)).
137. Id. at 139-40, 285 S.E.2d at 114. In support of its ruling, the court quoted extensively
from Sneed v. Board of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980). For a discussion of that case
see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980--Constitutional Law, 59 N.C.L. Rev.
1088, 1121 (1981).
138. While the vast majority of the program's expenses are covered by the tuition paid by
participants, see note 133 supra, the program is given free use of the elementary school facilities,
and that use generates heating, lighting and general maintenance expenses. The court termed
these expenses "nominal." 55 N.C. App. at 144, 285 S.E.2d at 117.
139. "The power to tax shall be exercised.. . for public purposes only ... ." N.C. Const.
art. V, § 2(l). Although this provision speaks only in terms of the taxing power, the supreme court
has interpreted it as applying to the spending power as well. Mitchell v. Industrial Div. Fin.
Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 143, 159 S.E.2d 745, 749-50 (1968).
140. 55 N.C. App. at 145, 285 S.E.2d at 117. See also Hughey v. Cloninger, 297 N.C. 86, 253
S.E.2d 898 (1979); Mitchell v. Industrial Div. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968)
("For a use to be public. . ., the ultimate net gain or advantage must be the public's as contradis-
tinguished from that of an individual or private entity."). See generally Note, Restricting Reve-
nue Bond Financing of Private Enterprise, 52 N.C.L. Rev. 859 (1974).
Two additional arguments advanced by the plaintiffs were summarily rejected by the court.
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First, the court rejected the argument that the legislature could not constitutionally delegate to the
school board the authority to maintain the day care program. 55 N.C. App. at 143, 285 S.E.2d at
116. Second, the court rejected the argument that the program violates plaintiffs' personal and
property rights under Art. 1, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 147, 285 S.E.2d at 118 ("The plaintiffs have
no vested property rights in providing after school care.").
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V. CRIMINAL LAW1
4. Abolition of Distinction Between Accessories Before
the Fact and Princi'pals
On June 25, 1981, the North Carolina General Assembly ratified an act
effective July 1, 1981, that abolishes all distinctions between accessories before
the fact and principles to the commission of a felony.2 Under the statute a
person who previously would have been guilty as an accessory before the fact
to any felony will now be guilty and punishable as a principal to that felony.
3
The Act contains a qualified exception to the abolition of the distinction for
persons convicted of capital felonies. If the jury finds that his conviction was
based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of one or more principals, co-
conspirators or accessories to the crime, the person shall be guilty only of a
Class B felony.
4
This statute is apparently a legislative reaction to the decision of the
North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Small.5 The court in that case re-
fused to impose liability as a principal upon a defendant who allegedly hired
two co-conspirators to kill his wife.6 Defendant was not present at the time of
the murder. Under the then-existing statutes, 7 a defendant not at the scene of
the crime was an accessory and as such was subject to punishment distinct
from that of a principal. The court, in recognizing that such distinctions were
matters for the legislature, stated that "[tio hold otherwise would be to expand
1. In an attempt to curb the theft and easy disposal of stolen silver, platinum, and gold
jewelry and other valuables, the 1981 General Assembly also enacted an Act to Regulate Precious
Metal Businesses. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 956, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1471 (codified
at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-163 to -173 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). Any dealer with precious metal
purchases constituting greater than 10% of his total business is required to apply for a permit from
a local law enforcement agency, to be issued only upon the furnishing of extensive identification
information, a record of former felony convictions and a record of all convictions within the
preceding five years. No permits are issued to applicants convicted of a felony involving larceny,
moral turpitude or receipt of stolen goods within five years of the application. In an effort to
assure compensation to owners of property suffering a loss traceable to a permit holder's violation
of the new statute, a $10,000 bond must be executed before a permit is issued. To facilitate the
identification and recovery of articles sold to dealers by persons other than the rightful owners,
dealers must maintain records identifying each seller and each item purchased, and are prohibited
from removing from the premises any items purchased for a period of five days from the date of
purchase. Conducting business in mobile homes, trailers and other structures that are easily
movable or abandoned readily is no longer permissible. Conviction for violation of the statute
results in the usual misdemeanor fine of no more than $500 and in imprisonment of no more than
six months, plus ineligibility for obtaining another permit within three years of conviction.
2. Law of June 25, 1981, ch. 686, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 984 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-5.2 (1981)). This statute repeals N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-5, -5.1 & -6.
3. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2 (1981).
4. Id.
5. 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980).
6. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980-Criminal Law, 59 N.C.L.
Rev. 1123, 1123-26 for a discussion of State v. Small. The Small court refused to adopt the rule
used for federal prosecutions expressed in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). In the
federal law of conspiracy, the overt act of one conspirator may be deemed the act of all the con-
spirators. Id. at 646-47. As a result, all conspirators are criminally liable as principals for the
substantive offenses committed in furtherance of the conspiracy by one of the conspirators.
7. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-5, -6 (1979).
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the scope of accessorial liability beyond the legislative design." s
B. Homicide
The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed several murder convictions
in 1981.9 In two cases involving the merger rule the court distinguished the
situation in which a defendant is convicted of first degree murder by a jury
verdict that is based on a theory of premeditation and deliberation as well as
on a theory of felony murder, from the situation in which a defendant is con-
victed of first degree murder by a jury verdict that fails to specify the theory or
theories on which the jury relied. Under the merger rule, when the commis-
sion of a major crime by its very nature includes a lesser offense, the lesser
offense is merged into the former, resulting in no punishment for the lesser
offense.10 InState v. Rook," because the jury found defendant guilty on both
premeditation/deliberation and felony murder theories, the underlying felony
of rape was not subject to the merger rule, and defendant could be sentenced
for rape in addition to first degree murder.' 2 Furthermore, the rape consti-
tuted a proper aggravating circumstance to be considered in sentencing on the
first degree murder conviction.13 In State v. Silhan,14 however, the jury failed
to specify the theory on which it based its first degree murder conviction. 15
The court ruled that when the jury verdict is silent on its basis for conviction,
the "case is treated as if the jury relied upon the felony murder theory for
purposes of applying the merger rule."' 16 As a result the underlying felony
merges into the murder conviction, precluding a separate judgment and sen-
tence on the crime of rape or other felony.' 7 Furthermore, the underlying
felony may not be submitted as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing on
the murder conviction. is
8. 301 N.C. at 417, 272 S.E.2d at 135.
9. See generally State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 284 S.E.2d 437 (1981); State v. Rook, 304
N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981); State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214 (1981); State V.
Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 277 S.E.2d 410 (1981); State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 275 S.E.2d 450 (1981).
Specifically, see Parton for supreme court venue and pretrial publicity challenges; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-926(a) (1978), for consolidation of offenses for trial; and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-450(b) (1981)
for indigents' rights to investigative assistance. See Williams for venue and pretrial publicity is-
sues, and for indigents' rights to investigative assistance. See Martin, Rool and Silhan for rejec-
tion of constitutional attacks on G.S. 15A-2000(e)(9), which provides that if "the capital felony
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," then it may be considered as an aggravating circum-
stance by a jury in recommending a sentence in capital felony cases. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
2000(e)(9) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
10. See R. Perkins, Criminal Law 554-55 (1969).
11. 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981).
12. Id. at 231, 283 S.E.2d at 750.
13. Id. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (Cune. Supp. 1981).
14. 302 N.C. 223, 275 S.E.2d 450 (1981) (murder with an underlying felony of rape).
15. Id. at 262, 275 S.E.2d at 477-78.
16. Id.
17. See State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980);
State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979). See generally Comment, Capital Punish-
ment in North Carolina: The 1977 Death Penalty Statute and the North Carolina Supreme Court,
59 N.C.L. Rev. 911 (1981).
18. 302 N.C. at 268, 275 S.E.2d at 478.
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The court in Rook also construed G.S. 15A-2000(c), 19 which requires a
jury recommending the death sentence to set forth in writing the "statutory
aggravating circumstance or circumstances which the jury finds beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."'20 The statute does not expressly contain a similar require-
ment for mitigating circumstances but requires the jury to state in writing
whether the "mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to out-
weigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found."'2 1 The issue in
Rook was whether there is a statutory or constitutional requirement that the
jury return specific findings on the mitigating circumstances submitted to it.2
2
The court concluded that this requirement could not be read into the statute
without sacrificing the statute's protections against "arbitrary, capricious, ex-
cessive or disproportionate imposition of the death penalty."23 In the court's
opinion such a requirement would unduly constrict the jury in its considera-
tion of any and all mitigating circumstances. 24 The court also relied on G.S.
15A-2000(d),25 which does not require specific jury findings on mitigating cir-
cumstances to be presented to the supreme court on review of judgment and
sentencing in capital punishment cases.
26
C. Rape
The North Carolina Supreme Court had two occasions27 in 1981 to re-
view convictions of first degree rape under the new North Carolina statute,
19. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981):
(c) Findings in Support of Sentence of Death When the jury recommends a sentence
of death, the foreman of the jury shall sign a writing on behalf of the jury which writing
shall show:
(1) The statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which the jury finds be-
yond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) That the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by the jury are
sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty; and,
(3) That the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 304 N.C. at 231, 283 S.E.2d at 750-51.
23. Id. at 235, 283 S.E.2d at 752.
24. Id.
25. 304 N.C. at 232, 283 S.E.2d at 751. But see the strong dissent on this issue by Justice
Exum in which he concludes that "properly read G.S. 15A-2000 requires the jury to indicate its
findings as to each mitigating circumstance submitted to it." Id. at 237, 283 S.E.2d at 754 (Exum,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Exum based his conclusion on the following
considerations: legislative intent; the statute's purpose; the practice followed by trial judges re-
quiring the jury to indicate in writing the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist (additionally,
Rook is the only case reviewed by the supreme court under this statute in which the jury recom-
mended death and did not follow this practice); the prejudice to the defendant by encouraging the
jury to think that the mitigating circumstances are less important than the aggravating circum-
stances; and the prejudice to the defendant on review of his death sentence before the supreme
court. Id.
26. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(d) (Cure. Supp. 1981).
27. State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 283 S.E.2d 719 (1981), was decided on November 3,
1981; State v. Barnette, 304 N.C. 447, 284 S.E.2d 298 (1981), followed on December 1, 1981.
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G.S. 14-27.2.28 Defendants in both cases were convicted of first degree rape,
which is defined by the statute as engaging in forcible, nonconsensual vaginal
intercourse with another person in which the perpetrator "employs or displays
a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article which the other person reasonably
believes to be a dangerous or deadly weapon."'29 Both of the court's opinions
examined the sufficiency of the evidence on each of the essential elements of
first degree rape: consent, force, and employment or display of a dangerous or
deadly weapon.
30
In State v. Sturdivant3l defendant observed prosecutrix having car
trouble, told her that he was a mechanic and offered assistance if she would
drive to his nearby house. After doing so, she agreed to drive him to his
friend's house, whereupon he directed her to drive down a dirt road that ended
at a tobacco barn. Defendant then pulled her out of the car and into the barn
where he raped her. Subsequently, she was ordered to take off her dress and
in so doing she picked up a tobacco stick from the floor and hit him with it.
Defendant then beat her face with his fists, 32 said he was going to kill her and
took out a pocketknife. Prosecutrix testified at trial that she then pleaded with
him not to kill her and to let her go, but he cut off her slip with the pocketknife
and had repeated forcible intercourse with her.
33
Defendant contended on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of first degree rape on the theory that he had employed a deadly
weapon during the commission of the rape. He argued that, although there
was testimony that he had displayed the knife to her after the first act of inter-
course, there was no evidence showing that he had employed the knife during
the first or subsequent acts of intercourse. The Sturdivant court found that the
knife had been "employed" in satisfaction of the requirements of G.S. 14-
27.2(a)(1)(a) in that defendant had used the knife to threaten his victim with
death, thereby discouraging further resistance, and to remove her under-
28. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.2 (1981). For a discussion of the new statute, see Comment,
Criminal Procedure-The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 931 (1982).
29. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.2(a)(2)(a) (1981). As alternatives to the essential element of the
employment or display of a dangerous or deadly weapon, an accused is guilty of first-degree rape
if, in the course of the rape, he inflicts serious personal injury upon the victim or another person or
if he commits the offense aided and abetted by one or more other persons. Id. § 14-27.2(a)(2)(a) to
-27.2(a)(2)(c).
30. See 304 N.C. at 461, 284 S.E.2d at 306-07; 304 N.C. at 299-300, 283 S.E.2d at 724-25.
31. 304 N.C. 293, 283 S.E.2d 719 (1981). The Sturdivant case also addressed an interesting
issue concerning the conviction for kidnapping: the prosecutor failed to allege specifically in the
indictment that the kidnapping was effected without the consent of the victim. The North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals held in State v. Froneberger, 53 N.C. App. 471, 281 S.E.2d 71 (1981), that
failure to allege the element of lack of consent rendered an indictment fatally defective. In Slurdl-
vant, however, the court noted that although the state's petition for discietionary review of
Froneberger was pending, the language of the present indictment was not identical to that in issue
in Frneberger; the convictions of Froneberger's "partners" charged with the kidnapping had been
upheld on appeal; and the decision in Frneberger in any event was not binding on the North
Carolina Supreme Court. The court held that the indictment was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in
the district court to try the defendant. 304 N.C. at 309, 283 S.E.2d at 730.
32. The court did not address the issue whether fists are "dangerous or deadly weapons" for
purposes of satisfying the statute.
33. 304 N.C. at 297, 283 S.E.2d at 723.
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clothing, thereby "expediting the execution of the additional sexual as-
saults."'34 Noting that conviction under the former statute had required a
specific showing by the prosecution that the weapon was used by the defend-
ant to overcome the resistance or to procure the submission of the victim,35 the
court found that there was no requirement under the new statute, G.S. 14-
27.2(a)(2)(a), of an express showing that a deadly weapon was used in apartic-
ular manner.36 Under the new statute, the prosecution must show only that a
dangerous or deadly weapon was employed or displayed in the course of a
rape.3 7 The court apparently assumed that the legislature intended to make
implicit in the new statute the logical assumption that such use of a dangerous
or deadly weapon always has some tendency to at least assist the accused in
accomplishing his "evil design" upon a usually unarmed victim.
38
In State v. Barnette39 the North Carolina Supreme Court again addressed
the interrelation of the elements of force, consent, and the employment or dis-
play of a dangerous or deadly weapon under G.S. 14-27.2(a). Prosecutrix tes-
tified that after meeting Barnette and several other men at a bar, she went with
them to a party where she was raped repeatedly by several of the men.4° The
arguments asserted by Bamette challenging his conviction depended largely
on testimony by prosecutrix that defendant Hughes had threatened and
pointed a shotgun at her before any of the sexual episodes occurred, and later,
forced her to put the barrel of the shotgun in her mouth after she had been
raped by another defendant and by Barnette but before she was raped by Bar-
nette a second time.
Defendant Barnette was convicted of first degree rape upon submission to
the jury of the alternative theories that he acted alone or with another defend-
ant in employing or displaying a deadly weapon, or that he was aided and
abetted by another person.4' Barnette argued on appeal that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to convict him under either theory. Nevertheless, the court
found that Hughes' forcing the victim to put the gun in her mouth and Bar-
34. Id. at 300-01, 283 S.E.2d at 725.
35. See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 299 N.C. 29, 261 S.E.2d 189 (1980); State v. Thompson, 290
N.C. 431, 226 S.E.2d 487 (1976).
36. 304 N.C. at 299, 283 S.E.2d at 724 (emphasis original).
37. Id., 283 S.E.2d at 725.
38. In a footnote, the court stated:
We perceive that the Legislature intended to make implicit in G.S. 14-27.2 a matter
of ordinary common sense: that the use of a deadly weapon, in any manner, in the
course of a rape offense, always has some tendency to assist, if not entirely enable, the
perpetrator to accomplish his evil design upon the victim, who is usually unarmed.
Id. at 299 n.1, 283 S.E.2d at 725 n.1.
39. 304 N.C. 447, 284 S.E.2d 298 (1981).
40. There were five defendants in State v. Barnette. Barnette's conviction for first degree
rape was affirmed on appeal, as was the conviction of Hughes for first degree rape. Hughes'
conviction for first degree sexual offense was reversed. Defendant Cashwell's conviction of first
degree rape was remanded for judgment for verdict of second degree rape, Coles' conviction for
second degree rape was affirmed and Smith's conviction of first degree sexual offenses was re-
manded for judgment for verdict of guilty of second degree sexual offense. Id. at 470, 284 S.E.2d
at 311-12.
41. Id. at 459, 284 S.E.2d at 305. See note 6 supra.
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nette's sexual intercourse with her, despite her verbal protest immediately fol-
lowing that incident, gave rise to a reasonable inference that Hughes had
helped "prepare for the commission of the crime by displaying or employing a
deadly weapon in order to overcome the victim's resistance and enable Bar-
nette to commit the crime."'4 2 Thus, there had been an employment or display
of a dangerous or deadly weapon or an aiding and abetting by another person
under G.S. 14-27.2(a) and (c).
Barnette also argued that although Hughes' display of the shotgun may
have caused fear of serious bodily harm, it was not directed to overcome pros-
ecutrix's will to resist sexual intercourse; consequently, evidence on the essen-
tial element of the use of force was deficient. The court considered this
contention in conjunction with Barnette's assertion that the failure to instruct
the jury that the essential element of force is proved only if a rape victim's
consent was induced by a reasonable fear of serious bodily harm. On the issue
of the jury instruction on consent, the court held that although a threat of
serious bodily harm that reasonably induces fear would in fact satisfy the force
requirement and negate consent,43 there had never been a requirement that
the jury must find consent using an objective standard of reasonableness. 44
The court stated that even if a reasonableness standard was required and the
jury in the instant case believed prosecutrix was in fact threatened with a
deadly weapon, it "follows that the fear engendered was both reasonable and
of violence."45 Regarding Barnette's argument that there was no evidence that
the display of force by use of the shotgun was directed against the victim's will
to vesist sexual advances, the court answered that an explicit threat was unnec-
essary and that the facts permitted a reasonable inference that Hughes' display
of force with the weapon was intended to make the victim submit to inter-
course with Barnette.46
D. armed Robbery
The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Gibbons47 addressed for
the first time the issue whether the mere possession of a firearm during the
course of a robbery is sufficient for conviction under G.S. 14-87, robbery with
a firearm.48 The evidence in Gibbons tended to show that defendant, with two
42. Id. at 460, 284 S.E.2d at 306 (citing State v. Burns, 287 N.C. 102, 116, 214 S.E.2d 56, 65,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975)).
43. See State v. Burns, 287 N.C. 102, 116,214 S.E.2d 56, 65, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975).
44. 304 N.C. at 461, 284 S.E.2d at 306.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 303 N.C. 484, 279 S.E.2d 574 (1981).
48. Id. at 488, 279 S.E.2d at 577. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Any person or persons who, having in possession or with the use or threatened use
of any firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means, whereby the life of a
person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal prop-
erty from another or from any place of business, residence or banking institution or any
other place where there is a person or persons in attendance, at any time, either day or
night, or who aids or abets any such person or persons in the commission of such crime,
shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
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companions, broke into a woman's rural home by using the butt of a shotgun
to break the glass in a door. The gun was then propped against a wall and
there was testimony that the robbery victim could not see the gun. Gibbons
was found guilty by a jury of robbery with a firearm under the statute.49 On
appeal, the court noted that while the statute on its face neither required the
actual use of a weapon nor excused the mere possession of a weapon alone
during the course of a robbery, there was indeed a requirement that the use or
possession threaten or endanger the life of a person.50 Because there was no
evidence that the shotgun was pointed at or otherwise used to threaten the
victim, the burden of proof on the essential element of possession was satisfied
but the requirement that the life of the victim be endangered or threatened by
such possession was not.51 Consequently, the court reversed defendant's con-




In State v. Thompson 53 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a
conviction was not void for variance when defendant was tried and convicted
for violation of the private sector embezzlement statute54 rather than the stat-
ute applicable to public officials. 55 Defendant had been employed as City
Clerk by the City of Saluda, North Carolina and had written salary checks to
herself above the amount of salary authorized for her. In briefly passing upon
this issue, the court noted that the indictment against defendant did not refer
specifically to any statute;56 consequently, it was sufficient to charge defendant
with violations of either statute. Also, both statutes created a felony offense,
and the sentence imposed upon defendant was within the maximum permissi-
ble under either statute.
57
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87(a) (1981).
49. Defendant also was found guilty of first degree burglary, felonious conspiracy, and as-
sault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. 303 N.C. at 485, 279 S.E.2d at 575.
50. There was evidence that defendant had beaten the victim severely as he demanded
money from her, consequently, as an alternative theory to that of mere possession, the prosecution
argued that defendant's fists constituted a "dangerous weapon, implement or means" under the
statute. The court, however, ruled that the instructions to the jury concerning the use of fists as a
deadly or dangerous weapon had been restricted to the crime of assault with a deadly weapon.
Thus, the jury could not have convicted defendant of armed robbery under that theory, and it was
unnecessary for the court to reach that issue. Id. at 490, 279 S.E.2d at 575-77.
51. Id., 279 S.E.2d at 578. Cf. State v. Melvin, 53 N.C. App. 421, 281 S.E.2d 97 (1981).
Although defendant in Melvin made no actual gesture or verbal threat of harm to the victim by
the use or by the threatened use of the firearm, the court held that evidence that the victim saw
defendant's hand over a gun when he demanded money was sufficient to satisfy the essential
element of the threatened use of the firearm which endangered or threatened her life. Id. at 433,
281 S.E.2d at 105.
52. 303 N.C. at 491, 279 S.E.2d at 579.
53. 50 N.C. App. 484, 274 S.E.2d 381 (1981).
54. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-90 (1981).
55. Id. § 14-92.
56. Under G.S. 15A-644(a) and -924(6), omission of the citation of the applicable statute in
the indictment is not ground for reversal of a conviction. Id. §§ 15A-644(a), -924(6) (1978).
57. 50 N.C. App. at 487, 274 S.E.2d at 383.
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F Hit-and-Run
In State v. Fearing58 the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted
North Carolina's hit-and-run statutes.59 While relying on its earlier decisions
in State v. Ray60 and State v. Glover,61 the court clarified its position on the
essential elements required for the crime of hit-and-run. In these earlier cases,
the court had made clear that knowledge of a collision or accident was re-
quired. The collision must have resulted in injury to a person, but neither Ray
nor Glover had clarified whether knowledge of such injury by the defendant
also was required. The Fearing court held that "in prosecutions under G.S.
20-166(a) the state must prove that the defendant knew (1) that he had been
involved in an accident or collision, and (2) that a person was killed or physi-
cally injured in the collision."62 This knowledge may be actual or implied.
63
The dissent forcefully argued that G.S. 20-166(a) requires a driver to stop
when he knows that there has been an accident or collision, even if he does not
know that a person has been injured or killed. According to the dissent, the
statutory language "resulting in injury" merely modified the kind of accident
about which a defendant must be aware, and was not meant to be an element
of defendant's knowledge. 64 Furthermore, the majority's opinion rendered the
statute internally inconsistent: if a driver leaves the scene of an accident or
collision believing only that he was in an accident and that property damage
was involved, he will be innocent even though a person was in fact injured or
killed, but guilty of a misdemeanor if no person was in fact injured or killed.65
G. Contempt
Two contempt cases decided by the North Carolina Court of Appeals
provide interesting interpretations and applications of the governing statutes
58. 304 N.C. 471, 284 S.E.2d 487 (1981).
59. G.S. 20-166(a) provides: "The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident or collision
resulting in injury or death to any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such
accident or collision, and any person violating this provision shall upon conviction be punished as
provided in G.S. 20-182." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a) (1978). G.S. 20-166(b) requires "[the
driver of any vehicle involved in an accident or collision resulting in damage to property and in
which there is not involved injury or death of any person" to immediately stop at the scene and
exchange relevant information with the other people involved. G.S. 20-182 provides that "every
person convicted of wifully violating G.S. 20-166... shall be punished ...." Id. § 20-182 (1978
& Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
60. 229 N.C. 40, 47 S.E.2d 494 (1948).
61. 270 N.C. 319, 154 S.E.2d 305 (1967).
62. 304 N.C. at 477, 284 S.E.2d at 491.
63. Id. at 477, 284 S.E.2d at 491.
64. Id. at 482-83, 284 S.E.2d at 493-94. The majority based its interpretation on the opinion
in Ray, but the wording in Ray merely presents the same problem of interpretation, rather than
establishing a reasonable solution. Id. at 481-85, 284 S.E.2d at 493-95.
65. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981). If someone is injured or killed, the
driver cannot be prosecuted under G.S. 20-166(a) according to the majority decision because he
did not know that someone was injured or killed, and the driver cannot be prosecuted under G.S.
20-166(b) because that act applies only to an accident or collision "in which there is not involved
injury or death of any person." If no person is injured or killed, however, the driver can be
prosecuted under G.S. 20-166(b) for a misdemeanor.
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to the respective facts of each case. State v. Johnson66 concerned a hearing on
a motion for revocation and modification of a pretrial release order at which
defendant was ejected from the courtroom for misconduct. The State, over
objections by the defense, moved that the court hold defendant in contempt of
court. The trial court deferred the motion until the hearing was completed.
Defendant was allowed to return to the courtroom after oral arguments and
the submission of written materials. The State again moved that defendant be
held in direct contempt. The court ruled that the motion would be considered
at a later time, but after final arguments the trial court recessed for the eve-
ning. The following morning, with defendant present, the trial court con-
ducted a hearing on the criminal contempt charge and allowed arguments.
The court found defendant in wilful and direct contempt and ordered a
twenty-day prison term.
67
On appeal defendant argued that the contempt proceeding was not sub-
stantially contemporaneous as required under G.S. 5A-14 68 for summary con-
tempt proceedings and that he was not given a written order to appear and
show cause as provided in G.S. 5A-15 69 for plenary contempt proceedings.
The court of appeals held that the contempt conviction was substantially con-
temporaneous with the direct contempt on the previous day, obviating the
need for the written order to appear. The court reasoned that the word "sub-
stantially" qualified the word "contemporaneously" and did not require the
contempt proceedings immediately to follow the misconduct.70 Although the
court recognized the requirement for due process safeguards in summary pun-
ishment cases,71 the court found that those safeguards were met. The court
found that, by his removal, defendant was put on notice of his misconduct,
and that to impose a sentence before the hearing's conclusion might have an-
tagonized further the already hostile defendant and may have caused further
disruption.
72
The court of appeals struck down a contempt conviction in State ex rel
66. 52 N.C. App. 592, 279 S.E.2d 77 (1981).
67. Id. at 595, 279 S.E.2d at 78.
68. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-14 (1981) states:
(a) The presiding judicial official may summarily impose measures in response to direct
criminal contempt when necessary to restore order or maintain the dignity and authority
of the court and when the measures are imposed substantially contemporaneously with
the contempt.
69. Id. § 5A-15 states:
(a) When a judicial official chooses not to proceed summarily against a person charged
with direct criminal contempt or when he may not proceed summarily, he may proceed
by an order directing the person to appear before a judge at a reasonable time specified
in the order and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. A copy of
the order must be furnished to the person charged. If the criminal contempt is based
upon acts before a judge which so involve him that his objectivity may reasonably be
questioned, the order must be returned before a different judge.
70. 52 N.C. App. at 596, 279 S.E.2d at 79.
71. Id. (citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11
(1954); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952)).
72. 52 N.C. App. at 596-97, 279 S.E.2d at 79-80.
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Zimmerman v. Mason.73 Defendant in Mason removed padlocks and a posted
copy of a temporary restraining order that was affixed to his building pursuant
to a state action alleging that defendants were operating a public nuisance.74
Defendant contended that since the temporary restraining order by its terms
did not forbid removal of the locks and the copy of the order, lie was not in
violation.75 The court agreed and reversed defendant's contempt conviction. 76
H Defenses77
1. Voluntary Intoxication
In State v. Gerald7" the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the
question of what type of evidence is sufficient to require an instruction to the
jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication. Voluntary intoxication, though
not a legal excuse for a crime, may be sufficient to negate the existence of
specific intent and thus make the defendant guilty of a lesser degree of the
crime charged.79 For the defense of intoxication to be available, the evidence
must show that at the time of the criminal act the defendant's mind and reason
were so completely intoxicated and overthrown that a specific intent could not
be formed.80 In the absence of this evidence, the court is not required to in-
struct the jury on this defense.81
In Gerald defendant was convicted of second degree murder and assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious bodily injury. De-
fendant had been drinking and had quarreled with several persons, finally de-
ciding to leave with his girlfriend. His girlfriend refused to go, and decedent
73. 54 N.C. App. 155, 282 S.E.2d 518 (1981).
74. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 19-1 to -20 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981) which govern offenses
against public morals.
75. The temporary restraining order stated in part:
That the defendant [sic], their servants, agents, and employees be, and they are hereby
enjoined and restrained from entering, operating, maintaining, removing the contents or
any portions thereof, and otherwise using those certain premises in the town ...
54 N.C. App. at 157, 282 S.E.2d at 519. The pertinent language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 19-2.3 (1978)
states:
Any violation of such temporary restraining order is a contempt of court, and where such
order is posted, mutilation or removal thereof, while the same remains in force, is a
contempt of court, provided such posted order contains therein a notice to that effect.
76. The court construed G.S. 19-2.3 to mean that the posted restraining order by its own
terms must forbid its own removal. The court also concluded that removal of the padlocks, not
forbidden by the order, did not constitute a violation nor fall within the order's prohibition from
using the premises. 54 N.C. App. at 157, 282 S.E.2d at 519-20.
77. In State v. Molko, 50 N.C. App. 551, 274 S.E.2d 271 (1981), the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that fear of a homosexual attack is a fear of great bodily harm for self-defense
purposes. Defendant had been found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.
Defendant alleged that he acted in fear of a homosexual attack.
In State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 279 S.E.2d 570 (1981), the North Carolina Supreme Court
discussed the difference between a perfect and an imperfect right of self-defense. Perfect self-
defense excuses a killing altogether, while imperfect self-defense, in which the defendant initiates
the quarrel, will reduce a charge of murder to voluntary manslaughter.
78. 304 N.C. 526, 284 S.E.2d 312 (1981).
79. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).
80. State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 579, 213 S.E.2d 238 (1975).
81. Id.
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told him to leave her alone. Defendant left, saying he would be back with his
gun. When defendant returned, he was carrying a shotgun. He walked up to
the decedent and shot him in the head, instantly killing him. A woman who
had been chatting with decedent, the only eyewitness to the killing, began to
run away. Defendant shot her in the back, injuring her.
Defendant appealed the assault conviction, arguing an intoxication de-
fense based on the testimony of several witnesses who had seen defendant
drinking that afternoon or had detected an odor of alcohol on defendant's
person after the crime. The court stated that "there was ample evidence that
defendant had been drinking, but not to an extent that he was intoxicated or
unable to reason."82 A mere showing that a defendant had been drinking will
not raise an inference of intoxication. For the defense to be raised, there also
must be clear evidence of the defendant's inability to reason. In Gerald the
same witnesses who testified that defendant had been drinking also testified
that he did not appear to be intoxicated.
83
2. Entrapment
In State v. Neville84 defendant was convicted of possession with intent to
sell and selling LSD. On appeal, defendant claimed that it was error for the
trial court to refuse to give an instruction on the defense of entrapment. Both
the North Carolina Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction.
Defendant claimed that he was involved in a scheme that was intended to
appear as if he were selling drugs; however, he specifically denied actually
possessing or selling LSD. He also relied on the defense of entrapment. In
rejecting the entrapment defense, the supreme court cited the majority rule
that precludes the assertion of entrapment when the defendant denies one of
the essential elements of the offense charged:8 5 "Where a defendant claims he
has not done an act, he cannot also claim that the government induced him to
do that act."8
6
The supreme court distinguished this case from other cases in which a
defendant was allowed to raise the entrapment defense even while denying the
commission of the crime. In those cases, the defense was allowed because
either the state's own evidence raised an inference of entrapment 7 or the de-
fendant denied the intent required for the crime.88 In Neville the state's evi-
82. 304 N.C. at 521, 284 S.E.2d at 319.
83. Examples of such testimony are: "[Gerald] was drinking at the time but hadn't had that
much. He wasn't drunk."; "I could smell an odor of alcohol about Gerald. . . .He did not ap-
pear to be intoxicated at the time." Id. at 522, 284 S.E.2d at 319.
84. 302 N.C. 623, 276 S.E.2d 373 (1981), aff'g 49 N.C. App. 684, 272 S.E.2d 164 (1980).
85. See State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 677 (1958).
86. 302 N.C. at 626, 276 S.E.2d at 375.
87. See State v. Knight, 230 S.E.2d 732 (W. Va. 1976). In this instance, "submission of the
defense is obviously proper." 302 N.C. at 626, 276 S.E.2d at 375.
88. See United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975). In this instance, "the entrap-
ment itself is an assertion that it was the will of the government, and not of the defendant, which
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dence did not raise an inference of entrapment, and defendant denied the acts
rather than the intent required for the crime.
L North Carolina Drug Paraphernalia Act89
In 1981 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the North Caro-
lina Drug Paraphernalia Act90 which makes the possession, 91 manufacture or
delivery,92 and advertisement 93 of drug paraphernalia misdemeanors. 94 Drug
spawned the commission of the offense." 302 N.C. at 626, 276 S.E.2d at 375. See also McCarroll
v. State, 294 Ala. 87, 312 So. 2d 382 (1975).
89. In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 50 U.S.L.W. 4267 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1982), the
United States Supreme Court considered a municipal ordinance requiring a business to obtain a
license before selling items "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs." Id. at
4269. Flipside, a seller of novelty devices, smoking accessories and drug-related literature,
challenged the ordinance without applying for the license or utilizing administrative procedures to
obtain clarification of the ordinances application to his activities, on the grounds that it was
facially vague and overbroad. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed judgment
for the City, declaring the language of the ordinance unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 4268-69.
The Supreme Court found that, while the ordinance regulated the sale of items displayed in
the proximity of drug-related literature, it neither regulated nor prohibited sale of the literature
itself, and that the regulation of drug-related items was a reasonable restriction of commercial
speech only, because it limited communication of activity proposing an illegal transaction. The
Court then stated that whether the ordinance was overbroad in encompassing the protected
commercial speech of others was irrelevant, because the overbreadth doctrine was inapplicable to
commercial speech. Id. at 4269. Finally, the Court held that Flipside failed to show that the
ordinance was impermissibly vague in all of its applications: the ordinance as applied was
sufficiently clear to provide Flipside with ample warning of the obligations imposed by the
ordinance, because at least some items such as "roach clips" were covered unequivocally by the
licensing requirement. Id. at 4269-70.
The effect of the Court's decision on future prosecutions under the North Carolina Drug
Paraphernalia Act is uncertain in that North Carolina's new statute is distinguishable from the
ordinance in Hoffman Estates. Instead of imposing a licensing requirement, the North Carolina
statute flatly prohibits the sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. Also, the North Carolina
Act is clearly penal, while the ordinance in Hoffman Estates was "quasi-criminal" in imposing
nominal civil penalties only. Nevertheless, the Court in Hoffman Estates, commenting that state
laws regulating or prohibiting the sale of drug paraphernalia have been enacted recently in many
communities, held that such legislation is not facially vague or overbroad so long as it does not
reach constitutionally protected conduct and is reasonably clear in its application to the individual
complainant. Id. at 4271. In a footnote, the Court remarked that the hostility of lower courts to
drug paraphernalia laws may be due to a belief that these laws are ineffective in curtailing illegal
drug use, a belief not to be regarded as a finding of vagueness in the laws. Id. at 4269 n.9,
Consequently, it is apparent that the Court did not intend to strictly limit the application of its
holding in Hoffman Estates to licensing ordinances identical to that of the Village of Hoffman
Estates.
90. Law of June 4, 1981, ch. 500, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 767 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 90-113.20 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
91. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.22 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
92. Id. § 90-113.23.
93. Id. § 90-113.24.
94. The General Assembly also enacted a bill establishing a drug education program. Law of
July 10, 1981, ch. 922, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1408. Persons with no previous convictions
relating to the possession of controlled substances, who plead guilty or are found guilty of a mis-
demeanor for possession of a controlled substance or for possession of drug paraphernalia under
the new North Carolina Drug Paraphernalia Act, may be placed on probation without the enter-
ing of a finding of guilty; however, the court may require the defendant to fulfill conditions of
probation by participating in a drug education program to be approved by the Department of
Human Resources. If the accused completes the terms of probation, the proceedings against him
are dropped. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-96(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
There is also a provision for the expunction of records for first offenders of the North Caro-
lina Drug Paraphernalia Act. Id. § 90-96(e).
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paraphernalia, as broadly defined in the Act, includes instruments ranging
from equipment designed to identify or analyze the purity, effectiveness, or
strength of controlled substances95 to ordinary devices such as spoons, blend-
ers, and mixers commonly found in kitchens.96 Whether an object is drug
paraphernalia for purposes of conviction under the Act depends on factors
such as proximity of the object to other paraphernalia,97 prior controlled sub-
stance convictions of the person in control of the object,98 and the existence of
residue of a controlled substance on the object.99 The prohibition of delivery,
manufacture with intent to deliver, or possession with intent to deliver drug
paraphernalia,1°° in conjunction with the prohibition of procuring advertis-
ments with the purpose of promoting the sale of objects intended or designed
for use as drug paraphernalia,10 makes apparent the legislative intent and
expectation that the statute will be used most effectively in the prosecution of
commercial retailers of prohibited paraphernalia rather than the prosecution
of individuals possessing "paraphernalia."
J. Impersonation of Firemen and Emergency Medical Services Personnel
On May 21, 1981, the North Carolina General Assembly ratified an "Act
to Create the Crime of Impersonation of Firemen and Emergency Medical
Services Personnel." 102 This statute became effective October 1, 1981. It is
now a misdemeanor for a person, with intent to deceive, to 'impersonate a
fireman or any emergency medical services personnel if (1) the impersonation
is made with intent to impede the performance of the duties of a fireman or
any emergency medical services personnel, or (2) any person reasonably relies




95. N.C. Gen. StaL § 90-113.21(a)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
96. Id. § 90-113.21(a)(8).
97. Id. § 90-113.21(b)(6).
98. Id. § 90-113.21(b)(2).
99. Id. § 90-113.21(b)(5).
100. Id. § 90-113.23(a).
101. Id. § 90-113.24(a).
102. Law of May 21, 1981, ch. 432, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Seas. 704 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-276.1 (1981)).
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4. Searches and Seizures
1. Note, State v. Keadle: Private versus Government Actions
In the heavily litigated area of fourth amendment' rights, in which abrupt
shifts and outright reversals of prior decisions are not uncommon, 2 one princi-
ple has remained unchallenged: when a private individual has conducted an
ostensibly "unconstitutional" search,3 the limitations of the fourth amendment
do not apply. An initial question that thus arises is whether a challenged ac-
tion is "private action" or "state action." Application of the distinction has at
times proved difficult, particularly when a "private" individual has sufficient
governmental contacts to fall on the cusp of the private action/state action
dichotomy.
Searches by public school officials have proved to be especially controver-
sial 4 In State v. Keade5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered
whether a resident advisor at a state university has sufficient contact with the
state to warrant subjecting his actions to fourth amendment scrutiny. In a
questionable holding, the court found that he did not.
The view that the fourth amendment does not apply to searches by pri-
vate individuals had its origin in Burdeau v. McDowell.6 There the United
States Supreme Court considered whether papers taken from petitioner's office
by private detectives who had dynamited his safes could be submitted to a
grand jury. Justice Day, writing for a divided Court,7 held that the "origin
t This subsection was written by Mack Sperling.
I. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Rakas v. illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978) (overruling the holding in Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960), that "anyone legitimately on premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality," because that phrase created "too broad a gauge for measure-
ment of Fourth Amendment rights"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling the
holding in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), that a wiretap on a phone line does not
constitute a fourth amendment intrusion); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967)
(overruling the holding of Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), that administrative searches of
private residences were reasonable without a warrant, because such warrantless searches consti-
tute a "significant intrusion upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment").
3. A search by a private individual cannot be "unconstitutional" for the simple reason that
the fourth amendment "was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and
was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies." Burdeau v. McDow-
ell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). See notes 6-9 and accompanying text infra.
4. See, e.g., In re W, 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); People v. Stewart, 63
Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1970); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (rex. Civ. App. 1970); In
re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
5. 51 N.C. App. 660, 277 S.E.2d 456 (1981).
6. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
7. Justice Brandeis filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Holmes concurred. Id. at 476.
Brandeis criticized the government's acceptance of the papers, ending with the often quoted state-
ment that "in the development of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been a
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and history [of the fourth amendment clearly showed] that it was intended as a
restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be
a limitation upon other than governmental agencies." Because private activ-
ity, with no governmental involvement, led to the seizure in Burdeau, the
Court ruled that the fourth amendment was inapplicable. Now known as the
"Burdeau rule," this interpretation of the fourth amendment's scope has sur-
vived relatively unmolested since its inception.9
In cases in which the actor conducting the search is indisputably a private
individual, there has been little difficulty in applying the rule.10 Problems arise
when the search is conducted by a private person who acts pursuant to author-
ity conferred by the government, making his conduct arguably state action.
While there is a certain amount of statutory regulation of the conduct of
school officials, 1 the more difficult question is whether the school official is
large factor. Respect for law will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means which
shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play." Id. at 477.
8. Id. at 475.
9. In Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74,79 (1949) the Court held that evidence unlawfully
acquired by state officers would be admissible if "secured by state authorities [and] turned over to
the federal authorities on a silver platter." The Court overturned the "silver platter" doctrine in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Elkins led one court to question the continued vitality of Burdeau. United States v. Williams,
314 F.2d 795, 797 (6th Cir. 1963). Subsequent decisions have specifically rejected this argument,
however. See, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306, 313 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v.
Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir. 1964). Moreover, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) the Supreme Court noted that when an individual voluntarily turns evidence over to the
police, "[t]here can be no doubt under existing law that the articles would later [be] admissible in
evidence." Id. at 487 (citing Burdeau v. McDowell as its sole authority).
Some courts, however, have added a significant corollary to the Burdeau rule: a search con-
ducted by a private individual will not be deemed private for fourth amendment purposes if re-
quested or assisted in by a government official. See, e.g., Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1
(9th Cir. 1966) (federal agents actively joined airline employees in searching the contents of a
passenger's package); People v. Fierro, 236 Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1965) (motel
manager instructed by police to seize narcotics from guest's room).
10. See, e.g., State v. Peele, 16 N.C. App. 227, 192 S.E.2d 67 (1972), where a burglary victim
entered suspect's home without a warrant in an effort to recover his stolen property. The court
held that "[t]he security against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Fourth
Amendment ... applies solely to governmental action." Id. at 234, 192 S.E.2d at 71. Peele repre-
sents a situation in which a strong argument can be made that the fourth amendment should apply
to private searches. The burglary victim was clearly acting with the primary objective of retriev-
ing the fruits of a crime. True, his primary motivation was personal, but certainly a desire to "do
justice" was present. When he then turned the stolen property over to the police, he was acting in
what amounted to a law enforcement role and the fourth amendment arguably should have ap-
plied.
One court has adopted the view that when a private individual seizes property with the objec-
tive of aiding the government in a prosecution, fourth amendment protection will follow. In
Knoll Assocs., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968), the court refused to
admit evidence stolen by defendant's disgruntled employee with the express purpose of aiding in
Knoll's prosecution. One commentator has termed this a "ratified intent" approach. See Note,
Evidence Stolen by Private Individual With Intent to Aid the Government Held Inadmissible in
Administrative Proceeding, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 206 (1969).
11. No North Carolina statute explicitly gives a school official power to search, but public
high schools and state colleges and universities are subject to substantial statutory regulation
nonetheless. Chapter 115 of the North Carolina General Statutes regulates elementary and secon-
dary education. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. at §§ 115C-299, -315 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (hiring of em-
ployees); id. § 115C-309 (student teachers); id. §§ 115C-364, -366 (admission and assignment of
pupils). Chapter 116 of the General Statutes, regulating higher education, deals with the state
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acting directly as a state agent merely by virtue of his employment by the state.
Courts that have considered this issue have come to differing results.'
2
InIn re Donaldson 13 a California court found a high school vice-principal
"not to be a governmental official within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment so as to bring into play its prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures." 14 The court focused primarily on the statutory duty imposed upon
the principal to provide an appropriate atmosphere for learning. In addition,
the court noted that the primary purpose of the search had been not to obtain
convictions, but to secure evidence of student misconduct.15 It would seem,
however, that the Donaldson court was less than precise in analyzing the issue.
While refusing to subject the principal's search to constitutional scrutiny (os-
tensibly because he was a private person), the court nevertheless engaged in a
fourth amendment reasonableness analysis by focusing on the circumstances
under which the search had been conducted.
In People v. Stewartt6 a New York court engaged in similarly circuitous
reasoning. The court held that a high school dean who had forced a student to
empty his pockets was a private person for fourth amendment purposes, bas-
ing this conclusion on the fact that the dean's duty as an educator made him
responsible for the "safety and welfare of (his) students .... ,,17 Thus, in the
court's opinion, the search had been reasonable under the circumstances.18
Actually, it is unnecessary to find that a search is private on the one hand, and
then to label it "reasonable" on the other. Private searches are not prohibited
by the fourth amendment even if unreasonable.
The court of appeals in Keadle relied heavily on the decision State v. Kap-
pes,19 in which an Arizona court, under similar facts, considered the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment to a search by a resident advisor. A University
of Arizona regulation provided that a school official could enter a student's
dormitory room to make routine maintenance inspections after posting a no-
tice in the dormitory twenty-four hours beforehand. Two resident advisors
university system. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-11(2) (1978) ("The Board of Governors shall be
responsible for the general... control of all affairs of the constituent institutions.").
12. For cases holding public school officials to be private persons see, e.g., In re Donaldson,
269 Cal. App. 2d 509,75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d
253 (1970); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (rex. Civ. App. 1970). For cases holding that a school
official's actions constitute state action by virtue of the employment relationship see, e.g., State v.
Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975);
People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974).
13. 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
14. Id. at 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
15. Apparently, the court was arguing that state of mind plays a crucial role in determining
whether a school official should be subjected to the fourth amendment. Yet even where individu-
als have been motivated by a desire to secure a conviction, courts have not transformed private
action into that of the state. See note 10 supra. Constitutional rights may be violated regardless of
the state of mind of the guilty party. The Donaldson court focused on the purpose of the search in
classifying it as private--since motivated by a private objective (discipline), it could not have
become state action by virtue of what it uncovered.
16. 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1970).
17. Id. at 60, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
18. Id.
19. 26 Ariz. App. 567, 550 P.2d 121 (1976).
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entered Kappes' room in accordance with these regulations and discovered
marijuana in plain view on defendant's desk. The court refused to allow a
motion to suppress, holding that "the actions of the student resident advisors
in carrying out room inspections serve the internal requirements of the univer-
sity . .. [but] are [not] tainted with that degree of governmental authority
which will invoke the fourth amendment."2 0 Despite this finding, this court
also went on to consider whether the search had been unreasonable, and con-
cluded that it had not been.
These decisions miss the mark.2 1 It should not matter whether the search
is made by a dean of a public high school or by a resident advisor at a state
university; each is given substantial authority by the state.22 Each is indispu-
tably a state employee 23 and is subject to the direct control of the state through
various administrative bodies.24 In short, each acts pursuant to the powers
and duties conferred by the state. As such, their conduct certainly rises to the
level of state action and demands fourth amendment scrutiny. The Donaldson
case is particularly questionable.25 That court focused on the statutory duties
that the principal had been discharging, and then went on to conclude that the
principal's actions were not state acton because he had complied with the stat-
utes. It would seem, however, that the court's conclusion that the principal
acted pursuant to these statutes mandates a finding of state action under the
Donaldson facts.
Some courts have adopted this reasoning and have found the actions of
20. Id. at 570, 550 P.2d at 124. The court skirted the issue of why the search did not rise to
the requisite degree of governmental involvement.
21. A possible explanation for the superfluous analysis seen in these cases is that courts in
high school search cases tend to state an alternative holding: namely, because the school stands in
locoparentis to its students, it shares the parents' right to search their children's possessions. But
even under this approach, the reasonableness of the search would seem to be irrelevant. Regard-
less, the in locoparenis doctrine has no application at the college leveL See, e.g., Soglin v. Kauff-
man, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
22. See note 44 infra.
23. In Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976), the mere fact that a university
resident advisor was a state employee was sufficent to warrant a finding of state action. See note
42 infra.
24. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-36 (1978) delegates control over "all matters pertaining to the
public schools in their respective administrative units" to county and city boards of education.
Resident advisors are subject to the control of the Board of Governors of the University of North
Carolina through N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-11(2) (1978), which states that the Board "shall be respon-
sible for the general determination, control, supervision, management and governance of all af-
fairs of the constituent institutions."
25. One commentator criticized the Donaldson decision as follows:
The court's theory is quite inscrutable. A vice-principal of a high school obviously exer-
cises the power of the state when he performs the duties assigned to him. Although it is
possible for any government employee to act privately, the facts reported in the case
completely belie any notion that the search challenged in this case was undertaken in an
individual capacity. In fact, most of the court's opinion is devoted to various justifica-
tions of the vice principal's action because he was acting in his official capacity: sharing
the authority of the master key to all student lockers, insuring the protection of all stu-
dents, preserving the law-and-order atmosphere necessary for the educational process,
and partaking of the schoors in locoparentis power.
W. Buss, Legal Aspects of Crime Investigation in the Public Schools 37 (1971).
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public school officials to be state action.26 In State v. Young,27 for example, a
school principal discovered marijuana after forcing three students to empty
their pockets. In deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule, the Georgia
Supreme Court stated, "[W]e think it too plain to be controverted that public
school officials are state officers acting under color of law, whose action is
therefore state action which must comport with the Fourth Amendment stan-
dards applicable to the given situation."
28
In Young the court found the principle so clear that it required no analy-
sis. In State v. Baccino29 a Delaware court thought that additional justifica-
tion was appropriate. There the seizure occurred when the principal of a
public high school took a student's coat and discovered hashish in the pocket.
The court ruled that the principal was a state official for fourth amendment
purposes because (1) he was subject to the supervision and control of the
board of education, and (2) he was a state employee. 30 The courts that have
found public school officials to be "private" persons for fourth amendment
purposes have disregarded these substantial contacts with the state. In State v.
Keadle31 the North Carolina Court of Appeals took the same approach.
In Keadle a resident advisor 32 in a dormitory on the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill campus entered defendant's room to turn off a light
that Keadle had left on. While in the room, he noticed a blanket covering an
object on defendant's bed. He lifted the blanket and discovered a tape deck,
which he believed had been stolen from another dormitory resident. After
bringing the alleged owner to Keadle's room to identify the tape deck, the
advisor notified the campus police who obtained a search warrant and seized
the tape deck.
The trial court granted Keadie's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling
that the resident advisor's conduct constituted an unreasonable search by an
employee and agent of the State of North Carolina acting in a quasi law en-
forcement capacity.3 3 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. After
noting that the fourth amendment's protections have traditionally been con-
fined to governmental rather than private action, the court of appeals dis-
26. See note 12 supra.
27. 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).
28. Id. at 494, 216 S.E.2d at 591.
29. 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
30. Id. at 871.
31. 51 N.C. App. 660, 277 S.E.2d 456 (1981).
32. The initial hurdle to this analysis is classifying a resident advisor as a "school official."
Although indisputably falling at the bottom of the university power structure, a resident advisor
has the requisite amount of power and responsibility to be considered a school official. His pri-
mary duty is to act as an ombudsman, thus placing him in an advisory capacity to the student. See
generally Dep't of Univ. Hous., Div. of Student Affairs, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, Resident
Assistant Manual (1981). In that role alone, he acts as a "funnel" to more powerful school offi-
cials. In addition, the resident advisor is also charged with enforcing the university's rules and
regulations. Id. at 126. From the perspective of the student, the resident advisor is certainly
cloaked with the power of a school official.
33. 51 N.C. App. at 661, 277 S.E.2d at 458.
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missed two theories under which the advisor's search might have been viewed
as governmental action for fourth amendment purposes.
The court first considered whether the search had been instigated at the
behest of law enforcement officers. Judge Morris rightly dismissed this con-
tention. Given the absence of any evidence that the resident advisor "had any
direction, instruction, or request from any law enforcement officer" to search
Keadle's room, a theory of government instigation could not be supported.34
Second, the court examined whether the advisor's contact with the state,
by virtue of his position as an employee of a state-supported university, was in
itself sufficient "to make him a quasi law enforcement officer or agent of the
state for [the] purpose of making the fourth amendment and the exclusionary
rule applicable. . .. -35 The court found insufficient state contacts, but also
relied on the premise that the imposition of the exclusionary rule on actions of
resident advisors would have no deterrent effect.3 6 The court further noted
34. Id. at 664, 277 S.E.2d at 459. Although Keadle involved absolutely no presearch encour-
agement by a government officer, courts have required a minimum of such encouragement before
characterizing a search as governmental. In United States v. Robinson, 504 F. Supp. 425 (N.D.
Ga. 1980), for example, a Drug Enforcement Agency agent seized a suitcase and took it to a police
station in the company of an airline employee. The agent laid keys taken from defendant on the
desk, stating that they appeared to fit the suitcase. He asked defendant to consent to a search, but
defendant refused. The airline employee then took the keys and opened the bag, believing he had
power to do so under the tariff laws. The court found sufficient governmental involvement to
trigger the fourth amendment because the airline employee had opened the bag at the "unspoken,
but real, encouragement of" the DEA agent. Id. at 431.
35. 51 N.C. App. at 664, 277 S.E.2d at 459.
36. The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule was seriously called into question in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971), in
which a dissenting Chief Justice Burger stated that the rule was "practically ineffective in accom-
plishing its stated objective of deterrence." Deterrence nevertheless remains the primary justifica-
tion for the rule. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Since the exclusionary rule
is a preventive rather than a remedial measure, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the
argument against suppression of evidence obtained by private individuals is that they feel no
compulsion to obey an exclusionary rule. Because their searches are not motivated by an effort to
obtain a conviction, the possibility of failure in a criminal prosecution would present no threat to
their actions.
One commentator has argued that application of the exclusionary rule would in fact have a
deterrent effect, and that the rule should therefore be applied:
Colleges and universities. . . are. . . intimate communities, and those who improperly
searched a student's room, such as resident advisors and head residents, may even live on
the same hall as the accused student. If the college is unable to discipline the student
because the evidence was illegally seized, these employees will have to suffer the contin-
ued presence of the undisciplined student near their living quarters.
Note, Search and the Single Dormitory Room, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1540, 1560 n.109 (1979).
An additional justification for the exclusionary rule has been the need to ensure judicial in-
tegrity. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968), the Court expressed this justification as follows:
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to.lawless
invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental
use of the fruits of such invasions.... A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial,
we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the
evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional
imprimatur.
An occasional court has seized on this aspect of the rule in an effort to justify imposing the rule in
a public school search context. For example, in Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 794-95
(W.D. Mich. 1975), the court stated:
The application of an exclusionary rule to College disciplinary hearings where the Col-
lege authorities have seized evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment rights will
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that the advisor had neither "the status nor the authority of a law enforcement
officer," 37 and that his actions had not been motivated by a desire to obtain a
criminal conviction.
The court's effort, and failure, to label the resident advisor a "quasi law
enforcement officer ' 38 reveals a misunderstanding of the basic application of
the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment is not limited to searches by
law enforcement officers, but extends to cover a wide range of "activities of
sovereign authority." 39 In Camara v. Municipal Court,40 for example, the
Supreme Court considered whether the fourth amendment's warrant require-
ment extends to the activities of government housing inspectors. In holding
that these inspectors fell within the amendment's reach, the Court noted that
"[the basic purpose of [the fourth amendment]. . . is to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental offi-
cials."'41 There was no line drawn separating government law enforcement
officers from other governmental officials.
The court of appeals in Keadle also considered whether the resident advi-
sor was an "agent of the state" for purposes of fourth amendment analysis. In
concluding that he had not acted in that capacity, the court ignored several
compelling reasons why the advisor should have been considered a state agent.
First, he was a state employee,42 and thus had direct contact with, and supervi-
sion from, the state. Second, in entering Keadle's room, the advisor was dis-
charging duties specifically imposed upon him by the University, and entered
with the aid of a master key provided to him by the University.43 Finally,
special circumstances surround the dormitory-resident/resident-advisor rela-
preserve the integrity and thus the legitimacy of the College as the maker and enforcer of
regulations. Institutions which enforce the law should not infringe upon fundamental
constitutional rights in doing so.
Given the Court's holding in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the continued viability of
the judicial integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule is open to doubt. In Janis the Court
refused to extend the rule to civil proceedings and noted that the "prime purpose of the rule, if not
the sole one," is deterrence. Id. at 446.
37. 51 N.C. App. at 664, 277 S.E.2d at 459.
38. Id. at 664, 277 S.E.2d at 459-60.
39. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
40. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
41. Id. at 528. Of course, the argument could be made that a government housing inspector
really acts in the capacity of a law enforcement officer. The Court apparently found no need to
address this problem. For an application of the Camara rationale in the school search context, see
W. Buss, supra note 25, at 32-36.
42. See note 23 supra. The University of North Carolina denominates resident assistants as
"student employees," perhaps in an attempt to insulate them from charges of state action. Inter-
view with Jody Harpster, Associate Director for Residence Life, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill (Nov. 10, 1981). In addition, the Resident Assistant Manual states that "resident
assistants are not to be considered 'Officers of the University." Dep't of Univ. Hous., supra note
32, at 132.
Mere words or classifications should not bar a finding of state action. Courts should instead
look at the factual circumstances involved. Even if resident assistants could be considered private
persons, their conduct becomes state action if the result of a request by a government official. See
note 9 supra. The state gave Goldberg authority to enter Keadle's room; thus, his entrance was
state action.
43. Interview with Jody Harpster, supra note 42.
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tionship. In the world of the college dormitory, where the police rarely in-
trude, the resident advisor acts essentially as the dormitory "policeman."" He
makes substantial recommendations on the appropriate disciplinary action
that is if rules or regulations are violated.45 These factors severely undercut
the court's holding that the resident advisor enjoyed neither the "status" nor
the "authority" of an agent of the state. For practical purposes, he had both.
The denial of Keadle's motion to suppress also was based partially on the
court's finding that the search had been motivated not by a desire to secure a
criminal conviction, but by a duty to fulfill administrative responsibilities. The
court relied heavily on the Arizona court's decision in Kappes for this proposi-
tion.46 In that case, however, the resident advisors discovered contraband in
plain view while legitimately in the room for maintenance purposes. In
Keadle the resident advisor discovered the contraband hidden beneath de-
fendant's blanket.4 7 Given his knowledge of the missing tape deck, one might
assume that the advisor's actions were somewhat motivated by a desire to
identify the culprit and secure a criminal conviction. If this was the case, then
the search arguably fell outside the scope of the advisor's administrative re-
sponsibilities. The court's holding therefore could be viewed as sanctioning an
unrestricted search by a resident advisor once he has entered a dormitory stu-
dent's room on an administrative pretext. Such a view all but strips dormitory
residents of their right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
"48
The court's final argument for not characterizing the resident advisor's
44. Resident advisors, also called resident assistants, are instructed as follows:
As the RA, you are the person on your floor charged with the responsibility of respond-
ing to a resident or visitor's behavior which is outside these [rules and regulations]. At
times, you will have to ask a resident to turn down a stereo, quiet down a party, restrain
from blatant violation of Federal or State Laws (such a[s] smoking marijuana) and more.
Dep't of Univ. Hous., supra note 32, at 126.
45. The disciplinary procedure outlined in the Resident Assistant Manual for a violation of
university rules is as follows: (1) verbal warning, (2) written warning by resident assistant's super-
visor (the area director), (3) recommendation of probation by resident assistant to area director,
(4) recommendation of cancellation of housing contract by resident assistant to area director.
Dep't of Univ. Housing, supra note 32, at 127.
46. State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz. App. 567, 570, 550 P.2d 121, 124 (1976).
47. 51 N.C. App. at 660, 277 S.E.2d at 457. The contention that the tape deck beneath the
blanket was not in plain view may hinge on the quality of the blanket's fabric. In United States v.
Drew, 451 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1971), the court adopted an "indirect" plain view approach in a case
.in which a police officer searched the defendant's car after seeing the outline of a pistol through a
blue opaque plastic folder. In Keadle, if Goldberg had clearly been able to identify the outline of
a tape deck beneath the blanket, his search might be justified under a Drew,/Kappes rationale.
There is nothing in the case that would support this reasoning, however.
48. U.S. Const. amend. IV. This seriously intrudes not only on the student's constitutional
rights, see note I supra, but also on his contractual rights under his housing agreement. University
regulations, incorporated by reference into the housing contract that each student signs, provide
that "[t]he University conducts regular maintenance, safety, and health inspections of rooms, but
these inspections do not involve the observation of anything not in plain sight in the room. Draw-
ers, closets, etc. are not opened." Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, Room to Live for Undergraduates,
1981-82, at 36. The regulations also provide that "searches will normally be made only pursuant
to a search warrant." Id.
It seems clear that Goldberg's search was made in violation of University regulations and that
a "consent" argument based on the housing contract could not be supported.
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conduct as state action was equally unpersuasive. To invoke the fourth
amendment, the court theorized, would require a concomitant application of
the exclusionary rule. But since the exclusionary rule would have no deterrent
effect on actions of a resident advisor,49 the court concluded that fourth
amendment analysis was inappropriate.
The court of appeals failed to recognize that it could have found a fourth
amendment violation of Keadle's rights without invoking the exclusionary
rule. In United States v. Calandra,5" the Supreme Court noted that "the exclu-
sionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any remedial de-
vice, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 51
Applying this analysis, the court could have extended constitutional pro-
tection to Keadle, but refused to apply the exclusionary rule. The court in
State v. Young 52 took this approach and defined a middle ground between
private persons and governmental law enforcement agents. This "intermedi-
ate group" was found to be subject to the fourth amendment, but not to the
exclusionary rule. The Young approach would not leave a student whose
fourth amendment rights had been violated by a public school official totally
without remedy.53 The aggrieved party could bring an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,54 for monetary damages from both the resident assistant individually
and from the state as his employer, based on the constitutional violation.
55
49. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
50. 414 U.S 338 (1974). The Calandra Court held that the exclusionary rule would not be
extended to grand jury proceedings.
51. Id. at 348.
52. 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).
53. Even the Burdeau Court did not contemplate that those victimized by private searches
would be left remediless. Justice Day stated, "We assume that petitioner has an unquestionable
right of redress against those who illegally and wrongfully took his private property under the
circumstance herein disclosed. . . ." 256 U.S. at 475.
54. That statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
55. According to Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a
"species of tort liability" in favor of persons who are deprived of "rights, privileges or immunities
secured" to them by the Constitution.
Fourth amendment violations by state officers are clearly actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 514 (5th Cir. 1980). In Marrero plaintiffs brought a
§ 1983 suit against the Hialeah police department for injury to their reputations as a result of an
unconstitutional search. The court noted: "Since the fourth amendment protects some of our
most cherished rights, and the injury to reputation flowing from the violation of those rights may
be devastating, we have no doubt that a principle of fair compensation requires that damage to
reputation caused by a violation of fourth amendment rights be compensable." Id. at 514 n.19.
See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976).
Conceivably, a plaintiff could bring an action under § 1983 when he had suffered no actual
damages (as probably would have been the case in Keadle). In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247
1310 [Vol. 60
CRIMINA4L PR 0 CED URE
Although this remedy is certainly not as desirable as application of the exclu-
sionary rule, it at least recognizes that constitutional protections extend to a
student's dormitory room and limit intrusions by university officials.
It is well recognized that students do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'56 It seems rea-
sonable to assume that they do not shed their fourth amendment rights there
either.5 7 Indeed, courts in the past have found that students enjoy fourth
amendment protection from official intrusion into their dormitory rooms.
58
The Keadle court's justification for not characterizing a search by a resident
advisor's actions as state action does not survive careful scrutiny. For the
nearly two million young Americans who consider their dormitory room
"home,"59 fourth amendment protection is both constitutionally mandated
and appropriate in a society that views college students as adults.
2. Stop and Seizure
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided three cases involving the
differences between an investigatory "stop" and a fourth amendment
"seizure." In State v. Grimmett60 the court held that traditional Terry v. Ohio6 1
analysis revealed that only a legitimate stop rather than a seizure had taken
place when a police officer intitially approached and spoke to defendant in the
(1978), plaintiffs brought suit under § 1983 against school officials for suspension without due
process of law but did not allege any actual damages. The Court held that "[b]ecause the right to
procedural due process is "absolute". . . and because of the importance to organized society that
procedural due process be observed ...we believe that the denial of procedural due process
should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury." Id. at 266. The Court
granted damages not to exceed one dollar. Id. at 267. Since fourth amendment protection is also
an "absolute" right, and society's interest in its enforcement is equally great, this reasoning would
be appropriate in the Keadle context. Of course, the problem arises that an aggrieved plaintiff
may not have the inclination to go to court merely for a principle-a one dollar recovery will deter
all but the most self-righteous of plaintiffs.
Another substantial stumbling block to recovery under § 1983 looms in the qualified good
faith immunity granted to school officials with respect to acts performed within the course of their
duties. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In Wood, the Court held that immunity
would not attach when a school official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the stu-
dent affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of consti-
tutional rights or other injury to the student." Id. at 322. The Court also required that for
immunity to fail, the actions cannot "reasonably be characterized as being in good faith." Id. In
Keadle, a lack of good faith might not be difficult to prove, given the existence of the University
search regulations, see note 48 supra, and the clear disregard of those boundaries.
Given the Wood test, however, courts have been reluctant to strip school officials of their
immunity. See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), in which the court, basing
its holding on Wood, refused to allow a damage recovery brought for an admittedly unconstitu-
tional search.
56. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
57. See W. Buss, supra note 25, at 27.
58. See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.
Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
59. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Census Pub. No. 245, Population
Characteristics 20 (1973).
60. 54 N.C. App. 494, 284 S.E.2d 144 (1981). See also note 111 and accompanying text infra.
61. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves
seizures of persons.)
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Charlotte, North Carolina airport. 62 Furthermore, applying Reid v. Georgia,63
the court concluded that Grimmett's nervousness and inability to identify him-
self thereafter did not provide sufficient articulable facts on which to base a
reasonable suspicion that Grimmett was engaged in criminal activity and thus
to justify a subsequent seizure.64 The court went on to indicate, however, that
Grimmett's consent to accompany the officer precluded the necessity of find-
ing any reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a
seizure.
65
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also applied Reid in State v.
Cooke.66 Officers had approached defendant Cooke at the Charlotte, North
Carolina airport based upon the following observations of defendant's behav-
ior: (1) nervousness, (2) difficulty in getting a suitcase into a locker, (3) failing
to acknowledge his companion when he walked past, and (4) failing to dress
"conservatively" as does the "normal business traveler." The court concluded
that these facts did not support a reasonable suspicion that Cooke and his
companion were engaged in criminal activity. Thus, the police had no right to
stop and detain Cooke.
67
In State v. Peck68 a university security officer stopped a vehicle and ar-
rested the driver for not carrying his driver's license. As the security officer
had orders not to leave the campus, he placed a call for assistance and a state
highway patrolman responded. The patrolman approached the passenger side
of the vehicle to check the passenger in the car and began a conversation with
the defendant-passenger. After observing defendant's appearance and learn-
ing that he did not feel well, the patrolman asked him whether he had any
drugs in the car or on him. When defendant responded by reaching into his
pants, the patrolman grabbed defendant's arm and pulled it out, bringing the
corner of a plastic bag into plain view. The bag was seized, and defendant was
arrested for possession of marijuana. The majority held that defendant's un-
healthy appearance 69 rendered the patrolman's question appropriate and thus
affirmed the trial court's admission of the bag into evidence.70 The dissent,
62. 54 N.C. App. at 494-95, 284 S.E.2d at 149. The officer approached Grimmett in a public
place, stated his purpose, and requested that Grimmett speak with him. Grimmett agreed to talk
and to enter the terminal with the officer. At no time did the officer present a weapon, use physi-
cal contact, or threaten Grimmett. Furthermore, the officer testified that had Grimmett refused to
talk to him, he would have had to let Grimmett go.
63. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (while in some circumstances a person may be detained without
probable cause to arrest, any curtailment of liberty by the police must be supported at least by a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity; ner-
vousness will not suffice).
64. 54 N.C. App. at 501-02, 284 S.E.2d at 150.
65. See note 62 and accompanying text infra.
66. 54 N.C. App. 33, 282 S.E.2d 800 (1981). See also notes 91-97 & 108-10 and accompany-
ing text infra.
67. 54 N.C. App. at 37-38, 282 S.E.2d at 804.
68. 54 N.C. App. 302, 283 S.E.2d 383 (1981).
69. Id. at 306, 283 S.E.2d at 386. Defendant's "condition" included dilated pupils, red eyes,
mucous in the comer of his mouth and the fact that he was "cotton-mouthed."
70. Id. at 306-07, 283 S.E.2d at 386. The majority emphasized the patrolman's right to be
where he was at the time he observed defendant. As it is clear that a policeman has the right to
address questions to anyone in the streets, it may be that Peck could have refused to answer. See
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taking judicial notice of the officer's uniform and weapon, and observing that
the officer's accusation was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable apprehension
by defendant that he was at least being detained for investigation, concluded
that the patrolman's questioning constituted a seizure.71 The dissent rejected
the argument that the patrolman had a reasonable suspicion that defendant
illegally possessed a controlled substance at the time he asked the question,
and suggested that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence that
flowed from the initial intrusion.
72
A recent United States Supreme Court denial of certiorari inspired a
lengthy dissent that questioned the North Carolina Supreme Court's applica-
tion of the fourth amendment. In Trapper v. North Carolina73 defendant
sought to obtain United States Supreme Court review of his conviction 74 after
the North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed his appeal for lack of a substan-
tial constitutional question.75 Although the United States Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented
vigorously. Brennan concluded that the available facts--(1) the officer had
heard unusual boat and truck noises and had seen a locked gate on defend-
ant's property; (2) the officer had known that that portion of the coastal county
was regularly used by marijuana smugglers; (3) the officer had seen a boat
inexplicably grounded in the area; and (4) he allegedly had been fired on while
surveying the suspect property from the water-left a substantial question
whether the stop of defendant's truck was based on a reasonable suspicion
resting on objective, articulable facts that the driver was involved in criminal
activity.
76
3. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals all considered the
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring). See also State v. Neyrey, 383 So. 2d 1222
(La. 1979).
71. 54 N.C. App. at 307-08, 283 S.E.2d at 387 (Wells, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge
apparently relied on the definition of seizure provided by Mr. Justice Stewart in United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980):
We conclude that a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a rea-
sonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circum-
stances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave,
would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone
of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.
72. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
73. 451 U.S. 997 (1981).
74. State v. Trapper, 48 N.C. App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680 (1980).
75. 301 N.C. 405, 273 S.E.2d 450 (1980).
76. 451 U.S. at 1000-01. For a discussion of State v. Trapper that reaches the same conclu-
sion reached by Mr. Justice Brennan, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980-
Criminal Procedure, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1013, 1163-64 (1981). See also United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411 (1981) (although a police officer may make inferences and deductions an untrained per-
son may not, police must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped).
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question of what constitutes a "legitimate expectation of privacy" sufficient to
invoke fourth amendment protections. 77 In Lee v. Gilstrap7 8 plaintiff brought
a section 1983 civil rights action against police officers to recover damages for
their alleged illegal entry and arrest of him while he was at his mother-in-law's
house. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit summarily held that
plaintiff had no privacy interest in his mother-in-law's house.79 While the lack
of analysis leading to that conclusion is somewhat disturbing,80 the judiciary's
general dislike of section 1983 actions may partially explain the summary
treatment.81
In State v. Greenwood8 2 a police officer searched and inventoried the con-
tents of a pocketbook found in a vehicle during a standard inventory of that
vehicle.8 3 The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the North Carolina
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the pocketbook and its contents should
have been suppressed.8 4 The supreme court based its reversal on defendant's
failure to show that the search and seizure of the pocketbook, which defendant
had stolen, infringed upon his own personal rights under the fourth amend-
ment.85 While the court's conclusion that "[n]o thief has any reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his use of the property he has stolen" is undoubtedly
correct,8 6 the court's discussion in arriving at that conclusion is somewhat con-
fusing. Citing State .Eppley,8 7 the court broadly stated that "[a]bsent owner-
77. Most recently in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the United States Supreme Court
emphasized the requirement of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the thing or place searched
or seized. While a property interest may suffice, a legitimate expectation of privacy, recognized as
such by society, may exist in things or places not owned. See also Gutterman, Fourth Amendment
Privacy and Standing: "Wherever the Twain Shall Meet," 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1981); Mickenberg,
Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois: From Property to Privacy and Back, 16 New
Eng. L. Rev. 197 (1981); Slobogin, Capacity to Contest a Search and Seizure: The Passing of Old
Rules and Some Suggestions for New Ones, 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 387 (1981).
78. 661 F.2d 999 (4th Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at 1000.
80. At least one commentator has suggested that a defendant invited to a dwelling might be
able to successfully assert a privacy interest therein. C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure § 4.02
(1980).
81. See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 950 n.3 (2d ed. 1973); id. at 149 (Supp. 1977) (growth of § 1983
suits: 280 in 1960; 17,543 in 1976 with 6,958 by state prisoners). See also Aldisert, Judicial Expan-
sion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Fed-
eral Caseload, 1973 Ariz. St. L.J. 557 (state prisoners' claims under § 1983 particularly aggravate
the problem of ever expanding dockets; consequently, prisoners should exhaust state remedies and
utilize state courts).
82. 301 N.C. 705, 273 S.E.2d 438 (1981). For a discussion of the court of appeals decision, 47
N.C. App. 731, 268 S.E.2d 835 (1980), see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law,
1980-Criminal Procedure, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1013, 1165-66 (1981).
83. Following State v. Hall, a defendant who had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
pocketbook would succeed in'suppressing the evidence obtained in an inventory search. See notes
119-22 and accompanying text infra. But see note 118 and accompanying text infra.
84. 301 N.C. at 708-09, 273 S.E.2d at 441.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 709, 273 S.E.2d at 441. See United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865, 870 n.2
(Ist Cir. 1977) (questioning defendant's standing to contest search of stolen suitcase found in car).
See generally 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(e) (1978 & Supp. 1982) (to determine rea-
sonable expectations of privacy look to thiefs perspective, not to police officer's perspective).
87. 282 N.C. 249, 192 S.E.2d 441 (1972).
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ship or possessory interest in the premises or property, a person has no
standing to contest the validity of a search."88 After the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Rakas v. Illinois and its legitimate expectation of
privacy test, however, ownership or possession is not a prerequisite to a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy,89 and "standing" is not a separate question
requiring independent determination by the court.90 By suggesting that own-
ership or possession may constitute a prerequisite to fourth amendment pro-
tection and that standing is a separate issue, the court misapplied Rakas, yet
arrived at a correct conclusion on the facts of the case.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in State v. Cooke91 is no-
table for its thorough treatment of what constitutes a legitimate expectation of
privacy in allegedly abandoned property.92 Emphasizing that a reasonable
expectation of privacy does not depend on actual possession and control at the
time of an illegal search, the court said that a bailment relationship may carry
with it a justified expectation of privacy;93 consequently, when Cooke en-
trusted the safekeeping of his suitcase to his travelling companion he did not
relinquish his expectation of privacy in its contents.94 After Cooke returned to
find the police were searching his companion's suitcase, he denied ownership
of his own suitcase. The court of appeals concluded that even if Cooke's dis-
claimer of ownership was an abandonment,95 it was not a voluntary one. The
lack of probable cause to seize Cooke's suitcase 96 and the threat that an illegal
search was about to take place rendered defendant's disclaimer involuntary
and a product of police misconduct so that he had not relinquished all expec-
tations of privacy in the property.
97
4. Searches Under Warrant
In State v. Trop98 two police officers followed a trail of cigarettes and
chewing gum from the site of a felonious larceny to a trailer near which one of
the officers had seen a subject whom he could not identify. They knocked on
the trailer door and requested and received permission to enter. After the oc-
cupants denied the officer's request to search the trailer, one officer left to ob-
tain a search warrant while the other remained behind in the trailer.
88. 301 N.C. at 707-08, 273 S.E.2d at 440.
89. See note 77 supra.
90. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
91. 54 N.C. App. 33, 282 S.E.2d 800 (1981). See also notes 66-67 and accompanying text
supra; notes 108-09 and accompanying text infra.
92. 54 N.C. App. at 40-45, 282 S.E.2d at 806-09. See also Survey of Developments in North
Carolina Law, 1980-Criminal Procedure, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1013, 1160-61 (1981).
93. 54 N.C. App. at 43, 282 S.E.2d at 807. See 3 W. LaFave, supra note 86, § 11.3.
94. 54 N.C. App. at 43, 282 S.E.2d at 807.
95. A dissenting judge would remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning
the abandonment and related legitimate expectations of privacy in the searched suitcase. Id. at 46,
282 S.E.2d at 809 (Martin, J., dissenting).
96. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
97. 54 N.C. App. at 44-45, 282 S.E.2d at 808. See also United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726,
729-30 (5th Cir. 1979).
98. 52 N.C. App. 244, 278 S.E.2d 592 (1981).
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Approximately one hour later a search under warrant disclosed several stolen
items.
In holding the seized evidence properly admitted into evidence, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals joined those jurisdictions that have upheld the le-
gality of "securing" premises pending issuance of a search warrant when both
probable cause and exigent circumstances, such as possible destruction of evi-
dence, exist.99 The court emphasized, however, that the officer's conduct was
relatively non-intrusive, indicating that it might not accept this alternative in
situations in which the officer's presence is more intrusive and, therefore,
unreasonable.lee
In State v. Brooks' 01 the North Carolina Court of Appeals had occasion
to discuss the constitutionality of G.S. 15A-256, which authorizes the
"[d]etention and search of persons present in private premises or vehicles to be
searched."'10 2 The court in dictum stated that the constitutionality of that stat-
ute was unaffected by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Ybarra v.
Illinois.103 The court's conclusion on that point is questionable.
The purpose of G.S. 15A-256 is to forbid the quick transfer of easily hid-
den contraband from one party to another immediately prior to execution of a
search warrant. In an effort to minimize undue infringement on the privacy of
individuals who happen to be in the vicinity of the person or place described
in the warrant, the legislature imposed two conditions that must be met before
unnamed individuals can be searched: (1) the search of premises and persons
designated in the warrant must prove unsuccessful and (2) the warrant must be
executed on private premises or in vehicles. Furthermore, any evidence seized
from persons not named in the warrant must be suppressed unless of the same
type described in the warrant. 1°4
99. 52 N.C. App. at 250-52, 278 S.E.2d at 597-98. But see State v. Dorson, 62 Hawaii 377,
615 P.2d 740 (1980); State v. Matsen, 287 Or. 581, 601 P.2d 784 (1979). See generally 2 W.
LaFave, supra note 86, § 6.5(c).
100. 52 N.C. App. at 251-52, 278 S.E.2d at 597-98. The officer conducted no search. Testi-
mony pointed out his politeness during his one hour wait in the trailer. Furthermore, he allowed
defendant to change clothes during that time. Id.
101. 51 N.C. App. 90, 275 S.E.2d 202, cert. denied, 302 N.C. 632, 280 S.E.2d 441 (1981). See
also State v. Guy, 54 N.C. App. 208, 282 S.E.2d 560 (1981) (officers had right to detain defendant
and another on premises while apartment was being searched pursuant to search warrant; court
citing G.S. 15A-256 as authority).
102. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-256 (1978) provides:
An officer executing a warrant directing a search of premises not generally open to
the public or of a vehicle other than a common carrier may detain any person present for
such time as is reasonably necessary to execute the warrant. If the search of such prem-
ises or vehicle and of any persons designated as objects of the search in the warrant fails
to produce the items named in the warrant, the officer may then search any person pres-
ent at the time of the officer's entry to the extent reasonably necessary to find property
particularly described in the warrant which may be concealed upon the person but no
property of a different type from that particularly described in the warrant may be seized
or may be the basis for prosecution of any person so searched. For the purpose of this
sqction, all controlled substances are the same type of property.
103. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
104. See Dellinger, Subchapter II. Law Enforcement and Criminal Investigation, 10 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 363, 374-75 (1974).
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Ybarra requires that probable cause be articulated with respect to the par-
ticular individual to be searched or seized. Indeed, "[this requirement cannot
be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there
exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises
where the person may happen to be." 105 State v. Watlington,106 which upheld
the constitutionality of G.S. 15A-256, was decided three years prior to Ybarra.
One commentator who has analyzed the North Carolina statute's constitution-
ality in light of Ybarra has concluded that Ybarra might prohibit the North
Carolina approach, 107 despite the qualifications the drafters appended in ef-
forts to lessen infringements on legitimate privacy expectations.
5. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
In State v. Cooke108 the court of appeals, applying standard fourth
amendment analysis, found no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless
search of defendant's suitcase once it was in the possession and control of
police officers. 109 The court rejected the State's argument that taking time to
obtain a search warrant would have delayed Cooke's subsequent arrest, be-
cause it found that there was no need to make an immediate arrest. In addi-
tion, the court noted that a magistrate would first have to find probable cause
to issue a search warrant before any arrest could follow. 10
In State v. GrimmettI I the court of appeals applied United States v. Men-
denhall,112 a recent United States Supreme Court decision, in concluding that
police officers did not violate defendant's fourth amendment rights because
defendant had voluntarily assented to the officer's requests (1) to talk, (2) to go
inside the airport terminal, (3) to produce identification, and (4) to move to the
basement area of the terminal. Significantly, the court held that voluntary
consent did not require explicit notice of the right to refuse to comply with the
officer's requests.' 1
3
In State v. Cooper1 4 the court of appeals dealt with the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement .115 The court concluded that af-
105. 444 U.S. at 91.
106. 30 N.C. App. 101, 226 S.E.2d 186, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 666, 228 S.E.2d 457 (1976).
107. Note, Individualized Probable Cause is Necessary to Search Persons Incidentally on
Premises Subjected to a Warrant Authorized Search, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 115, 122 n.60
(1981). This same writer described the North Carolina approach as "unique." Id. at 119 n.36.
108. 54 N.C. App. 33, 282 S.E.2d 800 (1981). See also notes 66, 67 & 91-97 and accompanying
text supra.
109. 54 N.C. App. at 39, 282 S.E.2d at 805. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See also State v. Gauldin, 44 N.C. App. 19, 259
S.E.2d 779 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 333, 265 S.E.2d 399 (1980); Survey of Developments in
North Carolina Law, 1980-Criminal Procedure, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1013, 1164-65 (1981).
110. 54 N.C. App. at 39, 282 S.E.2d at 805.
111. 54 N.C. App. 494, 284 S.E.2d 144 (1981). See also notes 60-65 and accompanying text
supra.
112. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
113. 54 N.C. App. at 502-03, 284 S.E.2d at 150-51.
114. 52 N.C. App. 349, 278 S.E.2d 532 (1981).
115. The court also indicated a willingness to extend the plain view doctrine to include contra-
band discovered through any of the officer's senses, especially smell. Id. at 352, 278 S.E.2d at 534.
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ter the defendant had been arrested and placed in the officer's patrol car, the
officer's subsequent search of defendant's vehicle did not constitute a valid
search incident to arrest. Applying the standard criteria for a valid search
incident to arrest, the court determined that the area searched was not within
the defendant's immediate control such that he could either reach a weapon or
conceal or destroy evidence.'1 6 It should be noted that the recent United
States Supreme Court holding in New York v. Belton 117 provides an expanded
search incident to arrest rule that would seem to allow a different result on
these facts." 8
In State v. Hall19 the court of appeals held that a police officer's search
of a small, closed, opaque medicine bottle and seizure of its contents exceeded
the permissible scope of a valid inventory search of a lawfully impounded
automobile. 120 Emphasizing the purpose of the inventory-to safeguard the
contents of lawfully impounded vehicles--the court concluded that the officers
could have fulfilled the caretaking function by listing the closed bottle itself on
the inventory form. 121 Significantly, the bottle was brown and its contents
were not in plain view. 122 In its careful delimitation of the scope of the inven-
tory search, the court expressed great concern that the inventory exception
could potentially provide a convenient method to bypass the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement. 123
B Miranda Warnings
In State v. Odom 124 the supreme court unanimously held that the admis-
sion of evidence of defendant's refusal to submit to a gunshot residue test is
not violative of due process. Defendant was arrested following a shooting
and charged with assault with intent to kill. After she was read her Miranda
rights she was asked to submit to a gunshot test, which she refused to take
until she had talked with her lawyer. The test was never administered, but at
trial, on cross-examination, the prosecution asked defendant whether she had
116. 52 N.C. App. at 352, 278 S.E.2d at 534. See State v. Hunter, 299 N.C. 29, 261 S.E.2d 189
(1980). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
117. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
118. The Court held that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occu-
pant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest search the passenger
compartment of that automobile" including the "contents of any containers found within the pas-
senger compartment." 453 U.S. at 460.
Of course, a state can continue to impose a stricter standard for the search incident to arrest.
Furthermore, since Belton v. New York was a 5-4 decision and its author, Justice Stewart, has
retired, Justice O'Connor's vote will be important in determining the fate of the Supreme Court's
new and expanded search incident to arrest rule.
119. 52 N.C. App. 492, 279 S.E.2d 111 (1981).
120. 52 N.C. App. at 498-500, 279 S.E.2d at 115-16.
121. 52 N.C. App. at 499, 279 S.E.2d at 115. As the court points out, numerous other courts
have limited the inventory search. Id. at 501, 279 S.E.2d at 116. Some courts, however, do allow
the more detailed inventory. See 2 W. LaFave, supra note 86, § 7.4(a).
122. 52 N.C. App. at 499-502, 279 S.E.2d at 115-17; note 113 and accompanying text supra.
123. 52 N.C. App. at 501-02, 279 S.E.2d at 116-17.
124. 303 N.C. 163, 277 S.E.2d 352, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 596 (1981).
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refused to take the residue test. 125 The court of appeals 12 6 overturned the con-
viction, following the rule laid down in Doyle v. Ohio 1 27 that it would be "fun-
danientally unfair and a deprivation of due process" 128 to allow the
prosecution to use defendant's reliance on her constitutional right to remain
silent to impeach129 her credibility.' 30 The court. recognized no constitutional
difference between exercising one's right to remain silent and exercising one's
right to request the assistance of counsel. 131
In reversing the court of appeals' decision, the supreme court first held
that defendant had no constitutional right to counsel at that point in the pro-
ceeding. The court analogized the gunshot residue test to other scientific non-
testimonial examinations such as blood tests and handwriting analyses, and
held that the gunshot residue test was not a "critical stage" 132 in the proceed-
ings giving rise to a constitutional right to counsel.' 33 The court then dist-
inguished Doyle by noting that the prosecution in that case was prohibited
from using defendant's silence for impeachment purposes because defendant
could not be penalized for exercising his constitutional right to remain si-
lent.134 The giving of Miranda rights assured defendant only that "she would
not be penalized for exercising her constitutional right to counsel."135 Since
Odom did not yet have a right to cousel, admission of her refusal to take the
test in the absence of counsel was not a violation of due process.136
In support of this analysis the supreme court relied upon the recent
Supreme Court decision in Jenkins v. Anderson137 which held that impeach-
ment by use of pre-arrest silence does not violate due process.13 Defendant
125. Id. at 164, 277 S.E.2d at 353.
126. State v. Odom, 49 N.C. App. 278, 271 S.E.2d 98 (1980).
127. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). See also State v. Lane, 301 N.C. 382, 271 S.E.2d 273 (1980) (com-
ment by a prosecuting attorney upon defendant's post-arrest silence is constitutionally
impermissible).
128. 49 N.C. App. at 280, 271 S.E.2d at 100 (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 618).
129. The court of appeals was not entirely convinced that defendant's refusal to submit to a
residue test was a "statement" inconsistent with her testimony, but it did not directly address the
issue. 49 N.C. App. at 280, 271 S.E.2d at 99. This evidential question has been addressed in the
context of a defendant's silence being used against him for impeachment purposes. See State v.
Lane, 301 N.C. at 385-86, 271 S.E.2d at 275-76 (dictum that silence may be used for impeachment
when, at the time of defendant's silence, it would have been natural for him to speak); Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 n.5 (1980). See generally 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1042 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
130. 49 N.C. App. at 280, 271 S.E.2d at 100 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 618). See also
State v. Lane, 301 N.C. at 383-84, 271 S.E.2d at 274-75.
131. 49 N.C. App. at 281, 271 S.E.2d at 100.
132. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). A critical stage is one during which
counsel is necessary to preserve defendant's right to a fair trial through meaningful cross-examina-
tion. It is thought that cross-examination at the trial itself is sufficient to protect defendant's inter-
ests in attacking objective scientific evidence. Id. at 227.
133. 303 N.C. at 167, 277 S.E.2d at 355. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (taking
of handwriting samples not a critical stage); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (sixth
amendment right to counsel does not attach to the giving of blood tests).
134. 303 N.C. at 168, 277 S.E.2d at 355. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 618.
135. 303 N.C. at 168, 277 S.E.2d at 355 (emphasis in original).
136. Id. at 168, 277 S.E.2d at 355-56.
137. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
138. Id. at 238.
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there was arrested for murder, and at trial claimed the shooting was self-de-
fense. On cross-examination the prosecution asked him why he did not report
the crime until two weeks after the shooting, thereby using defendant's pre-
arrest silence to imply that defendant had fabricated his story. 139 The
Supreme Court in Jenkins observed that the critical difference between the
facts in Doyle and those before the court was that in the latter the failure to
speak came before defendant was taken into custody and given his Miranda
warnings. 140 It was crucial to the Court's reasoning in Jenkins that no govern-
mental action had induced defendant to remain silent for the two weeks before
the arrest, and therefore the fundamental unfairness of impeachment by post-
arrest silence was not present.
141
In Odom the supreme court reasoned that even though defendant had
been told that she had a right to an attorney, the state had done nothing to
induce her to believe that she had a constitutional right to counsel at that point
in the proceedings.142 The court did not explain why the giving of Miranda
warnings did not induce defendant to think that she had a constitutional right
to request the assistance of counsel. As the court of appeals pointed out, surely
an arrested person who has been read his rights should be able to rely on the
assertion that he has a right to see an attorney.143 To say that a defendant
would not be induced to believe that a constitutional right to an attorney exists
at that point is to impute to the defendant an understanding of when the pro-
ceeding has reached a "critical stage."' 144 Otherwise, the defendant is con-
fronted with the dilemma that the Supreme Court held was unfair in Doyle:
either refraining from exercising what may well be a constituional right, or
being penalized for asserting it.
The court of appeals in State v. Perry145 held that a bail bondsman had
no obligation to give Miranda warnings to defendant, because a bail bonds-
man is not acting as a law enforcement officer or as an agent of the state when
taking a bail jumper into custody.146 Thus, the bondsman was permitted to
testify to his conversation with defendant that took place as the two were driv-
ing back to the police station following his recapture of defendant.' 47 The
court regarded the bondsman's action as purely private, arising out of the bail
contract between the principal and his surety,148 and noted the generally ac-
cepted principal that statements made to private individuals are not protected
139. Id. at 234.
140. Id. at 239-40.
141. Id. at 240.
142. 303 N.C. at 168, 277 S.E.2d at 355-56.
143. 49 N.C. App. at 281,271 S.E.2d at 100.
144. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
145. 50 N.C. App. 540, 274 S.E.2d 261 (1981).
146. Id. at 542, 274 S.E.2d at 262.





by Miranda requirements.1 49
The question was raised whether G.S. 85C-7,150 which grants a bonds-
man authority to recapture his principal, creates a law enforcement officer in
the person of a bail bondsman. In holding that it does not, the court stated
that the statute was merely a codification of the common law right of recapture
that had been recognized in North Carolina for many years. 151 Numerous
courts have held that a bail bondsman, acting independently, is not cloaked
with state authority.'5 2 It has been argued that courts have their own official
means for securing the presence of wayward defendants, 153 and that the right
of a bondsman to apprehend his prinicipal is purely contractual, requiring no
legislative flat. 154 Since the justification for requiring Miranda warnings is to
deter unlawful police interrogation tactics,1 55 and since the bondsman has no
particular interest in the defendant's guilt or innocence, this approach would
appear to be sound.
Other courts have held that a bondsman did act as an arm of the state,
and was therefore subject to constitutional limitations on his actions. These
courts generally dealt with cases involving more significant state participation
in the rearrest; for instance, a bondsman acting under authority of a state
bench warrant. 156 In the absence of significant state involvement, however,
the acts of a bondsman are apparently subject to few constitutional
limitations. 157
Nevertheless, there are several arguments that the court did not consider
directly which would support the contrary position that a bail bondsman is an
agent of the state. One argument is that the state-licensed and regulated
bondsman, as provided in G.S. 85C, is an integral part of the state's pretrial
release program, and therefore should be treated like an official of that pro-
149. See In re Simmons, 24 N.C. App. 28, 32,210 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1974); C. McCormick, Hand-
book on the Law of Evidence § 162 (2d ed. 1972).
150. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 85C-7 (1981) provides: "For the purpose of surrendering the defend-
ant, the surety may arrest him before the forfeiture of the undertaking, or by his written authority
endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, may request any judicial officer to order arrest of
the defendant."
151. 50 N.C. App. at 542, 274 S.E.2d at 262. For statements of the common law right of
recapture, see State v. Lingerfelt, 109 N.C. 775, 14 S.E. 75 (1891); Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S.
(Wall.) 366, 371 (1872). See also Note, Bailh An Ancient Practice Re-examined, 70 Yale L.L 966
(1961).
152. See Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'L Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1974) (en bane), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 40-41 (5th Cir. 1931); Maryland
v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Easley v. Blossom, 394 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Fla.
1975); Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968). These cases address the question
whether a bail bondsman is acting as an agent of state authority in the context of a civil suit
redressing constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
153. 505 F.2d at 554.
154. Id. See also People v. Houle, 13 Cal. App. 3d 892, 895, 91 Cal. Rptr. 874, 875-76 (1970).
155. United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904, 905 (9th Cir. 1971).
156. See, e.g., Maryland v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
157. Even when the bondsman does act with a cloak of state authority, it does not necessarily
follow that he will be treated for constitutional purposes as if he were a police officer. In Kear,
474 F. Supp. at 802, the court recognized fourth amendment restrictions on bondsman authority to




gram. 158 Another is that legislatures often make available to the bail bonds-
man judicial process and police power, unavailable to most individuals, to aid
him in the completion of his task and the protection of his investment.159 In
addition, there is case law to support the proposition that when bail is given
the prisoner is still technically under the control of the court 160 and is regarded
as delivered to the custody of his bondsman. 161 Each of these arguments sug-
gests that a bail bondsman acts with some state authority when lie recaptures a
bail jumper. Perry holds that when the only state involvement is the statutory
regulation of the bondsman's activities, and the recapture is made pursuant to
a private bail contract, the state's association with the bondsman is not signifi-
cant enough to warrant treating him as an arm of the state's law enforcement
program for Miranda purposes.
In State v. Porter162 defendant was arrested after a high-speed chase in
connection with the armed robbery of a store, and was taken into custody
without being apprised of his constitutional rights. As the officers were driving
him to the station, a police supervisor radioed the patrolmen and asked them
if they had found a bank bag in defendant's possession. When defendant
Porter heard this question he responded, "The bank bag is in the car." 163 One
of the patrolman then asked defendant, "What bank bag?"; 164 and the de-
fendant answered, "The bag from the robbery."'165 The primary issue was
whether defendant's second response 166 was inadmissible as the result of a
custodial interrogation conducted before the defendant was informed of his
right to remain silent. The court narrowed the question to "whether, in the
brief conversation between defendant Porter and [the patrolman], the officer
should have known that the respondent would suddenly be moved to make an
incriminating response." 167 Relying on Rhode Island v. Innis, 168 and the
United States Supreme Court's emphasis there on the brief and casual nature
of the policeman's remarks, 169 the court held that this conversation was not a
158. 505 F.2d at 558 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
159. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 85C-7 (1981); 505 F.2d at 557 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
160. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 547 (1952).
161. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872); State v. Lingerfelt, 109 N.C. 775, 14
S.E. 75 (1891). See also Federal Bail Procedures: Hearings on S. 1357 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights and the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin): "[I]n modem
times, the bail bondsman is an arm of the court performing a service in aid of civil law. As such,
he should be subject to procedures that recognize and protect the rights of the accused as much as
do other agents of law enforcement."
162. 50 N.C. App. 568, 274 S.E.2d 860, afl'd, 303 N.C. 680, 281 S.E.2d 377 (1981).
163. Id. at 569, 274 S.E.2d at 862.
164. There was opposing evidence that the inquiry was actually, "What bag, turkey?" Id. at
576-77, 274 S.E.2d at 867 (Martin, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 571, 274 S.E.2d at 862.
166. The court held that defendant's reply to the radio communication was clearly spontane-
ous and not the product of a custodial interrogation. Id. The dissent also agreed on this point. Id.
at 579, 274 S.E.2d at 867 (Martin, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 571-72, 274 S.E.2d at 863. This framing of the issue is almost a direct quotation
from Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980).
168. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
169. Id. at 302-03.
[Vol. 601322
CRIMINA4L PR 0 CED URE
custodial interrogation.170 In the view of the court, a question posed to a de-
fendant is not part of a custodial interrogation if it merely asks the defendant
to explain or clarify something he has already said voluntarily.' 7 1 The officer's
question, "What bank bag?", was a permissible response to defendant's vol-
untary spontaneous reply to the radio communication; the officer was "still
getting the big picture."'
172
In holding that this conversation did not constitute a custodial interroga-
tion the court may have misplaced its reliance on Innis. The holding in Innis
was that the term "interrogation" refers to "express questioning" and any
other words or actions that the police "should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response."'173 The conduct of the police officers there
consisted of a conversation between them that defendant overheard. Because
the conversation was not directed at defendant (at least not in form),17 4 it is
easy to understand why the Court felt that the officers should not have known
that their remarks would elicit an incriminating response. By way of contrast,
however, the officer in Porter directed his question to defendant; the very pur-
pose of the second question was to elicit an incriminating response.
175
Innis did not address the question whether a voluntary in-custody state-
ment becomes the product of an in-custody interrogation simply because the
officer asks defendant to explain or clarify a statement that previously was
offered voluntarily. For this proposition the court relied on three pre-Innis
North Carolina cases: State v. McZorn,'176 State v. Haddock 77 and State v.
Blackmon.178 Each of these cases, however, concerned a confession by a de-
fendant who had been read his Miranda rights and had waived them volunta-
rily. 179 Although the court noted that the circumstances in Porter were
170. 50 N.C. App. at 572, 274 S.E.2d at 863.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court noted that there was no evidence that the officer knew what was taken at
the store. His first involvement with the case came when he pursued defendant's car in response to
a radio call. This fact contributed to the court's determination that the officer's question was a
"natural response" to defendant's spontaneous remark, because he was trying to "get the big pic-
ture." Id. The dissent, however, was persuaded that the officer must have known he had appre-
hended one of the robbers and that his question was not just an innocent query. Id. at 578-79, 274
S.E.2d at 867 (Martin, J., dissenting).
173. 446 U.S. at 301.
174. Id. at 302. In a conversation between themselves, the officers in Innis expressed their
concern over the safety of handicapped children who were known to play in the neighborhood
where defendant had hidden his gun. Defendant, who was seated in the back seat of the patrol
car, interrupted the conversation and volunteered to show the officers where they could find the
gun. Id. at 294-95.
175. See 50 N.C. App. at 579, 274 S.E.2d at 867 (Martin, J., dissenting).
176. 288 N.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 201 (1975), modified as to death penalty, 428 U.S. 904 (1976).
177. 281 N.C. 675, 190 S.E.2d 208 (1972).
178. 284 N.C. 1, 199 S.E.2d 431 (1973).
179. In McZorn, defendant, after being warned of his rights, confessed that he had shot the
victim. An officer then asked him to "explain what happened." 288 N.C. at 432, 219 S.E.2d at
211. In Blackmon, defendant, again after he had been read his rights, made incriminating state-
ments in response to a comment by his co-defendant. A sheriff then asked him if he cared to make
any further statement. 284 N.C. at 4, 199 S.E.2d at 436. In Haddock, despite being twice assured
of his right to remain silent, defendant began confessing, whereupon an officer asked him to fur-
ther explain one of his statements. 281 N.C. at 680, 190 S.E.2d at 211.
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"somewhat different ' I80 than the facts in these cases, it apparently did not
think the distinction was significant. 18' Given, however, that the courts in
McZorn, Haddock and Blackmon relied primarily on the fact that the defend-
ants had knowingly waived their rights,18 2 Porter must be viewed as an exten-
sion of the reasoning in those cases.
A second important question that the Porter court faced was whether the
testimony should have been excluded as to Porter's codefendant Ross, because
the extra-judicial statement of a codefendant was used against him without his
having a chance to cross-examine the declarant. The State had argued that the
voir dire editing of the statement "the bag we got from the robbery" to "the
bag from the robbery" so sanitized the statement as not to implicate Ross. The
appellate court disagreed. The statement following the chase, arrest and hand-
cuffing left the jury with a single natural inference, namely, that both men had
been involved in the robbery. Nevertheless, and in contravention of the
United States Supreme Court decision in Bruton v. United States,8 3 the court
held that the statements were admissible as to Ross.
In Bruton the Supreme Court stated that while the confession of a defend-
ant could be introduced as competent evidence against that defendant as an
exception to the hearsay rule (admission of a party), the statement could not
be considered by the jury against a codefendant because it was "inadmissible
hearsay" as to the codefendant.184 The Court held that, as a practical matter,
the jury could not be expected to heed limiting instructions and would con-
sider the incriminating extrajudicial statement of the defendant against the
codefendant as well, even though as to the codefendant the statement would
be an inadmissible violation of the codefendant's rights granted by the con-
frontation clause of the Constitution.' 8 5 But the court of appeals ruled that the
Bruton rule would not apply if defendant Porter's exclamation could be char-
acterized as a spontaneous utterance.' 8 6 The court reasoned that such an ex-
clamation would not constitute inadmissible hearsay as to codefendant Ross
but would be admissible by virtue of its credibility and reliability as a sponta-
neous utterance.' 8
7
As the dissent points out, this holding was a complete misinterpretation of
Bruton. In this case, Porter, the out-of-court declarant, did not testify at the
trial. Ross had no way to cross-examine Porter. Ross' right of cross-examina-
tion, secured by both the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution and article I of the North Carolina Constitution,
was violated by the admission of this testimony. The majority apparently held
180. 50 N.C. App. at 572, 274 S.E.2d at 863.
181. While the court was cognizant of the distinction, it did not attempt to reconcile the deci-
sions. Id.
182. 288 N.C. at 432-33, 219 S.E.2d at 211; 281 N.C. at 682-83, 190 S.E.2d at 212-13 ; 284
N.C. at 12, 199 S.E.2d at 438.
183. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
184. Id. at 137.
185. Id. at 129.
186. 50 N.C. App. at 573, 274 S.E.2d at 863.
187. Id. at 578, 274 S.E.2d at 865 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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that if the extra-judicial statement is credible and reliable, the nondeclarant
defendant's rights to cross-examination have somehow been fulfilled, and
there is no violation of the Bruton rule. But this view ignores the essential
purpose served by cross-examination. It is the credible witness whom the de-
fendant needs to cross-examine. When the testimony is so incredible as to
defy belief by a jury, a defendant may well waive his right to cross-examine.
In any case, constitutional rights cannot be made to turn on whether this court,
or any other court, is of the opinion that an extra-judicial statement is credible.
The opinion implies that Bruton is limited to "confessions." The Bruton
Court, however, stated only that its rule applies where the powerfully incrimi-
nating extra-judicial statements .of a codefendant "are deliberately spread
before the jury in a joint trade."18 8 Constitutional rights should not depend on
the particular hearsay exception the court employs to admit the statement
against one of the codefendants.
C. Double Jeopardy
The United States Supreme Court has recently described the decisional
law on the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment 189 as a "a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navi-
gator." 190 The difficulties inherent in judicial application of the clause are
evidenced by State v. Andrews1 9 1 and State v. Perry192 where two different
panels of the North Carolina Court of Appeals 193 on the same day reached
conflicting decisions 194 on defendants' contentions that they were subjected to
multiple punishments upon convictions of felonious larceny 195 and felonious
188. 391 U.S. at 135-36.
189. "No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. Const. amend. V.
190. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
191. 52 N.C. App. 26, 277 S.E.2d 857 (1981).
192. 52 N.C. App. 48, 278 S.E.2d 273 (1981).
193. The two panels decided Andrews and Perry on the same day. Six months later, a third
panel followed Perry, Judge Vaughn dissenting. State v. Carter, 55 N.C. App. 192, 284 S.E.2d 733
(1981). Thus, seven of the twelve judges on the court of appeals have considered this issue.
194. Apparently, an en bane procedure does not exist in which the court of appeals might
resolve conflicts between different judicial panels. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-14 to -21 (1981). A
party, however, does have the right to an appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court in any case
"in which there is a dissent." Id. § 7A-30.
195. Defendants were sentenced under G.S. § 14-72(a), which provides in pertinent part:
Larceny of goods of the value of more than four hundred dollars ($400.00) is a Class H
felony. The receiving or possessing of stolen goods of the value of more than four hun-
dred dollars ($400.00) while knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that the
goods are stolen is a Class H Felony .... Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)
of this section, larceny of property, or the receiving or possession of stolen goods know-
ing or having reasonable grounds to believe them to be stolen, where the value of the
property or goods is not more than four hundred dollars ($400.00), is a misdemeanor
punishable under G.S. 14-3(a). In all cases of doubt, the jury shall, in the verdict, fix the
value of the property stolen.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72(a) (1981).
In Perry the conviction of felonious larceny was vacated and remanded for entry of a judg-
ment of misdemeanor larceny, 52 N.C. App. at 59, 278 S.E.2d at 281, because of the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury to determine the value of the stolen property and the court's failure to
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possession of stolen property.196 In Andrews defendant asserted that the lar-
ceny and the subsequent possession of the property stolen "constitute[d] a sin-
gle criminal offense"'197 that permitted only a single punishment. In Perry
defendant contended that possession of stolen property constituted a lesser in-
cluded offense of larceny, and therefore he could not be convicted and pun-
ished for both crimes. The court of appeals panel that considered Andrews
rejected defendant's claim, Judge Clark dissenting.' 98 The Perry panel, Judge
Robert M. Martin dissenting, 199 found that defendant stated a substantial
double jeopardy claim, and vacated and dismissed the conviction for posses-
sion of stolen property.
200
Though each defendant framed his contentions differently, for double
jeopardy purposes, the issue whether an act that violates two distinct statutes
encompasses the "same offense" or constitutes a greater and lesser included
offense by reference to the same standard. In Brown v. Ohio20 1 the United
States Supreme Court determined that the rule of Blockburger v. United
States20 2 was the appropriate standard to determine whether two statutory
violations were sufficiently distinguishable to permit successive prosecutions or
cumulative punishment. In Blockburger the Court held that "[w]here the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."
20 3
Therefore, an offense and its lesser included offense are viewed as "the same
offense" when determining the applicability of the double jeopardy clause.
20 4
Because the double jeopardy clause is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, 205 this federal constitutional standard is controlling on
submit the issue of misdemeanor larceny. Id. at 53, 278 S.E.2d at 277. This fact, however, has no
effect on the applicability of the double jeopardy clause to the issues presented in Andrews and
Perry. See 52 N.C. App. at 56 n.l, 278 S.E.2d at 279 n.l.
196. Defendants were sentenced under G.S. § 14-71.1, which provides in pertinent part:
If any person shall possess any chattel, property, money, valuable security or other
thing whatsoever, the stealing or taking whereof amounts to larceny or a felony, either at
common law or by virtue of any statute made or hereafter to be made, such person
knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe the same to have been feloniously
stolen or taken, he shall be guilty of a criminal offense, and may be indicted and con-
victed, whether the felon stealing and taking such chattels, property, money, valuable
security or other thing shall or shall not have been previously convicted, or shall or shall
not be amenable to justice ....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-71.1 (1981).
197. 52 N.C. App. at 31, 277 S.E.2d at 861.
198. Judge Clark, in a one sentence dissent, found that Perry governed the question of double
jeopardy. 52 N.C..App. at 38, 277 S.E.2d at 865 (Clark, J., dissenting).
199. Judge Martin, in a one sentence dissent, found that Andrews governed the question of
double jeopardy. 52 N.C. App. at 59, 278 S.E.2d at 281 (Martin (Robert M.), J., dissenting).
200. 52 N.C. App. at 59, 278 S.E.2d at 281.
201. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
202. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
203. Id. at 304.
204. See C. Whitebread, supra note 80, at 503; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167 n.6 (1977) ("a
lesser included and a greater offense are the same under Blockburger").
205. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). Although the North Carolina Constitu-
tion contains no express prohibition against double jeopardy, the principle "has always been an
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state courts,20 6 and, though the Blockburger standard was originally developed
as a test of statutory intent,20 7 the test has been adopted as a method of analy-
sis for alleged double jeopardy violations.20 8 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has found Blockburger to be the standard against which state statutes
are to be tested for double jeopardy purposes.
20 9
The Supreme Court has recognized that the double jeopardy clause "con-
sist[s] of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against mul-
tiple punishments for the same offense." 2 10 The first two areas of protection
are not implicated in either Perry or Andrews. It is the last area of protection,
dealing with judicial interpretation of the substantive law, which is the focal
point of the issues raised in Perry and Andrews.
When multiple punishment is at issue, "the role of the [double jeopardy
clause] is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative au-
thorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. '211 Where
the legislature has defined a single offense and the resulting punishment, the
clause prohibits a court from disregarding legislative intent and subjecting a
defendant to multiple punishment. It is not enough for the court to interpret
the statute to provide multiple punishment and then summarily find that this
was the legislative intent. The double jeopardy clause requires that the deter-
mination of legislative intent be subject to exacting scrutiny.
Viewed in this manner, the clause appears to act as a restriction only upon
the court.212 Nevertheless, because legislative acts will be construed with ref-
integral part of the law of North Carolina." State v. Battle, 279 N.C. 484, 486, 183 S.E.2d 641, 643
(1971). The prohibition is often found to come within the "law of the land" clause of N.C. Const.
art. I, § 19. See, e.g., State v. Shuler, 293 N.C. 34, 235 S.E.2d 226 (1977); State v. Irick, 291 N.C.
480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. Cannon, 38 N.C. App. 322, 248 S.E.2d 65 (1978).
206. See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 198, 195 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1973).
207. In Bloekburger the issue was whether petitioner could be subjected to cumulative punish-
ment for two separate sales of morphine not in or from its original stamped package in violation
of 26 U.S.C. §§ 692, 696 (1927). 284 U.S. at 301. The Court made no mention of the double
jeopardy clause in its opinion.
208. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) ("Unless 'each statute requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not,' Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871),
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecutions as well as cumulative punish-
ment."); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11 (1978) ("The Blockburger test has its primary
relevance in the double jeopardy context, where it is a guide for determining when two separately
defined crimes constitute the 'same offense' for double jeopardy purposes.").
209. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 168; Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 419.
210. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). See also State v.
Summrell, 282 N.C. 157, 192 S.E.2d 569 (1972).
211. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 165; see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 697
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases chal-
lenging multiple punishments is to prevent ... the sentencing court from imposing greater pun-
ishments, than the Legislative Branch intended") (emphasis in original); Commonwealth v.
Crocker, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1916, -, 424 N.E.2d 524, 529 (1981). Thus, the double jeopardy
clause ensures that the "power to define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be
imposed upon those found guilty of them, resides wholly with" the legislative branch of govern-
ment. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. at 689.
212. See 445 U.S. at 688-90; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 165; Commonwealth v. Crocker, 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. at -, 424 N.E.2d at 529.
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erence to double jeopardy considerations, it has been recognized that the
clause "acts as an indirect restraint on the legislature, because it demands a
certain standard of clarity from the legislature before multiple punishment will
be allowed." 213 The dispositive issue, therefore, is whether the legislative in-
tent, as embodied in its statutory provisions, is sufficiently unambiguous that
multiple punishment was clearly the desired legislative purpose. Even if the
legislative intent was clear, however, further inquiry must be made to deter-
mine whether the substantive offenses pass the Blockburger standard, to make
certain that the statutorily defined offenses are not in actuality one offense.
This two-tiered inquiry is suggested by Hein v. United States,214 Jeffers v.
United States,21 5 Simpson v. United States
216 and Zannelli v. United States.2 17
In all these cases, "[b]efore an examination [was] made to determine whether
cumulative punishments for the two offenses [were] constitutionally permissi-
ble, it [was] necessary, following [the] practice of avoiding constitutional deci-
sions where possible, to determine whether Congress intended to subject the
defendant to multiple penalties for the single criminal transaction."
21 8 In He/-
lin, Simpson and Jeffers, this inquiry revealed that Congress had not intended
cumulative punishment,219 so it was unnecessary to proceed further. In con-
trast, the inquiry in Zannelli revealed that Congress did intend to punish each
statutory violation separately, so further analysis using the Blockburger rule
was necessary to determine whether the offenses were distinct.
220
The continuing validity of this two-tiered analysis has been called into
question by Aibernaz v. United States.22 1 In Aibernaz, the Court merged the
issue of legislative intent into the Blockburger standard,222 declaring that "the
213. Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81,
118.
214. 358 U.S. 415 (1959) (prosecution under Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113
(1976), for bank robbery in violation of§ 2113(d) and for receiving the stolen property in violation
of § 2113 (c)).
215. 432 U.S. 137 (1977) (prosecution for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) by conspiring to
distribute heroin and for violAtion of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976) by conducting a continuing enterprise
to violate drug laws),
216. 435 U.S. 6 (1978) (prosecution for bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976), for use
of "a dangerous weapon or device" under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (d) (1976), and for use of firearm in
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Supp. IV 1980)).
217. 420 U.S. 770 (1975) (prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) by conspiring to
commit an offense against the United States and for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976) by con-
ducting a gambling business with five or more persons in violation of state law).
218. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. at 11-12.
219. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 419 (1959); Simpson, 435 U.S. at 14; United States
v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 547-48 (1976) (Court reaffirmed Heo/in and found that defendant con-
victed of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (b), (d) (1970) cannot also be convicted
of receiving or possessing the proceeds of that robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970))
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) ("ambiguity concerning the ambit of [sic] crimina
statute should be resolved in favor of lenity"); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955) (absen
legislative intent to the contrary, any "doubt will be resolved against turning a single transactioj
into multiple offenses"); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957).
220. 420 U.S. at 785 n.17.
221. 450 U.S. 333 (1981) (conviction on separate counts of conspiracy to import marijuana i
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976) and conspiracy to distribute marijuana in violation of
U.S.C. § 846 (1976)).
222. See text accompanying note 203 supra.
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question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different
from the question of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be
imposed."22 3 The concurring opinion, however, questioned the validity of this
statement, claiming that it was "supported neither by precedent nor reasoning
and [was] unnecessary to reach the Court's conclusion." 224 The concurring
Justices expressed adherence to the two-tiered inquiry, finding that "[n]o mat-
ter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally provide for cumu-
lative punishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact that
the other did not, under the criterion of Blockburger.
' '225
The41bernaz rule will prevent the application of the "rule of lenity" 226 in
those cases where legislative intent is ambiguous but where the Blockburger
standard finds that the distinct statutes punish separate offenses. Rather than
resolving legislative ambiguity against turning a single transaction into multi-
ple offenses, the legislature will bepresumed to have intended cumulative pun-
ishment if it frames its statutes so that they satisfy Blockburger. Furthermore,
if the statutes fall under Blockburger, that "rule should not be controlling
where. . there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." 227 In such
a case, where the legislature "intended . . . to impose multiple punishment,
imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution."
228
Albernaz therefore reverses the order of the inquiry suggested by cases
such as Simpson and Jffers.'2 9 The initial inquiry is whether the statutes in
question provide punishment for the "same offense" under the Blockburger
rule. If the answer is in the negative, no further inquiry will be necessary, and
the punishments will be valid. If, however, application of the Blockburger rule
finds the statutes to describe but one offense, then one must look for a "clear
and unmistakable legislative judgment" 2 30 to prescribe cumulative
punishments.23
The Blockburger case itself has been all but ignored by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.232 This consequence is not surpris-
223. 450 U.S. at 344.
224. Id. at 345 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Stevens and
Marshall.
225. Id.
226. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955); see note 219 supra.
227. Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333,340 (1981); see also Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684, 691-93 (1980).
228. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. at 344. In such a case, it appears that any potential
constitutional claim which a defendant has would fall under the eighth amendment's prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishment." See Westen & Drubel, supra note 213, at 114.
229. See text accompanying notes 214-220 supra.
230. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 791 (1975).
231. This analysis is consistent with the "conclusion that the Double Jeopardy Clause operates
as a rebuttable presumption against multiple punishment." Westen & Drubel, supra note 213, at
122. The presumption is rebuttable by strong evidence of contrary legislative intent. Id.
232. Prior to Perry andAndrews, Blockburger had been cited once both by the North Carolina
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 362, 226 S.E.2d 353, 364
(1976); State v. Vert, 39 N.C. App. 26, 30, 249 S.E.2d 476, 478, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 739, 254
S.E.2d 181 (1978). In Tolley the court cited Blockburger for the proposition "that a sentence of
imprisonment which is within the maximum authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual punish-
ment unless the punishment provisions of the statute itself are unconstitutional." 290 N.C. at 362,
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ing, however, since the case presented no constitutional issues. 233
Nevertheless, both courts have articulated an almost identical standard to de-
termine whether an act that violates two distinct statutes is the "same offense"
for double jeopardy purposes.2 34 The supreme court has also articulated a test
to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another: "One
offense is a lesser included offense of a more serious offense if all the essential
elements of the lesser offense are also essential elements of the greater offense;
and therefore proof sufficient to support a conviction on the more serious of-
fense would also support conviction on the lesser offense. '235
When reduced to their basic rationale, these standards seem relatively
easy to apply.236 The disparate results in Perry and Andrews demonstrate,
however, that what looks good in theory may be difficult in application. In
Andrews, the court of appeals found that:
[t]he element of possession is different from, and not included in the
elements of taking or carrying away required for larceny. The inci-
dental fact that possession goes with the taking and asportation is not
significant in law as defeating the legislative right to ban both or
either offense. . . .The elements of taking and carrying away of the
property are not essential to the offense of possession of stolen prop-
erty. . . . Thus, the requirements of Blockburger . . . are
satisfied.237
226 S.E.2d at 364. In Vert the court of appeals described Blockburger as the "same evidence" test.
39 N.C. App. at 30, 249 S.E.2d at 478. This label is technically a misnomer for "the Blackburger
test focuses on the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on
the actual evidence to be presented at trial." Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980). There-
fore, "[i]f each [statute] requires proof of a fact that the other [statute] does not, the Blockburger
test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes."
lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975). Accord, State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153,
163, 270 S.E.2d 476, 482 (1980) ("double jeopardy does not occur when the evidence to support
two or more offenses overlaps, but only when the evidence presented on more than one charge is
identical").
233. See note 206 supra.
234. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 295 N.C. 399, 245 S.E.2d 743 (1978); State v. Shook, 293 N.C.
315, 237 S.E.2d 843 (1977); State v. Dammons, 293 N.C. 263, 237 S.E.2d 834 (1977); State v.
Richardson, 279 N.C. 621, 185 S.E.2d 102 (1971); State v. Martin, 47 N.C. App. 223, 267 S.E.2d 35
(1980), appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 238, 269 S.E.2d 327 (1981); State v. Vert, 39 N.C. App. 26, 249
S.E.2d 476, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 739, 254 S.E.2d 181 (1978).
235. State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153, 162, 270 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1980); see also State v. Shook,
293 N.C. 315, 237 S.E.2d 843 (1977); State v. Hill, 287 N.C. 207, 214 S.E.2d 67 (1975); State v.
Richardson, 279 N.C. 621, 185 S.E.2d 102 (1971).
236. The test can be reduced to a simple algebra-like formula:
[W]here offense number 1 requires proof of elements A and B, and offense number 2
requires proof of only element A, then offense number 2 is a lesser-included offense of
offense number I and convictions for both are barred. Although this "pure" example of
lesser and greater offenses has never been presented to the Supreme Court, the plain
language of Blockburger requires this result, since offense number 2 does not require
proof of an element not required to prove offense number I. Similarly, when offense
number I requires proof of elements A and B, and offense number 2 requires proof of
element C, convictions for both offenses will be barred when human experience indicates
that in every instance the facts needed to prove elements A or B will also prove element
C.
Schwartz, Multiple Punishment for the Same Offense: Michigan Grapples with the Definitional
Problem, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 825, 832 (1979).
237. 52 N.C. App. 26, 33-34, 277 S.E.2d 857, 863 (1981) (citations omitted).
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The court of appeals panel in Perry, on the other hand, found that:
[e]vidence establishing commission of the offense of larceny necessar-
ily also establishes commission of the offense of possession of the
stolen property which was the subject of the larceny. It is impossible
to take and carry away the goods of another without in the process
possessing those goods with knowledge that they are stolen. There
are no facts to be proven in establishing possession of stolen goods
which are not also proven in establishing the larceny of those goods.
The prosecutor who has made out a case of larceny 4osofacto has
also made out a case of possession of the stolen goods which were
the subject of the larceny.
238
The contradictory results reached by the different panels of the court of ap-
peals may be evidence that in its present form, the Blockburger test is difficult
to apply.
Perhaps the test needs to be rephrased to simplify its application. Para-
phrasing various United States Supreme Court applications of the test suggests
various alternatives. For example, if as a matter of North Carolina law, lar-
ceny "does not always entail proof of [possession of stolen goods], then the two
offenses are not the same under the Blockburger test." 239 Or, the inquiry
might be whether a conviction for larceny "cannot be had without proving all
the elements of the offense of [possession of stolen goods]." 240 Another varia-
tion is whether possession of stolen goods "requires no proof beyond that
which is required for conviction of [larceny]." 24 1 These formulations may
provide the necessary tools to determine whether the essential element of "tak-
ing and carrying away"24 2 required for larceny subsumes the essential element
238. 52 N.C. App. 48, 56-57, 278 S.E.2d 273, 279-80 (1981).
239. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419 (1980) (emphasis added) (Illinois Supreme Court's
finding that an involuntary manslaughter prosecution is barred after driver has been convicted for
failure to reduce speed was vacated and remanded because failure to reduce speed may not always
be a necessary element of the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter by automobile). Cf. Ex
parte Nielson, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) (proof of illegal cohabitation sufficient to prove adultery be-
cause the crime of cohabitation presumptively would involve the crime of adultery).
See also State v. Griffin, 51 N.C. App. 564, 277 S.E.2d 77 (1981). In Griffin defendant, after
being involved in an auto accident, pleaded guilty to failure to yield the right of way in violation
of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-158 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981). Several days later, a party involved in the
accident died, and defendant was charged with death by vehicle in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 20-141.4 (1978). The court of appeals upheld defendant's double jeopardy claim, since the State
had stipulated that it would rely on no other evidence in the second prosecution other than de-
fendant's former guilty plea. This result seems proper under Vitale, for the Court in that case
indicated that if the State relied on evidence from the former prosecution to sustain its second
prosecution, the defendant's double jeopardy claim would be "substantial." 447 U.S. at 420. Simi-
larly, in Griffin, although failure to yield the right of way is not "always" an element of death by
vehicle, if the former is the only evidence of the latter, a conviction on the former charge should
bar the latter prosecution. Note, however, the caveat in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7
(1977) ("[a]l exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge
at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or
have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence").
240. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 694 (1980) (convictions for rape and killing com-
mitted in the course of the rape reversed since Congress did not authorize consecutive sentences
for offenses that are the "same offense" under the Blockburger test).
241. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 168 (1977) (proof of the greater offense of auto theft necessar-
ily involved proof of the lesser offense of ' Joyriding").
242. State v. Booker, 250 N.C. 272, 273, 108 S.E.2d 426, 427 (1959).
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of "possession" necessary for a violation of G.S. 14-71.1.243 If "[a]bsent a spe-
cial or technical definition or other clear indication to the contrary, words in a
statute [are to be] given their common and ordinary meaning,"244 then "tak-
ing" does include "possession."
245
Possession of the stolen goods is a necessary component of the act of lar-
ceny. Possession must constitute a continuing offense 246 in order for the
double jeopardy clause to prohibit punishment both for possession and for
larceny.247 If the possession that necessarily occurs with larceny is treated as a
single continuing course of action rather than as a series of separate acts, then
the "Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors
can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into
a series of temporal or spatial units.
'248
The North Carolina courts have held that possession of recently stolen
property raises a rebuttable presumption that the possessor stole the prop-
erty,249 and this would tend to support the view that possession is a continuing
offense subsumed within larceny. The doctrine applies,
only when the possession is of a kind which manifests that the stolen
goods came to the possessor by his own act,. . . and so recently and
under such circumstances as to give reasonable assurance that such
possession could not have been obtained unless the holder was himself
the thief.250
The implication from this language is that the presumption is permissible be-
cause it is likely that a thief has continuing possession of goods which he ear-
lier had stolen.
Yet other past decisions by the court concerning charges of both posses-
sion and another offense seem to refute the continuing offense theory. For
example, the court has denied a claim of double jeopardy when a defendant
has been convicted of both possession and sale of narcotics.251 In these cases,
however, illegal sale does not "always entail proof of '2 5 2 illegal possession.
243. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-71.1 (1981).
244. Food Town Stores, Inc. v. Salisbury, 300 N.C. 21, 38-39, 265 S.E.2d 123, 134 (1980).
245. One definition of "take" is "to get into one's hands or into one's possession, power, or
control by force or strategem." 2 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged)
2329 (1971).
246. "A continuing offense is an unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse
and operated by an unintermittent force however long a time it may occupy." State v. Johnson,
212 N.C. 566, 570, 194 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1937).
247. The legislature could, of course, segment the continuing offense into separately punish-
able units without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause. 432 U.S. at 169 n.8. This practice,
however, would raise eighth amendment issues of "cruel and unusual punishment," see Vesten &
Drubel, supra note 213, at 114, as well as potential due process questions, see 432 U.S. at 169 n.8.
248. 432 U.S. at 169, quoted in State v. Perry, 52 N.C. App. 48, 58, 278 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1981).
249. See, e.g., State v. Greene, 289 N.C. 578, 223 S.E.2d 365 (1976); State v. Lewis, 281 N.C.
564, 189 S.E.2d 216, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1046 (1972); State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480, 151 S.E.2d
62 (1966).
250. State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480, 486-87, 151 S.E.2d 62, 67 (1966) (emphasis added).
251. See, e.g., State v. Thornton, 283 N.C. 513, 196 S.E.2d 201 (1973); State v. Cameron, 283
N.C. 191, 195 S.E.2d 481 (1973); State v. Perry, 26 N.C. App. 185, 215 S.E.2d 176 (1975).
252. See note 239 supra.
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For instance, the sale may be effected without actually possessing the item,-
for example, by using a third person to accomplish the transfer.253 Also,
"[w]hile possession may be part of the sale, the possession may be legal and
the sale illegal; therefore, they are separate and distinct offenses. '254 A further
example is a prosecution for both possessing and transporting a prohibited
substance.255 Here, the cumulative punishment seems to relate to the tempo-
ral relationship between the acts; the defendant is punished both for possessing
and then for transporting the material.256 Both of these situations are thus
distinguishable from Perry and Andrews, in that the initial act (possession)
does not necessarily encompass the later distinct act (sale or transportation).
Larceny, on the other hand, is an initial distinct act which appears to encom-
pass the continuing offense of possession.
The supreme court's recent analysis in State v. Davis2 5 7 gives a hint of the
likely resolution of the Perry and Andrews conflict.258 In Davis, defendant
was indicted for receiving stolen property in violation of G.S. 14-71,259 but
was convicted of possession of stolen property in violaton of G.S. 14-71.1.26
0
The defendant argued that since he was convicted of an offense with which he
was not charged, there was prejudicial error requiring his conviction be over-
turned.261 The court of appeals disagreed, determining that possession of sto-
len goods was a lesser included offense of receiving stolen property, and
therefore there was no error in the conviction.262 The supreme court found on
appeal that possession of stolen property was not a lesser included offense of
receiving stolen property, and arrested judgment.
263
The Davis opinion, relied on heavily by the court of appeals in An-
drews,264 determined that:
[t]he element of possession is different from, and not included in, the
element of receiving, and vice versa. To convict a defendant under
G.S. 14-71.1 the state must prove among other things that the de-
fendant possessed rather than received, stolen goods. To convict
under G.S. 14-71 the state must prove that defendant received, rather
than possessed, stolen goods. . . .Although at first glance possess-
ion may seem to be a component of receiving, it is really a separate
253. This analysis, however, ignores the possibility of constructive possession.
254. State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. at 203, 195 S.E.2d at 489.
255. Albrech v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1926) (liquor); State v. Chavis, 232 N.C. 83, 59
S.E.2d 348 (1950) (liquor); State v. Meschoures, 214 N.C. 321, 199 S.E.2d 92 (1938) (liquor).
256. See, e.g., Albrech v. United States, 273 U.S. at 11 ("There is nothing in the Constitution
which prevents Congress from punishing separately each step leading to the consummation of a
transaction which it has the power to prohibit and punishing also the completed transaction").
257. 302 N.C. 370, 275 S.E.2d 491 (1981). For further discussion of Davis, see text accompa-
nying note 447 infra.
258. In each case, defendant has an appeal of right since there was a dissent in the court of
appeals decision. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30(2) (1981).
259. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-71 (1981).
260. Id. § 14-71.1.
261. State v. Davis, 302 N.C. 370, 372, 275 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1981).
262. 48 N.C. App. 386, 269 S.E.2d 242 (1980).
263. 302 N.C. 370, 275 S.E.2d 491 (1981).
264. 52 N.C. App. at 33-36, 277 S.E.2d at 863-64.
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and distinct act .... [T]he unlawful receipt of stolen property is a
single, specific act occurring at a specific time; possession, however, is
a continuing offense beginning at the time of receipt and continuing
until divestment.
265
Thus, although the court viewed possession as "a continuing offense beginning
at the time of receipt, ' '266 it refused to find that possession was subsumed
within the elements of receipt.267 Without elaboration, the court found that
"the legislature intended possession and receiving to be distinct, separate
crimes of equal degree rather than the former to be a lesser included offense of
the latter. '
268
Even if the court, contrary to its analysis in Davis, concludes that posses-
sion of stolen goods and larceny constituted the "same offense," the court
would still have to decide whether the legislature nevertheless intended to
punish each separately. This legislative intent should be "clear and unmistak-
able";269 the proliferation of statutory offenses often added in piecemeal fash-
ion by amendment270 requires that multiple punishment not be imposed
inadvertently as a result of the unforeseen overlap of statutory definitions.
Thus, the court must determine whether the legislature intended to effect an
important policy interest in enhancing the punishment of a particular combi-
nation of offenses. 271 To resolve the issue presented in Perry and Andrews, the
court must determine the purpose behind the enactment of G.S. 14-7 1.1. Was
the statute promulgated to further the punishment of one who steals and con-
tinues to possess the stolen goods, or was it enacted to provide an alternative
source of punishment if the state could not prove the larceny, but could prove
possession?
Both the Perry and Andrews courts found legislative intent supportive of
their conflicting interpretations of the scope of G.S. 14-71.1 and G.S. 14-72.
The Perry court found that both statutes proscribed punishments for the
"same offense."272 The court noted that when the General Assembly enacted
265. 302 N.C. at 373-74, 275 S.E.2d at 494.
266. Id. at 374, 275 S.E.2d at 494 (emphasis added).
267. Although receiving stolen goods is not a lesser included offense of larceny, see, e.g., State
v. Burnette, 22 N.C. App. 29, 205 S.E.2d 357 (1974), and possession of stolen goods is not a lesser
included offense of receiving stolen goods, State v. Davis, 302 N.C. 390, 275 S.E.2d 491 (1981),
these decisions do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that possession is therefore not a lesser
included offense of larceny. Statutory elements that are not common to larceny and receipt, and
to receipt and possession, may still be common elements of larceny and possession. For example,
if larceny requires proof of elements ABC, receipt requires proof of elements CDE and possession
requires proof of elements BC, then possession will be a lesser included offense of larceny. But if
larceny requires elements ABC, receipt requires elements CDE and possession requires elements
BCF, then none of the offenses is a lesser included offense of any of the others.
268. 302 N.C. at 374, 275 S.E.2d at 494.
269. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 791.
270. G.S. 14-71.1 was enacted in 1977. Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 978, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws
1300 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-71.1 (1981)). G.S. 14-72 can be traced to Law of Mar. 13,
1895, ch. 285, 1895 N.C. Sess. Laws 365 (codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72 (1981)).
271. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 594-97 (1961) (reasons offered to justify
separate punishment of conspiracy and the underlying substantive offense); lannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. at 778.
272. 52 N.C. App. at 54, 278 S.E.2d at 278.
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G.S. 14-71.1,273 creating the offense of felony possession of stolen goods, it
also amended G.S. 14-72(a) 274 to create the offense of misdemeanor possession
of stolen goods. The court determined that the purpose of these enactments
was "to provide protection for society in those incidents where the State does
not have sufficient evidence to prove who committed the larceny, or the ele-
ments of receiving." 275 Thus, the court viewed G.S. 14-71.1 as a measure to
shore up a deficiency in the penal statutes, 276 creating "for the State a position
to which to recede when it cannot establish the elements of. . . larceny but
can effect proof of possession of stolen goods."277 Rather than segmenting the
single act into two distinct statutory violations, the court reasoned that if en-
hanced punishment was the purpose of the legislation, this purpose "could be
achieved by the far simpler expedient of merely augmenting the penalty for
the larceny itself."
278
In contrast, the Andrews court determined:
The legislature's intent that possession of stolen property be a distinct
crime and not a lesser included offense of larceny is found in the
language of the statute itself. N.C.G.S. 14-71.1 contains the follow-
ing: "[Alny person [who possesses stolen property] . . . may be in-
dicted and convicted, whether the felon stealing [such property]...
shall or shall not have been previously convicted . . ." . . . It is
clearly the intent of the legislature to allow the state to convict and
punish a defendant for both larceny and the felonious possession of
the property so stolen.279
The court also noted that "[t]he punishment for both offenses is the same,"
280
leading to the belief that "the legislature created a separate crime of equal
degree with larceny when it passed N.C.G.S. 14-71.1. ' '281 Furthermore, the
court placed much reliance on the language of Albernaz v. United States,282
that "[w]here Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punish-
273. Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 978, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1300 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-71.1 (1981)).
274. Id. § 2 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72 (1981)).
275. 52 N.C. App. at 54, 278 S.E.2d at 278 (quoting State v. Kelly, 39 N.C. App. 246, 248,249
S.E.2d 832, 833 (1978)).
276. See, e.g., State v. Burnette, 22 N.C. App. 29, 205 S.E.2d 357 (1974) (failure to present
evidence of receipt of stolen property possessed by defendant caused reversal of conviction under
G.S. 14-7 1; court noted that General Assembly has not provided that possession of stolen goods is
a crime).
277. 52 N.C. App. at 54, 278 S.E.2d at 278.
278. Id.
279. 52 N.C. App. at 36, 277 S.E.2d at 864 (emphasis in original).
280. Id.
281. Id. The fact that both statutes provide for equal punishment seems to preclude a finding
that one is a lesser included offense of the other. See, e.g., Annot., I1 A.L.R. Fed. 173, 178 (1972)
(under Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c), to be a "necessarily included" offense, the "claimed lesser offense
[must have] a lighter penalty attached to it than does the charged offense"). Nevertheless, for
double jeopardy purposes, if the offenses can be deemed the "same offense," under the Block-
burger test, similarity of penalties should not bar the double jeopardy claim.
282. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
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ment, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution. ' 283
The resolution of the issue of legislative intent is problematic. Due to the
lack of any formal legislative history in North Carolina, the court must con-
strue legislative intent from the language of the statute itself and from the
circumstances leading to its adoption. On their face, neither statute evidences
a clear and unambiguous intent to provide enhanced punishment. As Davis
demonstrates, however, the court is likely to infer legislative intent to impose
cumulative punishments from the most minimal evidence. When the North
Carolina Supreme Court sets sail upon the "Sargasso Sea" 284 of double jeop-
ardy law, one can expect that, despite the serious problems presented, the
court knows exactly where its destination lies.
285
Postscript
As this Survey went to press, the North Carolina Supreme Court resolved
the issues presented in Perry.286 The court, in an opinion by Justice Meyer,
affirmed the court of appeals' remand of resentencing upon a verdict of guilty
of misdemeanor larceny and affirmed, on different grounds, the vacating and
dismissal of the conviction for stolen property.287 The court claimed to reach
its result without deciding the double jeopardy issue.288 Rather, the court fo-
cused on the presumed intent of the legislature in enacting the statutory of-
fense of possession. In interpreting this legislative intent, the court reasoned
"first, that larceny and possession of the property stolen in the larceny are
separate and distinct offenses and therefore double jeopardy considerations do
not prohibit punishment of the same person for both offenses; and second, that
although it could have done so, the legislature, by creation of the statutory
offense of possession of stolen property, did not intend to punish an individual
for both offenses. ''2
89
283. 52 N.C. App. at 37, 277 S.E.2d at 864 (quoting Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333,
344 (1981)).
284. Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. at 343.
285. In other double jeopardy cases, both the supreme court and the court of appeals reaf-
firmed the general rule that if an order of mistrial is declared for a "manifest necessity," a subse-
quent prosecution on the same offense does not place the defendant in double jeopardy. In State
v. Simpson, 303 N.C. 439, 279 S.E.2d 542 (1981), and State v. Williams, 51 N.C. App. 613, 277
S.E.2d 546 (1981), both courts found that although the defendants had been subjected to previous
prosecutions, in neither case were the circumstances so overbearing that a further retrial could be
prohibited. Neither case demonstrated oppressive nor harassing practices by the state; therefore,
"the public's interest in a final adjudication of guilt or innocence outweigh[ed] the defendant's
right to be free from further judicial scrutiny after a mistrial is declared." 303 N.C. at 446, 279
S.E.2d at 547.
286. 305 N.C. 225, 287 S.E.2d 810 (1982). 4ndrews, argued before the court on November 9,
1981, had not been resolved by this time.
287. 305 N.C. at 237, 287 S.E.2d at 817. Though disclaiming to deal with the double jeopardy
issue, the court's discussion of the nature of the two offenses followed traditional double jeopardy
analysis by employing the Blockburger test. See 305 N.C. at 232, 287 S.E.2d at 814; see also text
accompanying notes 188-96 supra. Justice Carlton found that "[a]ny discussion about double
jeopardy is wholly unnecessary to the disposition of this case and may come back to haunt this
Court in the future." 305 N.C. at 237, 287 S.E.2d at 817 (Carlton, J., concurring).
288. 305 N.C. at 231, 287 S.E.2d at 814.
289. See text accompanying notes 201-09 supra.
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In finding that the offenses were separate and distinct, the court applied a
Blockburger-type test as elucidated in State v. Cameron.290 The court found
that "proof of asportation is required for the larceny charge but not for the
possession charge, while proof of possession after the larceny is complete is
required for the possession charge but not for the larceny charge." 29' Thus,
"each crime 'requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not.' -292 Consequently, the Blockburger test demonstrated a legislative intent
that larceny and possession of the property stolen were to be separate and
distinct offenses.
293
In the second phase of its inquiry, the court looked to the purpose of the
possession statute to discern the scope of punishment that the legislature in-
tended when one criminal act encompassed both offenses. The court deter-
mined that the statutory crime of possession of stolen property was an effort
"to plug a loophole" in the common-law offense of larceny.294 Finding the
rationale of State v. Kely 2 95 persuasive, the court reasoned that the possession
statute was directed to those situations in which "one was found in possession
of stolen goods and the State was unable to prove either the larceny or receiv-
ing.",296 Consequently, the court was obligated to find that "though a defend-
ant may be indicted and tried on charges of larceny, receiving and possession
of the same property, he may be convicted of only one of those offenses."
297
State v. Perry is an unexpected, but welcome, resolution of this trouble-
some issue. As expected,298 the court found larceny and possession of the sto-
len property to constitute separate and distinct offenses. One may quarrel with
this finding, for the court did not persuasively refute the claim that possession
is a continuing offense subsumed within the act of larceny.299 Furthermore, if
recent United States Supreme Court opinions are scrutinized, a finding that
larceny and possession constitute separate and distinct offenses might have led
to the automatic inference that multiple punishment was intended.3°° By go-
290. 305 N.C. at 231-32, 287 S.E.2d at 814.
291. Id. at 230-31, 287 S.E.2d at 815.
292. Id. at 234, 287 S.E.2d at 815 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 248 U.S. 299, 304
(1932)).
293. Justice Carlton, who concurred in the result only, "disapproved of this portion of the
opinion and considered it 'dictum."' 305 N.C. at 237, 287 S.E.2d at 817 (Carlton, J., concurring).
294. Id. at 234-35, 287 S.E.2d at 816.
295. 39 N.C. App. 246, 249 S.E.2d 832 (1978); see also text accompanying notes 275-78 supra.
296. 305 N.C. at 235-36, 287 S.E.2d at 816-17.
297. Id. at 236-37, 287 S.E.2d at 817.
298. See text accompanying notes 257-68 supra.
299. In distinguishing the elements of proof required for each offense, the court stated that
"proof of possession after the larceny is complete is required for the possession charge but not for
the larceny charge." 305 N.C. at 234, 287 S.E.2d at 815 (emphasis added). Thus, the court did not
deal with the possible identity of elements while the larceny is in progress. The court could not
refute the "assert[ion ofl the Court of Appeals, [that] it may be impossible to take and carry away
goods without possessing them." Id. at 235, 287 S.E.2d at 816. From the court's disposition of the
case, however, the resolution of this issue may be unnecessary. It seems clear that the court is
segmenting the single criminal act into two separate offenses; the offense of possession begins only
after the larceny has been completed.
300. See Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. at 337, 344; Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. at
691-92; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 166. These cases appear to proceed on the assumption that if
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ing beyond the "separate and distinct offense" analysis and surveying the in-
tent and purposes of the legislative enactment, the court has correctly focused
on the ultimate concern of the double jeopardy clause: "assuring that the
court does not exceed its legislative authorization" 30I in imposing punishment.
.D Right to Speedy Trial
1. Preindictment Delay
In State v. Salem30 2 the North Carolina Court of Appeals retreated from
the dual burden test previously required for sustaining a fifth amendment due
process claim on the grounds of unreasonable preindictment delay.303 The
dual burden test, which first arose in this jurisdiction in the context of the sixth
amendment speedy trial guarantee in State v. Johnson3°4 and which was sub-
sequently applied by the United States Supreme Court in the fifth amendment
preindictment context in United States v. Marion,305 requires that a defendant
prove both (1) intentional and unnecessary delay caused for the convenience
or advantage of the State, and (2) prejudice to the defendant as a result of the
delay.306 The court in Salem did not totally abandon this test, but focused
instead upon a balancing approach in which the reasonableness of the delay is
weighed against the prejudice to the accused.
307
Defendant in Salem was convicted on a charge stemming from a sale of
narcotics which occurred in December 1977.308 An indictment was issued in
April, 1978, but that indictment was dismissed by judicial order over a year
later.309 A second indictment was issued in August, 1979, after defendant had
been arrested in May of the same year.310 The trial court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss for undue preindictment delay, considering only the period
of time between the event and the issuance of the original indictment.31'
The court of appeals held that the proper time interval for consideration
on the preindictment delay motion was the period between the event and the
arrest, a period of almost a year and a half.3 12 The court reasoned that, upon
dismissal, the original indictment became null and void and could not, there-
two offenses are separate and distinct under the Blockburger analysis, cumulative punishment was
the intended aim of the legislature if no contrary intent is indicated. See text accompanying notes
225-31 supra.
301. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 165; see note 211 supra.
302. 50 N.C. App. 419, 274 S.E.2d 501, cert. denied, 302 N.C. 401, 279 S.E.2d 355 (1981).
303. The dual burden approach was applied to fifth amendment claims by the court of appeals
just a year ago in State v. Davis, 46 N.C. App. 778, 266 S.E.2d 20 (1980), cert. denied, 301 N.C. 97,
273 S.E.2d 456 (1981).
304. 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969).
305. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
306. Id. at 324; State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969) (opinion of Justice
Sharp). This text was reiterated in State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976).
307. 50 N.C. App. at 426, 274 S.E.2d at 506.
308. Id. at 422, 274 S.E.2d at 503-04.






fore, establish the date defendant was "accused" for purposes of a preindict-
ment delay motion. The court next applied its new balancing approach and
found that defendant had not shown that the delay was either brought about
by the State intentionally to harass him or to handicap his defense, and that he
had not demonstrated significant prejudice resulting from the delay.
313
Surprisingly, the court failed to mention its year old decision in State v.
Davis,3 14 which held that the dual burden requirement was the appropriate
test in any preindictment delay case. 315 Nevertheless, the decision of the court
in Salem would have been the same under either approach. Consequently, it
will be interesting to see whether the balancing approach will supplant the
dual burden test in the absence of an express rejection by the North Carolina
courts of either the test itself or the cases that espoused it.
The conflicting approaches discussed in Salem were also considered by
the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. McCoy.3 16 The court first paid
lip service to the dual burden approach,3 1 7 but then backed away from it in
favor of the balancing test, citing State v. Dietz3 18 for its recognition that a
majority of the courts weigh "the reasonableness of the delay against the
prejudice to the accused.
'3 19
More importantly, the McCoy court recognized a distinction between a
fifth and a sixth amendment speedy trial claim.320 After affirming the trial
court's decision that defendant had been denied neither his statutory nor his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, the court stated that it need not determine
whether sixth amendment speedy trial standards or fifth amendment due pro-
cess standards apply to any period of delay between the issuance of an arrest
warrant and defendant's actual arrest when both events precede indictment,
because this defendant could not prevail under either standard.321 Neverthe-
less, the court saw fit to distinguish the two standards: "[because] the constitu-
313. Id. at 425-28, 274 S.E.2d at 505-07. The court saw the state's legitimate need to protect
the existence of an ongoing undercover operation as a reasonable justification for at least a portion
of the delay. It also pointed to the procurement of the earlier indictment as evidence of lack of
harassment intentions on the part of the state. Finally, it asserted that the delay was the fault of
the defendant himself, since he was aware the S.B.I. agents were looking for him. As to defend-
ant's claim of prejudice, the court held that general averments of impaired memory and lost wit-
nesses could not establish prejudice without a demonstration that evidence lost as a result of the
delay would have been significant or helpful to the defense of the case.
314. 46 N.C. App. 778, 266 S.E.2d 20 (1980), cert. denied, 301 N.C. 97, 273 S.E.2d 456 (1981).
315. Id. For an analysis of State v. Davis, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1980-Criminal Procedure, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1013, 1157 (1981).
316. 303 N.C. 1, 277 S.E.2d 515 (1981).
317. Id. at 7-8, 277 S.E.2d at 522.
318. 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976).
319. 303 N.C. at 8,277 SXE.2d at 522 (citing State v. Dietr, 289 N.C. at 491,223 S.E.2d at 359).
The court in McCoy, like the court in Salem, failed to reject expressly the dual burden test.
320. In McCoy the warrant for defendant's arrest was not served upon him until almost four
months after its issuance, during which time he had been hospitalized for treatment of wounds
received during perpetration of the alleged murder for which he was charged. 303 N.C. at 6, 277
S.E.2d at 521. The court was considering whether or not the "constitutional speedy trial clock
begins to run at the time any formal complaint is issued against defendant notwithstanding that no
indictment has been issued nor an arrest made," a conclusion which other state courts had often
reached. Id. at 10, 277 S.E.2d at 524.
321. The court expressed disapproval with the state's failure to serve the arrest warrant for the
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tional speedy trial mandate is designed for protection of other interests in
addition to ensuring a fair trial for defendant, its violation may occur even in
the absence of actual prejudice to the defense of the case."' 322 Given this dis-
tinction, the court may be unwilling to apply either the dual burden or balanc-
ing tests in a future case involving a sixth amendment speedy trial claim.
In leaving open the question of which standard applies to the interval
between the issuance of an arrest warrant and actual arrest, the supreme court
failed to provide guidance for the criminal lawyer confronted with a case in
which the interval involves a significant period of time. Justice Exum, how-
ever, in the opinion for the court, did make a good argument for application of
the constitutional speedy trial standards in such instances,32 though he was
careful to point out that the court reserved judgement on the issue. If the
applicable standard should make a difference in a future case, it is likely that
the argument advanced in McCoy would win out; but until that time, the care-
ful attorney must diligently pursue both fifth and sixth amendment remedies
in cases involving a delay between issuance of an arrest warrant and actual
arrest.
2. Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial
Several recent cases324 left no doubt that the North Carolina Court of
Appeals would employ the four factor balancing test, first announced in
Barker v. Wingo,325 as the sole standard for determining whether a defend-
ant's constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. In these cases the
court continued its repudiation of State v. McKoy,326 in which the North Car-
olina Supreme Court held that a twenty-two month delay between arrest and
trial was an impermissible delay in violation of the sixth amendment in the
absence of reasonable explanation from the prosecution.327 The initial retreat
began in the 1979 case of State v. Branch,328 in which the court of appeals held
that a twenty-three month delay between arrest and trial was not per se a
violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial.
329
In State v. Shelton 330 140 days passed between defendant's indictment on
four month period, but did not find the delay to have been prejudicial because of the circum-
stances of the case. Id. at 13 n.3, 277 S.E.2d at 526 n.3.
322. Id. at 8, 277 S.E.2d at 522.
323. Id. at 7-10, 277 S.E.2d at 522-24. Justice Carlton indicated in a concurring opinion,
which was joined by three other justices, that he considered the extensive discussion of the ques-
tion whether the sixth amendment right to speedy trial attaches at the time the arrest warrant is
issued to be pure dictum.
324. See State v. Shelton, 53 N.C. App. 632, 281 S.E.2d 684 (1981); State v. Hughes, 53 N.C.
App. 117, 282 S.E.2d 504 (1981); State v. Moore, 51 N.C. App. 26, 275 S.E.2d 257 (1981); State v.
Watson, 51 N.C. App. 369, 276 S.E.2d 732 (1981).
325. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
326. 294 N.C. 134, 240 S.E.2d 383 (1978).
327. Id. The McKoy decision was surprising because little prejudice to defendant was shown.
328. 41 N.C. App. 80, 254 S.E.2d 255, appeal dismissed, 297 N.C. App. 612, 257 S.E.2d 220
(1979) (lack of a substantial constitutional question).
329. Id.
330. 53 N.C. App. 632, 281 S.E.2d 684 (1981).
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charges of armed robbery and his subsequent trial.331 In holding the delay
insufficient to establish prejudice by itself, the court of appeals cited the 1980
case of State v. Rartman332 for the proposition that 319 days, standing alone,
is not sufficient time to constitute unreasonable and prejudicial delay.33 3 It is
now apparent that no period of time, standing alone, will automatically consti-
tute a violation of a defendant's right to a speedy trial, but that the length of
the delay will be but one factor in the determination.
The other three factors that will be weighed in making the determination
whether defendant's speedy trial right has been violated include the reason for
the delay, assertion of the right by the defendant and actual prejudice to the
defendant. 334 The test is a tough one, as recent decisions demonstrated,
335
and it is now apparent that a delayed trial which meets the time limits pre-
scribed in North Carolina's speedy trial act 336 will not, absent extraordinary
circumstances, be held to be a denial of the sixth amendment right. Courts
will be careful not to combine the two issues,337 because it is clear the legisla-
ture intended the constitutional test to stand alongside the statutory test.
338
Nevertheless, decisions finding delays of five years,339 twenty-three months,
340
319 days341 and fourteen months342 insufficient to show a sixth amendment
violation point to the conclusion that the careful separation of the statutory
test and constitutional test is of little substantive value.
34 3
3. Speedy Trial Act
The North Carolina Speedy Trial Act 344 was both amended by the Gen-
eral Assembly345 and criticized by practitioners346 during the year. The act
was also the basis for many criminal appeals, almost all of which were unsuc-
331. Id. at 636, 281 S.E.2d at 689.
332. 49 N.C. App. 83, 270 S.E.2d 609 (1980).
333. 53 N.C. App. at 638, 281 S.E.2d at 689.
334. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); State v. Branch, 41 N.C. App. 80, 254 S.E.2d 255
(1979).
335. See State v. Shelton, 53 N.C. App. 632, 281 S.E.2d 684 (1981); State v. Hughes, 53 N.C.
App. 117, 282 S.E.2d 504 (1981); State v. Moore, 51 N.C. App. 26, 275 S.E.2d 257 (1981); State v.
Watson, 51 N.C. App. 369, 276 S.E.2d 732 (1981).
336. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-701, -702 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
337. See, e.g., State v. Shelton, 53 N.C. App. 632, 281 S.E.2d 684 (1981). The court of appeals
methodically worked through the constitutional issue and then applied the statutory standards.
338. There is a separate section included in the Act that provides, "No provision of this Article
shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of a speedy trial as required by the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-704 (1978).
339. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
340. State v. Branch, 41 N.C. App. 80, 254 S.E.2d 255 (1979).
341. State v. Hartman, 49 N.C. App. 83, 270 S.E.2d 609 (1980).
342. State v. Hughes, 53 N.C. App. 117, 282 S.E.2d 504 (1981).
343. This statement is not intended as a criticism of the court's approach. Because the legisla-
ture so carefully separated the two speedy trial protections they must be treated as distinct entities.
344. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-701 to -703 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
345. Speedy Trial Act Amendments of 1981, ch. 626, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 913
(amending N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-701 to -703).
346. See Price, The North Carolina Speedy Trial Act, .17 Wake Forest L. Rev. 173 (1981).
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cessful, 347 and was interpreted in a variety of contexts by both the supreme
court and the court of appeals.348 The attention that the act has received sug-
gests that it may not be the answer to the problem to which it is addressed.
3 49
The most important of the statutory amendments amounted to a legisla-
tive admission that the act has not worked as well as had been hoped. The
original act set October 1, 1981 as the effective date of the 90-day limit,350 but
an amendment351 left the limit at 120 days until October 1, 1983-a full 2-year
extension. Another amendment made the sanctions contained in the act inap-
plicable at the district court level until October 1, 1983.352 Both of these
amendments, which were accompanied by several minor qualifications and
changes, 353 indicate the hope of the legislature that the act will eventually
prove successful, but the changes fall far short of answering criticism that the
statute has created a "technical fiasco." 354 The legislature must be of the opin-
ion that the small reduction in the waiting time before trial over the past sev-
eral years,355 which has come at the expense of numerous dismissals for
noncompliance with the Act,356 will eventually accelerate to the point where
the statute is serving its purpose well.
In State v. Young 357 and State v. Charles358 the courts considered the
dates for the beginning of the 120-day period, concluding that the period runs
from the occurrence of the last of the enumerated events in the statute-arrest,
service of criminal process, waiver of indictment, or indictment.359 In Young
the supreme court rejected defendant's argument that the lapse of more than
120 days between arrest and trial violated the "spirit" of the statute.360 Like-
wise, in Charles the court of appeals strictly applied the "whichever occurs
last" clause.36 1 These decisions make it clear that, once a defendant has been
indicted, the statute no longer pertains to the period which passed subsequent
to arrest but prior to indictment.
347. Only one of the many reported decisions in the area concerned a successful appeal on
statutory speedy trial grounds. See State v. Vaughan, 51 N.C. App. 408, 276 S.E.2d 518 (1981).
The plea has met with greater success at the trial level. See Price, supra note 346, at 215.
348. The majority of the interpretations regarded excludible periods of time under the statute
to bring the time period back within the prescribed limit. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-703 (1978 &
Cum. Supp. 1981); State v. Vaughan, 51 N.C. App. 408, 276 S.E.2d 518 (1981).
349. The desire for prompt disposition of criminal cases is not justification for a statute that
"tends to provide a technical defense to criminal responsibility for those criminal defendants who
are capable of manipulating the system." Price, supra note 346, at 215.
350. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-701(al)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
351. Speedy Trial Act Amendments of 1981, ch. 626, § 10, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 913,
914.
.352. Id. §§4-12, 11-12.
353. Id. §§ 1-9.
354. Price, supra note 346, at 217.
355. Id. at 215.
356. Id.
357. 302 N.C. 385, 275 S.E.2d 429 (1981).
358. 53 N.C. App. 567, 281 S.E.2d 438 (1981).
359. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-701 (al)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
360. 302 N.C. at 388, 275 S.E.2d at 432.
361. 53 N.C. App. at 571, 281 S.E.2d at 441 (1981).
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The date of indictment for the purpose of the running of the time period
is often not clear itself, as demonstrated in State v. Moore.362 In Moore an
indictment was issued against defendant on August 27, 1979.363 A new indict-
ment was obtained on January 7, 1980.364 On February 11, 1980, defendant's
motion for dismissal pursuant to the speedy trial act was allowed without
prejudice. 365 Defendant was subsequently recharged and convicted on the
same charge.366 Defendant appealed on the ground that the court erred in
allowing his motion to dismiss without rather than with prejudice.367 But the
court of appeals failed to reach that question. The court held that, pursuant to
G.S. 15A-646, 368 the indictment of January 7 superseded the indictment of
August 27, preventing the expiration of the 120-day limit between indictment
and trial.369 Thus, the court concluded that the motion should not have been
granted in the first instance.
370
The decision of the court of appeals in Moore leaves a loophole available
to the State, because the sanctions of the Act can be avoided by obtaining new
indictments which supersede ones previously issued.371 The decision runs
contrary to G.S. 15A-701(al)(3), which provides:
When a charge is dismissed. . . , and the defendant is afterwards
charged with the same offense or an offense based on the same act or
transaction. . . then [the trial shall begin] within 120 days from the
date the defendant was arrested, served with criminal process,
waived an indictment, or was indicted, whichever occurs last, for the
original charge.
372
The court did not even mention this section of the Act, apparently finding that
362. 51 N.C. App. 26, 275 S.E.2d 257 (1981).





368. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-646 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The statute, in pertinent part, provides:
If at any time before entry of a plea of guilty to an indictment or information, or com-
mencement of a trial thereof, another indictment or information is filed in the same court
charging the defendant with an offense charged or attempted to be charged in the first
instrument, the first one is, with respect to the offense, superceded by the second and,
upon the defendant's arraignment upon the second indictment or information, the count
of the first instrument charging the offense must be dismissed by the superior court
judge.
369. 51 N.C. App. at 28, 275 S.E.2d at 259-60.
370. The court pointed out that in this case, the State had "valid reason to obtain a new
indictment," and that the obtaining of the new indictment was both appropriate and in good faith.
Id. at 28, 275 S.E.2d at 260.
371. The court recognized the opportunity the State has to defeat the statutory speedy trial
limitations by obtaining new indictments, but stated that concern regarding that possibility is "ap-
propriately addressed to the General Assembly.' Id.
As to the question of whether the charges should have been dismissed with or without
prejudice, a question purposely not resolved, the court indicated that although the decision on that
issue is in the discretion of the trial judge, failure to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of
law indicating consideration of each factor involved would amount to an abuse of that discretion.
Id.
372. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-701(al)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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a superseding indictment is different from a dismissed charge followed by
recharge. 373 Nevertheless, further development in this area is likely, especially
if reindictment becomes a widespread prosecutorial tactic.
In State v. Fearing374 the North Carolina Supreme Court settled an area
of confusion which had been presented by the existence of the provision appli-
cable to counties with limited court sessions.375 The State argued G.S. 15A-
702 exempted such counties from the statute.37.6 Earlier in the year, in State v.
Berry,377 a court of appeals panel had held that the 120-day requirement
"does not apply 378 to trials in counties with limited court sessions, 379 lending
support to the State's argument. Justice Copeland, writing the opinion of the
court, rejected this argument, stating that G.S. 15A-702 "only addresses the
situation where a defendant elects to move for aprompt trial after the applica-
ble time period of G.S. 15A-701 has expired due to the limited terms of court
in the county of venue .... "380 The Act covers counties with limited court
sessions, but "justifiable delay caused by a county's number of court sessions is
a period which may be excluded from the required timetable of G.S. 15A-
701."381
In so holding, the supreme court took the position stated by Judge Wells
for another court of appeals panel in State v. Vaughan:382 "No county is ex-
empt from the speedy trial act." 383 The burden is on the State, according to
the court in Vaughan, to show not just that a limited number of terms of court
are available, but that due to such limited number of terms of court, the time
limitation of the statute could not reasonably be met.3s4 Fearing and Vaughan
settle the limited court session dilemma in favor of the defendant, and serve as
373. This distinction is hard to accept. Perhaps the court did not consider the section due to
the fact that it was not raised and argued by defendant.
In State v. Walden, 53 N.C. App. 196, 280 S.E.2d 505 (1981), the court of appeals did con-
sider the applicability of this section in another context. In Walden the fact that two indictments
contained different dates of alleged child abuse was enough to justify the court in holding that the
two charges stemmed from different events. Id. at 197-98, 280 S.E.2d at 507. The court noted that
had this not been the case the statutory speedy trial clock would have run from the date of the first
indictment.
374. 304 N.C. 499, 284 S.E.2d 479 (1981).
375. The provision appears first at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-701(b)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1981) as part
of the excludible time period section. It next appears at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-702 (1978) m a
section which expressly deals with such counties.
376. 304 N.C. at 505, 284 S.E.2d at 484.
377. 51 N.C. App. 97, 275 S.E.2d 269 (1981).
378. Id. at 99, 275 S.E.2d at 271.
379. InBerry the court of appeals panel found that McDowell County is such a county. Id. In
State v. Sellars, 52 N.C. App. 380,.278 S.E.2d 907 (1981), the court of appeals held that Chatham
County also falls into that category, 52 N.C. App. at 394, 278 S.E.2d at 918. It appears from the
decisions that any county which does not continually have regular sessions of criminal superior
court could qualify for some time exclusion under the Act.
380. 304 N.C. at 505, 284 S.E.2d at 484.
381. Id.
382. 51 N.C. App. 408, 276 S.E.2d 518, cert. dismissed, 303 N.C. 319, 281 S.E.2d 658 (1981).
383. 51 N.C. App. at 412, 276 S.E.2d at 520.
384. The trial court had found that Franklin County was a county with limited court sessions
and that defendant's speedy trial motion to dismiss should therefore be denied. Id.
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a warning to district attorneys in affected counties that they must do more than
just plead limited sessions in order for time to be excluded under the statute.
In two other cases385 decided during the year, the North Carolina
Supreme Court interpreted portions of the speedy trial act. In State v. Har-
ren386 the court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Branch, held that the
statutory exclusion of time for mental examinations from the 120-day running
period of the Act includes the period of time between the date of defendant's
return to jail from the hospital and the date the results of the examination
become available to the parties. 387 Noting that the rationale for the exclusion
itself applies equally to the time period in question, the Chief Justice ex-
plained: "The State could not properly bring defendant to trial during this
time period, for to do so would. . . deprive him of the benefit of the mental
examination. s388 This interpretation was applied in a series of subsequent
cases,389 and, in fact, inspired a statutory amendment.
390
In State v. Oliver39 1 defendant argued that because calendaring of mo-
tions392 is controlled by the state, the only time that should be excludable from
speedy trial computation due to such motions is the time between the filing of
the motion and the next session of court wherein the motion could be
heard.393 In rejecting this conclusion, Justice Exum, in his opinion for the
court, held that the time between the filing of the motion and its disposition is
properly excluded,394 subject to two limitations: the motion must be "heard
within a reasonable time after it is filed," 395 and the State must not "delay the
hearing for the purpose of thwarting the speedy trial statute." 396 Although no
indication of what constitutes a reasonable time in this context appears in the
statute or the court's opinion, it can be implied from Oliver that any pur-
poseful delay on the part of the State in the disposition of pretrial motions will
not be covered by any of the enumerated exclusions.
39 7
385. State v. Harren, 302 N.C. 142, 273 S.E.2d 694 (1981); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274
S.E.2d 183 (1981).
386. 302 N.C. 142, 273 S.E.2d 694 (1981).
387. Id. at 145-46, 273 S.E.2d at 697.
388. Id.
389. State v. McCoy, 303 N.C. 178, 277 S.E.2d 515 (1981); State v. Letterbough, 53 N.C. App.
693, 281 S.E.2d 749 (1981); State v. Shelton, 53 N.C. App. 632, 281 S.E.2d 684 (1981).
390. Speedy Trial Act Amendments of 1981, ch. 626, § 9, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 913,
914 (amending N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-701(b)(1) (1978)).
391. 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183. (1981).






397. Other statutory exclusions were considered in a number of cases decided during the year.
See State v. Fearing, 304 N.C. 499, 284 S.E.2d 479 (1981) (periods of delay from other proceedings
concerning defendant and special jury venire); State v. Letterlough, 53 N.C. App. 693, 281 S.E.2d
749 (1981) (preparation of new counsel); State v. Shelton, 53 N.C. App. 632, 281 S.E.2d 684 (1981)
(codefendant joinder); State v. Melton, 52 N.C. App. 305,,278 S.E.2d 309 (1981) (essential witness
availability and continuance); State v. Daniels, 51 N.C. App. 294, 276 S.E.2d 738 (1981) (continu-
ance in interest of defendant).
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E. Right to Counsel
1. Standard of Competence
In State v. Misenheimer398 the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized
that the test of effective assistance of counsel has been expressed in at least two
ways. 3 9 9 State courts4°° often ask whether defense counsel's performance was
so ineffective that the trial was a "farce" or a "mockery of justice";40' federal
courts have developed a higher standard of perfdrmance, 402 following the sug-
gestion by the Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson403 that counsel's per-
formance should be "within the range of competence demanded of attorney's
in criminal cases."404 The Misenheimer court refused to state definitively the
test to be applied in North Carolina, finding that defendant had failed "to
meet the stringent standard of proof on the question of whether an accused has
been denied constitutionally effective representation. '405
The court intimated that its recent decisions showed a preference for the
McMann standard in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.406
Yet recent decisions by the court of appeals indicate that it has not perceived
the movement, if any, from the "farce and mockery" standard to the McMann
standard. In State v. Hughes40 7 a decision announced on the same day as
Misenheimer, the court of appeals found the "general rule" to be the "farce
and mockery" standard; there was no mention of McMann.408 One month
later, the court of appeals reaffirmed its adherence to the traditional standard,
without mention of the discussion in Misenhemer.409 Clearly, if the supreme
398. 304 N.C. 108, 282 S.E.2d 791 (1981).
399. Cf. State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 295-96, 256 S.E.2d 154, 160 (1979) (noting McMann
and suggesting "that courts look to the ABA standards relating to the defense function as a 'relia-
ble guide for determining the responsibilities of defense counsel ") (quoting Marzullo v. Mary-
land, 561 F.2d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978)); State v. Mathis, 293
N.C. 660, 669, 239 S.E.2d 245, 251 (1977) (whether "attorney's representation is so lacking that
trial has become a farce and a mockery ofjustice"); State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 612, 201 S.E.2d
867, 871 (1974); see also State v. Richards, 294 N.C. 474, 498, 242 S.E.2d 844, 859 (1978) (the court
noted that the "farce and mockery" test has been criticized and also noted the "range of compe-
tence" test).
400. See Annot., 2 A.L.R.4th 27 (1980).
401. Id. at 45.
402. Cf. Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (the "Federal Courts of Appeal are in disarray" on the minimum standard of compe-
tence that an attorney must display).
403. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
404. Id. at 771. See generally Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of
Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decosten, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 752
(1980).
405. 304 N.C. at 121, 282 S.E.2d at 800 (quoting State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 613, 201 S.E.2d
867, 871-72 (1974)). InMisenheimer defendant claimed that the trial counsel's failure to renew his
motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence and the decision not to introduce evidence in
defendant's behalf afforded him ineffective assistance of counsel. The court noted that it was the
defendant's own decision not to present evidence; thus, a renewal of the motion to dismiss would
have been "futile." Id. at 120-21, 282 S.E.2d. at 799-800.
406. Id. at 121, 282 S.E.2d at 800.
407. 54 N.C. App. 117, 282 S.E.2d 504 (1981).
408. Id. at 123, 282 S.E.2d at 508.
409. State v. Maher, 64 N.C. App. 639, 284 S.E.2d 351 (1981).
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court is moving to reject the "farce and mockery" standard, this should be
done explicitly. With proper guidance as to which standard to employ, trial
courts would be in a better position to evaluate the performance of defense
counsel.
While the "farce and mockery" test is supported by a large body of case
law, the standard is too imprecise to provide proper guidance: it states but a
conclusion while obscuring the basis upon which that conclusion rests. The
inadequacy of the standard has led Chief Judge Bazelon of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia to state that the "test requires such a mini-
mal level of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the sixth
amendment." 410 This dissatisfaction is mirrored by the frequent use in both
federal411 and state41 2 courts of the McMann "range of competence" test.
Adoption of the McMann test would provide a court with a wide range of
criteria to employ in the evaluating counsel's performance. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit has suggested that the trial court refer not only to
precedent from state and federal courts, but also to "state bar canons, the
American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Defense Function, and in
some instances, expert testimony on the particular conduct at issue. ' 413 In
both Misenheimer 414 and State v. Milano415 the court cited with approval the
determination by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that the ABA
Standards Relating to the Defense Function provide "a reliable guide for de-
termining the responsibilities of defense counsel." 416 Thus, the "range of
competence" test provides the trial court, as well as appellate courts, with the
opportunity to evaluate counsel's competency against objective criteria.417
Adoption of the McMann standard by the North Carolina Supreme Court
would allow state courts to develop a substantive body of law defining the
contours of this fundamental constitutional right.
410. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1973).
411. It appears that all federal circuit courts of appeal except the Second Circuit have adopted
the "range of competence" or "customary skill" test. See, in order of circuit, United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (Ist
Cir. 1978); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561
F.2d 540,543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Akridge v. Hopper, 545 F.2d 457,
459 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 941 (1977); United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 866 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978); United States v. Toney, 527 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978); Cooper
v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974, (1979); Dyer v. Crisp,
613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980). But see Cole v. Quick, 598 F.2d 609
(2d Cir. 1979) (retention of "farce and mockery" standard).
412. Annot., 2 A.L.R.4th 27 (1980) (state court standards for effective representation).
413. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011
(1978); see also Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
414. 304 N.C. 108, 282 S.E.2d 791, 799 (1981).
415. 297 N.C. 485, 495, 256 S.E.2d 154, 160 (1979).
416. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d at 547.
417. But see Note, Criminal Law-Competence, Prejudice and the Right to "Effective" Assist-
ance of Counsel, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 185, 191 (1981) ("a constitutional test based on the Standards'
specific duties would thrust a judge into an active role in the defense of criminal cases").
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2. Indigent's Right to Substitute Counsel
In State v. Hutchins418 the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the
right of an indigent defendant to dismiss court-appointed counsel and have
substitute counsel appointed. Defendant Hutchins was indicted on three
counts of first degree murder in the deaths of two deputy sheriffs and a high-
way patrol officer.419 Defendant presented no evidence at the trial; he was
found guilty of one second degree murder and two first degree murders and
was sentenced to death.
4 20
On appeal defendant contended that the trial court committed prejudicial
error in denying defendant's pretrial motion for removal of court-appointed
counsel and appointment of substitute counsel.421 Defendant's attorney had
also filed a motion asking for removal as defendant's counsel after defendant
had "fired" him.422 The defense attorney's motion requesting his own re-
moval indicated that "since the attorney's initial conference with defendant, he
had met with a 'stiffening personal resistance . . . which soon thereafter in-
volved [sic] into a personal antagonism on the part of defendant' toward the
418. 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981).
419. The deaths were apparently the result of a disagreement between defendant and his
daughter. On the day of the murders, defendant had become angry at his daughter for making a
strong alcoholic punch in preparation for celebrating her graduation from high school, which was
to take place that evening. Id. at 326, 279 S.E.2d at 792. After being beaten by her father, she fled
to a neighbor's house, where she called the Rutherford County Sherifis department. Id. at 327,
279 S.E.2d at 793. Both Deputy Sheriffs who were dispatched to the scene were fatally wounded
by defendant, who fled in his auto armed with a shotgun and rifle. Id. A state trooper, who had
given chase to the defendant, was later found dead near the area where defendant was eventually
captured. Id. at 328, 279 S.E.2d at 794.
420. Id. at 329, 279 S.E.2d at 794.
421. Id. at 334, 279 S.E.2d at 797. Defendant also raised the issue of whether the trial court
has an obligation to inform a defendant of his right to proceedpro se. Id. at 335, 279 S.E.2d at
797. Although recognizing that under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), a criminal de-
fendant has the right to refuse representation and to conduct his own defense, the supreme court
found that this right does not carry with it "a concurrent recognition of the right to be warned of
its existence." 303 N.C. at 338, 279 S.E.2d at 799. The defendant must take the initiative and
make "some form of an affirmative statement of a desire to proceed pro se." Id. (emphasis in
original). Consequently, "[s]tatements of a desire not to be represented by court-appointed coun-
sel do not amount to expressions of an intention to represent oneself." Id. at 339, 279 S.E.2d at
800.
This interpretation of Fare//a is consistent with past decisions by the court, see, e.g., State v.
Branch, 288 N.C. 514, 220 S.E.2d 495, cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907 (1977); State v. Thacker, 301
N.C. 348, 271 S.E.2d 252 (1980), and decisions in other jurisdictions see generally Annot. 98
A.L.R.3d 13, 30-31 (1980). The reluctance to impose a procedural requirement that the defendant
be informed of his right to proceedpro se is characterized by the dissent in Fare/a: "Permitting
every accused person, even the most uneducated and unexperienced, to insist upon conducting his
own defense... can only add to the problems of an already malfunctioning criminal justice sys-
tem." 422 U.S. at 836-37 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
The court in Hutchins also found implicitly that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 (1981), which
mandates the procedure that the trial judge is to follow when the defendant elects to represent
himself, does not embody a requirement that the defendant be informed of this right. 303 N.C. at
339-40, 279 S.E.2d at 800. Rather, the court viewed G.S. 15A-1242 as a safeguard to insure that
when a defendant explicitly requests to proceedpro se, the request is voluntary, knowing and
intelligent.
422. The court-appointed attorney had received the following letter from defendant, who was
confined in the county jaih "I am fire you from my case. I'll not to court with you as my lawyer.
You have to lie to my mother in other words I don't need you any more at all. That is that.
Goodbye." 303 N.C. at 360, 279 S.E.2d at 811-12.
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attorney."423 Thus, "'no meaningful communication' was possible between
[counsel] and defendant." 424 The trial court denied both motions, finding that
defendant had demonstrated no legal justification for removal of his court-
appointed counsel. Rather, the court found "that the only reason defendant
had articulated for wishing to have his attorneys discharged was because...
they had not visited him enough to discuss the case." 425
The supreme court found no error in the denial of defendant's motion.
Determining that the findings of fact by the trial court were fully supported by
the evidence, the court treated the findings as conclusive.426 Despite the ma-
jority's opinion, Justice Exum's dissent focused upon "the gross deterioration
in the attorney-client relationship" and concluded that the trial court's find-
ings were unsupported by the record.
427
Although an indigent defendant has no right to replacement counsel
merely because he is dissatisfied with the attorney's services428 or choice of
trial tactics,429 removal and replacement of court-appointed counsel may be
necessary to preserve the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.430 The relationship between an attorney and his client is perhaps the
most critical barometer of counsers ability to provide effective representation;
an attorney who enjoys neither the trust nor confidence of his client can hardly
be an effective advocate of his client's interests. Therefore, "the defendant has
the right to insist that his case not be handled by an attorney in whom he has
no confidence." 431 An "irreconcilable conflict or breakdown in communica-
tion between defendant and his counser' lends support to a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
432
Nevertheless, the Hutchins court found no sixth amendment violation,
433
despite ample evidence of such irreconcilable conflict and lack of communica-
tion presented by both defendant4 34 and by counsel.435 Furthermore, the se-
423. 303 N.C. at 331, 279 S.E.2d at 795.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 334, 279 S.E.2d at 797.
426. Id. at 335, 279 S.E.2d at 797-98.
427. Id. at 365, 279 S.E.2d at 814 (Exum, J., dissenting). Justice Exum's dissent was joined by
Justice Carlton.
428. See, e.g., State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976); State v. Robinson, 290
N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
429. See, e.g., State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 271 S.E.2d 252 (1980); State v. Robinson, 290
N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
430. See, e.g., State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976).
431. State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 672, 190 S.E.2d 164, 173 (1972).
432. State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 373, 230 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1976); see also State v. Thacker,
301 N.C. 348, 352-53, 271 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1980); State v. Gray, 292 N.C. 270, 233 S.E.2d 905
(1977).
433. 303 N.C. at 336-37, 279 S.E.2d at 797.
434. Justice Exum described defendant's relationhip with his attorney as follows:
At the hearing before Judge Smith Mr. Hutchins complained that his lawyers had
"promised this and promised that, and none ofthem have come throug. He said, "We
ain't talked over the case at all." "If I can't trust them now," Mr. Hutchins said, "I can't
trust them anymore." Mr. Hutchins complained that his lawyers had not let him know
what they were doing, had not visited him in jail, and had not kept him informed about
the outcome of various pretrial proceedings.
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verity of the potential punishment makes it incumbent upon the court to see
that defendant's right to effective assistance is scrupulously preserved. It cer-
tainly would make "a farce and a mockery ofjustice" to force a defendant in a
capital case to rely upon counsel who cannot be an effective advocate of his
cause.
F Jury Instructions
1. Lesser Included Offenses
In State v. Young 436 the court of appeals addressed the question whether
a jury may convict a defendant of a lesser included offense, rather than the
offense charged, when the "lesser" offense carries the same penalty as the
"greater" offense charged. Defendant was indicted for common law rob-
bery.437 At trial, after the presentation of the evidence, the court granted de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the charge of common law robbery based on
insufficiency of the evidence, and instructed the jury that it could find defend-
ant guilty of larceny of the person.438 On appeal defendant argued that his
conviction of larceny was invalid because larceny of the person is not a lesser
included offense of common law robbery. The thrust of defendant's argument
303 N.C. at 360, 279 S.E.2d at 812 (Exum, J., dissenting).
435. Mr. Fox, one of defendant's court-appointed attorneys, described why he should be re-
lieved from the case as follows:
Mr. Hutchins andlhave reacheda state where we have an absolute lack of communication.
That he has personal-a feeling personal against me as opposed to all other persons in
his acquaintance; a lack of trust. He doesn't feel he can place trust of his situation, his
case in my hands. As a result, that hasput me in aposition where-with the lack of com-
munication I am unable toprepare effectivelf or the defense of this case. . . . On talking
aboutpotential defenses based on mental attitudes, mental status, getting inside Mr. Hutch-
ins'mind, andIPm not able to communicate with him, whatsoever, it makes it, at thispoint, a
physical impossibility, as well as a legal impossibility, in my opinion, to adequatel'yprepare a
defense on behalf ofMr. Hutchins, as his attorney, to a charge offirst degree murder.
Id. at 360-61, 279 S.E.2d at 812 (Exum, J., dissenting) (emphasis by court). Mr. Blanchard, de-
fendant's other court-appointed attorney, said:
My dealings with him are colored by the fact that he is-the animosity is great enoughfor
Mr. Fox He doesn't feel like he can deal with Mr. Fox In talking with him for afew
moments today, he says he doesn'tfeel like he can trust me. And the animosity is now
getting to theplace where I think it will interfere with anything Mr. Hutchins and I could
accomplish.... I realize he does not have the right to fire and pick and choose, but we
are dealing with three counts of first degree murder. In something of this nature, I think
that Mr. Hutchins deserves or at least needs in his own mind counsel which he can feel
comfortable with; that he can believe what they're going to say; that he has respect for
their ability. It is myfeeling Mr. Hutchins has none of thosefor Mr. Fox nor L
Id. at 361-62, 279 S.E. 2d at 812.
436. 54 N.C.App. 366, 283 S.E.2d 812 (1981).
437. The evidence showed that defendant snatched fifty dollars from the prosecuting witness
as the latter walked down a Raleigh street. Id. at 367, 283 S.E. 2d at 813.
438. Conviction of an offense other than the offense charged is permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15-170 (Cum. Supp. 1981), which provides: "Upon the trial of any indictment the prisoner may
be convicted of the crime charged therein or a less degree of the same crime, or of an attempt to
commit a less degree of the same crime."
Common law robbery is generally defined as larceny of the person plus the additional ele-
ment of assault. 54 N.C. App. at 372, 283 S.E.2d at 81 (Becton, J., dissenting).
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was that larceny of the person is not a crime of "less degree" 439 than common
law robbery because both crimes carry the same penalty.440 A majority of the
court of appeals held that, despite the identity of penalty, larceny of the person
is a lesser included offense of common law robbery.441 The court relied en-
tirely upon previous holdings of North Carolina courts442 which had expressly
stated that the former crime was a lesser included offense of the latter.443
The dissent, however, argued forcefully that a lesser included offense
must be both included in the offense charged (its constituent elements being a
proper subset of the greater offense), 4" and subject to lesser punishment.445
The argument is that a defendant should get something in return for his expo-
sure to conviction of an offense that was not charged, especially when he is
convicted of an offense that requires proof of fewer elements than the offense
charged. 446 When a defendant is exposed to the same penalty, he receives
nothing in return; the state may obtain the same sentence by proving fewer
elements than are included in the indicted offense. The dissent viewed this
439. Note that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-170 does require that the lesser included offense be one of
"less degree."
440. 54 N.C. App. at 367, 283 S.E.2d at 813. Both common law robbery and larceny of the
person are felonies that carry maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment plus a fine. For of-
fenses committed before July 1, 1981, punishment for both was pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-2
(1981). Under the new classification system for felonies committed after July 1, 1981, both of-
fenses would be Class H felonies, carrying the same punishment as under § 14-2. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 14-72(a)(1), -72(b)(1), -87.1, .2 (1981).
441. 54 N.C. App. at 367, 283 S.E.2d at 813.
442. The court relied upon State v. Kirk, 17 N.C. App. 68, 193 S.E.2d 377 (1972) for the
proposition that larceny of the person is a lesser included offense of common-law robbery. The
holding in Kirk, on facts similar to those before the Young court, reached precisely that result.
Interestingly, however, the cases cited by the court in Kirk as support of this proposition do not
hold that larceny of the person is a lesser included offense of common-law robbery. For example,
the court in State v. Bell, 228 N.C. 659, 46 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1948), held that "in a prosecution for
robbery with firearms, an accused may be acquitted of the major charge and convicted of an
included or lesser offense, such as common law robbery, or assault, or larceny from the person, or
simple larceny." The other two cases cited in Kirk contain similar language. See State v. Swaney,
277 N.C. 602, 178 S.E.2d 399 (1971); State v. Wenrich, 251 N.C. 460, 111 S.E.2d 582 (1959).
Courts in these cases held only that common-law robbery is a lesser included offense in prosecu-
tions for armed robbery. Unless the string of crimes listed at the end of the Bell excerpt is in-
tended to be read in descending order, with each offense being a lesser included offense to the one
preceding it, then this line of cases was misconstrued in Kirk. An intention of descending lesser
included offenses is unlikely, however, because larceny of the person is certainly not a lesser in-
cluded offense of the offense immediately preceding it, assault. In its most liberal interpretation,
the Bell line stands only for the proposition that larceny of the person is a lesser included offense
of armed robbery, which is not quite the same as saying it is a lesser included offense of common-
law robbery.
Besides Kirk, one must look to the nineteenth century to find affirmative support for the view
that larceny of the person is a lesser included offense of common-law robbery. The supreme court
in State v. Cody, 60 N.C. 197 (1864), held that "the charge of commission of larceny is included in
that of the commission of a robbery .... [Robbery is] an aggravated species of [larceny]." Id. at
198.
443. The generally accepted test for determining what is an "included" offense is that the
greater offense charged must contain all the essential elements of the lesser offense. See State v.
Aikens, 286 N.C. 202, 209 S.E.2d 763 (1974); State v. Arnold, 285 N.C. 751, 208 S.E.2d (1974);
State v. Riera, 276 N.C. 361, 172 S.E.2d 535 (1970).
444. Th6 dissent conceded that this part of the test was met. See note 438 supra.
445. The dissent argued that this test is mandated by due process and statutory construction.
54 N.C. App. at 371-76, 283 S.E.2d at 815-18 (Becton, J., dissenting).
446. Id. at 373, 283 S.E.2d at 816 (Becton, J., dissenting).
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situation as particularly bothersome in cases in which the jury reaches a com-
promise verdict, or thinks it is doing the defendant a favor by convicting him
of the "lesser" charge.447
The position taken in the dissent is supported implicitly in North Caro-
lina cases and explicitly in the definition of lesser included offenses in federal
courts. In State v. Davis448 defendant was charged with receipt of stolen prop-
erty, but was convicted of possession. In reversing the conviction the supreme
court made two observations regarding the relationship between the two of-
fenses. First, it held that the act of possession is different from the act of re-
ceiving;449 thus, possession of stolen property is not even "included" in
receiving stolen property.450 Second, the court noted that the punishment for
both offenses was identical.451 These factors together led the court to conclude
that the legislature intended possession and receiving to be "separate crimes of
equal degree rather than the former to be a lesser included offense of the lat-
ter."452 A possible interpretation of Davis is that receiving stolen property is a
crime "separate" from possession because of the varying elements of the
crime, and that it is a crime of "equal degree" with possession because the
prescribed punishment is the same.453 It would follow, then, that a crime of
equal punishment, i.e., equal degree, is not an offense of "less degree" as con-
templated by G.S. 15-170. Similarly, in federal courts a lesser included offense
must be both included and lesser. Cases interpreting Rule 3 1(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 454 hold that the requirements of a lesser included
offense are met only when the included offense involves fewer elements than
the charged greater offense and when the claimed lesser offense carries a
447. Id.
448. 302 N.C. 370, 275 S.E.2d 491 (1981). For further discussion of Dalr, see text accompa-
nying note 257 supra.
449. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-71, -71.1 (1981) (receipt and possession of stolen property).
450. 302 N.C. at 373, 275 S.E.2d at 494. The court determined that receiving stolen property is
"a single, specific act occurring at a specific time," whereas possession is a "continuing offense
beginning at the time of the offense and continuing until divestment." Id.
The court analogized the difference to the distinction between "selling" and "transporting"
controlled substances made in State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 195 S.E.2d 481 (1973). While
receipt is not analytically the same as possession, that one can be accomplished without the other
does not necessarily follow. That is to say, one cannot receive stolen goods without also possess-
ing them, and vice versa. By way of contrast, however, one may transport a controlled substance
without selling it, and one may sell it without transporting it. For further discussion of Days, see
text accompanying notes 257-68 supra.
451. 302 N.C. at 374, 275 S.E.2d at 494. Both are treated as Class H felonies under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-72 (1981).
452. 302 N.C. at 374, 275 S.E.2d at 494.
453. The following language from State v. Cameron supports the proposition that crimes of
equal punishment are crimes of equal degree:
By setting out both the possession and sale as separate offenses in the statute and by
prescribing the same punishment for possession and for sale, it is apparent that the Gen-
eral Assembly intended possession and sale to be treated as distinct crimes of equal de-
gree, to be separately punished rather than providing that one should be a lesser
included offense in the other.
283 N.C. at 202, 195 S.E.2d at 488.
454. "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense




lighter penalty than does the greater charged offense.455
2. Court Modification of Submitted Instructions
In State v. Puckett4 56 the court of appeals examined whether it was preju-
dicial error for the trial court to substitute its own general witness-credibility
instruction for defendant's specific instruction charging the jury that one of the
prosecution's witnesses had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. In
the course of the witness' testimony, which pertained to the deliberateness of
defendant's alleged killing, the witness stated that her minor child would in-
herit all of the victim's estate if defendant were convicted of the voluntary
manslaughter of defendant's husband.4 57 Defendant submitted an instruction
that would have charged the jury to scrutinize the testimony of this witness in
light of her interest in the outcome. The court denied defendant's request and
substituted its own general instruction regarding the credibility of witnesses. 45
In reversing the conviction the court of appeals held that when a request
is correct in law and supported by the evidence 45 9 in the case, it is error for a
court to change the meaning or so qualify the requested instruction as to
weaken its force.460 While a court need not give even a proper request verba-
tim, the jury charge must be substantially the same as the requested instruc-
tion.4 61 The substituted charge of the trial court was not substantially the
same as the requested instruction because it did not specifically direct the jury
to the credibility of the witness in question.
462
. Probation and Parole463
The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Cooper4 1A upheld, as a
valid condition of probation, a prohibition against defendant's operating a
455. United States v. Cady, 495 F.2d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 1974). See also James v. United States,
238 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1956).
456. 54 N.C. App. 576, 284 S.E.2d 326 (1981).
457. Id. at 581, 284 S.E.2d at 329.
458. Id.
459. See State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 229 S.E.2d 163 (1976).
460. 54 N.C. App. at 581, 284 S.E.2d at 329. See also Lloyd v. Bowen, 170 N.C. 216, 86 S.E.
797 (1915); Brink v. Black, 77 N.C. 59 (1877).
461. 54 N.C. App. at 581, 284 S.E.2d at 329.
462. Id. In a related case, the court of appeals held that it was not prejudicial error for the
trial judge to repeat a charge already given. The court observed that a trial judge has wide discre-
tion in charging a jury. State v. Murray, 55 N.C. App. 94, 284 S.E.2d 525 (1981).
In State v. Kinard, 54 N.C. App. 443, 283 S.E.2d 540 (1981), the court held that the last
paragraph of the pattern jury instruction N.C.P.I.-Crim. 104.90 (pertaining to identifications made
after the crime) applies only to a lineup or show-up situation and not to a photograph identifica-
tion. The court referred to footnote three of the instruction, which states that the last paragraph
applies only to "confrontations," and held that a confrontation is "the act of setting a witness face-
to-face with the prisoner," and thus does not include photographic identification. Id. at 446, 283
S.E.2d at 542 (citing State v. Behran, 114 N.C. 797, 19 S.E. 220 (1894); Black's Law Dictionary 372
(4th ed. 1951)).
463. See generally Comment, Criminal Procedure-The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act,
60 N.C.L. Rev. 631 (1982).
464. 304 N.C. 180, 282 S.E.2d 436 (1981).
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motor vehicle on the streets or highways of North Carolina from 12:01 a.m.
until 5:30 a.m. during the period of probation. G.S. 15A-1343(b)(17) 465 allows
for the imposition of any condition reasonably related to the defendant's reha-
bilitation. Defendant in Cooper, who had been convicted of felonious posses-
sion of stolen credit cards, contended that the condition was not reasonably
related to the offenses committed or to his rehabilitation. The court disagreed
and found that the operation of a motor vehicle late at night was reasonably
related to the "reception, possession and disposition of stolen property" and
that the condition minimized defendant's "opportunity" for contact with per-
sons engaged in criminal activities.
'466
In State v. McNe4i 467 the court of appeals468 rejected a due process and
equal protection attack on a lower court judgment and commitment order
which recommended that defendant, who was convicted of felonious breaking
and entering and felonious larceny, pay $417.50 in restitution to his victim and
$250 for court-appointed counsel as a condition for attaining work release or
parole. 469 The last sentence of the order read: "All monies are to be paid
prior to the defendant's consideration for parole." 470 In addition to his consti-
tutional claims, defendant argued that the lower court usurped the power of
the North Carolina Parole Commission.4 71 The court of appeals upheld the
order by interpreting the language to mean that only if the parole commission
accepted the court's recommendation must the money be paid prior to the
465. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(17) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
466. 304 N.C. at 183, 282 S.E.2d at 438. The court in Cooper also construed N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-1342(g) (Cum. Supp. 1981), which provides: "The failure of a defendant to object to a
condition of probation at the time it is imposed does not constitute a waiver of the right to object
at a later time to the condition." Defendant Cooper had his probation revoked for a violation of
the condition but did not raise his objection to the condition until heard in the court of appeals.
The supreme court held that "a defendant cannot relitigate the legality of a condition of probation
unless he raises the issue no later than the hearing at which his probation is revoked." 304 N.C. at
183, 282 S.E.2d at 439. The court reviewed the statute's commentary and found that subsection
(g) was designed to avoid the dilemma of a defendant not contesting a condition of probation
when imposed for fear that he might get an active sentence. Thus, the court concluded that "at a
later time" in the statute referred to the revocation hearing. No right to challenge the condition
for the first time at the appellate level existed. Id.
467. 54 N.C. App. 454, 283 S.E.2d 565 (1981).
468. In another case, the court of appeals interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340 (Cum. Supp.
1981). State v. Bass, 53 N.C. App. 40, 280 S.E.2d 7 (1981). Defendant Bass was convicted by a
jury of misdemeanor welfare fraud, which had a statutorally defined limit of $400 at the time of
trial. Id. at 43, 280 S.E.2d at 9. The trial court imposed a suspended sentence with supervised
probation on condition that defendant make restitution of $541 for overpayments received under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. Defendant argued that restitution should
be no more than $400 because she was convicted of misdemeanor rather than felonious welfare
fraud. The court of appeals rejected defendant's argument holding that the condition imposed on
a suspended sentence need only be supported by the evidence, not established beyond a reason-
able doubt as is needed for a conviction, and that the State's evidence, which defendant did not
contest, amply supported the $541 figure. Id.
469. 54 N.C. App. at 457, 283 S.E.2d at 566-67.
470. Id.
471. The thrust of defendant's argument is based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-57.1 (1978), which
essentially provide that when a court recommends restitution as a condition of parole, the parole
commission is authorized to impose the court's recommendation but is not bound by such
recommendation.
1354 [Vol. 60
CRIMINAdL PR 0 CED URE
consideration of defendant's parole.
4 72
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Evans v. Garrison473 held
invalid a condition of parole that two defendants each pay restitution of
$2,500 to the North Carolina Bureau of Investigation.474 Defendants had
pleaded guilty to drug offenses under plea bargaining agreements with the
state without knowledge or reason to foresee that the restitution would be im-
posed as a condition for parole. The court invalidated the condition on two
grounds: (1) the imposition of special conditions upon parole eligibility in a
plea bargaining context without informing the defendants of that possibility
rendered their guilty plea invalid under the voluntary and intelligent stan-
dard;475 and (2) the North Carolina statute that provides for restitution as a
condition of parole upon a guilty plea when the bargained agreement provides




In State v. Burney47 8 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
constitutional right to a public trial479 of a defendant charged with first degree
rape was not violated when the trial judge, exercising his discretionary author-
ity pursuant to G.S. 15-166,480 ordered the courtroom cleared of all "non-
interested" persons during the testimony of the seven-year-old victim.48 1 De-
472. 54 N.C. App. at 458, 283 S.E.2d at 568.
473. 657 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1981).
474. Id. at 67.
475. Id. at 66. For a good discussion of the voluntary and intelligent standard, see C. White-
bread, Criminal Procedure §§ 21.01-.06, at 407-28 (1980).
476. 657 F.2d at 66. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981) allows for restitution
to an aggrieved party or parties which "shall include individuals, firms, corporations, associations
or other organizations, and government agencies, whether federal, state or local." The statute also
provides, however, "that no government agency may benefit by way of restitution except for par-
ticular damage or loss to it over and above its normal operating costs." Id. Consequently, the
North Carolina Bureau of Investigation is not a victim under the statute unless it suffers a particu-
lar loss over and above its normal operating costs. 657 F.2d at 66-67.
477. In State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 281 S.E.2d 377 (1981), the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that an extrajudicial statement by a co-defendant not testifying at trial can be admitted
against a defendant under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule without
violating the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, provided that the hearsay bears
adequate "indicia of reliability" to guarantee its trustworthiness. 303 N.C. at 697, 281 S.E.2d at
378-88 (quoting from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). See also State v. Stevens, 295 N.C. 21,
243 S.E.2d 771 (1978) (dying declaration); State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 235 S.E.2d 828 (1977)
(implied admissions).
478. 302 N.C. 529, 276 S.E.2d 693 (1981).
479. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
.... " U.S. Const. amend. VI.
480. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-166 (1981). The statute provides:
In the trial of cases for rape and of or a Isic] sex offense or attempt to commit rape or
attempt to commit a sex offense, the trial judge may, during the taking of the testimony
of the prosecutrix, exclude from the courtroom all persons except the officers of the court,
the defendant and those engaged in the trial of the case.
481. The trial judge ordered the courtroom cleared of all persons except the defendant, his
family, his attorney, the defense witnesses, the assistant district attorney, the state's witnesses, the
officers of the court, the members of the jury, and the members of the victim's family. 302 N.C. at
533-34, 276 S.E.2d at 696.
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fendant's attack on the trial judge's ruling was based on both state482 and fed-
era14 83 constitutional provisions guaranteeing defendant's right to a public
trial. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,4 84 the court ruled that in the interest of the fair
administration of justice, the trial judge may impose reasonable limitations
upon the access of the public and the press to a criminal trial.4 85 Because of
the sensitive and personal nature of sexual offenses, and especially those in-
volving young children, the court concluded that the limited exclusion im-
posed by the trial judge was not unreasonable.4
6
In State v. Wright the court of appeals allowed the trial judge to overrule
a challenge for cause of a prospective juror, despite the fact that the juror
stated she had formed an opinion about the case prior to the voir dire.48 7
Under G.S. 15A-1212(6), 488 the defendant had a right to challenge the juror,
but since the judge has the discretion to grant or to deny the challenge,48 9 he
can pursue the juror's answer and determine if she can fairly assess the evi-
dence, disregarding her pre-conceived opinion.4 90 Many jurors may hear
about a case through the media, without forming an opinion, and clearly this
is not grounds to remove them.49 1 The court of appeals will now allow jurors
to be seated even if that information has led them to form an opinion, if the
trial judge finds they can still act independently of that opinion and base a
decision on the evidence.
The legislature recently enacted a statute providing for deferred proba-
tion in the place of a criminal trial for first-time offenders charged with of-
fenses punishable by less than ten years imprisonment.4 92 This practice
requires the consent of the prosecution and the defense, as well as the trial
judge. Those who accept the probation will have the charges against them
dropped if they serve their probation satisfactorily. 493 A violation of proba-
482. Defendant argued that his right to a public trial was guaranteed by N.C. Const. art. I,
§§ 18, 24. See State v. Yoes, 271 N.C. 616, 157 S.E.2d 386 (1967).
483. See note 479 supra.
484. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
485. 302 N.C. at 537-38, 276 S.E.2d at 698.
486. Id.
487. 52 N.C. App. 166, 278 S.E.2d 579 (1981). The prospective juror was asked several times
if she had formed an opinion. Initially she replied affirmatively, then she said she "sort of" had an
opinion. Later she said she had none. In response to several questions from the judge, she stated
she could divorce herself from that opinion and act on the evidence. The judge then denied the
challenge.
488. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1212(6) (1978). A juror may be challenged if he states he has
formed an opinion about-the case. He cannot be asked who that opinion favors.
489. Id. §§ 9-17, 15A-1211(b).
490. 52 N.C. App. at 172, 278 S.E.2d at 584-85.
491. State v. Hunt, 37 N.C. App. 315, 246 S.E.2d 159 (1978), cert. denied, 295 N.C. 736, 248
S.E.2d 865 (1978).
492. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Other requirements are: notice and op-
portunity to be heard accorded crime victim; defendant must not have been convicted of a felony
or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; defendant must not have been on probation previ-
ously, and he must be unlikely to commit another offense. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1342(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1981), two years is the maximum length of probation for this deferred sentence.
493. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1342(i) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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tion will mean the charges will be pursued. At first blush, this statute looks
like a way for young offenders from well-to-do families to be accorded special
treatment and spared a criminal record. The probable effect, however, will be
to provide the district attorney a chance to dispose of weak cases without hav-
ing to take a dismissal.
494
Another recent statute limits appeals to the supreme court by making de-
cisions by the court of appeals final on motions for appropriate relief.495 A
similar statute was repealed in 1977. Presumably, this reenactment will ease
the supreme court's caseload.
In State v. Dobson4 96 the court of appeals declared that appeals by the
state on motions to suppress evidence under G.S. 15A-979(c) 497 must strictly
comply with the statute. The State must certify to the trial court in its notice of
appeal that the appeal is not made to delay the trial and that the evidence in
question is essential to the prosecution. The burden of proof is on the State to
show that it has complied with the statute, and failure to meet this burden
voids the appeal.
498
The supreme court handed down several decisions regarding joinder and
severance of criminal charges against one defendant, the most notable being
State v. Silva.499 Defendant was charged with two separate offenses linked
together by a conspiracy charge.500 The only "transactional connection" re-
quired for joinder by the statute50 1 was the conspiracy, which was dropped at
the end of the State's evidence. Defendant failed to move for severance at this
point, thereby waiving his right, although the dismissal ended the connection
between the cases and made severance proper. The court stated that when
defendant made his motion to sever before trial, the existence of the conspir-
acy charge properly allowed joinder; he could be granted severance when the
charge was dropped, but then only by making a new motion.502 This decision
does not leave a defendant technically without remedy because he can and
494. If this assumption is correct, the threat of prosecution for failure to obey the probation
officer will carry no real force.
495. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-28(1981).
496. 51 N.C. App. 445, 276 S.E.2d 480 (1981). The prosecution appealed the suppression of
certain evidence, but the trial record showed only that notice was given. There was no indication
that the State had followed the statutory provisions.
497. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
498. Statutes granting the State the right to appeal will always be strictly construed against the
State. See State v. Harrell, 279 N.C. 464, 183 S.E.2d 638 (1971); State v. Horton, 7 N.C. App. 497,
172 S.E.2d 887 (1970).
499. 304 N.C. 122, 282 S.E.2d 449 (1981).
500. Defendant was charged with armed robbery, and with larceny of an automobile. The
prosecution charged that the auto theft was part of a conspiracy to rob banks using stolen vehicles,
because the armed robbery had been perpetrated in a different stolen vehicle. Id. at 127, 282
S.E.2d at 452.
501. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-926(a) (1978). Several offenses may be joined if they are "based
on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constitut-
ing parts of a single scheme or plan." 304 N.C. at 126, 282 S.E.2d at 452.
502. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-927(a) (1978) provides that a defendant must move for severance
before trial. If his motion is denied, he may renew it "based on a ground not previously known"
at the close of State's evidence. Failure to make either of these motions constitutes a waiver. This
practice alleviates the problem of later evidence showing the impropriety ofjoinder.
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should ask for severance at the close of the prosecution's case. Nevertheless,
allowing conspiracy charges, regardless of how tenuous, to connect several
otherwise unconnected charges will require that the trial judge balance the
prejudice to the defendant against the burden of retrying all the charges on the
overloaded court docket.
50 3
The court had several other opportunities to address joinder and sever-
ance. In State v. Young the supreme court held that an escaped convict who
raped a woman and stole a car within a brief period of time after his escape
was properly tried for all three offenses at once. 5 4 Two murders committed
by the defendant while on a continual drunken spree separated in time by six
to eight hours, were also found to be properly joined in State v. Oxendine.505
In addition, joinders were upheld by the court in State v. Parton, and in State
v. Bracey. In Parton, two murders were committed almost a month apart, but
the circumstances surrounding both were similar. Defendant confessed to both
at the same time, and the key witness to both murders was the same man.
506
State v. Bracey, however involved three separate robberies over a ten-day pe-
riod in a two-block area of town; however, defendants each time used similar
assaults to take petty cash from the small businesses involved. 07 In none of
the above cases did the defendants show any prejudice by the joinder of the
offenses. Because the determination of severance motions is left to the trial
judge's discretion, most joinders will be upheld. There must be some connec-
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503. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-927(b)(2) (1978) requires severance during trial if it is necessary
"to achieve a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense." The jury
must be able to distinguish fairly between the various offenses.
Granting severance requires declaring a mistrial. Id. § 15A-927(a)(4).
504. 302 N.C. 385, 275 S.E.2d 429 (1981). The court noted that even had the escape charge
been severed, evidence of the defendant's escape would have been relevant and admissible in a
trial for the rape and larceny.
505. 303 N.C. 235, 278 S.E.2d 200 (1981). The court noted that separate trials would have
involved overlapping evidence. Id. at 241, 278 S.E.2d at 203-04.
506. 303 N.C. 55, 277 S.E.2d 410 (1981). Both murdered girls had been strangled and buried
in shallow graves within one-eighth mile of each other.
507. 303 N.C. 112, 277 S.E.2d 390 (1981).
508. The Official Commentary to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-926 (1978) sets out the requirement
under that statute that some transactional basis must exist between the charges. The old law of
permittingjoinder of similar crimes with no transactional connection has been dropped. See State





North Carolina has long displayed a liberal policy in its rules governing
admission of evidence of prior misconduct for impeachment purposes. Con-
trary to the rule in many jurisdictions,' a witness in North Carolina's courts
may be impeached by introduction of any criminal conviction;2 there is no
restriction to the traditional "infamous" crimes or to crimes directly related to
credibility.3 Moreover, inquiry is not limited to criminal convictions. Exami-
nation concerning any behavior tending to reflect negatively on general moral
character is permitted freely.4 Indeed, it was not until 1971 that North
Carolina finally abandoned its minority position permitting inquiry into com-
pletely unrelated indictments and arrests. 5
The law in this area in North Carolina rests in part on the assumption
that no prejudice occurs when there is an unequivocal denial of the act in
question by the witness being impeached.6 Theoretically, the cross-examiner's
questions are not evidence to be considered by the jury. Only the witness's
answers are to be considered, and they are to be taken as given.7 When the
witness denies the act, his credibility stands unimpeached. 8 North Carolina
law recognizes that this assumption, standing alone, is somewhat contrary to
common sense and might result in enormous abuse if left unchecked. The
assumption is buttressed in North Carolina by two policing doctrines. First,
the trial court judge has discretionary control over the scope of cross-examina-
tion.9 Second, the questions must be asked in good faith.'0
1. See C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 43, at 84 (2d ed. 1972).
2. State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 30 S.E.2d 230 (1944); 1 D. Stansbury, North Carolina Evi-
dence § 112, at 342 (H. Brandis rev. 1973).
3. Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967).
4. State v. Bracey, 303 N.C. 112, 277 S.E.2d 390 (1981); State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 193
S.E.2d 71 (1972); 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 111, at 340-42.
5. State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971). For discussion of Williams, see
Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1972-Evidence, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1070, 1070
(1973); Note, Inadmissibility for Impeachment Purposes of Evidence Showing Prior Arrest or In-
dictment, 8 Wake Forest L. Rev. 467 (1972).
6. State v. Spaulding, 288 N.C. 397, 414, 219 S.E.2d 178, 189, death sentence vacated mem.,
428 U.S. 904 (1975); State v. Black, 283 N.C. 344, 350, 196 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1973); State v. Jacobs,
51 N.C. App. 324, 331, 276 S.E.2d 482, 486 (1981).
7. Distinguish the prohibition against introducing extrinsic evidence of alleged criminal or
other degrading conduct from the practice of "sifting" the witness by asking him questions about
such conduct, which is permitted, subject to the court's discretion, under North Carolina law.
State v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270, 278-79, 240 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1978).
8. If defendant admits that he committed the alleged act, a limiting instruction confining
consideration of this evidence to evaluation of his credibility must be given if requested. State v.
Norkett, 269 N.C. 679, 153 S.E.2d 362 (1967). Although any possibility of prejudicial substantive
use is theoretically controlled by a limiting instruction, the effectiveness of such instruction often
has been called into question. See, e.g., Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and
Effect, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 264 (1966); Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and
Other Matters, 70 Yale L.J. 763, 777 (1961); See also the text accompanying notes 89-107 infra.
9. State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 675, 185 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1971); 1 D. Stansbury, supra
note 2, § 111, at 341-42.
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The potential in this for unfair treatment of witnesses under North Caro-
lina law area has been noted frequently." Two 1981 cases further illustrate
difficulties with the rules in their present form. In State v. Dawson 12 a crucial
alibi witness was questioned by the prosecuting attorney about prior acts of
shoplifting. The witness, defendant's mother, consistently denied the acts
throughout a series of six questions.' 3 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
had reversed defendant's conviction because the State failed to show a good
faith basis for the questions, pointing out that defendant's "whole defense was
built on misidentification and alibi."' 14 The North Carolina Supreme Court
disagreed and reversed the court of appeals, citing the established rule that
good faith is presumed unless the record discloses evidence of bad faith. 15
Although questioning "the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct,"'16 the court
concluded that "no affirmative showing of good faith by the prosecutor is
required."
'17
State v. Pilkington 8 also involved a situation in which credibility was cru-
cial to the defense. Defendant was prosecuted for alleged child molestation. As
the sole witness for the defense, defendant admitted to being in the area and to
talking to the child, but denied attempting to molest him. On cross-examina-
tion, he was questioned about unrelated traffic violations, which he denied
having committed. It was later discovered that the questions had been based
erroneously on the record of another person having the same name as defend-
ant. In upholding the convictions, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted
that the prosecutor's good faith was unquestioned,19 and emphasized that de-
fense counsel had been informed of the State's reliance on the records some
weeks before trial, but had failed to correct the error.20 Justices Exum and
Carlton, in dissent, found acquiescence on the part of defendant unlikely,
21
pointing out that the questions were objected to and that defendant was never
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 281-82, 156 S.E.2d 265, 270
(1967); State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 332,30 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1944); Comment, Impeachment of the
Criminal Defendant by Prior Acquittals-Beyond the Bounds of Reason, 17 Wake Forest L. Rev.
561 (1981); Note, The Fourth Circuit Threatens Impeachment with Prior Acts of Misconduct in
North Carolina, 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 447 (1979); Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1980-Evidence, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1176-80; Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law,
1978-Evidence, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 1069-77.
12. 302 N.C. 581, 276 S.E.2d 348 (1981).
13. Id. at 584, 276 S.E.2d at 350-51.
14. 48 N.C. App. 99, 107, 268 S.E.2d 572, 577 (1980), rev'd 302 N.C. 581, 276 S.E.2d 348
(1981).
15. 302 N.C. at 586, 276 S.E.2d at 352.
16. Id. at 583, 276 S.E.2d at 350.
17. Id. at 586, 276 S.E.2d at 352 (emphasis in original),
18. 302 N.C. 505, 276 S.E.2d 389 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 290 (1982).
19. Id. at 510, 276 S.E.2d at 393.
20. Id. at 511, 276 S.E.2d at 393.
21. The majority declines ... to award a new trial primarily upon its conclusion that
defendant somehow acquiesced in being cross-examined on the basis of someone else's
police record. Simply to state the proposition undermines its validity. In a case such as
this where all depends on whom the jury believes, it is inconceivable that a defendant
would knowingly and understandingly acquiesce in being cross-examined on the basis of
someone else's record. Id. at 515, 276 S.E.2d at 395 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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shown the record relied upon. The dissent argued that the cross-examination
was so severely prejudicial that defendant was denied due process.
2 2
These cases illustrate distinct but related difficulties inherent in North
Carolina law in this area. Dawson demonstrates the near-impossible burden
facing a litigant on appeal. When record evidence is inadmissible, 23 and good
faith is presumed in the absence of contrary evidence, demonstration of the
lack of good faith on appeal is indeed a formidable task.24 The solution advo-
cated by the court of appeals in Dawson-a requirement that the impeaching
party establish a good faith basis for questioning25 -would undoubtedly solve
many of the problems in this area. This requirement, in addition to decreasing
the risk of undue prejudice, probably would limit the inquiry to prior acts that
have some basis in fact, thus increasing the probability that the witness' re-
sponse will be relevant to his credibility.
Such a rule, however, would not have produced a different result in Pilk-
ington, because the good faith basis for questioning was clear. Nevertheless, a
disturbing aspect of that case was the court's reluctance to look beyond rigid
application of the rules and to inquire whether the result was fair. The major-
ity appears to have given little weight to the consideration that defendant's
case turned on his credibility, and that his credibility necessarily and unjustly
was damaged by the prosecutor's groundless questions. To the extent that de-
fendant acquiesced in the groundless questioning, the decision would seem to
be correct. But that acquiescence, as pointed out by the dissent, was not at all
clear from the facts.2 6 Pilkington and Dawson illustrate North Carolina's con-
tinued failure to recognize and remedy the dangers inherent in the use of prior
acts for impeachment purposes.
2. Witness Credibility
The majority rule in the United States is that in the absence of a direct
attack upon the credibility of a witness, no evidence will be admitted to sup-
port his credibility.27 The North Carolina Supreme Court discarded this rule
in State v. Lucas.28 Although the court acknowledged that it had recognized
22. Id. at 517, 276 S.E.2d at 397.
23. See State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 517, 212 S.E.2d 125, 132 (1975) ("Denial of prior of-
fenses by the witness may not be contradicted by introducing the record of his conviction.").
24. The problem does not arise when the trial court makes an advance determination of the
adequacy of the basis for questioning. This potential solution was suggested by the court of ap-
peals in Dawson. 48 N.C. App. at 105-06, 268 S.E.2d at 576 ("If it appears at all that the prosecu-
tor had a basis for asking these questions, it appears solely from the asking, and therein lies the
problem with the court's refusal to require a showing that the questions were asked in good
faith."). The North Carolina Supreme Court also pointed out the availability of voir dire in situa-
tions such as the one in Dawson. 302 N.C. at 586 n.1, 276 S.E.2d at 352 n.l. For a discussion of
the use of voir dire in such cases see Note, supra note 11, at 465-66.
25. 48 N.C. App. at 107, 268 S.E.2d at 577.
26. 302 N.C. at 515, 276 S.E.2d at 395-96 (Exum, J., dissenting).
27. See 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1124, at 255 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1976); C. McCormick,
supra note 1, § 49, at 102. Supporting evidence can come in the form of either: (1) evidence of the
general good character of the impeached witness, or (2) evidence of consistent statements made by
the witness whose credibility has been attacked. Id. at 103.
28. 302 N.C. 342, 275 S.E.2d 433 (1981). Defendant was convicted of first degree burglary,
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the majority rule in earlier cases, 29 it reasoned that "the necessity of impeach-
ment as a prerequisite to corroboration would seem to be more theoretical
than real."30 The court therefore ruled that prior consistent statements that
sustain and strengthen the witness' testimony at trial are admissible for pur-
poses of corroboration.3'
B. Scientfc Proof 2
1. In General
In State v. Temple33 the supreme court held that a dentist's expert testi-
mony identifying bite marks on a murder victim's skin as those of defendant
was admissible so long as that testimony was based upon established scientific
methods.34 The Temple decision is significant because admissibility of evi-
dence identifying an accused by his bite marks was a question of first impres-
sion in North Carolina.35 With the holding in Temple, North Carolina joins
every jurisdiction that has addressed this issue.36
The general rule in North Carolina on the admissibility of scientific meth-
ods of proof is that courts should accept such testimony when the accuracy
and the reliability of the process involved has been established and recognized
either by judicial notice or to the satisfaction of the court through expert testi-
mony.37 In Temple the expert testified to the uniqueness of an individual's
dentition, and then stated that he had made impressions of defendant's teeth
and matched these impressions with the bite marks found on the victim's
body.38 From these tests the expert gave his opinion that the defendant's teeth
second degree sexual offense and common law robbery. At trial, the victim identified defendant
from the witness stand, without objection, as the man who broke into her home and assaulted her.
She was then permitted to testify over objection that she previously had picked defendant out of
the crowd in the courtroom at the probable cause hearing and identified him as her assailant at
that time. One question on appeal was whether the testimony of the previous identification at the
probable cause hearing should have been admissible to bolster the victim's in-court identification,
when the victim's credibility had not been impeached. Id. at 347, 275 S.E.2d at 436.
29. See, e.g., State v. Cope, 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954); Gibson v. Whitton, 239 N.C.
11, 79 S.E.2d 196 (1953); State v. Melvin, 194 N.C. 394, 139 S.E. 762 (1927); State v. Parish, 79
N.C. 610 (1878).
30. 302 N.C. at 347, 275 S.E.2d at 437 (quoting I D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 50, at 144).
31. Id. Because the only virtue of the court's rule is simplicity of application, it should be
abolished. No other state has followed this example.
32. In two cases involving scientific methods of proof the court of appeals held that evidence
of defendant's willingness to take polygraph and voice and stress tests properly was excluded by
the trial court. State v. Makerson, 52 N.C. App. 149, 153, 277 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1981) (defendant
took a voice stress test and was willing to take a polygraph test); State v. Duvall, 50 N.C. App. 684,
697, 275 S.E.2d 842, 853, disc. review denied, 302 N.C. 399, 279 S.E.2d 358 (1981) (defendant was
willing to take polygraph test). The Duvall court reasoned that admitting such testimony would
create the inference that the results of the test were favorable to the defendant. Id.
33. 302 N.C. 1, 273 S.E.2d 273 (1981).
34. Id. at 11-12, 273 S.E.2d at 279.
35. Id. at 11, 273 S.E.2d at 279. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 1122 (1977).
36. See, e.g., People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975).
37. State v. Powell, 264 N.C. 73, 140 S.E.2d 705 (1965). See I D. Stansbury, supra note 2,
§ 86, at 271.
38. The supreme court rejected defendant's argument that the testimony was inadmissible
because it was based on unreliable mathematical probabilities that a person has unique dentition.
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had caused these bite marks.39
The supreme court held that since this evidence "was based upon estab-
lished scientific methods, [such testimony] is admissible as an instrumentality
which aids justice in the ascertainment of the truth. Any objection to this




Introduction of experimental evidence is an extremely useful technique
that presents a variety of opportunities to the creative trial lawyer. In deciding
whether to admit experimental evidence, a trial court's primary consideration
is the similarity of the experimental conditions to those of the actual case.4 1 In
State v. Wright42 the court of appeals delineated the requirements in North
Carolina as follows: (1) the experiment must be conducted under conditions
substantially similar to those prevailing at the time of the occurrence involved
in the action, and (2) the result of the experiment must have a legitimate ten-
dency to prove or disprove an issue arising out of that occurrence. The court
further stated that whether an experiment was conducted under substantially
similar conditions is a question of law and is reviewable by the appellate
courts.
4 3
The court then discussed some of the relevant considerations that the trial
judge should use in evaluating similarity of conditions. A court should con-
sider whether the experiment can be evaluated rationally with different condi-
tions and whether a reasonable expert in the field would rely upon it.44 These
considerations are quite sensible and are in accordance with the modem trend
of cases.45 Because the similarity of conditions is always relative, the central
question is the experiment's probative value. If differences between the exper-
The court concluded that Dr. Webster had arrived at his opinion from his many years of experi-
ence in examining teeth, noting that the dentist had expressly stated that he had made no mathe-
matical studies on this issue. 302 N.C. at 12, 273 S.E.2d at 280.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 13, 273 S.E.2d at 281. The court based this holding on Patterson v. State, 509
S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (evidence comparing teeth marks with defendant's teeth held
admissible).
41. 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 94, at 303-05.
42. 52 N.C. App. 166, 278 S.E.2d 579 (1981). Defendant bus driver was convicted of invol-
untary manslaughter and failing to stop at a red light. Defendant asserted that the brakes did not
respond. The State offered the testimony of a mechanic at the school bus garage concerning a test
performed on the brakes of the bus one half hour after the accident. The inoperable bus was
hooked up behind a wrecker and towed at approximately 5-10 miles per hour. When the brakes
were applied, the bus stopped. Defendant contended that the test was not conducted under condi-
tions that were sufficiently similar to those existing when the accident occurred. At the time of the
accident, defendant had driven the bus loaded with 35 students for some time through traffic,
frequently using the brake pedal.
43. Id. at 173, 278 S.E.2d at 585. Because the concept of substantial similarity is not easily
defined, the decision of the trial judge should be overturned only if it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Jones, 287 N.C. 84, 214 S.E.2d 24 (1975).
44. 52 N.C. App. at 173-74, 278 S.E.2d at 586 (quoting State v. Jones, 287 N.C. at 97-98, 214
S.E.2d at 33-34 (1975)).
45. See C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 202, at 485-88.
1982] EVIDENCE 1363
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW[
iment and the event in question are explainable and understandable by a jury
of average intelligence, the evidence should be admissible. In Wright the ex-
perimental evidence had probative value tending to show the normal braking
capacity of a vehicle. A requirement of an exact replication of conditions ex-
isting at the time of the accident was held to be neither reasonable nor neces-
sary, especially because the differences in the conditions were pointed out
clearly to the jury.
In Green v. Wellons, Inc.46 the.court of appeals discussed a significant
question often raised by the use of experimental evidence, namely, the weight
it should be given. After the party offering the evidence has demonstrated that
an experiment has sufficient similarity to the disputed event to render it admis-
sible, the probative value of the evidence becomes a question for the jury.47
The Green court considered the use of an experimental deposition taken at the
scene of plaintiff's injury. In an effort to establish that on the day of the acci-
dent plaintiff could have seen the objects over which she fell, defendant con-
ducted an experiment in which plaintiff placed the objects where they were
before she tripped over them, and then retraced her steps and actions on the
day of the fall. During the course of the experiment-deposition, plaintiff ad-
mitted that the objects were clearly visible. In reversing the trial court, the
court of appeals ruled that such an experiment, while admissible, did not auto-
matically entitle defendant to summary judgment, because replication of con-
ditions can never be exact. The decision not to allow the experimental result
to be conclusive is sensible because plaintiff continued to insist that she did not
see the rocks on the day of herfall until it was too late for her to avoid falling
over them.
The court of appeals also discussed the use of scientific evidence in State
v. Mears,48 expanding the 1981 holding of the state supreme court in State v.
Bass.49 In Bass defendant's fingerprint was found at the scene of the crime.
Defendant, however, presented a plausible explanation for its presence which
was perfectly consistent with a finding of innocence. Absent corroboration in
the form of real or circumstantial evidence of defendant's presence at the scene
46. 52 N.C. App. 529, 279 S.E.2d 37 (1981). Plaintiff sued a shopping center owner to recover
for injuries resulting from her fall over rocks lying on the shopping center's sidewalk. Durin the
taking of plaintitl's deposition at the shopping center under similar weather conditions, plaintiff
picked out several rocks, placed them where they had been on the sidewalk when she fell, walked
to her parked car and looked back. On this occasion, she was able to see the rocks. Based on the
deposition, the trial judge decided that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and
rendered summary judgment for the defendant.
47. Id. at 534, 278 S.E.2d at 41.
48. 54 N.C. App. 666, 284 S.E.2d 158 (1981). Defendant security guard was indicted for and
convicted of breaking and entering and larceny. The State's evidence centered around fifty dollars
taken from the vault of defendant's employer. After an earlier disappearance of cash, the sherfi's
office had dusted the money in the vault with an ultraviolet powder. Defendant was on the prem-
ises when the most recent shortage was discovered. Defendant was questioned by an officer and
exposed to ultraviolet light which revealed fluorescent particles on his clothing. Defendant testi-
fied that the source of the fluorescent particles on his arms and clothing was a product he had used
on the day of his arrest to fix a leak in his car's air conditioning system. The $50 was found in the
employee's restroom.
49. 303 N.C. 267, 278 S.E.2d 209 (1981).
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at the time of the crime, the court held that defendant was entitled to a
nonsuit.5
0
In Mears the evidence consisted of fluorescent particles found on defend-
ant's body and clothing, which were not retained by the State for comparison
or analysis. At both the time of questioning and at trial, defendant presented
an explanation for the presence of fluorescent material on his body that was
consistent with his innocence. The State presented no evidence tending to re-
fute this explanation and no other evidence tending to place defendant at the
scene of the crime. The court held that the use of such "scientific" evidence
requires the State to establish materiality through proven testing procedures,
and to preserve the particles for comparison by the fact finder. Because this
was not done, admission of the evidence was erroneous.
51
This holding is a proper and logical extension of State v. Bass. Finger-
print tests arguably are more reliable as scientific evidence than are fluorescent
particle tests because of the uniqueness of every fingerprint. Thus, a more
stringent standard should be applied to the use of fluorescent particle tests.




"Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a state-
ment made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show
the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter."
5 3
The court of appeals reached an arguably incorrect decision with respect
to the hearsay rule in Fisher v. Thompson,54 a negligence case arising from a
two-car collision. The jury found plaintiff to be contributorily negligent. At
trial defendant testified that a third party had said that this car was the second
that plaintiff had torn up. The court held that this evidence was not objection-
able because "Itihe statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, but only for the mere purpose of showing that the statement was
made."55 To conceive of any legitimate purpose that the statement could have
had other than proving the truth of the matter asserted is difficult.
56
50. Id. at 272, 278 S.E.2d at 212-13.
51. 54 N.C. App. at 668, 284 S.E.2d at 159.
52. 303 N.C. at 271-72, 278 S.E.2d at 212.
53. C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 246, at 584. See also Fed. R. Evid. 801(c): "'Hearsay' is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
In State v. Cleveland, 51 N.C. App. 159, 275 S.E.2d 284 (1981) the court held that "It]he
threat by defendant's confederate, made during their joint commission of the crime, was as com-
petent against defendant as it would have been against the confederate." Id. at 160, 275 S.E.2d at
285. The declaration was not offered to show the truth of the matter asserted, but as "part of the
totality of the circumstances in this case." Id. at 161, 275 S.E.2d at 285.
54. 50 N.C. App. 724, 275 S.E.2d 507 (1981).
55. Id. at 734, 275 S.E.2d at 515.
56. A second arguably erroneous ruling involved a police officer's testimony for the State that
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There also were several important cases in 1981 dealing with the res ges-
tae exception to the hearsay rule, and, more particularly, with spontaneous
utterances. The North Carolina Supreme Court discussed both terms in State
v. Marvin.57 The underlying premise for the spontaneous utterance exception
to the hearsay rule is that when a person responds to an unusual event before
having time to reflect on that response, it is more likely to be trustworthy. This
hearsay exception is a common-sense approach to the basic problem of hear-
say, the removal of relevant information from the trier of fact. When safe-
guarded by the use of a stringent definition of spontaneous utterance, this
hearsay exception becomes a valuable technique for determining the truth
without infringing upon the rights of the defendant. To be a spontaneous ut-
terance, the declaration must be (1) so spontaneous as to make reflection or
fabrication unlikely; (2) made at the same time as the transaction or be so
closely connected as essentially to be part of the event; and (3) relevant to the
facts at issue.58 In Marvin the supreme court ruled that a statement, made by
a participant in the robbery as he was carrying the stolen tools to the get-away
vehicle, that he "had the guard on the floor," was admissible as a spontaneous
utterance.59 Although the court applied the res gestae test properly, it well
may be time to reevaluate the usefulness of such a vague and ill-defined con-
cept.60 General principles of relevancy and trustworthiness may be more use-
ful in determining admissibility.
The supreme court decided two important cases involving the rule estab-
lished in State v. Smith.6' Justice Huskins, speaking for the court in Smith, set
forth the circumstances in which prior recorded testimony of a witness may be
admitted at a subsequent trial: (1) the witness is unavailable; (2) the proceed-
he did not have independent present recollection of the accident or subsequent investigations.
The court allowed the officer to testify using the written accident report as recorded recollection,
because all the requirements for recorded recollection were met. What the court failed to realize
was that the report contained hearsay. The report stated what the plaintiff and defendant each
had said. These out-of-court statements would have been inadmissible as hearsay if the officer
were testifying from his present memory; the fact that they were written did not cure the flaw.
57. 304 N.C. 523, 284 S.E.2d 289 (1981). The defendant was convicted of first degree mur-
der, felonious breaking and entering, felonious larceny and armed robbery.
58. 304 N.C. at 529-30, 284 S.E.2d at 293. See also Hargett v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co., 258 N.C. 10, 128 S.E.2d 26 (1962); Little v. Power Brake Co., 255 N.C. 451, 121 S.E.2d 889
(1961); Coley v. Phillips, 224 N.C. 618, 31 S.E.2d 757 (1944). See generally I D. Stansbury, supra
note 2, § 164, at 554.
59. 304 N.C. at 530, 284 S.E.2d at 294. See also State v. Hamlette, 302 N.C. 490, 276 S.E.2d
338 (1981) (applying the spontaneous utterance rule and emphasizing the spontaneity assumes
relevance).
60. Commentators and, less frequently, courts, have criticized use of the phrase resges-
tae. Its vagueness and imprecision are, of course, apparent. Moreover, traditional limi-
tations on the doctrine, such as the requirement that it be used only in regard to the
principal litigated fact and the frequent insistence of concurrence (or at least a close
relationship in time) between the words and the act or situation, have restricted its use-
fulness as a tool for avoiding unjustified application of the hearsay rule. . . . But it
seems clear that the law has now reached a stage at which this desirable policy of widen-
ing admissibility will be best served by other means.
C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 288, at 687. See also Cox v. State, 64 Ga. 374, 410 (1879); 6 J.
Wigmore, supra note 27, § 1767, at 253; Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admis-
sible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229 (1922).
61. 291 N.C. 505, 231 S.E.2d 663 (1977).
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ings at which the testimony was given was a former trial of the same cause, a
preliminary stage of the same cause or the trial of another cause involving the
issue and subject matter at which the testimony is directed; and (3) the current
defendants were present at the time and represented by counsel.62 In the first
case, State v. Graham,63 the supreme court carefully delineated those instances
in which the prior testimony of an unavailable material witness could be intro-
duced into evidence without violating the defendant's sixth amendment right
of confrontation.6 4 In order to protect the defendant's sixth amendment right
to confrontation, the opportunity to cross-examine must be more than theoret-
ical. In Graham this standard was not met for two reasons. At the first trial
defendant was accused of being an accessory before the fact. He therefore had
no motivation to cross-examine the witness about the elements of the crime
charged in the second trial, aiding and abetting. Furthermore, even if defend-
ant had the same motivation, any real opportunity was eliminated by the first
trial judge's instruction to limit the cross-examination to the issue of the pres-
ence of defendant at the homicide.65 Admission of the witness' prior testi-
mony in this situation would have been a flagrant violation of the sixth
amendment.
In the second case, Munchak Corp. v. Caldwell,66 the supreme court re-
viewed a case in which the court of appeals found what it believed to be a
situation not covered by Smith. The case involved a claim by plaintiff em-
ployer for reformation of an employment contract. Defendant counterclaimed
for specific performance. The trial court ordered that the two issues be tried
separately. The reformation issue was tried before a jury on January 3, 1977.
Over two years later, defendant's counterclaim for specific performance was
tried before a different judge sitting without a jury. Defendant was allowed to
offer into evidence the prior transcript without laying a foundation. The court
of appeals, reasoning that the two proceedings were but two parts of the same
case, stated that
62. Id. at 524, 231 S.E.2d at 675.
63. 303 N.C. 521, 279 S.E.2d 588 (1981). Defendant's previous prosecution as an accessory
before the fact was dismissed. Defendant subsequently was charged with aiding and abetting in
the same murder. A witness refused to testify at the subsequent trial, invoking his fifth amend-
ment right. The State attempted to offer into evidence the transcript of the witness' testimony at
the previous trial. The court, properly refused to allow the testimony in as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
64. "An exception to the sixth amendment right of confrontation exists where a material
witness is unavailable to testify, but has given testimony at a previous judicial proceeding against
the same defendant, and was subject to cross-examination by that defendant at the prior proceed-
ing." Id. at 522-23, 279 S.E.2d at 590. See also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). The
justification for allowing the prior testimony as substantive evidence is that defendant's right of
confrontation adequately was protected by the opportunity to cross-examine at the initial proceed-
ing. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968).
65. 303 N.C. at 525, 279 S.E.2d at 591.
66. 301 N.C. 689, 273 S.E.2d 281 (1981). On discretionary review, the supreme court held
that the trial court erred in permitting defendant to offer into evidence the transcript of the prior
proceeding without laying a proper foundation. The court, however, ruled that the error was
harmless when the proceeding at which the transcript was admitted was before a judge sitting
without a jury, and when, disregarding incompetent evidence, there was sufficient admissible-evi-
dence to support the court's necessary findings in its award of specific performance.
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[i]f the claim had been heard on the same day, the parties and the
judge would have been cognizant of and able to rely on evidence
presented on the claim for reformation .... To hold otherwise
would be to destroy the ability of trial judges to exercise discretion by
severing complicated cases into more understandable issues.
67
The supreme court disagreed:
[W]e are not presented here with a situation in which a case is sepa-
rated into issues to be heard at different times by the same judge or
jury. In the case, the evidence was heard by a jury in the action on
the complaint. That prior proceeding was presided over by Judge
Kivett. Some two years later,.the matter of defendant's counterclaim
came on for trial before Judge Mills. The transcript constituted out-
of-court statements, and, assuming that it was offered to prove the
truth of the matters contained therein and was therefore hearsay, we
hold that . . . it was inadmissible absent the laying of a proper
foundation.
68
D. Prior Acts as Substantive Evidence
Evidence of a defendant's prior crimes is not admissible under North
Carolina law to prove that the defendant subsequently committed another
crime. 69 This well-established rule is subject to the equally well-establishd
exception that evidence of prior crimes will be admitted when relevant to some
other fact logically related to guilt.70 Evidence of prior crimes may be admis-
sible, for example, to show motive,
71 intent,72 identity73 or state of mind.
74
Other well-recognized exceptions allow the evidence to be admitted to show a
common scheme, plan or design.75 Expansive interpretation of these excep-
tions at times has threatened to swallow the rule.
76
67. 46 N.C. App. 414, 417, 265 S.E.2d 654, 657 (1980), modified, 301 N.C. 689, 273 S.E.2d
281 (1981).
68. 301 N.C. at 693, 273 S.E.2d at 284-85. See text accompanying note 61 supra for a discus-
sion of the necessary foundation.
69. State v. MeClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954).
70. Id. One often-quoted statement of the rule is as follows:
Evidence of other offenses is inadmissible on the issue of guilt if its only relevancy is to
show the character of the accused or his disposition to commit an offense of the nature of
the one charged; but if it tends to prove any other relevant fact it will not be excluded
merely because it also shows him to have been guilty of an independent crime.
I D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 91, at 289-90.
71. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 303 N.C. 185, 278 S.E.2d 238 (1981).
72. See, e.g., State v. Searles, 304 N.C. 149, 282 S.E.2d 430 (1981).
73. See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 303 N.C. 299, 278 S.E.2d 207 (1981).
74. See, e.g., State v. Rick, 51 N.C. App. 383, 276 S.E.2d 768, afi'd, 304 N.C. 356, 283 S.E.2d
512 (1981).
75._ See, e.g., State v. Williams, 303 N.C. 507, 279 S.E.2d 592 (1981). Discriminating between
evidence showing a common scheme and that showing propensity (forbidden under the general
rule) is often difficult. For a discussion of this distinction, see 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 27, § 304,
at 202-05.
76. See, e.g., State v. May, 292 N.C. 644, 665, 235 S.E.2d 178, 191 (Exum, J., in dissent,
stating: "Under the majority's holding the rule against admitting such evidence is totally abro-
gated."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928 (1977); State v. Arnold, 284 N.C. 41, 199 S.E.2d 423 (1973)
(commented on in I D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 92 n.97 (Supp. 1979)); State v. McClain, 282
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Reassuringly, several 1981 cases demonstrated judicial willingness to find
error in substantive misuse of evidence of prior crimes. In State v. Taylor
77
the North Carolina Supreme Court found error78 in the trial court's allowing
use of prior crimes evidence against a defendant charged with murder, armed
robbery, aggravated kidnapping and assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to kill. Defendant apparently had been involved in a number of incidents over
a five-day period,79 but the charges had not been consolidated for trial. In this
trial on charges relating to the third and fourth victim, the State introduced
testimony of the second victim regarding assertions made to her by defendant
of prior crimes similar to those for which he later was tried. The State argued
that the evidence was admissible because the acts "constitute[d] an overall
plan by this defendant to steal cars and to kidnap and rape women."80 The
prosecution pointed out that testimony about the same prior crimes was held
admissible by the supreme court in a previous trial against this same defend-
ant for crimes committed against the second victim. The supreme court held
that its prior ruling of inadmissibility was inapplicable to this trial because the
kidnap victim here was male, and because no rape was involved in the inci-
dent for which defendant was being tried. Thus, the evidence did not tend to
establish an overall plan to kidnap this victim and therefore was
inadmissible.81
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found reversible error in two cases
involving substantive use of evidence of prior acts. In State v. Mca4dams
82
defendant was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter after his gun fired
while he was cleaning it, killing his wife. The State introduced testimony that
the day before the shooting defendant had, in the course of cleaning his gun,
pointed it toward a neighbor. The court of appeals pointed out that this evi-
dence was relevant only to establish "a culpably negligent disposition: and was
thus improperly and prejudicially admitted."
83
Although North Carolina courts traditionally have been liberal in admit-
ting evidence of prior sex crimes in cases involving similar sex offenses,84 the
N.C. 357, 193 S.E.2d 108 (1972) (same); State v. Rick, 51 N.C. App. 383, 276 S.E.2d 768, affd 304
N.C. 356, 283 S.E.2d 512 (1981) (Webb, J., dissenting).
77. 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981).
78. Because of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant apart from the erroneously
admitted evidence, however, the error was held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
270, 283 S.E.2d at 775.
79. Examination of published opinions of defendant's earlier trial suggests that the sequence
of events was as follows: defendant kidnapped, raped and stole the car of a female (State v.
Taylor, 301 N.C. 164,270 S.E.2d 409 (1980)); following his release, he kidnapped, raped, and stole
the car of a second female, murdered a third female and kidnapped, shot, and stole the car of a
male, all occurring between August 28 and September 1, 1978. The trial that was the subject of
the 1981 opinion did not include charges relating to the first two victims.
80. 304 N.C. at 269, 283 S.E.2d at 775.
81. Id. at 270, 283 S.E.2d at 775.
82. 51 N.C. App. 140, 275 S.E.2d 500 (1981).
83. Id. at 143, 275 S.E.2d at 502. While a series of such incidents might be admissible as
habit, see 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 95, at 306 n.23, one such incident clearly falls short.
84. E.g., State v. Williams, 303 N.C. 507, 279 S.E.2d 592 (1981); 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2,
§ 92, at 299.
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court of appeals found reversible error in such admission in State v. Pace.85 In
that case defendant, charged with rape, relied upon a consent defense. The
State called a witness who testified that she had been raped by defendant some
months before. Defendant admitted intercourse with the witness but alleged
consent. In reversing the trial court's refusal to exclude the State's evidence of
prior acts, the court of appeals pointed out that the evidence could not come in
under the identity exception because identity was not at issue in the case, nor
were there sufficient similarities in the alleged acts to invoke the common
scheme or modus operandi exceptions. 8 6 Because the evidence was relevant
only to show a disposition on the part of defendant to commit sex crimes, and
because the defense relied to such a great extent on defendant's credibility, the
court of appeals reversed the conviction.
87
These decisions are entirely consistent with the policies underlying the
prohibition against substantive use of prior act evidence.88 The analysis in all
three cases is clear, and should provide substantial guidance to members of the
legal profession. In particular, the court's decision in Pace serves notice that
even the court's oft-noted leniency in admitting such evidence in sex-crime
cases is not without bounds.
E. Cautionary Instructions
The cautionary istruction is a means of controlling the evidence consid-
ered by the jury.89 It may be used to restrict the use of evidence admitted for a
limited purpose9° or to exclude entirely from the jury's consideration evidence
that, although inadmissible, nevertheless found its way to the jury.91 The rules
in North Carolina regarding the use of the cautionary instruction are for the
most part fairly clear. The instruction may be given upon the motion of coun-
sel, or the court may act ex mero motu.92 The time at which the instruction is
given is discretionary; the court may act immediately, or it may wait until its
final charge to the jury.93 It is presumed that the jury disregards evidence
removed from its consideration by instruction,94 but this presumption may be
overcome by a showing that the nature of the evidence or its manner of pres-
entation rendered implausible the jury's ability to comply with the instruc-
85. 51 N.C. App. 79, 275 S.E.2d 254 (1981).
86. Id. at 83-84, 275 S.E.2d at 256.
87. Id.
88. For an excellent discussion of the policies underlying the general rule see State v. Mc-
Clain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954).
89. See I J. Wigmore, supra note 27, §§ 13, 19.
90. See, e.g., Hood v. Queen City Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534, 107 S.E.2d 154 (1959) (limited as
to purpose); Brown v. Whitley, 12 N.C. App. 306, 183 S.E.2d 258 (1971) (limited as to party).
91. See, e.g., Hill v. Pinelawn Memorial Park, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 231, 275 S.E.2d 838, rev'd
on other grounds, 304 N.C. 159, 282 S.E.2d 779 (1981) (jury admonished to disregard improper
question).
92. State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 215, 241 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1978).
93. Id. If given promptly, the instruction need not be repeated at the end of trial in the
absence of counsel's request for repetition. State v. Billups, 301 N.C. 607, 272 S.E.2d 842 (1981).
94. State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 226 S.E.2d 629 (1976); State v. Hawley, 54 N.C. App.
293, 283 S.E.2d 387 (1981).
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tion.9 5 Failure to make an affirmative request for a cautionary instruction
constitutes waiver of the right to have the jury so instructed.96 Therefore, ab-
sent unusual circumstances, 97 failure to instruct will not result in appellate
reversal when no request was made by counsel.
Two significant 1981 cases questioned the sufficiency of protection against
prejudicial use of inadmissible evidence provided by cautionary instructions.
In State v. Silva 98 the jury in a criminal trial was informed of the results of a
search subsequently held to have been illegal. A curative instruction was de-
livered by the court following belated voir dire on the legality of the search.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the instruction provided insuffi-
cient protection against prejudice to the defendant. 99
Cautionary instructions received different treatment from the North Car-
olina Court of Appeals in Fideli y Bank v. Garner,100 an action to collect the
balance due on a note from an accomodation endorser. In closing argument,
plaintiff's counsel stated that defendant previously had been convicted of per-
jury. Because this was the first mention of any such conviction, 101 there was
no suppporting evidence in the record. The court promptly instructed the jury
to disregard the statement, denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. The
court of appeals, relying on the rule that the jury is presumed to disregard
evidence when instructed to do so, upheld the trial court's action. 102 In a
strong dissent Judge Becton argued that the jury could not help but be influ-
enced by the attorney's statement, despite the cautionary instruction.103
95. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Winebarger, 300 N.C. 57, 265 S.E.2d 227 (1980); State v.
Britt, 288 N.C. 699, 220 S.E.2d 283 (1975).
96. State v. Wright, 304 N.C. 349, 356, 283 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1981).
97. See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 241 S.E.2d 65 (1978). In Locklear the prosecut-
ing attorney said to a defense witness, "[You are lying through your teeth and you know you are
playing with a perury count; don't you?" Id. at 214, 241 S.E.2d at 68. Although no timely objec-
tion was made, the trial court's failure to suppress the comments ex mero molu was held reversible
error. The supreme court stated that the trial court has a duty to intervene in cases of "flagrant
and prejudicial misconduct of counsel." Id. at 218, 241 S.E.2d at 70. But cf. State v. Jordan, 49
N.C. App. 560, 272 S.E.2d 405 (1980) (prosecutor's statement to defense witness that "[y]ou know
that is a lie don't you?" not so improper as to invoke exception to general waiver rule).
When a motion to strike is granted, the better practice is immediately to instruct the jury to
disregard the witness' answer. Vandiver v. Vandiver, 50 N.C. App. 319, 323, 274 S.E.2d 243, 246,
disc. review denied, 302 N.C. 634, 280 S.E.2d 449 (1981). Failure to do so, however, is unlikely to
amount to prejudicial error, the court will assume that the trial judge's sustaining of counsel's
motions to strike alerted the jury that the evidence was inadmissible. Id.
98. 304 N.C. 122, 282 S.E.2d 449 (1981).
99. While the general rule is that an instruction that evidence is not to be considered
.. . cures any error in its admission.... the rule is inapplicable when the error admit-
ting the evidence is of constitutional dimension. [In a such a case,] prejudice is pre-
sumed, and the burden is on the State to prove otherwise.
Id. at 133, 282 S.E.2d at 456.
100. 52 N.C. App. 60, 277 S.E.2d 811 (1981).
101. There was, however, evidence of a different conviction (for insurance fraud) for which
the defendant had received a full pardon. Id. at 64-65, 277 S.E.2d at 814.
102. Id. at 65, 277 S.E.2d at 814.
103. The dissent quoted extensively from State v. Britt, 288 N.C. 699, 220 S.E.2d 283 (1975),
stating that the principles set forth in that case should control. Britt involved a criminal trial in
which a prosecutor introduced inadmissible evidence in the course of cross-examination of a de-
fendant being tried for murder. Defendant previously had been sentenced to death for the identi-
cal offense, but was being retried following reversal of his conviction by the North Carolina
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The solution to the problem presented in Fidelity Bank is not as clear as
was the case in Silva or State v. Britt. 104 Those cases involved criminal trials,
in which the juries repeatedly were exposed to inadmissible and prejudicial
evidence. 105 Fidelity Bank, on the other hand, involved a civil action that had
proceeded without serious incident until closing arguments, at which point a
single reference to inadmissible evidence occurred. The trial court's refusal to
grant a mistrial, and the court of appeals' refusal to reverse, are thus not with-
out logical support. Nevertheless, as the dissent pointed out, it is virtually
impossible to believe that the jury could have been unaffected by information
having such apparent and devastating relevance. 10 6 Furthermore, as also was
suggested by the dissent in Fideliy Bank,10 7 the majority decision provides
little incentive to attorneys to avoid making such arguments, for they may be
secure in the knowledge that a cautionary instruction will protect them.
F Opinion
North Carolina courts decided several cases involving opinion evi-
dence.'08 In Combs v. Woodie' 09 the court of appeals held that the trial court
committed error sufficient to require a new trial by allowing surveyors to state
their opinions of the location of the true boundary lines between two parties'
properties.110
In North Carolina a surveyor may give his opinion about whether a mark
or an object is a boundary of some tract of land, but the surveyor may not give
Supreme Court. The court explained this to the jury in a cautionary instruction necessitated by
the prosecutor's reference to the events leading up to the trial. The prosecutor's improper conduct
in this and several other instances led the North Carolina Supreme Court to reverse defendant's
conviction yet again. The court stated, "[Slome transgressions are so gross and their effect so
highly prejudicial that no curative instruction will suffice to remove the adverse impression from
the minds of the jurors." Id. at 713, 220 S.E.2d at 292. The dissent in Fidelity Bank rested its
argument on this statement and others like it in Britt. 52 N.C. App. at 66-69, 277 S.E.2d at 214-16
(Becton, J., dissenting).
104. 288 N.C. 699, 220 S.E.2d 283 (1975). See note 103 supra.
105. A cautionary instruction is, of course, less likely to be effective if exposure is repeated.
Duke Power v. Winebarger, 300 N.C. 57, 265 S.E.2d 227 (1980). In State v. Jones, 54 N.C. App.
482, 283 S.E.2d 546 (1981), the court dealt with this problem in an interesting fashion. In that
case, a court reporter, acting at the jury's request, read back testimony of an expert witness, in-
cluding portions that had been stricken at trial. Because the reporter had read back the cautionary
instruction as well, the court held that the error was non-prejudicial.
106. "It is hard to imagine a more damaging and damning statement. It is folly to believe that
all twelve jurors were able completely and totally to erase the. . . statement from their minds."
52 N.C. App. at 67, 277 S.E.2d at 815.
107. "This court should not sanction the type of argument in this case and should not 'open
the door for advocates generally to engage in vilification and abuse-a practice which may be all
too frequent, but which the law rightfully holds in reproach.' Id. at 68, 277 S.E.2d at 816 (quot-
ing State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 660, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967)) (Becton, J., dissenting).
108. In State v. Wells, 52 N.C. App. 311, 278 S.E.2d 527 (1981), the court of appeals held that
the trial court's admission of the investigating officer's opinion of the location of the impact in an
automobile collision was error. Id. at 314, 278 S.E.2d at 529. The court said that although the
officer was competent to testify on the condition and position of the vehicles and other physical
facts observed by him at the scene, testimony of his conclusions about the traffic lane in which he
believed the accident occurred was incompetent because it invaded the province of tle jury. Id.
109. 53 N.C. App. 789, 281 S.E.2d 705 (1981).
110. Id. at 790, 281 S.E.2d at 706.
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his opinion of the boundary's location (relative to a specific tract of land),
because this is a simple question of fact, not a question of science or skill."'
The surveyor is limited to relating facts within his knowledge when giving
evidence on the boundaries of land. 112 The effect of the North Carolina rule is
to refuse to recognize both that a surveyor is an expert and that the location of
property boundaries is a proper subject for expert testimony.
The North Carolina rule has been criticized for this very reason.' 3 In-
deed, this rule appears to be a deviation from the typipal rule structure con-
cerning expert opinions.' 14 Clearly, if the dispositive question is whether the
issue "is one on which the witness can be helpful to the jury because of his
superior knowledge,"" 5 there is no persuasive rationale for the consistent re-
fusal by the North Carolina courts to allow surveyors to give their opinions
about the location of a boundary. "However, the rule is firmly ensconced in
the law in this State, and the Supreme Court has not seen fit to change it.'
'116
When next presented with this issue, the supreme court should seize the oppor-
tunity to eliminate this antiquated rule of law.
In State v. Loren 17 the supreme court upheld the trial court's admission
of testimony by the arresting officer in a first degree rape case that defendant
was acting as if he was trying to hide something."18 The court reasoned that
this testimony constituted a shorthand statement of fact, since it was impracti-
cable for the officer to so describe defendant's actions as to allow the jury to
draw the conclusion." 9
In In re Peirce12 0 a social worker testified on an issue that required an
expert opinion. Defendant objected but was overruled by the trial court.
121
The court of appeals held that by overruling the defendant's objection the trial
111. Stevens v. West, 51 N.C. 49, 53 (1858).
112. 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 130, at 416.
113. Wigmore, for example, believes that the North Carolina rule is based on poor analogies
and argues for the contrary position:
[I]f [the witness] is offering his judgment, being that of an experienced observer familiar
with the ground, as to the specific actual place signified by a mark or line named in the
description, his testimony is admissible; for in the latter case he has what the court can-
not possibly have, namely, an acquaintance with the features of the land and the other
data which were probably associated in the mind of the map-maker or deed-maker with
the phrases used and are therefore essential to be considered in interpreting the language
of the description.
7 J. Wigmore, supra note 27, § 1956, at 110.
114. See generally 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, §§ 132-37; 6 J. Strong, North Carolina Index,
Evidence §§ 47-49.3, at 124-43 (3d ed. 1976).
115. 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 134, at 33.
116. 53 N.C. App. at 792, 281 S.E.20t at 707.
117. 302 N.C. 607, 276 S.E.2d 365 (1981).
118. The officer's actual testimony and the question that elicited it were as follows:
Q. What exactly did you see him do?
A. I had my headlights on and my spotlight on him in the driver's seat and I could see
him moving around like he was trying to do something, hide something or do something.
[d. at 610, 276 S.E.2d at 367.
119. Id. at 611, 276 S.E.2d at 367-68.
120. 53 N.C. App. 373, 281 S.E.2d 198 (1981).
121. Id. at 384, 281 S.E.2d at 205.
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judge implicitly found that the witness was qualified as an expert. 122
In State v. Boone,123 a prosecution for armed robbery and kidnapping,
the supreme court affirmed the well-settled principle in North Carolina that
lay opinion may be received concerning the mental capacity of a defendant in
a criminal case.' 24 The court also held that it was error for the trial court to
exclude the testimony of a deputy sheriff who, after observing the defendant
set fire to the bed in his cell, testified that defendant was "totally unaware of
what he was doing."'125 North Carolina allows opinion evidence by non-ex-
perts concerning the irrational acts of an accused that occur proximately to the
time of the alleged offense.
126
0. Testimony 2 7
In State v. Miller 128 a professor of pathology and regional pathologist in
the Chief Medical Examiner's office was offered as an expert witness to give
testimony of the size, or gauge, of a murder weapon.129 The supreme court
held that the witness was properly qualified as an expert forensic pathologist
122. Id. The witness had four years of experience as a social worker. See also State v. Shaw,
293 N.C. 616, 239 S.E.2d 439 (1977), and 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 133, at 428-32, for
discussion regarding the qualifications of expert witnesses.
123. 302 N.C. 561, 276 S.E.2d 354 (1981).
124. Id. at 565, 276 S.E.2d at 357. Defendant's father was asked on cross-examination
whether defendant knew right from wrong. See State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E.2d 595
(1976). See generally 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 127.
125. 302 N.C. at 565, 276 S.E.2d at 357. This error, however, was found to be non-prejudicial.
126. Id.
127. In State v. Duvall, 50 N.C. App. 684, 275 S.E.2d 842, disc. review denied, 302 N.C. 399,
279 S.E.2d 358 (1981), the court of appeals held that an expert psychiatrist's opinion whether
defendant had suffered panic upon discovery of the victim's body was properly excluded. Because
the psychiatrist had met with defendant only once, for the purpose of preparing for trial, the
conversation with defendant therefore lacked inherent reliability. Id. at 698-99, 275 S.E.2d at
853-54. For a discussion of the inherent reliability standard, see Survey of Developments in
North Carolina Law, 1980-Evidence, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1182-86 (1980).
In Board of Transp. v. Lyckan Deve. Co., 53 N.C. App. 511, 281 S.E.2d 84 (1981), the court
of appeals allowed an expert to give his opinion, based in part on a city development plan, of the
merits of future developmental possibilities of a particular tract of land. Id. at 512, 281 S.E.2d at
85. The court said that the expert's description of the plan, which was not in evidence, was only
part of the basis for his expert opinion, and that there was no ground for a hearsay objection
because the truth of the plan was not asserted. Id.
In Alva v. Cloninger, 51 N.C. App. 602, 277 SE.2d 535 (1981), the court of appeals ruled that
the trial court erroneously excluded testimony from an expert real estate appraiser about the
standard of care for a competent appraiser. The court stated that "in response to properly phrased
questions an expert should be allowed to assist the jury in determining the duties of a competent
appraiser." Id. at 612, 277 S.E.2d at 541. See also Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159
N.C. 327, 74 S.E. 885 (1912) (expert witnesses declared 'core maker to be incompetent).
In Memorial Hosp. v. Brown, 50 N.C. App. 526, 274 S.E.2d 277 (1981), the court of appeals
held that the trial court erroneously refused to allow the hospital's credit manager to give his
opinion of the reasonableness of the amount the hospital was trying to recover from defendant.
The court also found error in the trial court's refusal to allow defendant's personal physician to
give his opinion testimony of the reasonableness of the surgical charge portion of defendant's bills.
In the appellate court's view, the experience and qualifications of both witnesses made them
competent to give their opinions and to help the jury reach a conclusion on the issue of the
reasonableness of the hospital's charges. Id. at 530, 274 S.E.2d at 280.
128. 302 N.C. 572, 276 S.E.2d 417 (1981).
129. Id. at 580, 276 S.E.2d at 421-22.
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whose skills included determining the nature of the instrumentality causing an
injury.' 3
0
In State v. Puckett,13 1 however, the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's refusal to allow a witness qualified as an expert in the field of pathol-
ogy to testify about the results of a toxicologic analysis of a murder victim's
body. The court of appeals reasoned that the witness qualified as an expert
only in the field of pathology, and noted that the toxicologic examination was
completed by someone not under the pathologist's supervision.'
32
In Cochran v. City of Charlotte133 the trial court allowed expert testimony
as to the adverse effect on plaintiff's properties caused by the extension of an
airport runway.134 The court of appeals held that the witnesses were qualified
as experts due to their experience and knowledge of the value of property in
the airport area, even though the witnesses' familiarity with the history of the
effect of the airport upon the value of surrounding properties was not estab-
lished.' 35 In another aspect of this case, the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's refusal to admit the testimony of a witness stipulated to be "an expert
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineer, specializing in the field of Acoustics in
Noise and Vibration Control." 136 The witness was called to testify on the ef-
fect of noise on humans, but there was nothing in the record that established a
special expertise by the witness in the field of the effect of noise on humans.
37
In 1981 the General Assembly enacted a statute eliminating the require-
ment that expert testimony be given only in response to hypothetical questions
and establishing the conditions under which an expert must disclose the un-
derlying facts or data upon which his opinion is based.13 8 The new law
promises to simplify the introduction of expert testimony and will have a de-
cided impact on the conduct of trials in this state.
H. Statutory Developments
1. Privilege for Records of Medical Review Committees
The General Assembly enacted a statute in 1981 restricting the admissi-
bility of records, proceedings and other materials of medical review commit-
tees in civil actions against providers of health services. 139 In essence, the
130. Id.
131. 54 N.C. App. 576, 284 S.E.2d 326 (1981).
132. Id. at 580, 284 S.E.2d at 328. The court noted that exclusion of such testimony was within
the discretion of the trial court. Id.
133. 53 N.C. App. 390, 281 S.E.2d 179 (1981).
134. Id. at 398, 281 S.E.2d at 186. The experts were real estate appraisers.
135. Id. at 398-99, 281 S.E.2d at 186-87.
136. Id. at 403, 281 S.E.2d at 189.
137. Id.
138. Law of June 11, 1981, ch. 543, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 816 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 8-58.12 to -58.14 (1981)).
139. Law of June 29, 1981, ch. 725, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1062 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 131-170 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). The Act provides as follows:
The proceedings of, records and materials produced by, and the materials considered by
a committee are not subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action
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statute grants a limited privilege to hospitals in medical malpractice cases.
The policy underlying the statute is to allow physicians and other health care
personnel to discuss more openly all of the factors in a given case and thus
ultimately to produce better medical care for society. From the point of view
of the patient injured by negligent medical care, however, the statute may
deny access to valuable and often essential information necessary if the patient
is to bring a claim for relief.
2. Spousal Competency
At common law, husbands and wives were incompetent to testify either
for or against each other in both civil and criminal cases.140 Today, the com-
mon-law rule in civil actions has been widely abrogated by statute.141 With
certain exceptions, a husband or wife now may testify for or against the other
in criminal actions without interference by the old common-law bar.142
One aspect of the common law of spousal competency that did not change
was the so-called "Mansfleld rule."' 143 Under this rule a husband or wife was
not permitted to testify to the husband's non-access to his wife during the pe-
riod in which conception occurred. As it was colorfully put, neither spouse
was allowed to "bastardize the issue. ' 144
In 1981 the Mansfield rule was abolished by the enactment of G.S. 8-57.2,
which permits either a husband or wife to testify on "any relevant matter" in
cases in which paternity is an issue.1 45 The reasons for the old rule have been
against a provider of professional health services arising out of the matters which are the
subject of evaluation and review by the committee, and no person who was in attendance
at a meeting of the committee shall be required to testify in any civil action as to any
evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of the commit-
tee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions of the
committee or its members. However, information, documents, or records otherwise
available are not immune from discovery or use in a civil action merely because they
were presented during proceedings of the committee nor should any person who testifies
before the committee or who is a member of the committee be prevented from testifying
as to matters within his knowledge, but the witness cannot be asked about his testimony
before the committee or opinions formed by him as a result of the committee hearings.
140. C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 66, at 144-46.
141. Id. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-56 (1981).
142. The law on spousal testimony in criminal actions underwent substantial change in 1981
as a result of the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 276
S.E.2d 450 (1981). For a thorough discussion of that case, see Note, State v. Freeman: Adverse
Marital Testimony in North Carolina Criminal Actions: Can Spousal Testimony Be Compelled?,
60 N.C.L. Rev. 874 (1982). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1981).
143. Application of the Mansfteld rule in North Carolina is discussed in I D. Stansbury, supra
note 2, § 61. For cases applying the rule, see, e.g., Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d
562 (1968); Wake County Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Bailey v. Matthews, 36 N.C. App.
316, 244 S.E.2d 191 (1978).
144. Goodright v. Moss, Cowp. 591 (1777), quoted in 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 61, at
194.
145. Law of June 22, 1981, ch. 634, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 918. The new statute reads
as follows:
Whenever an issue of paternity of a child born or conceived during a marriage arises in
any civil or criminal proceeding, the presumed father or the mother of such child is
competent to give evidence as to any relevant matter regarding paternity of the child,
including nonaccess to the present or former spouse, regardless of any privilege which
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long unclear; although not serving as a bar to the admission of other evidence
of paternity, it served to render inaccessible what was arguably the best evi-
dence on the point. The new law should significantly simplify proceedings in
an area in which proof is often difficult to produce.
3. Photographs
In 1981 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a statute allowing
the introduction of photographs and photographic representations as substan-
tive evidence. The statute provides as follows:
Any party may introduce a photograph, video tape, motion picture,
X-ray or other photographic representation as substantive evidence
upon laying a proper foundation and meeting other applicable evi-
dentiary requirements. This section does not prohibit a party from
introducing a photograph or other pictorial representation solely for
the purpose of illustrating the testimony of a witness.
146
The legislature thus eliminated the irrational distinction that has prevailed in
North Carolina since 1929 between photographs as substantive evidence and
photographs as illustrative eivdence.147
Prior to enactment of G.S. 8-97, the general rule in North Carolina was
that photographs and similar representations were admissible only for the lim-
ited purpose of illustrating the testimony of a witness. 48 Although the rule
was criticized severely, 149 the North Carolina courts consistently refused to
eliminate the illustrative-substantive distinction,' 50 choosing instead to make
exceptions to the rule.1t 5
In eliminating this distinction, G.S. 8-97 places North Carolina in line
with other jurisdictions that have ignored the illustrative-substantive distinc-
tion. 152 Once a proper foundation has been established, photographs and sim-
ilar representations will now be admissible either as substantive evidence or as
illustrative evidence. The nature of the authentication required for the intro-
may otherwise apply. No parent offering such evidence shall thereafter be prosecuted
based upon that evidence for any criminal act involved in the conception of the child
whose paternity is in issue and/or for whom support is sought, except for perjury com-
mitted in this testimony.
146. Law of May 26, 1981, ch. 451, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess 718 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 8-97 (1981)).
147. See Huneycutt v. Cherokee Brick Co., 196 N.C. 558, 146 S.E. 229 (1929). For a discus-
sion of the early development of this rule in North Carolina, see Gardner, The Camera Goes to
Court, 24 N.C.L. Rev. 233 (1946).
148. State v. Bass, 249 N.C. 209, 105 S.E.2d 645 (1958).
149. See, e.g., 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 34, at 98-100; C. McCormick, supra note 1,
§ 214, at 530-34; 3 J. Wigmore, supra note 27, § 790; Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1979-Evidence, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1456-59 (1979).
150. See, e.g., State v. Jeffers, 48 N.C. App. 663, 269 S.E.2d 731 (1980) (Judge Webb noting
that the distinction was "still very much alive" in North Carolina). For a discussion of State v.
Jeffers, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980-Evidence, 59 N.C.L. Rev.
1191-92 (1980).
151. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 297 N.C. 447, 255 S.E.2d 182 (1979) (photograph of shoe sole
impression admitted as substantive evidence); State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973)
(photographs of fingerprints admitted as substantive evidence).
152. See, e.g., Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1016 (Ind. App. 1979).
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duction of photographs introduced for substantive purposes is the same as that
for photographs introduced solely for illustrative purposes, except that a wit-
ness need not first describe the scene.153 For photographic representations
such as X-rays and hidden: cameras a different foundation probably will be
required. Pictures such as these may be authenticated by showing that, in gen-
eral, the process by which such a picture is made is accurate and reliable and
that the particular photograph sought to be admitted was properly made.154
With the enactment of G.S. 8-97, North Carolina finally recognizes that
technological developments have made photographic evidence an accurate
and reliable evidentiary form. By eliminating the unnecessary illustrative-
substantive distinction, the legislature has authorized the use of a properly
authenticated photograph as a "silent witness,"' 55 and not merely as an illus-
tration of the testimony of a witness.
JAY MICHAEL GOFFMAN
MARTIN L. HOLTON, III
DONA LEWANDOWSKI
153. Interview with Kenneth Broun, Dean of the University of North Carolina School of Law
and contributing author of C. McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence (2d ed. 1972), in
Chapel Hill, N.C. (February 10, 1982). For a discussion of the requirements for authenticating
photographs under the old rule, see 1 D. Stansbury, supra note 2, § 34.
154. See Spivey v. Newman, 232 N.C. 281, 59 S.E.2d 844 (1950); 3 J. Wigmore, supra note 27,
§ 795, at 244.
155. See 3 J. Wigmore, supra note 27, § 790, at 220.
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VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. The Parent-Child Jelationshop
1. Establishing Paternity'
In 1981 the North Carolina General Assembly amended G.S. 49-142 to
eliminate the statute of limitations in civil actions to establish paternity. The
former version of the statute had allowed these actions only when brought
within either a) "three years next after the birth of the child,' 3 or b) "three
years next after the date of the last payment by the putative father for the
support of the child, whether such last payment was made within three years
of the birth of such child or thereafter."4 The amended-statute permits a suit
to establish paternity to be commenced at any time prior to the death of the
putative father.5
This amendment places the statute in compliance with the 1980 decision
in County ofLenoir ex rel Cogdell v. Johnson.6 In Cogdell the court of appeals
held G.S. 49-14(c)(1) to be violative of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution.7 The General Assembly
obviously realized that G.S. 49-14(c)(2) was equally defective and eliminated
both subdivisions.
In another action relating to paternity, the General Assembly added a
1. In Durham County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Williams, 52 N.C. App. 112,277 S.E.2d 865
(1981), the court of appeals interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-132(a) (Cune. Supp. 1981) very
literally. According to this statute a court is permitted to approve a father's acknowledgment of
paternity when it is "accompanied" by the mother's corresponding statement of his paternity. Id.
In the Williams case defendant submitted his acknowledgment of paternity to the court on
September 24, 1979; on October 2, 1979, the court decreed defendant to be the father and ordered
support. Seven days later the mother executed and submitted her statement. Defendant later
moved to have the judgment set aside for lack ofjurisdiction. The trial court denied this motion.
The court of appeals, however, held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a decree
of paternity or support as the defendant's acknowledgment of paternity was not accompanied by
the mother's affirmation.
2. Law of June 17, 1981, ch. 599, § 14, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 870, 872 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-14 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
3. Law of June 29, 1967, ch. 993, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1426 (current version at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 49-14 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
4. Id.
5. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-14(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
6. 46 N.C. App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980). This case is treated in Survey of Developments
in North Carolina Law, 1980-Family Law, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1194, 1205-07 (1981).
7. 46 N.C. App. at 189, 264 S.E.2d at 821. The court agreed with petitioner that the statute
was discriminatory in that no statute of limitations applies to actions for support brought by the
mother of a legitimate child. The court then had to determine the constitutionality of this discrim-
ination. To do so the Cogdell court employed a form of judicial review involving less than strict
scrutiny but more than ordinary scrutiny. Id. at 186, 264 S.E.2d at 819. The court based its
ultimate decision of unconstitutionality on several rationales. First, a child is entitled to support
from its father until majority; therefore, such a claim is never stale. The purpose of a statute of
limitations-to avoid litigation of stale claims-is therefore not served. Second, the court rejected
the defendant father's contention that the statute of limitations is necessary to avoid fraudulent
claims. Id. at 188, 264 S.E.2d at 821. Finally, the court seriously questioned the statute of limita-
tions in light of advances in blood-typing tests. Id. at 188-89, 264 S.E.2d at 821. See Comment,
The Use of Blood Tests in Actions to Determine Paternity, 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 591 (1980).
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new section, G.S. 8-57.2, 8 which enables the presumed father or mother of a
child to testify in any action (civil or criminal) in which paternity is at issue.
This section9 expressly overrules the common-law rule in North Carolina that
neither spouse can "bastardize" a child by testifying to the husband's nonac-
cess to the wife at the time of conception.' 0
Before G.S. 8-57.2 was ratified, the court of appeals had already judicially
repudiated the common-law rule of parental incompetency. In Wake County
ex rel Manning v. GreenI I the court held that the rule had outlived its purpose
of protecting a child from "illegitimacy" that would deprive the child of legal
and property rights. According to the court, such deprivations have been
largely ameliorated by the United States Supreme Court in recent years.' 2 The
Manning court concluded that spousal testimony was the best evidence on the
issue of access and should be admissible.'
3
The Manning court also dealt with the presumption of the legitimacy of a
child born within marriage. The court was required to define the standard of
proof necessary to rebut this presumption in a civil suit.14 Some North Caro-
lina courts in the past had required proof that the husband "could not have
had access" 15 to the mother (in other words, impossibility of access); other
courts had found proof that the husband "did not have access" 16 sufficient to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy. The court of appeals in Manning held
that the "did not have access" standard was sufficient. 17 As the court pointed
out, in today's mobile society if the father was required to negate every possi-
bility of access the presumption would become a conclusive one. 18
2. Termination of Parental Rights
G.S. 7A-289.23 was amended in 1981 to provide indigent parents the right
to appointed counsel in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. 19 The stat-
8. Law of June 22, 1981, ch. 634, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 918 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 8-57.2 (1981)).
9. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57.2 (1981) states in pertinent part:
Whenever an issue of paternity of a child born or conceived during a marriage
arises in any civil or criminal proceeding, the presumed father or the mother of such
child is competent to give evidence as to any relevant matter regarding paternity of the
child, including nonaccess to the present or former spouse, regardless of any privilege
which may otherwise apply.
10. See Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 220, 13 S.E.2d 224, 226 (1941). This rule is commonly
referred to as "Lord Mansfield's Rule"; apparently it originated in dictum by Lord Mansfield in a
1777 ejectment case.
11. 53 N.C. App. 26, 279 S.E.2d 901 (1981).
12. Id. at 31, 279 S.E.2d at 904.
13. Id.
14. See also State v. White, 300 N.C. 494, 268 S.E.2d 481 (1980) (presumption of legitimacy
in a criminal case). *hfte is discussed in Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980-
Family Law, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1194, 1202-05 (1981).
15. E.g., Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 197, 159 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1968).
16. E.g., State v. Bowman, 230 N.C. 203, 204, 52 S.E.2d 345, 345 (1949).
17. 53 N.C. App. at 30, 279 S.E.2d at 904.
18. Id.
19. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 966, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1492 (codified at N.C.
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ute, as amended, directs the Administrative Office of the Courts to bear the
fees of appointed counsel.20 Prior to amendment, G.S. 7A-289.23 only pro-
vided for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, who was to be an attorney,
to represent minor parents in termination hearings. 21 Indigent parents are
now entitled to appointed counsel and, in addition, are entitled to an ap-
pointed guardian ad litem if 1) "it is alleged that a parent's rights should be
terminated pursuant to G.S. 7A-289.32(7);" 22 or 2) "the parent is under the
age of 18 years."
23
The legislature amended G.S. 7A-289.23 after the United States Supreme
Court had decided that appointment of counsel was not constitutionally re-
quired in all termination proceedings. In Lassiter v. Department of SocialServ-
ices24 the petitioner, a mother whose rights had been terminated by a district
court in Durham County, North Carolina, appealed the termination on the
ground that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment entitled her,
as an indigent, to an appointed attorney. In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court
rejected this argument and held that the Constitution does not require the ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination
hearing.25 Ms. Lassiter, the court decided, had not been denied due process as
she had faced no chance of incarceration, her case had not presented any
troublesome points of law and an attorney could not have made a difference in
the determination of her case.26 Although it is conceivable that Lzassiter could
be viewed as a conclusion by the United States Supreme Court that indigent
parents do not need or deserve legal representation in parental termination
hearings,27 the North Carolina Legislature should be commended for amend-
Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.23 (1981)). This act amended three other sections of Articles 24B and 36, also
dealing with the appointment of counsel in such cases:
1. Summons to a parent in a termination hearing shall now notify the parent of an
indigent's right to appointed counsel. Counsel must be requested on or before the date
of the hearing. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 966, § 2, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1492,
1492-93 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.27 (1981)).
2. At the time of the termination hearing the court shall determine whether the
parents are indigent; if they are, counsel shall be appointed to represent them. Parents
are also entitled to an extension of time following this appointment. Id. § 3, at 1492
(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.30 (1981)).
3. "An action to terminate indigent parent's rights" is now included among the
listed actions entitling indigents to counsel. Id. § 4, at 1492 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7A-451(a) (1981)).
20. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.23 (1981).
21. Law of June 24, 1979, ch. 1206, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 138.
22. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.23(l) (1981). G.S. 7A-289.32(7) is specifically included as al-
lowing termination of parental rights if the parent is incapable of providing proper care due to
mental retardation or mental illness. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.32(7) (1981).
23. Id. § 7A-289.23(2).
24. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The Lassiter decision was filed on June 1, 1981; the amendment to
the termination statute was ratified on July 10, 1981. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 966, § 1, 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1492 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.23 (1981)). For a discussion of the
constitutional underpinnings of Lassiter, see this Survey, Constitutional Law, at 1278-79.
For a recent article exploring Lassiter in depth see Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights:
The Indigent Parent's Right t6 Counsel After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 Farn. L.Q. 205 (1981).
25. 452 U.S. at 31.
26. Id. at 33.
27. Recognizing this possibility, Justice Stewart took pains to note that:
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ing its statute in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Lassiter.
28
The issue of the right to a trial by jury in parental status termination
proceedings was addressed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in In re
Ferguson.29 In Ferguson petitioner mother appealed the denial of her motion
for a jury trial in her termination proceeding. The court in Ferguson held that
petitioner was not entitled to a trial by jury.30 The court noted that the termi-
nation statutes expressly provide for trial by judge;31 therefore, the court con-
cluded, the petitioner would only be entitled to a jury trial if there was a
constitutional right to a jury in this proceeding. 32 The constitutional right
would exist only "where the perogative existed at common law or by statute at
the time the Constitution was adopted. . . .Proceedings to terminate paren-
tal rights were unknown at the common law. . . .The statute establishing
these proceedings was first adopted by the legislature in 1969." 33 For these
reasons the Ferguson court held that the natural mother had no right to a trial
by jury in these proceedings. 34
The constitutionality of North Carolina's termination proceedings was at-
tacked again in In re Biggers.35 The respondent in Biggers argued that the
termination statute was unconstitutional in that all the grounds for termina-
tion in G.S. 7A-289.3236 were void for vagueness.37 The court of appeals re-
jected this argument, finding the statute sufficiently specific to overcome the
vagueness definition.
38
In its Fourteenth Amendment, our Constitution imposes on the States the standards
necessary to ensure that judicial proceedings are fundamentally fair. A wise public pol-
icy, however, may require that higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolera-
ble under our Constitution .... The Court's opinion today in no way implies that the
standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by
the States are other than enlightened and wise.
452 U.S. at 33-34. See also Besharov, supra note 24, at 219-21.
28. The issue of the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings
was addressed in August of 1981 by the North Carolina Supreme Court. In In re Clark, 303 N.C.
592,281 S.E.2d 47 (1981), the petitioner argued that G.S. 7A-289.23 (at that time unamended) was
violative of the North Carolina Constitution. In Clark the court, following Lassiter, held that the
"failure of the Act, (prior to recent amendment), to require appointment of counsel for indigent
parents or the minor child in all cases did not make the act unconstitutionally defective under the
Constitution of North Carolina." 303 N.C. at 600, 281 S.E.2d at 53.
29. 50 N.C. App. 681, 274 S.E.2d 879 (1981).
30. Id. at 684, 274 S.E.2d at 880.
31. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.30 (1981).
32. N.C.R. Civ. P. 38.
33. 50 N.C. App. at 683, 274 S.E.2d at 880.
34. The court in Clark also held that there "exists no constitutional right to trial by jury in
proceedings to terminate parental rights." 303 N.C. at 607, 281 S.E.2d at 57.
35. 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981).
36. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.32 (1981).
37. The Biggers court noted that similar statutes are increasingly being attacked on vague-
ness grounds. These attacks, the court stated, have been almost uniformly rejected. 50 N.C. App.
at 341-42, 274 S.E.2d at 242. See Comment, Application of the Vagueness Doctrine to Statutes
Terminating Parental Rights, 1980 Duke L.J. 336.
38. 50 N.C. App. at 341-42, 274 S.E.2d at 242. In Clark the petitioner also argued that G.S.
7A-289.32 was void for vagueness. The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument,
making reference to Biggers. 303 N.C. at 605, 281 S.E.2d at 56.
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The trial judge had determined that the Biggers' child was a neglected
child under G.S. 7A-278(4)39 and had terminated parental rights pursuant to
G.S. 7A-289.32(2).40 The court of appeals, therefore, was required to deter-
mine whether G.S. 7A-278(4)'s definition of a 'neglected child' rendered the
termination statute unconstitutionally vague. The court determined that G.S.
7A-289.32(2) was not vague because "the terms used in 7A-278(4) are given a
precise and understandable meaning by the normative standards imposed
upon parents by our society, and parents are, therefore, given sufficient notice
of the types of conduct that constitute child neglect in this State."
41
The respondent in Biggers also attacked the constitutionality of G.S. 7A-
289.32 on equal protection grounds. This statute provides seven grounds for
termination of parental rights. Two of these, G.S. 7A-289.32(2) and (4), were
identified by the trial judge as grounds for termination in the Biggers case.
The court of appeals considered only whether subdivision (4) was subject to
attack on equal protection grounds.4 2 Subdivision (4) permits termination
when the child has been placed in foster care and the parent fails, for six
months, to pay reasonable costs of support.43 The basis for an equal protection
claim would be that this subdivision discriminates against parents according to
their financial circumstances. The court of appeals concluded that this claim
could not be sustained: "G.S. 7A-289.32(4) requires parents to pay a reason-
able portion of the child's foster care costs, and this requirement applies to all
parents irrespective of their wealth or poverty. . . . [The ability of the par-
ents to pay is-the] controlling characteristic of what is a reasonable amount for
them to pay."44
As the court pointed out, all parents have a duty to support their children,
within their means. According to the Biggers court, G.S. 7A-289.32(4) repre-
sents the legislature's conclusion "that a child's best interest is served by a
termination of parental rights when his parents cannot provide reasonable
support. '45
39. This particular act has been repealed. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 815, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess.
Laws 966. G.S. 7A-517 now provides the equivalent definition. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-517 (1981).
In pertinent part the former statute provided:
(4) A "neglected child" is any child who does not receive proper care or supervision or
discipline from his parent, guardian, custodian or other person acting as a parent, or who
has been abandoned, or who is not provided necessary medical care or other remedial
care recognized under State law, or who lives in an environment injurious to his welfare,
or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, § 2, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1050 (repealed 1979).
40. G.S. 7A-289.32(2) allows termination of parental rights if "[t]he parent has abused or
neglected the child. The child shall be deemed to be abused or neglected if the court finds the
child to be an abused child within the meaning of G.S. 110-117(l)(a), (b) or (c), or a neglected
child within the meaning of G.S. 7A-278(4)." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.32(2) (1981).
41. 50 N.C. App. at 341, 274 S.E.2d at 241-42.
42. Id. at 338, 274 S.E.2d at 240.
43. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.32(4) (1981). For the provisions of subdivision (2) see note 40
supra.
44. 50 N.C. App. at 339, 274 S.E.2d at 240 (emphasis in original).
45. Id. at 339, 274 S.E.2d at 241.
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3. Adoption
G.S. 48-25 was revised during the 1981 General Assembly to allow re-
lease to the adopting parents of non-identifying adoption information 46-in-
formation that will not identify a biological relative of the adoptee. The 1981
change rewrote subsection G.S. 48-25(d) and added a new subsection, (e).
Prior to the change, G.S. 48-25(d) had only provided for the release of medical
records or other information concerning the physical or mental health of the
adopted child, and this information only upon demand. 47 The amended sub-
section (d) requires that the adoptive parents be given, prior to finalization of
the adoption, a number of types of information including information con-
cerning the date of birth of the adoptee and weight at birth,48 the age of the
biological parents,49 the heritage of the biological parents,50 the education of
the biological parents,51 and the general physical appearance of the biological
parents.52 This information can be withheld only if it would tend to identify a
biological relative of the adoptee.
53
Subsection (e) of G.S. 48-25 requires that the adoptive parents also be
given a complete health history of the biological parents, if available.5 4 This
history shall include "any information which would have a substantial bearing
on the adoptee's mental or physical health."55 The problem with this subsec-
tion is that the medical information is often inadequate; G.S. 48-25(e) only
compels disclosure of a full health history "if available". One possible solu-
tion to this problem would be to require the natural parents to answer a de-
tailed questionnaire during the preadoption investigation.5 6 In this manner
the medical information, which is often very important, would be available.
4. Child Abuse
Four bills were passed by the General Assembly in 1981 concerning child
abuse. The most significant of the four bills was House Bill 243, which re-
wrote G.S. 7A-549.57 The new statute allows a medical professional who sus-
pects that he or she is treating an abused child to retain custody of the child for
twelve hours, when authorized by a chief district judge. During these twelve
46. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 924, §§ 2-3, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1421, 1421-22 (codi-
fied at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-25(d), (e) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
47. Law of June 1, 1979, ch. 739, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 807. See also Speas, The
Adoptee's Right of Access to Sealed Adoption Records, 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 563 (1980).
48. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-25(d)(1) (1981).
49. Id. § 48-25(d)(2).
50. Id. § 48-25(d)(3).
51. Id. §48-25(d)(4).
52. Id. § 48-25(d)(5).
53. Id. § 48-25(d).
54. Id. § 48-25(e).
55. Id.
56. See Speas, supra note 47, at 581.
57. Law of June 29, 1981, ch. 716, § 2, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess., 1053, 1053-54 (codi-
fied at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-549 (1981)).
[Vol. 601384
hours the department of social services is to be notified and to begin immedi-
ate investigation.
The other three bills did not drastically change the existing law. School
personnel are now under a duty to report suspected child abuse cases to the
director of the area social services department.58 Appointment of a non-law-
yer as guardian ad litem in abuse and neglect cases is now permitted. 59 Judges
may now enter consent orders on petitions charging abuse, neglect or depen-
dency when all parties are present and represented (all but the juvenile may
waive representation) and sufficient findings of fact are made by the judge.60
B. Divorce 61
In Pitts v. Pitts62 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a trial
court erred in failing to instruct a jury that isolated or casual acts of sexual
intercourse between separated spouses toll the statutory period for divorce
based on a one-year separation period.63 Although the decision applied ex-
isting law, the court, in dicta, also commented on North Carolina case law
which holds that even isolated acts of intercourse constitute the resumption of
marital relations64 and thereby toll the statutory separation period. The court
opined that this precedent discourages reconciliation because of a fear that one
act of intercourse could defeat an action for absolute divorce; it also asserted
58. Law of May 20, 1981, ch. 423, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 510, 640 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-400 (1981)).
59. Law of June 8, 1981, ch. 528, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, st Sess. 800 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-586 (1981)).
60. Law of May 12, 1981, ch. 371, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, st Sess. 417 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-641 (1981)).
61. In 1981 the North Carolina General Assembly amended G.S. 50-8 to provide for
personal service of a divorce complaint and summons on a defendant in accord with rule 40)(1)
of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, when the complainant is a nonresident of the
state. Law of June 17, 1981, ch. 599, § 15, 1981, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 870, 872 (codified
at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-8 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). Rule 40)(1) states that service of process shall be
accomplished by leaving the summons and complaint with the defendant or at the defendant's
home with some person of suitable age and discretion or with an agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive process for the defendant. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1)(a), (b). Previously, G.S. 50-8
stated only that the "summons [should be] served upon the defendant personally." N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50-8 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
62. 54 N.C. App. 163, 282 S.E.2d 488 (1981). In Pitts the wife filed an action for divorce
based on a one year separation period. The husband testified that the parties had engaged in
sexual relations during the one-year period, and the wife denied this allegation. After the jury
returned a verdict for the wife on the issue of fulfillment of the statutory separation requirement,
the district court granted the wife's divorce. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred
in not instructing the jury that isolated acts of intercourse would toll the statutory separation
period.
63. G.S. 50-6 states: "Marriages may be dissolved and the parties thereto divorced form the
bonds of matrimony on the application of either party, if and when the husband and wife have
lived separate and apart for one year. " N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-6 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
64. In Murphy v. Murphy the North Carolina Supreme Court held that sexual intercourse
between husband and wife after the execution of a separation agreement voids the contract, even
though the resumption of sexual relations is "casual" or "isolated." 295 N.C. 390, 395, 245 S.E.2d
693, 697 (1978). Accord Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 271 S.E.2d 393 (1980); State v.
Gossett, 203 N.C. 641, 166 S.E. 754 (1932). See also Wadlington, Sexual Relations After Separa-
tion or Divorce: The New Morality and the Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 Va. L. Rev. 249, 258-
59 (1977).
1982] FAMILY LAW 1385
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
that the rule may encourage manipulation of the spouse who desires reconcili-
ation by the other, who wants to void an unfavorable separation agreement.
65
"In view of such dangers," the court stated, "the dictates of public policy
strongly suggest that this matter is worthy of legislative consideration. '66 PItas
is significant because it represents another attempt 67 by the court of appeals to
express its opposition to a harsh and destructive trend in North Carolina fam-
ily law.
Responding to another developing trend in the law, the court of appeals
in Crutchley v. Crutchley68 decided that divorcing spouses may submit their
support disputes to arbitration.69 To resolve this issue, the court interpreted
the Uniform Arbitration Act, which governs written agreements to arbitrate.
70
The court based its conclusion on the statute's broad language: "[Tiwo or
more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration any controversy
existing between them at the time of the agreement .... -71 Because the legis-
lation did not specifically exclude domestic disputes from the scope of the
Act,72 the court reasoned that the provision in the statute encompassed the
arbitration of support issues between divorcing spouses.
Also in 1981, the court of appeals addressed the issue of personal indigni-
ties as a fault ground for divorce.
73
65. 54 N.C. App. at 165, 282 S.E.2d at 490.
66. Id.
67. See Hand v. Hand, 46 N.C. App. 82,264 S.E.2d 597 (1980), discussed in Survey of Devel-
opments in North Carolina Law, 1980-Family Law, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1200-02 (1981).
68. 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d 744 (1981). In 1976 plaintiff wife filed an action for a
divorce from bed and board, alimony pendente lite, permanent alimony, custody of the children
and child support, title to the parties' residence and two vacant lots and counsel fees. The hus-
band answered the complaint and counterclaimed for a divorce from bed and board and for cus-
tody of the children. Thereafter, the court entered an order approving the parties' consent to
arbitration and in 1977 granted defendant's motion for confirmation of the award, which granted
plaintiff custody of the two oldest children, child support and alimony. In 1978 the wife filed a
motion in the cause requesting modification of the arbitration award to increase the alimony and
child support amounts. The trial court denied plaintiffs motion, stating that the arbitrator's
award was binding on the parties. The issue before the court of appeals was whether a judically
confirmed arbitrator's award dealing with spousal support could be modified after the statutory
time period for modification had expired.
69. Id. at 737, 281 S.E.2d at 747. After resolving this threshold question, the court affirmed
the trial court's decision to deny plaintiff wife's motion to modify the arbitrator's award on the
grounds that it was binding on the parties, absent their consent to modify, after the statutory time
period for modifying an award had expired. Id. at 739, 281 S.E.2d at 748.
70. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-567.1 to -.20 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
71. Id. § 1-567.2(a) (emphasis added by the court).
72. The legislature did create two specific exemptions to the general rule of arbitrability:
disputes between employers and employees or their representatives and agreements stipulating
that the Act shall not apply. Id. § 1-567.2(b)(1), (2).
73. In Vandiver v. Vandiver, 50 N.C. App. 319, 274 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 302 N.C. 634,
280 S.E.2d 449 (1981), the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's grant of a
divorce from bed and board to plaintiff wife. The court held that plaintiff's evidence of her hus-
band's act-allowing their minor children to view "hardcore" pornographic material and making
sexual advances upon the parties' minor daughter-were sufficient to constitute "such indignities
to the person ... as to render his or her condition intolerable and life burdensome." N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50-7(4) (1976). 50 N.C. App. at 324, 274 S.E.2d at 247.
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C Child Custody and Support74
1. Child Custody and Visitation
In Hamlin v. Hamlin75 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
trial court was justified in hearing a father's motion to modify visitation rights
without the presence of the father.76 Upon the parties' separation in 1973, the
trial court found that both plaintiff-wife and defendant-husband were fit to
take custody of their son, but that it would be in the son's best interest to grant
primary custody to his mother and temporary custody to his father during the
summer months. Plaintiff and defendant were divorced in 1974; the custody
arrangements, however, remained unchanged. In 1975 defendant took the
son, without the consent of the mother, from North Carolina to Alaska where
defendant was then living. After defendant returned the child to North Caro-
lina, the parties agreed that neither of them would take their son outside North
Carolina without consent of the other or permission of the court. Subse-
quently, defendant filed a motion asking the court to permit the son to spend
the summers with defendant and his family in Alaska. Although defendant
was absent from the hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order
allowing the son to visit defendant in Alaska for periods not to exceed forty-
five days. Plaintiff appealed from this order. The court of appeals affirmed
and plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.
77
The supreme court compared a child custody proceeding to any other
civil dispute, noting that G.S. 1-11 provides that "[a] party may appear either
in person or by attorney in actions or proceedings in which he is repre-
sented." s78 Although the court recognized that a party generally is not re-
quired to appear in a civil proceeding, it also stated that, except where
"compelling circumstances . .. otherwise dictate," 7 9 a judge should require
the presence of both parties in child custody matters in order better to evaluate
the best interest of the child.80 The court found the unusual facts of this case
to rise to the level of "compelling circumstances," 8' and therefore affirmed the
74. In Ingle v. Ingle, 53 N.C. App. 227, 280 S.E.2d 460 (1981), the court of appeals evidenced
its willingness to award permanent custody of a child to the father. Upon plaintiff wife's
testimony that her husband had taken good care of the child since their separation, the court
found no error in the trial court's award of custody to defendant-father.
In Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981), the court of appeals asserted that
a trial judge must consider all the facts of a case and decide the issue of custody according to the
best interests of the child. Although the trial judge, who awarded custody of the minor child to
defendant-father, had indicated in his findings that the mother's paramour had been living with
her and the child since the parents' separation, the court of appeals concluded that "[s]uch
adulterous conduct alone is insufficient to determine custody." Id. at 574, 284 S.E.2d at 174. The
court remanded the case for further factfinding.
75. 302 N.C. 478, 276 S.E.2d 381 (1981).
76. Id. at 483, 276 S.E.2d at 385-86.
77. Id. at 478-81, 276 S.E.2d at 383-84.
78. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-11 (1969).
79. 302 N.C. at 484, 276 S.E.2d at 386.
80. G.S. 50-13.2(a) provides that child custody orders shall be based on what will "best pro-
mote the interests and welfare of the child.' N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). See
Hinde v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966); In re Lewis, 88 N.C. 31 (1883).
81. The court noted that the son was 14 years old with no apparent disabilities; that defend-
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lower court's order.
Justice Carlton, in dissent, persuasively argued that the majority had cre-
ated "a dangerous precedent in the child custody law of North Carolina.
82
He asserted that a trial judge would find it virtually impossible to determine
the best interests of the child without the presence of both the father and the
mother, and therefore, a court should not find "compelling circumstances" as
easily as the majority did in this instance.
83
Although there may be isolated instances in which a court should not
require a parent to be present at a custody hearing,84 it is difficult to imagine
such exceptions, especially given the wide discretion of the trial judge in deter-mining the best interest of the child.85 It is unlikely that a trial judge could
easily decide that issue if he cannot personally view the demeanor, attitudes
and expressions of both parents.
The supreme court ruled on a custody matter relating to foster parents in
Oxendine v. Catawba County Department of Social Services.86 The child was
surrendered for adoptive placement to defendant in 1978; defendant thereafter
placed him in plaintiffs' home pursuant to a foster parent agreement. In 1979
plaintiffs brought an action in district court seeking permanent custody of the
child. Plaintiffs' action was ultimately dismissed due to their lack of standing
to seek custody of the child, and they appealed.
87
The supreme court held that the court of appeals did not err in deciding
that plaintiffs had no standing to bring a custody action. Plaintiffs argued that
they were authorized to seek custody under G.S. 50-13.1, which states that
"[a]ny parent, relative, or otherperson. . . claiming the right to custody of a
minor child may institute an action... for the custody of such child .... ,,ss
The court, however, disagreed, finding this case to be governed by G.S. 48-
9.1(1), which provides that the county department of social services shall have
legal custody of a child who has been surrendered for adoption until the oc-
currence of one of the events specified in the statute.89 Since the county
agency retains legal custody, the court reasoned that foster parents are given
only physical custody of the child; therefore, foster parents cannot bring an
ant could not attend the hearing because of his job schedule in Alaska; and that defendant's
present wife and his parents were present at the hearing. 302 N.C. at 483-84, 276 S.E.2d at 586.
82. Id. at 486, 276 S.E.2d at 387 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 487, 276 S.E.2d at 388. Justice Carlton argued that "[ilnconvenience, no matter
how great, should rarely rise to the level of 'compelling circumstances."' Id.
84. As Justice Carlton stated: "If the father were ill or otherwise unable to travel, I would be
more inclined to excuse his absence." Id.
85. See, e.g., Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); Pendergraft v.
Pendergraft, 23 N.C. App. 307, 208 S.E.2d 8887 (1974); Harrington v. Harrington, 16 N.C. App.,
628, 192 S.E.2d (1972); In re Custody of Mason, 13 N.C. App. 334, 185 S.E.2d 433 (1971), cert.
denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 513 (1972); Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417
(1971).
86. 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981).
87. Id. at 700-02, 281 S.E.2d at 371-73.
88. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
89. Id. § 48-9.1(1). The four specified events are: entry of an interlocutory decree as pro-
vided in G.S. 48-17, entry of a final order of adoption, revocation of consent (of natural parents)
and entry of a contrary order by a court. Id. None of those events occurred in this case.
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action to gain legal custody of a foster child. The court construed G.S. 48-
9.1(1) as an exception to the general grant of standing to contest custody as
provided in G.S. 50-13.1.9o
2. Jurisdiction in the Child Custody Area
In Lynch v. Lynch91 the North Carolina Supreme Court confronted a ju-
risdictional question in the area of child custody. Plaintiff husband brought
suit in North Carolina seeking a divorce from bed and board and custody of
the parties' minor child. Defendant wife appeared to ask that an Illinois judg-
ment awarding custody of the child to the wife be given full faith and credit.
The district court denied the wife's motions and awarded permanent custody
to the husband. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part;
subsequently, the wife's petition for discretionary review was granted by the
supreme court.
92
The supreme court held that the wife made a general appearance in ask-
ing the trial court to enforce the Illinois judgment; therefore, the court was
authorized to grant her motion for full faith and credit.93 The court also held
that, because plaintiff had not entered a valid motion for modification of the
custody decree,94 the court's jurisdiction over the matter terminated upon the
award of fall faith and credit to the Illinois judgment. Any new action for
modification must reestablish jurisdiction over defendant as of the date the
action was filed.95
The three dissenting justices disagreed with both of the majority's points.
First, the dissenters argued that defendant had not made a general appearance
by appearing to ask for full faith and credit. If defendant had made a general
appearance, the court would have jurisdiction over the matter until the child
reached majority, and defendant could be forced to return to North Carolina
to litigate any motion that plaintiff might make.96 The dissenters contended
that if a defendant asks for enforcement of a foreign decree, a North Carolina
court would acquire jurisdiction only to inquire into the jurisdiction of the
foreign court and whether proper notice and an opportunity to be heard had
90. 303 N.C. at 707, 281 S.E.2d at 375. See Clark, Law of Domestic Relations § 17.6, at 596
(1968), for further discussion of the foster home arrangement.
The supreme court also ruled in Oxendine that, despite a clause in the foster parent agree-
ment that prohibited plaintiffs from instituting adoption proceedings without defendant's permis-
sion, the plaintiffs may have standing to initiate adoption proceedings if, on remand, there is a
determination that the defendant unreasonably and unjustly withheld its consent in a manner
contrary to the child's best interests. 303 N.C. at 708-09, 281 S.E.2d at 376.
91. 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840, afFg 302 N.C. 189, 274 S.E.2d 212 (1981).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 373-74, 279 S.E.2d at 844-45.
94. Although plaintiff originated this action with a motion for modification, Illinois law pro-
hibited him from doing so at that time; therefore, plaintiffs motion for modification was invalid.
Id. at 375, 279 S.E.2d at 845.
95. Id. The court recognized that, under the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act [hereinafter UCCJA], even if the plaintiff filed a motion for modification in the future,
a North Carolina court would decline jurisdiction over the matter because plaintiff had wrong-
fully removed the child from the mother's custody. Id., 279 S.E.2d at 846.
96. Id. at 378, 279 S.E.2d at 850 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
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been given to all parties. Second, when a court does grant full faith and credit
to a foreign decree, the plaintiff should have the opportunity to allege changed
circumstances if the sister state would so allow. The court's jurisdiction should
continue in order to inquire into those circumstances, rather than evaporating
after the grant of full faith and credit, as the majority held.
97
Although a clear conflict arose in Lynch over the law on interstate en-
forcement and modification of child custody orders, it is difficult to measure
the actual impact of the decision because any future action by the plaintiff in
Lynch, and most other suits in this area, will be governed by the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 98 which diminishes the importance
of the inquiry into issues of full faith and credit and personal jurisdiction over
the parties.
Addressing another jurisdictional issue, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals clearly outlined the major provisions of the UCCJA99 in Davis v. Da-
vis.100 Although the Act was passed by the General Assembly in 1979, the
court stated that the sensitive issue of child custody contests still had not been
squarely addressed; therefore, the court felt "a grave responsibility to interpret
thoroughly the Uniform Act so as to accomplish its purposes."'' The court
enumerated in capsule form the major bases for jurisdiction of custody matters
under the Act, the considerations a court must address when there are simulta-
neous proceedings in North Carolina and in another state, the situations in
which a court may decline jurisdiction of a custody proceeding and the provi-
sions of the Act that allow for modification of custody decrees from other
jurisdictions. 102
In Williams v. Richardson,10 3 the court of appeals wrestled with the incon-
sistent purposes of the Act and resolved the conflict by virtually ignoring one
purpose without significantly advancing the other. In Williams plaintiff wife
and defendant husband were divorced in 1977 in Virginia. Plaintiff was
awarded custody of their two children. She remarried in 1978. In May, 1979
defendant filed a petition for custody in Emporia, Virginia, where plaintiff
lived at the time. She and the children later moved to North Carolina. On
February 7, 1980, the Virginia court "found that a change of custody would be
in the best interest of the children and granted permanent custody to [defend-
97. Id. at 379, 279 S.E.2d at 851. See In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966);
Richter v. Harmon, 243 N.C. 373, 90 S.E.2d 744 (1956).
98. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50A-1 to -25 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
99. Id.
100. 53 N.C. App. 531, 281 S.E.2d 411 (1981).
101. Id. at 534, 281 S.E.2d at 413. The general purposes of the Act are enumerated in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50A-l(a) (Cur. Supp. 1981).
102. 53 N.C. App. at 534-39, 281 S.E.2d at 413-15. After a concise summary of the Act, the
court went on to hold that when defendant-wife left her husband in North Carolina and moved to
California with their four children and filed a petition for custody of the children in California
after she and the children had lived there only one month, California was not the "home state" of
the children for jurisdiction under the Act. Therefore, North Carolina had exclusive jurisdiction
over the custody matter and could decline to enforce the California custody order.
103. 53 N.C. App. 663, 281 S.E.2d 777 (1981).
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ant]."'104 Defendant then took the children to Georgia.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff went to Georgia and removed one child from
school and returned her to North Carolina. She could not locate the other
child. She immediately began an action in North Carolina to obtain custody
of the children. The trial court asserted jurisdiction, and awarded plaintiff
primary custody and defendant visitation privileges.
Two questions arose: first, whether the North Carolina trial court should
have asserted jurisdiction to consider modifying the custody dispute; and sec-
ond, whether it was proper for the trial court to modify the Virginia decree
once jurisdiction had been asserted. The UCCJA addresses the first of these
issues as follows:
If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of
this State shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to the
court of this State that court which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in
accordance with the Chapter. . . and (2) the court of this State has
jurisdiction.
10 5
Because the children had not lived in Virginia for the six months immedi-
ately preceding the institution of the action, Virginia did not continue to have
jurisdiction over their custody.' 0 6 The court of appeals held that the North
Carolina trial court could properly assert jurisdiction under G.S. 50A-
3(a)(2). 10 7 Therefore, the remaining question was whether the North Carolina
trial court should have modified the Virginia custody decree.
Several factors weigh heavily against modifying the Virginia decree.'
08
First, the time and energy of the Virginia court that entered a decree just eight-
een days before plaintiff instituted the action in North Carolina would be
104. Id. at 665, 281 S.E.2d at 778.
105. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-14(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
106. The test for Virginia's continuing jurisdiction under UCCJA is found at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50A-3 (Cum. Supp. 1981). G.S. 50A-3(a)(1)(i) provides for jurisdiction if the state is the "home
state" of the child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-3(a) (1)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1981). "Home state" is defined
in G.S. 50A-2(5) as "the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived
with the child's parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months."
Id. § 50A-2(5). Since Mrs. Williams moved to North Carolina on August 6, 1979, and the action
was instituted on February 25, 1980, it was clear that Virginia was not the "home state."
G.S. 50A-3(a)(2) provides for assertion of jurisdiction if
[it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume jurisdiction because
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a
significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial
evidence relevant to the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships ....
The trial court found it to be in the child's best interest for North Carolina to assert jurisdiction.
The court of appeals affirmed. 53 N.C. App. at 669, 281 S.E.2d at 780.
107. See note 106 supra.
108. The purposes of the UCCJA are listed in G.S. 50A-1 and include the following: avoiding
jurisdiction competition; promoting the stability of the home environment; deterring abductions of
children undertaken to obtain custody awards; avoiding relitigation of other states' custody de-
crees insofar as feasible; and facilitating the enforcement of other states' custody decrees. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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wasted. 109 Second, plaintiff would be rewarded for contemptuously disregard-
ing the Virginia proceeding. 10 To modify the Virginia decree is, in effect, a
double slap in Virginia's judicial face. Third, plaintiff would be rewarded for
abducting the child from Georgia in violation of the Virginia custody de-
cree. 11' G.S. 50-8(b) expressly commands that if a petitioner for a modifica-
tion decree has wrongfully removed the child from the person entitled to
custody the court may not exercise jurisdiction "[u]nless required in the inter-
est of the child.""12 The use of the word "required" seems to evidence a strong
policy against exercising jurisdiction under such circumstances."13 Similarly,
if the purposes of the Act to "deter abductions"" 14 and to "avoid re-litiga-
tion"115 are to be achieved to any extent, courts should be hesitant to condone
the conduct of contemptuous and child-snatching parents. Although it is easy
to say that the behavior of the parents is of secondary importance when the
best interests of their children are involved, 116 this attitude does little to
achieve the purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
As an additional obstacle to modification of another state's custody de-
cree, North Carolina requires a showing of "changed circumstances." 117 "The
party moving for modification assumes the burden of proving a substantial
change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. . . . It must be
shown that the circumstances have so changed that the welfare of the child
will be adversely affected unless the custody provision is modified .. ."1t18
The court of appeals in Williams remanded the case for a determination of
whether there were "changed circumstances," but it is doubtful that a "sub-
109. See id. § 50A-1(a)(6); note 108 supra.
110. After Mrs. Williams obtained a continuance on August 2, she failed to appear at any of
the later hearings scheduled by the Virginia court to consider the custody issue.
111. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-1(5) (Cum. Supp. 1981); note 108 supra.
112. Id. § 50A-8. The court of appeals remanded the case for an express determination as to
whether it would be required in the interest of the child for the North Carolina court to exercise
jurisdiction. 53 N.C. App. at 670, 280 S.E.2d at 781. The court noted, however, that "[in the vast
majority of cases, such action will result in the refusal by the courts of this State to exercise juris-
diction to modify a custody decree." Id. at 669-70, 281 S.E.2d at 780.
If North Carolina asserts jurisdiction and modifies the Virginia decree, when it appears that
the Virginia decree was not punitive and was based on substantial evidence, then the admonition
contained in G.S. 50A-8(b) and the circumstances of plaintiffs contempt must carry very little or
no weight at all. Compare Clark v. Clark, 67 A.D.2d 388, 416 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1979) (New York
courts could properly decline jurisdiction when the mother had improperly removed the child
from Virginia) with Nehra v. Uhlar, 168 NJ. Super. 187, 402 A.2d 264, cert. denied, 81 N.J. 413,
408 A.2d 807 (1979) (upholding the trial court's jurisdiction and modification of another state's
custody decree because "the paramount issue before the trial court and this court is necessarily the
welfare of the children rather than the tactics of the parent").
113. See 168 N.J. Super. at 196, 402 A.2d at 268-69.
114. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-1(a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1981). See note 108 supra.
115. Id. § 50A-l(a)(6). See note 108 supra.
116. See Nehra v. Uhlar, 168 N.J. Super. 187,402 A.2d 264, cert. denied, 81 N.J. 413,408 A.2d
807 "(1979); see note 112 supra. At least one commentator has questioned the "capacity of a judge
or any other professional to determine the best interests of a child with any degree of certainty."
Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining
Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive Modifications, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 978, 983
(1977). Ms. Bodenheimer was Reporter for the drafting committee of the UCCJA.
117. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
118. Searl v. Searl, 34 N.C. App. 583, 587, 239 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1977) (emphasis added).
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stantial change" could have occurred since the recent Virginia decree was
entered.
As an exception to the "changed circumstances" rule,1 19 the court of ap-
peals construed the UCCJA to allow modification of a custody decree of an-
other state if the prior decree was "punitive."' 120 The court of appeals
remanded the case for the additional purpose of determining whether the Vir-
ginia decree was punitive.
121
Another recent court of appeals decision interpreting the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act concerned an interesting and well-reasoned applica-
tion of G.S. 50A-3(a)(2).12 2 In Nabors v. Farrel1123 the parents of three minor
children were divorced in Massachusetts. The mother was awarded custody of
the children and moved to North Carolina with them. The father was
awarded visitation privileges for one month each summer at the father's par-
ents' home. He remained in Massachusetts, and in June 1979, he sought in
Massachusetts a modification of the decree in the form of a definite visitation
period and a change of the location to his home. On April 30, 1980, the Mas-
sachusetts court granted the father's requested relief. On February 21, 1981,
fully aware of the Massachusetts proceeding, the mother sought a modification
of the original decree in North Carolina. The father sought to have that action
dismissed under G.S. 50A-6(a). 2 4
The court of appeals ruled that under G.S.50A-3(a)(2) 12 5 "the child and
at least one contestant have a significant connection with [Massachusetts]" and
"there is available in [Massachusetts] substantial evidence relevant to the
child's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships;"
119. This is more accurately an exception to G.S. 50A-13, which requires "courts of this State
[to] recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court of another state which had
assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with [the UCCJA]."
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-13 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
120. 53 N.C. App. at 673, 281 S.E.2d at 782
Although some courts still engage in the highly questionable practice of modifying
custody in order to punish a parent, courts generally do not honor the punitive custody
decrees of other states.
The Uniform Act itself does not explicitly provide an exception for punitive decrees,
but the comments to the Act and its underlying policies do support such an exclusion
Bodenheimer, supra note 116, at 1005-07. See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 13,
Commissioners' Note (1968).
121. 53 N.C. App. at 673-74,281 S.E.2d at 782-83. See in this regard Brooks v. Brooks, 20 Or.
App. 43, 530 P.2d 547 (1975), an important groundbreaking decision in which the exception was
applied because "the order was punitive, viz., [imposed] to discipline the mother for alleged inter-
ference with the father's visitation rights. .... " Id. at 50, 530 P.2d at 551. The determination
whether a decree is punitive is a factual matter. The court of appeals did not delineate the stan-
dard for the trial court to apply, but under Brooks it would seem to be whether the decree was
based "solely" or "primarily" on some wrong committed by the losing parent. See Bodenheimer,
supra note 116, at 1007.
122. See note 106 supra.
123. 53 N.C. App. 345, 280 S.E.2d 763 (1981).
124. G.S. 50A-6 provides as follows: "(a) [i]f at the time of filing the petition a proceeding
concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction
substantially in conformity with [the UCCJA], a court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdic-
tion .. " N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-6 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
125. See note 106 supra.
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therefore, Massachusetts had jurisdiction with respect to the limited issue of
visitation. If the father had instituted a general custody modification action in
Massachusetts, it is highly doubtful that the "child. . . [would] have a signifi-
cant connection with [Massachusetts]" or that "there [would be] available in
[Massachusetts] substantial evidence relevant to the child's present or future
care. ... "126 But for the limited purpose of visitation it is clear that Massa-
chusetts is the best place to litigate. Thus, the court of appeals has wisely
given the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction .Act a flexible interpretation to
allow the state that is best able to decide the issue to exercise jurisdiction. 127
3. Child Support
The 1981 North Carolina Legislature enacted an amendment to G.S. 50-
13.4(b) that makes both the father and mother primarily liable for the support
of a minor child.128 Previously, the statute imposed the primary obligation for
child support on the father, while the mother's responsibility was only secon-
dary.129 After 1981 both parents have equal child support duties. Although
many mothers cannot actually contribute equally to support their children,
this amendment reflects the reality that more mothers are now financially able
to share childraising responsibilities with the father.
In Falls v. Falls130 the court of appeals overturned a trial court order pro-
viding that monthly child support payments (by the father) should increase
annually as the cost of living increased, if the children's needs grew accord-
ingly. 131 The court of appeals held that "the cost of living escalator in this
case. . . [was] infirm because it focused exclusively on circumstances of the
children and a cost of living index while ignoring the changing or unchanging
ability to pay of the parents."' 32 The court found that an automatic increase
in child support conditioned only on a rise in the children's needs violated
G.S. 50-13.4(c), which requires child support to be based on several factors,
including the child's needs, the accustomed standard of living of the children
and the earnings of the parties. 133 Further, the court noted that nothing in the
record established the reliability of the Consumer Price Index used to measure
the increase in the cost of living;13 4 this factor bolstered the court's decision to
reject the automatic cost of living increases in Falls.
126. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5OA-3(a)(2) (Cure. Supp. 1981).
127. The court of appeals decided other cases under the UCCJA in 1981. See Pope v. Jacobs,
51 N.C. App. 374, 276 S.E.2d 487 (1981) (North Carolina court could decline jurisdiction under
the Act when Michigan was the home state of the children, and substantial evidence relating to the
care, protection and training of the children was more readily available there.).
128. Law of June 18, 1981, ch. 613, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 892 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
129. See, e.g., In re Register, 303 N.C. 149, 277 S.E.2d 356 (1981); Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C.
98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976), rev'g 27 N.C. App. 435, 219 S.E.2d 648 (1975).
130. 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546 (1981).
131. Id. at 207, 278 S.E.2d at 550.
132. Id. at 219, 278 S.E.2d at 557.
133. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
134. 52 N.C. App. at 218, 278 S.E.2d at 556.
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The court of appeals observed that the inclusion of automatic cost of liv-
ing adjustments in child support orders is appropriate in some circum-
stances.135 In fact, these increases can be advantageous to both parties by
preserving the original order from the effects of inflation; the increases are
advantageous to the supporting parent because they ease the courtroom bur-
den through a decrease in modification proceedings. Although the court did
not sustain the cost of living increases in Falls, it specifically asserted that its
decision should not discourage other parties from making proper use of auto-
matic adjustment mechanisms.
1 36
The court of appeals decided another issue concerning child support in
Jones v. Jones,137 in which it held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in allowing a father credit against his child support obligation for certain
expenses he incurred for his children during their visitation with him. The
court of appeals relied on Goodson v. Goodson,138 a 1977 case that first estab-
lished the guidelines for determining whether credit or expenditures made on
behalf of dependents should be allowed. The Goodson court stated, "We think
that the better view allows credit [only] when equitable considerations exist
which would create an injustice if credit were not allowed .... ,,139
With the Jones decision, the court of appeals added another case to a
growing list of authority in North Carolina14° that permits credit against sup-
port obligations for certain voluntary expenses incurred by the payor parent.
In addition to these cases, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided
other minor issues in the child support area in 1981, relating to the defense of
laches 141 and to the factors considered in determining the amount of child
135. Id.
136. Id. at 220-21, 278 S.E.2d at 557-58. The court outlined what it considered to be the
minimum provisions in an annual cost of living adjustment formula:
(1) Provisions focusing on the relative abilities of the parents to pay as well as on the needs of
the child;
(2) Provisions stating that if the non-custodial parent's income decreases, or increases by a lesser
percentage than the percentage change in the index, the child support payments should in-
crease or decrease by a like or lesser percentage;
(3) Provisions stating that, if the parties are unable to determine the correct adjustment, either
party may request that the court determine the same;
(4) Provisions allowing either party to petition the court for modification due to a substantial
and continuing change of circumstances. Id.
137. 52 N.C. App. 104, 278 S.E.2d 260 (1981).
138. 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).
139. Id. at 81, 231 S.E.2d at 182.
140. See also Lynn v. Lynn, 44 N.C. App. 148, 260 S.E.2d 682 (1979); Beverly v. Beverly, 43
N.C. App. 60, 257 S.E.2d 682 (1979). There is a division of authority on this question in other
jurisdictions. See 47 A.L.1.3d 1031 (1979).
141. In Larsen v. Sedberry, 54 N.C. App. 166, 282 S.E.2d 551 (1981), the court of appeals held
that the defense of laches would not be recognized when plaintiff wife brought an action to collect
arrearages fifteen years after a divorce decree was entered ordering the husband to pay $15 per
week in child support. The court found that the only bar to plaintiffs action was the applicable
ten-year statute of limitations. See also Nall v. Nail, 229 N.C. 598, 50 S.E.2d 737 (1948) (laches
not recognized when wife brought an action for support seven years after separation); Lindsey v.
Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. 201,237 S.E.2d 561 (1977) (ex-wife able to sue on a support judgment more
than ten years after it was entered); Streeter v. Streeter, 33 N.C. App. 679, 236 S.E.2d 185 (1977)
(court refused to find laches when wife waited nine years before asseting her support rights).
1982] FAMILY LIW 1395
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
support.142
D. Property Settlement and Alimony
1. The Equitable Distribution Act
In 1981 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a major change in
the state's family law by granting courts the power to distribute property of
divorcing couples according to considerations other than legal title. With the
passage of G.S. 50-20, "an act for equitable distribution of marital property,"
the legislature took North Carolina from the pure common law approach to
the majority approach that permits courts to award property to divorced
spouses based on a variety of considerations.
1 43
In a state with a pure common law approach to property division, prop-
erty follows title upon divorce. Thus, a dependent spouse who has contributed
housekeeping, parenting, chauffeuring and cooking services to the marriage
often suffers injustice if all the property investments during the marriage are
placed in the income-earning spouse's name. Likewise, a spouse who contrib-
utes all of his or her earnings for family support while the other spouse invests
in property may emerge the economic loser upon divorce. 44 With the elimi-
nation of recriminatory defenses to divorce, which were often used as bargain-
ing chips by dependent spouses wishing to retain a share of marital property,
those spouses whose contribution to marital property was not reflected by
ownership of legal title often encountered serious financial difficulty.
145
Under North Carolina's new law the court may divide and distribute all
the marital property of the parties. Marital property is defined by the statute
as "all real and personal property acquired by either spouse during the course
of marriage and presently owned, except property determined to be separate
property."' 146 Under the new act separate property means "all real and per-
sonal property acquired by a spouse by bequest, devise, descent, or gift during
the course of the marriage."'147 A gift made by one spouse to another will be
considered separate property only if the intention that it remain separate is
142. In Stanley v. Stanley, 51 N.C. App. 172, 275 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 182, 280
S.E.2d 454 (1981), the court of appeals held that when a husband had disregarded his marital
obligation to provide reasonable support for his children, an award of child support may be based
on earning capacity rather than on the general measure of actual earnings. In this case, plaintiff-
wife and her husband separated before their child was born. Defendant paid the mother $10 per
week for the first two years of the child's life, but he had made no further support payments since
1966. Plaintiffhad tried to serve defendant with process over the years, but defendant moved so
often that he could not be served. The court also found that, although defendant was presently
unemployed, he had no health problems or illnesses that would keep him from worldng, and in
fact had earned $800 and $1,500 per month at his last two jobs, This course of conduct, said the
court, displayed defendant's intention to ignore his parental responsibilities.
143. Law of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1184 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
144. See H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations § 14.8, at 449 (1968); Marsehal, Proposed Re-
forms in Divorce Law, 8 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 35, 45-48 (1976).
145. Foster and Freed, Divorce Reform: Brakes on Breakdown? 13 J. Fain. L. 478-82 (1973-
74).
146. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
147. Id. § 50-20(b)(2).
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stated in the conveyance. Any increase in value of separate property is also
separate property, as is anything exchanged for separate property, regardless
of title. In addition, both vested pension or retirement rights and professional
or business licenses are considered separate property.
148
After the initial division of property into "marital" or "separate" catego-
ries, the court must make an equal division of the net value of the marital
property unless this division is inequitable, in which case the court is directed
by the statute to divide the property "equitably."' 149 Under the Act, the court
shall take the following factors into consideration:
1. the income, property and liabilities of the parties.
2. a spouse's obligation for support arising out of a prior marriage.
3. the duration of the marriage, age and health of the parties.
4. the need of the custodial parent for the marital home or its effects.
5. vested pension and retirement rights and expectations of non-vested
rights.
6. an equitable claim or interest in or a direct or indirect contribution to
marital property; this may include joint efforts, expenditures, contributions or
a lack thereof, such as services as a parent, spouse, wage-earner or
homemaker.
7. efforts by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential
of the other spouse.
8. direct contribution during the marriage to any increase in the value of
separate property.
9. the liquid or non-liquid character of the marital property.
10. the difficulty in evaluating an interest or asset in a business or pro-
fession and the desirability of retaining the interest or the asset without
interference.
11. tax consequences to both parties.
12. any other factors the court finds proper.
150
It is important to note that courts are not to regard alimony or child sup-
port in the property allocation. 151 After the property division, however, a
party may request a modification of child support or alimony.' 52 If distribu-
tion of property is impractical, the court may award a distributive award as a
substitute or supplement) 53 The statute defines a distributive award as a
lump sum payment or fixed installments, and thus does not include payments
that are treated as ordinary income.154 The intent of this provision may be to
148. Id.
149. Id. § 50-20(c).
150. Id. at (1)-(12).
151. But note that obligations from former marriages of either spouse are taken into consider-
ation. Id. § 50-20(c)(2).
152. Id. § 50-20(f).
153. Id. § 50-20(e).
154. Id. § 50-20(b)(3).
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ensure that courts do not award payments that look like alimony-"periodic"
payments that continue for more than ten years or until the death or remar-
riage of the dependent spouse. Alimony is deductible by the supporting
spouse and taxable as ordinary income to the dependent spouse. t55
By distinguishing these installments of a property settlement from support
rights, the legislature may be trying to work an avoidance of the rule in United
States v. Davis,156 in which the Supreme Court held that a transfer of property
from a husband to a wife in exchange for the relinquishment of her inchoate
marital rights results in the husband's realization of taxable gain. In commu-
nity property states, where the property rights are vested in both spouses, the
Davis rule has been held inapplicable.' 57 If a distributive award in this state is
deemed to be a settlement of vested property rights rather than inchoate mari-
tal rights, it is perhaps arguable that the Davis rule is inapplicable.
The legislature went further in its attempt to create vested property rights
with a provision 158 in the Act that identifies the rights of parties to equitable
distribution as a "species of common ownership, the rights of the respective
parties vesting at the time of the filing of the divorce action." 159
Under the new statute the court may transfer legal title as provided in
G.S. 1A-l, Rule 70 and G.S. 1-228.160 Before the settlement of the property,
the parties may request a notice of lis pendens to be recorded with regard to
marital property. If a conveyance or encumbrance of the property is recorded
before the filing of lis pendens or if interest in the property was obtained by
descent before the filing, the property will pass free of any equitable distribu-
tion claim. The court may cancel notice of lis pendens if the property is
bonded.161
The procedure for obtaining equitable distribution of property is set out
in G.S. 50-21. A party may file a cross-action in a suit for absolute divorce or
fie a separate action. Subsections (e) and (f) of G.S. 50-11 bar an assertion of
the right to equitable distribution after a judgment of absolute divorce. An
action or motion brought within six months of the date of judgment is permit-
ted if. (a) service of process was by publication and defendant failed to ap-
pear,162 or (b) the court rendering divorce lacked jurisdiction over an absent
spouse or the marital property. In such a case the validity of the divorce may
be attacked in an action for equitable distribution.1 63
Equitable distribution will no doubt make a dramatic difference in the
economics of marital dissolution in North Carolina. Its passage raises count-
less questions for the courts. For example, courts must establish guidelines for
155. See H. Clark, supra note 144, § 14.12, at 48 (1968).
156. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
157. See H. Clark, supra note 144.
158. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(k) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 50-20(g).
161. Id. § 50-20(h).
162. Id. § 50-11(e).
163. Id. § 50-11(f.
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untangling thorny marital/separate property issues and for determining what
weight should be given the provision for "equal division." Also among the
areas to be fleshed out by the courts are rules for measuring contributions such
as homemaking, and the effect of the Act on taxes, alimony and child support.
It is important to remember that equitable distribution will not affect the
parties' rights to decide between themselves how to distribute their own prop-
erty. Nevertheless, when the parties are unable to reach an agreement, courts
now have much greater power to divide and distribute the property equitably.
2. Note, The Discretionary Factor in the Equitable Distribution Actt
When a North Carolina court makes an equitable distribution of marital
property upon divorce, it is charged to consider eleven specific factors. 16 In
addition, the court is directed to weigh "[a]ny other factor which [it] finds to be
just and proper."' 65 This catch-all "Factor 12," appended to the list like a
legislative afterthought, is integral to the operation of the distribution statute.
Creation of the Discretionary Power
The basic function of Factor 12 is to empower the district court judge to
exercise discretion in making a property division equitable. As in New York,
from whose statute North Carolina borrowed its Factor 12 language, "[t]he
new law is termed an 'equitable distribution' statute because the judge is per-
mitted to consider '[a]ny other factor which the court shall expressly find to be
just and proper.' 1166 It is this Factor 12 equitable power that completes the
legislature's abrogation of the rigid and much-criticized common-law rule of
distribution by title.167
The substitution of a discretionary standard for a fixed rule of law inevi-
tably results in problems-prominently, problems of uncertainty that make for
costly litigation. "We cannot," writes one commentator, "have both individ-
ual justice (or more correctly, the hope of individual justice) and predictable,
fast, easy and inexpensive disposition of matters of divorce." 168 In addition,
there is the fear that the power to consider principles of equity entails the
power to act arbitrarily. Upon the enactment of New York's distribution stat-
ute, "[s]ome opponents felt that the latitude given to the courts would perpetu-
ate inequities. Although such critics claimed that judges in New Jersey were
making unbalanced awards . . ., a critical examination of their evidence
t This subsection was written by Kim Wetherill.
164. Id. § 50-20(c)(1)-(l 1). See text accompanying note 150 supra.
165. Id. § 50-20(c)(12).
166. Recent Developments-Equitable Distribution in New York, 45 Albany L. Rev. 483, 504
(1981) (quoting 1981 N.Y. Laws, ch. 281, § 9). The New York equitable distribution statute in-
cludes the Factor 12 language at N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(5)(d)(10) (McKinney Supp.
1981)).
167. Note, Is There a Need for Equitable Distribution of Property upon Divorce in North
Carolina? Leatherman v. Leatherman, 11 N.C. Cent. L.J. 156 (1979).
168. Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 Willamette L.J. 413, 433 (1976).
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reveals allegations with few substantiating details."'169
The North Carolina Act, like that of New York, provides detailed guide-
lines for the court to follow, and requires that the trial judge set forth in writ-
ing the basis of the distribution.1 70 The extent, however, to which the
enumeration of specific equitable factors answers the criticisms expressed
above depends in large part on whether and how that enumeration operates as
a restraint on the Factor 12 discretionary power.
Discretion unaffected by enumerated factors is one extreme possibility.
In one case, a Wyoming judge's refusal to hear evidence of marital misconduct
in making a property division, despite the statutory directive to consider "the
relative merits of the parties," was upheld: "When there are adequate assets to
comfortably provide for both of the parties, the trial court does not abuse its
discretion when it refuses to permit the parties to air their dirty laundry in
court." 171 It is doubtful that such judicial disregard of legislative fiat would be
tolerated in North Carolina, whose statute is considerably more detailed and
emphatic in its guidelines than that of Wyoming.172 Indeed, the North Caro-
lina legislature may well have intended to foreclose litigation on the first
eleven factors it enumerated.
At the other extreme, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
indicated that a trial judge's recognition of factors not enumerated in the dis-
tribution statute would constitute an error of law. 173 The Massachusetts stat-
ute, however, contains no Factor 12 counterpart; therefore, the Massachusetts
rule is not germane to North Carolina's situation.
The real question for North Carolina is not whether a court can refuse to
consider any applicable enumerated factor, but rather what considerations
apartfrom those specofcaly mandated may be considered within the exercise of
169. 45 Albany L. Rev., supra note 166 at 504-05.
170. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) & (i); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(5)(d), (g) (McKinney
Supp. 1981). Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981) (commending the matter of
distribution entirely to judicial discretion). Within two years after the equitable distribution stat-
ute was adopted in New Jersey, the state supreme court established a fairly thorough list of discre-
tionary guidelines in Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974). The court would
consider
(1) respective age, background and earning ability of the parties; (2) duration of the
marriage; (3) the standard of living of the parties during the marriage; (4) what money or
property each brought into the marriage; (5) the present income of the parties; (6) the
property acquired during the marriage by either or both parties; (7) the source of acquisi-
tion; (8) the current value and income-producing capacity of the property; (9) the debts
and liabilities of each of the parties to the marriage; (10) the present mental and physical
health of the parties; (11) the probability of continuing present employment at present
earnings or better in the future; (12) effect of distribution of assets on the ability to pay
alimony and support; and (13) gifts from one spouse to the other during marriage.
Id. at 211, 320 A.2d at 492.
171. Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 715 (Wyo. 1980).
172. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1977) provides that the court shall make a "just and equitable"
distribution, "having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the condition in which
they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired, and the
burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children."
173. Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1977) (citing Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 208, § 34). According to the Rice court, the guidelines set forth in the third and fourth
sentences of Section 34 "define the scope of a trial judge's discretion." Id.
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its discretion. Commentary on the New York statute is useful in answering
this question because of the similarity of that statute to the one enacted by
North Carolina. Under the New York statute "[flactor [10], as a catch-all,
permits the judge to weigh and balance matters which may have been over-
looked in setting up the guidelines."' 174 This approach may be difficult to ap-
ply,175 but it fits judicial discretion within the framework of legislative intent.
In addition, it is appealing in its subtle insistence on the best of possible
worlds: it suggests at once the "hope of individual justice" and the possibility
of "predictable, fast, easy and inexpensive disposition ... 176
The presumption of equal distribution created by the statute177 should,
theoretically, have a limiting effect on the exercise of judicial discretion. But
the quantum of evidence on each of the twelve factors required to overcome
the presumption is not spelled out. That question, too, would appear to be one
for the court's discretion.
178
The enactment of an equitable distribution statute reflects the popular
recognition that marriage is a partnership whose dissolution requires equitable
division of assets. 179 In the determination of what factors shall govern this
division, however, the partnership analogy is little more than a point of depar-
ture.180 On one hand, the partnership comparison suggests that marriage be
viewed as a joint effort toward augmenting the marital estate. Equitable distri-
bution is thus seen as a means of proportionately reimbursing each spouse for
174. Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 50 (1981) (em-
phasis added).
175. One issue is whether the statute is sufficiently ambiguous to permit consideration of a
factor not enumerated, or whether that factor is excluded by implication. The determination, for
example, whether homemaking services can be considered in any context other than that de-
scribed in Factor 6 would involve just such a painstaking analysis. In conducting the analysis-in
the process of discerning legislative intent--the court will effectively limit or expand its discretion-
ary power.
176. Rheinstein, supra note 168, at 433. Of course, if the statutory guidelines were less com-
prehensive, the goal of predictability would not be as well served by a "legislative oversight"
standard; indeed, the standard would probably not be appropriate.
177. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
178. The presumption of equal distribution may have been incorporated in the statute largely,
if not solely, for tax reasons.
179. Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 67, 85 (1980). The marital partnership theory as a basis for distribution of assets upon di-
vorce originated in civil-law-influenced community property states; the rise of the theory in com-
mon-law title states can largely be attributed to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307
(1973) (hereinafter cited as UMDA). See generally Comment, Alimony, Property Settlement and
Child Custody Under the New Divorce Statutes: No-Fault is Not Enough, 22 Cath. U.L. Rev.
365, 374-75 (1973). Only six states have directly adopted some version of the UMDA: Colorado,
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-113 (1973); Illinois, IlL. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ken-
tucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.190 (Supp. 1980); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 722A (1964);
Missouri, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.330 (Vernon Supp. 1982); and Montana, Mont. Code Ann. § 40-
202 (1981). The UMDA, however, has had much broader influence. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Chal-
mers, 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974) (discussed in text accompanying notes 201-04 infra).
180. Except perhaps in those states that adhere to a rule of equal division. See Daggett, Divi-
sion of Property upon Dissolution of Marriage, 6 Law & Contemp. Probs. 225, 233 (1939). See
also Cal. Civ. Code § 4800 (West Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 32-712 (Supp. 1981); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 107.105(e) (1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255 (West 1981).
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contributions-direct or indirect-to the marital property. 8 1 On the other
hand, the original terms of the marriage contract-including the state-imposed
duty of support-have some bearing on the property consequences of divorce.
Of course, the question of post-marital support is usually settled in the context
of alimony.'8 2 But the same factors that determine the amount of alimony-
needs of the dependent spouse, abilities of the supporting spouse 8 3-also
figure largely, if less obviously, in the equitable distribution of marital
property.'
8 4
The tendency to blur distinctions between alimony and property division,
which results from the coexistence of these different distribution policies, has
been vehemently criticized by many commentators:
Alimony is an award for support and maintenance and has histori-
cally been based on the common law duty of the husband to support
his wife. Property division, on the other hand, is based on the joint
contribution of the spouses to the marital enterprise. . . . Since ali-
mony and property division spring from different considerations, the
courts must recognize the distinction if a uniform application of the
law is to be achieved.185
Certainly the criticism is well-founded. Property division should effectuate a
return to each party of that which he has invested in the marital estate,
whereas alimony aims toward financially satisfying the marital expectations of
the spouses. But if alimony and property division are viewed as having the
common purpose of accomplishing a dissolution with the least possible
financial disruption, the confusion is perhaps understandable.1
8 6
A North Carolina court's choice of nonenumerated "just and proper" fac-
tors should reflect its apprehension of the policies underlying the statute. The
factors chosen and the weight accorded those factors may vary, depending on
whether the statute is viewed as espousing primarily a policy of repayment of
contribution or one of accommodating the needs of one party with the abilities
of the other. While these policies are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
neither are they always consistent.
181. See, e.g., UMDA § 307(l) (Alternative B); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(6)-(8) (Cum. Supp.
1981); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
182. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1(1) (1976); 2 R. Lee, North Carolina Family Law § 135 (4th
ed. 1980).
183. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1(3) & (4), 16.5(a) (1976).
184. Id. § 50-20(c)(1),(2) & (4). Compare N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 236(B)(5)(d) with
§ 236(B)(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
185. Inker, Walsh, & Perocchi, Alimony and Assignment of Property: The New Statutory
Scheme in Massachusetts, 11 Faro. L.Q. 59, 69 (1977) (reprinted with minor changes from 10
Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1 (1975)).
186. See also H. Clark, supra note 144, § 14.8, at 450-51 (1968); 2 R. Lee, supra note 182,
§ 135.1, at 145-46. A twofold policy of equitable distribution was discussed in Rothman v. Roth-
man, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (1974). On one hand, said the court, the distribution
statute protects a dependent spouse against the eventuality of the supporting spouse's death or
financial misfortune. This is a protection which an "inherently precarious" alimony award cannot
give. On the other hand, the statute acknowledges noneconomic contributions to the marital
estate. "Only if it is clearly understood that far more than economic factors are involved, will the
resulting distribution be equitable within the true intent and meaning of the statute."
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Will Fault Be Considered Under Factor 12?
There is little consensus among states with equitable distribution statutes
whether fault or misconduct is an appropriate factor to be weighed in making
the distribution. While a number of statutes recognize fault as a factor,1 87 a
larger number expressly preclude consideration of fault,188 and an even larger
number fail to mention it at all.189 North Carolina's statute falls into the last
category. If fault is to be considered under the statute, it must be under the
"any other factor" language in Factor 12. Prediction of how North Carolina
courts will resolve this issue requires study of the similar legislation in New
York and its judicial reception.
The legislative history of New York's Section 236 indicates that the "any
other factor" language was the result of compromise between those who
wanted "marital fault" expressly included as a factor and those who wanted it
expressly excluded. 190 One can envision the same debate in the North Caro-
lina legislature.19, Of course, if the question whether to consider fault was
deliberately reserved for judicial discretion, it becomes unnecessary to specu-
late whether the legislature "may have overlooked" the fault factor.
The fault question has not yet been resolved by the New York Court of
Appeals, and only a few lower court cases decided under the new statute have
187. The following statutes permit the court to consider fault in making an equitable distribu-
tion of marital or community property: Ala. Code § 30-2-52 (Cum. Supp. 1981); Ark. Stat. Ann.
§§ 34-1202, 34-1214(A) (Cum. Supp. 1981); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West Supp. 1981);
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 580-47(a) (Supp. 1980); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-6A-05(b)(4)
(1980); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 34 (Law. Co-op. 1981); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.330.1(4) (Vernon
Supp. 1982); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(1)(b) (1979); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 (1981); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, § 751 (1974); Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1977).
188. The following statutes call for no-fault property division: Alaska Stat. § 09.55.210(6)
(Supp. 1981); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-318A (Supp. 1981); Cal. Civ. Code § 4800 (West Supp.
1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-113(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(a) (1981);
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Burns 1980);
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.190(2) (Supp. 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1982); Mont.
Code Ann. § 40-4-202(1) (1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981); S.D. Codi-
fied Laws Ann. § 25-4-45.1 (1976); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1982); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 767.255 (West 1981).
189. These statutes are silent on the question whether fault is a factor: D.C. Code § 16-910
(1981); Idaho Code § 32-712 (Cum. Supp. 1981); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21 (West 1981); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 60-1610 (Cum. Supp. 1981); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336, (1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
19, § 722-A (1981); Mich. Comp. Laws § 522.19 (1967) (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.99 (Callaghan
1974)); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Cure. Supp. 1980); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 34-23 (West Supp.
1981); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-7(B)(1) (1978); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney
Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-24 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18 (1980); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105(e) (1979); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 20-3-130 (Law Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1891); Tex. Faro. Code Ann. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982);
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1981).
190. Foster, supra note 174, at 49. See also Wels, The Role of Fault, in A Practical Guide to
the New York Equitable Distribution Divorce Law 289 (Foster ed. 1980).
191. North Carolina has not published legislative histories. One legislator confirmed that, as
in New York, the "any other factor" language was a compromise. Basically, he said, the language
accommodated those who wanted marital fault included as an equitable distribution factor, those
who felt that the role of fault should be restricted to the determination of alimony and the "tax
experts" who argued that any fault-based property division would be a taxable event under the
Davis rule. Interview with Joe Hackney, Representative of 17th District of N.C. in Chapel Hill,
N.C. (Feb. 26, 1982). See also United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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addressed the question. In Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff92 the wife was granted a
divorce on cruelty grounds; the husband's guilt, was apparently not an issue in
the property division. In Giannola v. Giannols193 the court held that in appro-
priate circumstances, an award of maintenance194 may be precluded by marital
fault. The court indicated that while fault may be considered in making an
equitable distribution of property, it will not have a preclusive effect, "the the-
ory being that each party to the marriage is entitled to take with him, that
which he contributed to the marriage."' 195  In Kobylack v. Kobylackl96 the
court, while acknowledging that fault can be considered, refused to consider
the wife's infidelities in dividing the marital property. Because the parties
were childless, relatively young, healthy, self-supporting and eligible for re-
marriage, the court deemed it unfair to consider any factors other than eco-
nomic contribution. "As a general rule, fault should not be used as a
punishment but only as a consideration to tilt the balance where there are
insufficient assets to make the parties economically 'whole.' "197
The Giannola and Kobylack cases are noteworthy in several respects.
First, they articulate a strong policy of repayment of contribution. Further,
the distinction drawn by Giannola emphasizes that the weight accorded the
fault factor decreases as a needs/abilities policy is supplanted by one of repay-
ment of contribution.1.98 Finally, the fairness of the rule enunciated in Koby-
lack is questionable. When marital assets are modest, the application of a
fault factor to distribution may have a more severe punitive effect than when
there are sufficient assets to repay fully each spouse's contribution. 199
Predictably, the lower New York courts have turned for guidance to case
law from New Jersey, whose statute leaves the problem of what factors shall
determine an "equitable" distribution entirely to judicial discretion.200 Chal-
mers v. Chalmers, the leading New Jersey case, states a general rule of no-fault
property division.20' The issue in Chalmers was whether an award to the wife
of only twenty percent of the marital assets could be sustained on the basis of
192. 108 Misc. 2d 311, 437 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1981).
193. 109 Misc. 2d 985, 441 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
194. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(6)(a)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
195. 109 Misc. 2d at 986-87, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (citing Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186,
320 A.2d 478 (1974)). The New York court's reliance on the Chalmers decision is somewhat
misplaced. In Chalmers the New Jersey Supreme Court espoused a theory of repayment of contri-
bution in support of its conclusion that marital fault is not a relevant factor in equitable distribu-
tion. See discussion at text accompanying notes 201-204 infra.
196. 110 Misc. 2d 402, 442 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
197., Id. at 405, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
198. It can be argued forcefully that the fault factor should have no place in a needs/abilities
analysis. Because fault has traditionally played a central role in alimony determinations, how-
ever, courts are prone to associate fault with alimony regardless of the alimony policy involved.
See generally Comment, 22 Cath. U.L. Rev., supra note 179, at 368-70. See also H. Clark, supra
note 144, at 442; Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, Private Agreements and
the State, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 819, 822-25 (1981).
199. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B) Practice Commentary C236B:13 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
200. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A-34-23 (West Supp. 1981).
201. 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974); see note 195 supra. See also Mabne v. Mahne, 147 N.J.
Super. 326, 371 A.2d 314 (1977); Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
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her admitted adultery. In overturning the award, the court made several ob-
servations. First, the court noted that, "fault may be merely the manifestation
of a sick marriage .... Marriage is such an intricate relationship that often
it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain upon whom the real responsibility
for the marital breakup rests." 20 2 Second, the New Jersey statute, while ex-
pressly permitting the consideration of divorce grounds (other than separa-
tion) in a determination of alimony or maintenance, did not provide for
similar consideration in the context of equitable distribution. Third, the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) emphasizes that division is to be
made "without regard to marital misconduct." 203 Finally, the court recog-
nized an underlying policy of contribution in which marital fault is irrelevant,
"since all that is being effected is the allocation to each party of what really
belongs to him or her. '204
Few generalizations can be drawn from a survey of other jurisdictions
with statutes that completely omit reference to fault.20 5 The tendency among
courts that have addressed the question is toward considering fault as a factor
to be balanced with other---enumerated or discretionary-factors. This has
been the result in Kansas, 20 6 Michigan, 207 North Dakota,208 South Caro-
lina20 9 and Texas. 210 One court in Texas (a community property state) devel-
oped an interesting formula: it would consider, among other factors, "the fault
in breaking up the marriage; and the benefits the innocent spouse would have
received from a continuation of the marriage." 211 The Maine Supreme Judi-
cial Court has indicated that because the no-fault provision was omitted from
that state's version of the UMDA, it would infer a legislative intent that fault
be considered. 2 12 On the other hand, Iowa has judicially precluded considera-
tion of fault in equitable distribution.213 Similarly, Oregon courts take very
202. 65 N.J. at 193, 320 A.2d at 482.
203. UMDA § 307 (1973).
204. 65 N.J. at 194, 320 A.2d at 483. Whether this strong no-fault position will admit of any
exceptions is discussed further below. See text accompanying notes 205-15 infra.
205. See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R.3d 1116 (1973); 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation
§ 933 (1966 & Cum. Supp. 1981); 27B C.J.S. Divorce, § 295(7) (1959 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
206. Smith v. Smith, 5 Kan. App. 2d 117, 612 P.2d 1257 (1980); Neis v. Neis, 3 Kan. App. 2d
589, 599 P.2d 305 (1979).
207. Patrick v. Patrick, 99 Mich. App. 132, 297 N.W.2d 635 (1980); Tigner v. Tigner, 90 Mich.
App. 787,282 N.W.2d 481 (1979); Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 940 (1979).
208. Carr v. Carr, 300 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1980); Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, appeal
after remand 281 N.W.2d 569 (N.D. 1977).
209. Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41,267 S.E.2d 427 (1980). The court held that the statu-
tory foreclosure of alimony to an adulterous spouse does not extend to a "special equity award of
property." Id. at 43, 267 S.E.2d it 429. Still, adultery is one consideration for the court in fash-
ionmg an equitable distribution. See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. Com. Supp. 1981).
210. Murffv. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (rex. 1981); Thomas v. Thomas, 603 S.W.2d 356 (rex.
Civ. App. 1980); Price v. Price, 591 S.W.2d 601 (rex. Civ. App. 1979).
211. Price v. Price, 591 S.W.2d at 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) A discussion of the fault factor in
community property division may be found in Younger, Community Property, Women and the
Law School Curriculum, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 211, 241-44 (1973).
212. Zillert v. Zillert, 395 A.2d 1152 (Me. 1978).
213. In re Marriage of Stuart, 252 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1977); In re Marriage of Willcoxson, 250
N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1977); In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972).
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seriously the legislative admonition that a property division should be
equal.214 It is doubtful that these courts will indulge in inquiries about marital
fault.
Even in jurisdictions whose statutes specify fault as a relevant considera-
tion, there may be circumstances in which a court will decline to weigh the
fault factor. For example, in Alabama, if both parties are equally at fault,
their marital transgressions are in effect cancelled out and a property division
is made as though both were blameless.
215
In summary, despite strong policy arguments for no-fault property divi-
sion, a majority of courts that have addressed the question without the assist-
ance of a statutory guideline have concluded that fault is a relevant
consideration in equitable distribution. It can be anticipated that North Caro-
lina courts will follow the majority approach and treat fault as one-though
not a controlling or preclusive-consideration in the balancing process.
Several general observations can be made about the probable relationship
between fault and equal distribution. Despite the movement toward a rule of
no-fault maintenance,216 North Carolina remains firmly committed to a sys-
tem of fault-based alimony. In Williams v. Williams, decided in 1980, the
North Carolina Supreme Court defended the statutory fault system as involv-
ing "not a question of adherence to outdated traditions in the marital relation-
ship, 'but a question of 'fairness and justice to all parties.' ",217 North
Carolina's retention of fault-based alimony might be a reason for excluding
considerations of fault from the equitable distribution of property. But the
statutory enumeration of factors usually considered in an alimony determina-
tion218 may tempt the courts to indulge in the associated fault inquiry, making
it logically impossible to adhere to a strict contribution theory. Moreover,
even a strong policy of contribution does not always foreclose the fault
inquiry.2 19
214. See, e.g., Glatt v. Glatt, 41 Or. App. 615, 598 P.2d 1237 (1979). For a contrasting ap-
proach, see Ford v. Ford, 616 S.W.2d 3 (Ark. 1981) (approving, under the Arkansas "equal pre-
sumption" statute, an award of 90% of the marital assets to the husband when the wife, because of
depression and mental disorder, had not contributed to the marriage for some five years).
215. See, e.g., Nolen v. Nolen, 398 So. 2d 712 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981). Of course, to reach the
"cancellation" point in the trial court may require days or weeks of testimony and volumes of
exhibits. For example, in Dees v. Dees, 390 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980), a determination of
equal fault was reached after review of 250 pages of pleading and orders, 1650 pages of testimony
and 200 exhibits.
216. See, e.g., UMDA § 308(b) (1973); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-114(2) (1973); IlL. Ann. Stat.
ch. 40, § 504(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980) (as amended by 1981 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 82-566, 82-717
(West)); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-203(2) (1981). See also Comment, Alimony Considerations
under No-Fault Divorce Laws, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 792 (1978); Note, Does No-Fault Divorce Portend
No-Fault Alimony?, 34 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 486 (1973) (discussing In re Marriage of Williams, 199
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972)).
217. 299 N.C. 174, 189, 261 S.E.2d 849, 859 (1980) (quoting BeaU v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 674,
228 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1976)).
218. See 184 and accompanying text supra.
219. See, e.g., Kobylack v. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d 402, 442 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1981);
Giannola v. Giannola, 109 Misc. 2d 985, 441 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. 1981). A strong policy of
contribution would seem, however, to decrease the weight of the fault factor in the balancing
process.
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Though theoretically the presumption of an equal distribution should re-
strict the scope of the court's examination into fault, the strength of the North
Carolina presumption is unclear. The language of the statute suggests that the
presumption may be only a starting point in the balancing process; it thus may
have only as much force as a court in its discretion decides to give it. In any
event, if the proper standard is not strict equality but equality under the circum-
stances, fault may foreseeably come into play as a circumstance.
Finally, if fault is to be considered under Factor 12, it should be entitled
to only as much weight as that accorded any one of the eleven enumerated
factors. To give it controlling or preclusive effect despite its omission from the
statute might well constitute an abuse of discretion.
In What Cases Is Fault a Relevant Factor?
To suppose that North Carolina courts will consider fault as a discretion-
ary "just and proper" factor is to begin rather than to conclude the inquiry.
Because North Carolina recognizes both fault and no-fault grounds for di-
vorce,220 the question arises whether the grounds for divorce should be taken
into account in determining what is an equitable distribution. In other words,
may the court properly consider fault in making a distribution pursuant to a
no-fault divorce? A survey of decisions from other courts that have enter-
tained the question yields some interesting results.
In a number of states in which equitable distribution statutes expressly
mention fault as a factor to be considered, divorce itself is granted exclusively
on no-fault grounds. 221 This is the situation in Hawaii,222 Missouri, 223 Ne-
vada224 and Wyoming. 225 One Wyoming court exhibited its displeasure at
this awkward legislation by simply refusing to consider fault in making an
equitable distribution.
226
Other states with fault-based distribution statutes recognize both fault
and no-fault divorce grounds.227 The general result among courts in these
states is that fault is relevant in determing the equity of property distribution
220. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-5 (1976 & Supp. 1981) (fault grounds for absolute divorce); Id. § 50-
7 (fault grounds for divorce from bed and board); Id. § 50-6 (absolute divorce after one-year
separation).
221. Contrast this situation with that in South Dakota, where marital fault is not a proper
consideration in equitable distribution, but divorce is available only on fault grounds. S.D. Codi-
fied Laws Ann. § 25-4-2 (1976).
222. Hawaii Rev.'Stat. §§ 580-41, -42 (1976).
223. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.305 (Vernon 1977).
224. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.010 (1979).
225. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-104 (1977).
226. Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 715 (Wyo. 1980). For further discussion of this case, see text
accompanying note 171 supra.
227. See, e.g., the following statutes: Ala. Code § 30-2-1(a) (1975); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1202
(Cum. Supp. 1981); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-40(c) (West Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-
05-03 (1981); R.I. Gen. Law s§ 15-5-2 (1981) (fault grounds), § 15-5-3 (1981) (three-year separa-
tion), § 15-5-3.1 (1981) (irreconcilable differences); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 551 (1974 & Supp.
1981).
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even when a divorce was obtained on no-fault grounds.228 This response may
be justified as nothing more than judicial deference to legislative mandate.
But to the extent that a court has discretion to consider factors not mentioned
in the distribution statute, it should give some deference to the fact that at least
one of the parties decided against "airing the dirty laundry in court."
There are arguments against this position. First, a court making an equi-
table distribution can consider fault only when evidence of fault is presented
to it. The litigant's decision to present such evidence may appear to override
his earlier decision to avoid the fault question in the divorce action. The
stakes are much higher, however, in an action for property division, and a
litigant may feel compelled by the distribution statute's inclusion of the fault
factor to build a case on fault. Second, it can be argued that a court's system-
atic refusal to consider the fault factor in distributions following no-fault di-
vorces may effectively eliminate no-fault divorce, at least in cases in which
marital assets are large.
229
Even under a fault-based distribution statute, however, fault is only one
factor to be considered. Thus, it is not likely that a party will consider the
fault factor in deciding whether to pursue a no-fault divorce. Furthermore,
the argument that fault would be considered in the distribution of property
should have little application when there is little marital property. In these
cases there are fewer resources to finance protracted litigation-and it is in
these cases that the fault factor would work the more serious punishment.
230
The argument that fault should be disregarded, or cancelled out as a fac-
tor, in a distribution following a no-fault divorce has considerably more force
when the applicable distribution statute is silent on the fault question.
23 '
228. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1202 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (when divorce based on three-year separa-
tion, questions of fault can be raised only in hearing on alimony or equitable distribution); Pas-
quariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 362 A.2d 835 (1975) (decided under the statutory
predecessor of Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 46b-81); Carr v. Car, 300 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1980); Hultberg
v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41 (N.D. 1977); Carter v. Carter, 413 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1980). Compare the
Alabama statute permitting the court to consider fault in making a property allowance when di-
vorce is based on fault. Ala. Code § 30-2-52 (Supp. 1981). It may be argued by implication that
fault is not a proper consideration in distribution following no-fault divorce.
229. When fault grounds for divorce exist, the parties may still prefer a no-fault dissolution
that spares them considerable expense and anxiety. Nevertheless, if no-fault divorce is understood
to preclude fault-based property division, no-fault divorce may lose much of its appeal for an
innocent spouse. When large marital assets are at stake, the value of a favorable fault-based
division may well exceed the emotional and financial costs of obtaining a fault-based divorce.
230. See text accompanying note 199 supra.
231. In a few states with distribution statutes that are silent on the fault question, divorce is
available only on no-fault grounds. Iowa Code Ann. § 598.5(7) (West 1981); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 552.6 (19-) (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.86(3) (Callaghan 1974)); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-353(7) (1978);
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 107.025, .036 (1979). Utah provides for divorce only on fault grounds, Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-1, -2 (1976), 30-4-1 (Supp. 1981). The other states provide both fault and no-
fault divorce grounds. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-904, -906 (1981); La. Civ. Code Ann. arts.
138-39 (West Supp. 1981); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 691 (1981); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-2
(West Supp. 1981); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-4-1, -2 (1978); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170 (McKinney
1977); N.D. Cent. Code 14-05-03 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.01 (Page 1980); Olda. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 1271 (West 1961); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-10 (Law Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1981); Tex.
Faro. Code Ann. §§ 3.01-.06 (Vernon 1975). For additional tables showing divorce grounds of the
different states, see Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 Faro. L.Q. 229,
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Regretably, few courts have been persuaded by this contention.232 In Michi-
gan, divorce is available only on no-fault grounds; 233 nonetheless, say the
courts, "[flault is still a consideration in matters of property division .... *,234
n Texas, where both fault and no-fault divorce grounds are provided,
235
courts have studiously avoided the issue. In Young v. Young 23 6 the court held
that when a divorce is based on fault, fault may, but need not, be considered in
making a property division. In the most recent reported case dealing with this
question in Texas, Murff v. Murff,2 7 the court found fault a proper considera-
tion when the divorce was based on both fault and no-fault grounds. 238 Both
the Young and Murff courts, however, did not decide whether fault would be a
proper distribution factor in a case of no-fault divorce.
One praiseworthy decision comes from Georgia, where, in the absence of
an equitable distribution statute, the courts have ordered the equitable appor-
tionment of property as alimony. In Anderson v. Anderson239 the court relied
on UMDA sections 307 and 308 in holding that misconduct of the parties is
irrelevant in deciding issues of either property division or alimony when di-
vorce is granted on a no-fault ground.24° The addition of a provision permit-
ting no-fault divorce to section 30-102 of the Georgia Code, said the court,
expressed a "public policy of avoiding recriminations between married per-
sons seeking a divorce. Where these parties obtain a divorce on this ground, it
follows that these same recriminations should not then be admitted on the
issue of alimony." 24 1 Three judges joined in a dissent that cautioned,
"[h]usbands beware and take heed," and went on to argue that the decision
was "bad domestic relations law and bad contract law."2 42 The dissenters ulti-
mately won the day: the alimony statute was rewritten, making "adultery or
desertion" a bar to an alimony award.
243
North Carolina provides for alimony exclusively on the basis of fault;
244
the fact of a no-fault divorce simply has no relevance in an alimony determi-
nation. 245 In fact, two forms of alimony are available without any divorce at
241 (1981) (revision of Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1980 in 6 Farn. L.
Rptr. 4043 (1980)).
232. But see In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972).
233. Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.6 (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.86(3) (Callaghan 1974).
234. Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, -, 267 N.W.2d 155, 159 (1978).
235. Tex. Fain. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 3.01-.06 (Vernon 1975).
236. 609 S.W.2d 758, 762 (rex. 1980).
237. 615 S.W.2d 696 (rex. 1981).
238. Id. at 698.
239. 237 Ga. 886, 230 S.E.2d 272 (1976).
240. Id. at 889-92, 230 S.E.2d at 274-76.
241. Id. at 891, 230 S.E.2d at 275.
242. Id. at 893, 895, 230 S.E.2d at 276, 277. The dissenters claimed that females looking for
"easy lifetime support with no... responsibility. . ." would move to Georgia to attempt to
marry "ambitious, industrious and eligible male residents ... " Id. at 893, 230 S.E.2d at 276
(Ingram, J., dissenting).
243. Ga. Code Ann. § 30-201 (1980).
244. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.2 (1976).
245. Id.
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all.2 4 6 Equitable distribution, on the other hand, cannot take place outside the
context of divorce,247 raising the as yet unanswered question whether the di-
vorce grounds will influence the distribution. In any event, when a no-fault
divorce has been granted by a North Carolina court and neither party has
petitioned for alimony, the court making a distribution should carefully re-
view the situation before allowing the parties to become embroiled in a poten-
tially messy and arguably needless fault contest.24 8
What Constitutes Fault?
In general, two kinds of misconduct qualify for consideration under the
various equitable distribution statutes in other states. The first, loosely de-
nominated "marital fault," comprises mainly that misconduct which under-
mines the marriage relationship. The other may be described as "property
fault," meaning such misconduct with respect to assets as might give rise to
traditional equitable remedies. 249
Courts that consider marital fault face a tremendous problem in defining
just what misconduct is to have property consequences. There are, unfortu-
nately, few guiding principles. New Jersey case law suggests one possible ap-
proach. One of the earliest cases decided under the New Jersey statute,
Sanders v. Sanders,250 involved a sixty-seven-year-old man who had married
a woman twenty years his junior and had expended his life savings in the
purchase of the marital home; his income (from Social Security) was used to
support his wife and her dependent daughter. The wife made no economic
contribution to the marital property and, shortly after the marriage, ceased her
"wifely duties"; she finally moved out and refused further contact with her
husband except to demand, after he was granted a divorce on grounds of de-
sertion, that she be awarded one-half of the marital home. The court re-
246. Both permanent alimony and alimony pendente lite may be awarded without divorce.
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-16.1(1) & (2), -16.2, -16.3 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
247. Id. § 50-21.
248. It is unclear whether the North Carolina statute even permits a court to consider that
alimony has not been requested. See id. §§ 50-20(c)(1), -20(). An existing alimony order may not
be considered by the court providing for an equitable distribution. Id. § 50-20(f). On the other
hand, G.S. 50-20(c)(1) directs the court to consider the "income, property and liabilities of each
party" and G.S. 50-20(c)(12) provides that the court shall consider any other factor it finds to be
just and proper. Arguably, the absence of an alimony request should be considered under these
provisions:
The situation posed in the text involves a bilateral no-fault divorce proceeding. Different
considerations may pertain when a valid no-fault divorce has been decreed ex parte by the court
of a sister state, and the dependent spouse, a North Carolina resident, is precluded from an ali-
mony award by his or her failure to file a timely request. See id. § 50-11(c). If equitable distribu-
tion, available for six months after such an ex parte decree, id. § 50-11 (e), is to compensate, in a
sense, for lost alimony, the court is less likely to be influenced by the fact that the divorce was
based on no-fault grounds.
249. See, e.g., the following New York cases dealing with the availability of injunctive relief in
an equitable distribution context: Bisca v. Bisca, 108 Misc. 2d 227, 437 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct.
1981); Franzese v. Franzese, 108 Misc. 2d 154, 436 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Gramazio v.
Gramazio, 108 Misc. 2d 579, 438 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Froelich-Switzer v. Switzer, 107
Misc. 2d 814, 436 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
250. 118 N.J. Super. 327, 287 A.2d 464 (Ch. Div. 1972).
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sponded to her claim by extinguishing all her right, title and interest in the
home, resting its decision primarily on the wife's conduct in relation to the
marriage.
251
Chalmers v. Chalmers,252 stating a general rule of no-fault distribution for
New Jersey, seemed implicitly to overrule Sanders. After a more recent lower
court case, however, the status of Sanders is unclear. In D'Arc v. D'4rc253 the
court returned the vast bulk of the marital assets to the wife upon proof that
the husband, in an attempt to secure for himself his wife's sizable estate, had
attempted to solicit her murder. The court first distinguished this case from
Chalmers, pointing out that the husband in DArc had contributed nothing to
the marriage but had merely enjoyed enormous sums of money that had come
to his wife from her father's trust fund.
Further, here we are not dealing with the usual type of "fault" where
the conduct of one spouse may merely be a reaction to the faults or
shortcomings of the other spouse. Here the "fault" is an attempt by
Dr. D'Arc to commit one of the most heinous crimes known to man-
kind-murder.2
54
Citing Sanders, the court remonstrated against a mechanical application of a
rigid principle when it would compel an "absurd" result.
While D'Arc can be limited to its facts, it also points the way toward the
establisment of a more general guideline for courts not similarly bound by a
no-fault rule. DArc yields the premise that marital misconduct "so evil and
outrageous that it must shock the conscience of everyone"255 should be con-
sidered an important factor in making a distribution. But this premise will not
govern most fact situations. Perhaps the more interesting aspect of DArc is its
suggestion, insofar as it revives the Sanders case, that some misconduct less
grievous than murder may also be relevant to the distribution decision. The
difficulty lies in formulating a standard-and this difficulty increases as a
court's willingness to consider marital fault increases. Sanders may provide
such a standard: marital fault that reflects the relative contributions of the
parties to the marital property should be taken into account when the property
is divided. Strictly speaking, this is not "property fault." Helga Sanders did
not misappropriate, conceal or dissipate marital property; she simply made no
contribution to it and therefore had no equitable claim to it.
While too narrow to encompass the various marital misdeeds that have
actually been considered by courts making such distributions,256 this standard
251. Id. at 329-30, 287 A.2d at 466-67.
252. 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478.
253. 164 N.J. Super. 226, 395 A.2d 1270 (Ch. Div. 1978), modified, 175 N.J. Super. 598, 421
A.2d 602 (App. Div. 1980) (sustaining property division, overturning award to husband of counsel
fees).
254. Id. at 241, 395 A.2d at 1278.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Carr v. Carr, 300 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1980) (extramarital relationships);
Schuchard v. Schuchard, 293 N.W. 428 (N.D. 1980) ("verbal abuse," "use of foul names," "con-
tinual arguing and lack of sexual compatibility"); Tigner v. Tigner, 90 Mich. App. 787, 282
N.W.2d 481 (1979) ("defendant's responsibility in causing the marital breakdown").
1982] FAMIL Y 1-4W 1411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
possesses several attractive features. It would spare a court the necessity of
drawing tortuous distinctions based on degrees of culpability and would also
eliminate one possibility for judicial capriciousness. Further, it seems to ex-
plain the reluctance of the Giannola and Kobylack courts in New York to
weigh marital fault.25 7 Finally, it reconciles different distribution policies: if
the legislative enumeration of alimony factors in the first place indicates the
court's authority to indulge in the associated fault inquiry, it is the policy of
contribution that determines what kind of fault may be the subject of inquiry.
Property fault, or misconduct that directly affects the marital assets,
should certainly be considered when the assets are divided.258 In fact, in three
states where consideration of marital fault is forbidden by statute, property
fault is expressly included as a distribution factor.259 In one of these states,
California, the misconduct must amount to "deliberate misappropriation" of
community assets; the courts have interpreted this statutory language very nar-
rowly as "calculated thievery by a spouse, not the mishandling of assets."
'260
The same is true with respect to debt: absent a showing of "gross mishandling
of community financial affairs which would be tantamount to fraud," the court
will effect an equal division of community debt.261 Indiana's statute focuses
on misconduct in the disposition of marital property; but even when such mis-
conduct is proved, it is only one factor for the court's.consideration. 262 Mis-
conduct cannot be used to enlarge the marital estate263-in other words, it
does not invoke any rule of tracing assets in the distribution process. Under
the South Dakota statute, in contrast, the only misconduct relevant to distribu-
tion is that misconduct which affects the acquisition of marital property. Few
guidelines emerge from South Dakota's case law; it seems clear that the statu-
tory misconduct standard does not open a "back door" for the introduction of
evidence of all "faults and circumstances leading up to the divorce."
264
In other states where a more general fault standard exists, courts are
(perhaps af/riori) willing to consider property fault in dividing marital assets.
For example, a Texas court upheld an unequal division weighted in favor of
the wife when the husband had converted a substantial amount of community
property.265 Courts with discretion to consider the fault question-particularly
courts in New York and North Carolina-may be expected to demonstrate a
similar willingness to weigh property fault against the offending spouse.
257. See text accompanying notes 193-99 supra.
258. See Foster, supra note 174, at 50.
259. The following statutes provide for property fault: Cal. Civ. Code § 4800(b)(2) (Vest
Supp. 1981), Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Bums 1980); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-4-45.1
(1976).
260. In re Marriage of Schultz, 105 Cal. App. 3d 846, -, 164 Cal. Rptr. 653, 660 (1980).
261. Id. (emphasis in original).
262. In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Ind. 1980); Armstrong v. Armstrong,
391 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ind. App. 1979).
263. Id.
264. Price v. Price, 278 N.W.2d 455, 458 (S.D. 1979).
265. Grothe v. Grothe, 590 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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Other "Just and Proper" Factors
Fault is but one of the many factors that may command discretionary
attention in the variety of fact situations likely to arise under North Carolina's
distribution statute. Two particular factors that might fall within the Factor 12
discretionary mandate to the North Carolina courts under the new Act will be
briefly examined below. First, when the marriage of the parties seeking an
equitable distribution followed a period of cohabitation, the question is
presented whether equities that may have arisen during cohabitation are enti-
tled to be weighed in the distribution process. Analysis of the question re-
quires exploration of North Carolina's statutory scheme.
All property acquired by either spouse prior to marriage is included
within the statute's definition of "separate property." 266 Under such an ex-
pansive definition, property acquired during premarital cohabitation, whether
acquired jointly or separately, would be classified as "separate" property.
267
Even so, the premarital accumulation of property has equitable distribution
consequences. Any direct contribution made during the course of the mar-
riage to the increase in value of the "separate" property will be weighed in
dividing marital property.268 The statute does not mandate expressly in any of
the eleven specific factors that either direct contributions made prior to th
marriage, or indirect contributions to the "separate" property (for example,
homemaker services) made either before or during the marriage, would be
counted in determining an equitable distribution.269 To the extent, however,
that indirect contributions made during the marriage to separate property are
not implicitly excluded from consideration, it is possible that they may be
taken into account under Factor 12.
Whether Factor 12 would also embrace premarital contributions, direct or
indirect, is unclear.270 There is nothing in the distribution statute itself to pre-
clude such treatment. Further, if a nonmarital relationship culminates in mar-
riage, a court may view an arguably unenforceable contract as a valid
antenuptial agreement. One commentator has concluded that, if the parties'
written agreement
was intended to govern the legal incidents of their long term relation-
ship, including their possible marriage, it may qualify as an antenup-
tial contract. The fact that the parties lived together before marriage
should not disqualify their agreement from being considered to be
[an] antenuptial contract unless it is clear that they intended that
266. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
267. See Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9 (Me. 1979). But see Note, Meretricious Relation-
ships-Property Rights: A Meretricious Relationship May Create an Implied Partnership-In re
Estate ofThornton, 81 Wash. 2d, 499 P.2d 864 (1972), 48 Wash. L. Rev. 635 (1973).
268. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
269. Id. G.S. 50-20(c)(6) applies only to marital property.
270. There are conflicting policy considerations at play in this area. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-184 (1981) (making lewd and lascivious cohabitation a misdemeanor); see also Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 77 IM. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). But see I R. Lee, supra note 182, § 16.4, at 85-86
(marshaling policies in support of the principle that the validity of contracts respecting property
should not turn on a couple's marital status).
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their agreement apply [only] while they remained single.27 1
The equitable distribution statute contemplates the validity of antenuptial
agreements insofar as they provide for the distribution of marital property, but
only as between the parties.272 The extent to which a court can reexamine the
agreement is unclear. Minimally, it would seem that the existence of such an
agreement should be treated as a just and proper consideration under Factor
12. Arguably, the court should also be able to delve far enough into the agree-
ment to ascertain premarital equities that bear on the distribution of marital
property.
273
To the extent that the North Carolina statute advances a needs/abilities
policy for distribution, a second relevant Factor 12 consideration is the issue of
each spouse's employability and potential for future earnings. The enumer-
ated factors indicative of a needs/abilities analysis274 look to the time a distri-
bution is to become effective and no further. If this limitation is intentional on
the part of the legislature, the courts are foreclosed from further inquiry. Sev-
eral aspects of the statute suggest an intentional limitation. For example, con-
tributions to the education or career potential of a spouse are expressly
considered.275 Also, while professional and business licenses are treated as
separate property,276 direct contributions to any increase in their value will be
recognized.
277
Viewed in another way, the limitation that these enumerated factors ap-
-pear to impose on the Factor .12 inquiry may be an unintended effect of diver-
gent distribution policies. It is hard to imagine how such enumerated factors
as the age and health of the parties278 could have any real significance were
the courts required to limit their projections to the effective distribution date.
The consideration of expected pension and retirement benefits279 likewise en-
tails projection beyond the date of distribution. A discretionary examination
of employability and probable future financial circumstances would not seem
inconsistent.
The legislative history of the distribution statute casts the problem in a
very different light. As was pointed out early in this discussion, the North
Carolina statute--especially in its detailed enumeration of distribution fac-
tors-is patterned closely after that of New York. Nevertheless, New York's
271. Foster, Agreements Between Non-Marital Partners, in A Practical Guide to the New
York Equitable Distribution Divorce Law 133-34 (Foster ed. 1980).
272. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Whether this section applies only to
agreements that provide exclusively for the distribution of marital property or whether it applies
to agreements to the extent that they deal with marital property is unclear. The latter interpreta-
tion seems preferable, at least when by its terms a contract is severable.
273. Unfortunately, the equitable distribution statute is inadequate to correct the unfair situa-
tion that may result when most or all of a couple's property was acquired prior to marriage.
274. See text accompanying notes 183-84 supra.
275. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
276. Id. § 50-20(b)(2).
277. Id. § 50-20(c)(8).
278. Id. § 50-20(c)(3).
279. Id. § 50-20(c)(5).
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Factor 8, "the probable future financial circumstances of each party,"280 has
no statutory counterpart in North Carolina, unless North Carolina's Factors 7
and 8 (contributions to education, career potential and separate property) con-
stitute such a counterpart. The conclusion that the legislature intended to sub-
stitute Factors 7 and 8 for New York's Factor 8 is the most feasible
explanation for a noticeable difference between the enumeration schemes,
identical in most other respects. The North Carolina variation is crucial in
that it signals a conscious legislative restriction on the way a court can evalu-
ate the respective earning capacities of the parties. Further, the restriction it-
self reflects an intentional substitution of a contribution policy for an alimony
policy.
CONCLUSION
Factor 12 vests in a trial judge the power to determine what would be an
"equitable" division of marital property in light of the circumstances. This
discretionary power has great potential for individual justice. Its correspond-
ing potential for abuse is limited by the legislative enumeration of specific
guidelines, and, more fundamentally, by the policies that shape the equitable
distribution statute.
Equitable distribution in North Carolina means that a spouse who has
contributed directly or indirectly to marital property is entitled to a share of
that property upon divorce. Thus, if a court is to weigh fault at all in balanc-
ing the various distribution factors, it should consider only that fault which
affects the marital property or reflects the spouses' relative contributions to it.
Similarly, premarital contributions to separate property should be recognized
as relevant to a determination of an equitable distribution.
The difficulty in defining the scope of the Factor 12 power arises from the
legislature's insistence that certain factors normally reserved for alimony de-
terminations also be considered in the distribution process. When alimony
and contribution considerations are at odds, the court must decide which dis-
tribution policy has priority. The language of the statute and its legislative
history support the priority of a contribution policy. Only litigation, however,
will finally resolve the question.
3. Other Developments
In other important legislative action in 1981, the General Assembly elimi-
280. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(5)(d)(8). In addition to New York, fifteen jurisdictions
legislatively provide for consideration of either the employability, probable future earning poten-
tial or financial condition of each party in an equitable distribution: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-
1214(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981), Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West Supp. 1981), DeL Code
Ann. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(3) (1981); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-910(b) (1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 580-
47(a) (Supp. 1981), Idaho Code § 32-712(1)(b)(3), -712(1)(b)(6) (Supp. 1981); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40,
§ 503(c)(7) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-11(b)(5) (Burns 1980); Iowa Code
Ann. § 598.21(I)(f) (West 1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 34 (Law. Co-op. 1981), Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1981); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-202(1) (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3105.18(B)(1) (Page 1980), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401(d)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981), Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 767.255(6) (West 1981).
19821 FAMILY LAW 1415
NORTH C4.ROLINA4 LAW REVIEW[
nated the presumption in alimony actions that the husband is the supporting
spouse. G.S. 50-16.1(3) and (4) define a dependent spouse as a spouse
"whether husband or wife." 281 The recently deleted portion of the statute
stated that a husband is "deemed to be the supporting spouse unless the con-
trary is shown."282 The court of appeals had interpreted "deemed" to mean
"presumed, '283 therefore requiring that proof to the contrary be shown to re-
but the presumption.
As the statute now stands, "supporting spouse" in North Carolina "means
a spouse, whether husband or wife, upon whom the other spouse is actually
substantially dependent or from whom such other spouse is substantially in
need of maintenance and support. '284 The court of appeals had already noted
the "very substantial constitutional questions" arising from the gender-based
discrimination in the statute as it was interpreted prior to amendment.285 The
deletion of the presumption of the husband as the supporting spouse should
prevent a constitutional challenge,28 6 although it is doubtful that many practi-
tioners depended on the presumption even prior to the amendment.
The General Assembly also lowered a major alimony hurdle for depen-
dent spouses in 1981 by deleting the portion of G.S. 50-11(c) that impaired the
right of a dependent spouse to receive alimony if that spouse both initiated
and obtained a divorce based on separation for the statutory period of one
year.28 7 The statute retains a prohibition of an award of alimony to a depen-
dent spouse, served with process within or without the state, who was a de-
fendant in a divorce based on grounds of adultery. That prohibition is the
only exception in subsection (c) of the statute, itself an exception to the stat-
ute's declaration that an absolute divorce bars alimony. As the statute now
stands, therefore, only defendants in divorces granted on grounds of adultery
are barred from obtaining decrees of alimony.
The court of appeals discussed enforceability of property settlement pro-
visions in separation agreements in Cobb v. Cobb28 8 and.Athey v. Athey. 28 9 In
both cases the court limited and explained rulings in prior cases. In Cobb the
court of appeals held that property settlements in separation agreements incor-
porated into divorce decrees290 are enforceable by contempt proceedings. 291
281. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
282. Id.
283. Galloway v. Galloway, 40 N.C. App. 366, 253 S.E.2d 41 (1979); Rayle v. Rayle, 20 N.C.
Ap. 594, 202 S.E.2d 286 (1974).
284. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
285. Galloway v. Galloway, 40 N.C. App. at 369, 253 S.E.2d at 43-44 (1979).
286. 2 R. Lee, Supra note 182, § 135.1 at 157.
287. Law of April 9, 1981, ch. 190, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 161. The following
cases are examples of former law: McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976);
Becker v. Becker, 273 N.C. 65, 159 S.E.2d 569 (1968).
288. 54 N.C. App. 230, 282 S.E.2d 591 (1981).
289. 54 N.C. App. 470, 283 S.E.2d 568 (1981).
290. In Bunn v. Buimn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964), the supreme court distinguished
between separation agreements that are merely approved by the court and those that are adopted
or incorporated by reference into a divorce decree. Courts may enforce the former only in con-
tract actions and may not modify the agreement except with the consent of both parties. Courts
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In North Carolina, property settlements, as distinguished from support provi-
sions, are generally not modifiable by the court.292 Defendant-husband in
Cobb argued that since property settlements are not modifiable by the courts,
they are not enforceable by contempt.293 Defendant cited Bunn v. Bunn294 to
support his argument. Justice Sharp in that opinion stated that "[i]f the judg-
ment can be enforced by contempt it may be modified and vice versa. 295
Defendant Cobb argued, based on that statement, that if an agreement may
not be modified, it may not be enforced by contempt.
296
The court of appeals, finding that the agreement had been incorporated
into the decree, disagreed with the defendant's reasoning. Judge Vaughn ar-
gued that the "phrase 'vice versa' does not mean the negative of what was
previously stated. 'Vice versa' means the order changed."2 97 The court ar-
gued that both property and support provisions were part of the court order
and that since the parties requested in their pleadings that the agreement be
"made subject to the orders of this court," it would "demean the court to allow
defendant to successfully argue that the court cannot enforce those portions of
the decree that defendant might select to ignore." 298 The court explained the
rationale for treating property and support differently with regard to modifica-
tion by noting that a settlement of property rights created vested rights; sup-
port rights, because of their nature must be modifiable.
2 99
InAthey3°° the court of appeals discussed the effect on a separation agree-
ment of a reconciliation of the parties and reversed a lower court ruling for
summary judgment. The husband and wife agreed in August 1978 that if the
wife gave up her right of support, the husband would make payments on their
car. The husband ceased making the payments in February 1979. In April
1979 the parties reconciled. In October 1979 they separated again, and the
wife sued for alimony. The issue before the court was whether the reconcilia-
tion constituted a rescission of the separation agreement that barred her claim
for alimony. The district court granted the defendant husband's motion for
summary judgment. On appeal, husband cited Pots v. Pots 30 1 for the rule
that any provision in a separation agreement fully executed prior to reconcilia-
may enforce support provisions of an incorporated agreement by contempt. Levitch v. Levitch,
294 N.C. 437, 241 S.E,2d 506 (1978). They may also modify the support provisions. Britt v. Britt,
49 N.C. App. 463, 271 S.E.2d 921 (1980).
291. 54 N.C. App. at 231-32, 282 S.E.2d at 592.
292. Holsomback v. Holsomback, 273 N.C. 728, 161 S.E.2d 99 (1968).
293. In Cobb the agreement set an amount of child support, and required the husband to pay
$62,400 in monthly installments to free the wife's property from debt. She sued to enforce by a
contempt order. 54 N.C. App. at 230-31, 282 S.E.2d at 592.
294. 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
295. Id. at 70, 136 S.E.2d at 243.




300. In this case the wife brought an action for alimony pendente lite, permanent ownership of
specified personal property and one-half of remaining personal property.
301. 24 N.C. App. 673, 211 S.E.2d 815 (1975).
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tion is unaffected by the reconciliation. The husband in this case claimed that
all the terms of his agreement with his wife except the car payments were fully
executed.
The court of appeals found the wife's claim for alimony not barred by the
reconciliation. This case was distinguishable from Potts, the 4they court
stated, because in Potts the agreement was court-approved and fully exe-
cuted.30 2 In Athey the court deemed the question whether the agreement be-
tween the parties was rescinded to be one of material fact, depending upon
whether the failure to make car payments by the husband relieved the wife of
her obligation not to sue for alimony.
303
The court of appeals also ruled in 1981 on the professional obligation of
district attorneys representing out-of-state plaintiffs in Uniform Reciprocal
Support Act (URESA) actions;3o4 it held that the duty should be equal to that
of privately-retained counsel. In Thelen v. Thelen30 5 the court of appeals af-
firmed the setting aside of a judgment against a Maryland plaintiff who sought
to enforce a Maryland support decree of $1,000 per month. The North Caro-
lina defendant hired private counsel to challenge the order based on changed
circumstances. The district attorney representing plaintiff failed to notify her
of the Mecklenburg County hearing and presented only the written record of
the case to rebut defendant's claim of changed circumstances.
In a subsequent action a district court granted plaintifis rule 60(b) mo-
tion30 6 to set aside the judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertance and ex-
cusable neglect on the part of her attorney. The court of appeals affirmed,
finding that the actions of the district attorney did not constitute adequate
representation as required by law. The court refused to set rigid rules to deter-
mine what constitutes proper representation; it noted that "[t]he statutory ap-
pointment of the 'official who prosecutes criminal actions for the State' to
represent the obligee in URESA proceedings is not just an empty formality
but is designed to guarantee to the complainant effective assistance of counsel
302. 54 N.C. App. at 472,283 S.E.2d at 569. For a general discussion of the effects of reconcil-
iation see 2 R. Lee, supra note 182, § 200.
303. 54 N.C. App. at 472, 283 S.E.2d at 569.
304. Chapter 52A of the North Carolina General Statutes is North Carolina's codification of
URESA.
It establishes a two-state procedure by which a spouse who is owed support may enforce
payment by an out-of state obligor spouse without leaving the state or obtaining personal jurisdic-
tion over the obligor. The obligor may defend in his or her own jurisdiction. The statute provides
that it shall be the duty of the official who prosecutes criminal actions for the State in the court
acquiring jurisdiction to appear on behalf of the obligee in proceedings under this chapter. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 52A-10.1 (1976). Thus, a spouse to whom support is owed files a complaint in an
initiating court, which forwards the complaint to the state of the obligor. In that state a district
attorney's office is charged with the responsibility of serving notice on the obligor and representing
the obligee.
305. 53 N.C. App. 684, 281 S.E.2d 737 (1981).













Despite increasing attacks2 on the institution of tenancy by the entirety,
3
the North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Foreclosure ofDeed of Trust4 reaf-
firmed the judicial support historically given- the concept of entirety owner-
1. Additional Developments: The North Carolina General Assembly amended G.S. 46-3 in
1981 by allowing a court presiding over a partition action, pending final determination of the
proceeding, to make orders in the best interest of the parties involved, most notable of which is the
appointment of receivers, pursuant to G.S. 1-502(6). This provision was presumably enacted to
protect the assets of the estate in issue from being misappropriated by a party to the action prior to
the judgment of partition. Law of June 16, 1981, ch. 584, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 851
(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 46-301 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
The General Assembly also statutorily approved the use of "Savings Bank," or "Totten,"
trusts, in its enactment of G.S. 54B-129, 130, passed as part of Chapter 54B ("Savings and Loan
Associations"). Law of April 30, 1981, ch. 282, § 3, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 272, 318-19
(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 54B-129, -130 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). The statute gives two or more
people the right to hold the balance of a withdrawable savings account as joint tenants, with or
without the right of survivorship, as they decide. Withdrawals from and deposits to the account
may be made by either joint tenant without affecting the nature of the account.
G.S. 54B-130 also permits an individual to establish a withdrawable account with a savings
and loan, with the funds to be held in his name as trustee for the benefit of another, so that the
balance of the account is paid to the designated beneficiary upon the trustee's death. The trustee
is given the absolute right during his life to change the designated beneficiary, as well as take
funds in and out of the account. A complete withdrawal of all funds is deemed to be a revocation
of the trust.
Trusts of this sort are often labelled "tentative" trusts, as the beneficiary has no enforceable
right until a designated future occurrence-typically, the trustee's death. See R. Newman,
Newman on Trusts 75 (2d ed. 1955).
Significantly, in each type of account, the payment by the savings institution to the survivor,
be he a joint tenant or a beneficiary, discharges the bank from all liability, insulating it from the
wrath-and law suits-of frustrated would-be heirs.
For a general analysis of G.S. 54B, see this Survey, Commercial Law, at 1267.
2. The consitutitonality of tenancy by the entirety was unsuccessfully challenged in
D'Ercole v. D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Mass. 1976), but such a case has yet to surface in
North Carolina. See Porter, Real Property-Tenancy by the Entirety in North Carolina: An Idea
Whose Time Has Gone?, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 997, 1006 (1980).
3. For concise discussions of the characteristics of the tenancy by the entirety in North Car-
olina, see Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924); Lee, Tenancy by the Entirety in North
Carolina, 41 N.C.L. Rev. 67 (1962).
4. 303 N.C. 514, 279 S.E.2d 566 (1981).
5. "The doctrine of title by entireties between husband and wife as it existed at common law
remains unchanged by statute in this State." Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, Inc., 239 N.C. 481, 486,
80 S.E.2d 472, 476 (1954).
After adoption of Married Womens' Property Acts, several states that had recognized the
entirety estate repealed it. North Carolina's version of this Act appears in the Constitution of
1868:
The real and personal property of any female in this State acquired before marriage, and
all property, real and personal, to which she may, after marriage, become in any manner
entitled, shall be and remain the sole and separate estate and property of such female,
and shall not be liable for any debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and
may be devised and bequeathed and conveyed by her, and, with the written assent of
husband, conveyed by her as if she were unmarried.
N.C. Const. art. X, § 6 (1868).
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Long v. Barnes, 87 N.C. 309 (1882), reasoned that the
legislature "never had in contemplation to change the established rules of construction, or destroy
or change the properties and incidents belonging to estates, or to give married women any greater
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ship in this State.6 The court held that surplus proceeds arising upon the
foreclosure and sale of entirety property pursuant to a power of sale contained
in the deed are not capable of being held in the entirety.7 While the ruling
does narrow the outlines of acceptable tenancies by the entirety, it operates to
indicate the courts' continuing commitment to the entirety estate, although the
court refused to extend the tenancy beyond its common law restriction to
realty.8
The general rule concerning the distribution of proceeds realized upon
the conversion of entirety property into another form of estate is that the volun-
tary sale of entirety property by husband and wife results in the dissolution of
the entirety estate.9 Absent a contrary intent10 husband and wife then hold
the proceeds as tenants in common, and the estate is severable at the request or
death of either. North Carolina courts have experienced no difficulty justify-
ing this result, and have steadfastly adhered to their position that because
"there was never any estate by the entireties in personalty"'I at common law,
the proceeds derived from such a sale are "[o]rdinarily. . . held as tenants in
Comon." 
12
This rule, though highly favored by the courts for its simplicity of appli-
cation, was perceived as inappropriate for involuntary sales of entirety prop-
erty when there was no act of severance by the tenants. Consequently, the
"involuntary conversion" doctrine evolved, holding that the funds derived
from conversions such as sales of entirety land for incompetent spouses13 or
estates than are conveyed to them by the terms of the instruments under which they derive title."
Id. at 312.
Tenancies by the entirety are currently recognized in only 22 states. For a complete listing,
see Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 8 (1959). Massachusetts and Michigan are the only other entirety states
whose courts have held the estate to remain unaffected by legislative action. See Pray v. Stebbins,
141 Mass. 219, 4 N.E. 824 (1886); Morrill v. Morrill, 138 Mich. 112, 101 N.W. 209 (1904).
6. The North Carolina General Assembly has also consistently demonstrated its support of
the entirety estate. Illustrative of this support is a statute passed in 1981 extending the tenancy by
the entirety to mobile homes. The amendment broadens the common law presumption that a
conveyance of real property to a husband and wife, nothing else appearing in the instrument,
creates a tenancy by the entirety, to include conveyance of mobile homes. Law of June 5, 1981,
ch. 507, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 786 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. 41-2.5 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
7. 303 N.C. at 516, 279 S.E.2d at 568.
8. See, e.g., Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 195 S.E.2d 552 (1973); Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C.
396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947); Gooch v. Weldon Bank & Trust Co., 176 N.C. 213, 97 S.E. 53 (1918).
This restriction to realty is true in only five of the other entirety states: Indiana, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York and Oregon. See Fogelman v. Shivey, 4 Ind. App. 197, 30 N.E. 909 (1892);
Scholten v. Scholten, 238 Mich. 679, 214 N.W. 320 (1920); Central Trust Co. v. Street, 95 N.J. Eq.
278, 127 A. 82 (1923); In re Albrecht's Estate, 136 N.Y. 91, 32 N.E. 632 (1892); Stoute v. Van
Zante, 109 Or. 430, 219 P. 804 (1923).
9. "When property held as tenants by the entirety is sold, the proceeds derived from the sale
will not be held as tenants by the entirety with the right of survivorship!' Wilson v. Ervin, 227
N.C. at 399, 42 S.E.2d at 470.
10. Although the tenancy in common does not have the survivorship feature of the tenancy
by the entirety, it may be added artificially. The supreme court held in Wilson that parties to a
sale have the right to determine by contract what disposition shall be made of the funds, "or how
they should be held.' Id. at 399, 42 S.E.2d at 470.
11. Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118, 128, 100 S.E. 269, 275 (1919)
(Clark, CJ., concurring).
12. 227 N.C. at 399, 42 S.E.2d at 470.
13. See Perry v. Jolly, 259 N.C. 305, 130 S.E.2d 654 (1963). The Perry court held that for a
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eminent domain proceedings 14 retain the entirety characteristics of the realty
they replace. The doctrine was consistently applied when the conversion was
by its very nature forced on the entirety tenants, but a difference of opinion
persisted concerning the question whether the doctrine should be applied to
surplus proceeds arising after mortgage foreclosures of entirety property, be-
cause the tenants voluntarily had given the power to foreclose in the deed of
trust.
A most definitive resolution to the related issue of insurance proceeds
came in 1963 when New York's highest court decided Hawthorne . Haw-
thorne,15 a case now regularly cited as controlling in the area of involuntary
conversion.' 6 The court held that proceeds from a fire insurance policy on
entirety property, payable to husband and wife, were to be held in common.
While the court recognized the similarity of the "involuntary character of the
loss of the realty"' 7 by fire and by condemnation, it found a critical distinction
between the two situations in that the insurance policy had been voluntarily
procured. "[W]hile the loss was involuntary, the [insurance proceeds were]
not a substitute forced on the parties equally involuntarily,"'18 but instead were
the result of a "voluntary contractual act."'19 Presumably, a voluntarily ob-
tained mortgage resulting in an involuntary loss at foreclosure would also be
subject to this reasoning.
North Carolina courts have consistently followed Hawthorne. In Forsyth
County v. Plemmons,20 a case presenting the identical question as Hawthorne,
the court of appeals stripped the insurance proceeds of entirety status. More
recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in Lovell v. Rowan Mutual Fire
Insurance Co.,21 relied on Hawthorne to declare fire insurance proceeds com-
mon property, although the policy was payable to the husband alone. The
court held that the wife also possessed an insured interest in the property, and
therefore was entitled to her share as a tenant in common.
sale to be voluntary, both husband and wife must accede to it, and if one is incompetent the sale is
necessarily involuntary, thus "transfer[ring] the rights of the tenants from the land to the fund."
Id. at 314, 130 S.E.2d at 661.
14. North Carolina Highway Comm'n v. Myers, 270 N.C. 258, 154 S.E.2d 87 (1967).
Describing the condemnation proceedings as an "involuntary transfer of title" requiring no
"[v]oluntary action by the owners," the court concluded that "the compensation paid by the
[State] therefore [had] the status of real property owned by husband and wife as tenants by the
entirety." Id. at 262, 154 S.E.2d at 90.
15. 13 N.Y.2d 82, 192 N.E.2d 20, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1953). For an analysis of Hawthorne's
impact on New York real property law, see Note, Real Property: Tenancy by the Entirety: Wife's
Right to Division of Insurance Proceeds After Separation, Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 28 Alb. L.
Rev. 319 (1964).
16. See Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Fort Lee
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. LiButti, 55 N.J. 532, 264 A.2d 33 (1970) (surplus proceeds following mort-
gage foreclosure); Howell v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (App. Div.
1974) (fire insurance proceeds).
17. 13 N.Y.2d at 85, 192 N.E.2d at 21, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 2 N.C. App. 373, 163 S.E.2d 97 (1968).
21. 302 N.C. 150, 274 S.E.2d 170 (1981). See this Survey, Commercial Law, at 1239.
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In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust22 is the most recent case in this line of
decisions. In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court cited Judge
Vaughn's recognition in his dissent to the court of appeals decision for the
proposition that a "number of voluntary choices are made by parties who sign
a deed of trust conveying a power of sale."'23 These choices "made by [hus-
band and wife] in buying realty and subjecting it to a deed of trust do not
provide the proper factual background for determining that sale at foreclosure
was involuntary in the true sense of that word."'2 4 The court rejected the ap-
plication of the involuntary conversion doctrine and refused to "extend the
reach of a common law fiction, the concept of entirety property, to include
funds which, even at common law, could only be deemed personalty.
' 25
The Plemmons and In Re Foreclosure cases indicate that the involuntary
conversion doctrine may be limited to eminent domain and incompetency
cases.26 This trend towards limiting the doctrine of tenancy by the entirety
demonstrates the courts' increasing awareness of the frequent criticisms that
the entirety estate has no place in modem society. 27 Some commentators have
argued that the estate is not needed because the rights of women concerning
property ownership are now for the most part statutorily protected, which was
not the case in common-law England where the estate originated.28 Critics
also note the problems the estate creates for creditors seeking to enforce their
interests against individual spouses.29 Nevertheless, the current popularity of
22. 303 N.C. 514, 279 S.E.2d 566 (1981).
23. Id. at 518, 279 S.E.2d at 568.
24. Id. This holding is in direct conflict with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court's holding in In re
Reaves, 3 Bankr. 605 (E.D.N.C. 1980), a case also concerning foreclosure of entirety property.
After a futile struggle to locate pertinent prior decisions, the court finally satisfied itself that there
were "no North Carolina decisions on whether a foreclosure sale is a voluntary or involuntary
conversion of real property." Id. at 607. Free from precedential constraints, the court determined
that "the foreclosure was [not] the result of any affirmative act on the part of the Bankrupt and his
wife and. . .[therefore] the foreclosure was an involuntary transfer. The proceeds from the sale
assume the nature of entireties' property ....... Id. This decision was ignored in In re
Foreclosure.
25. 303 N.C. at 517, 279 S.E.2d at 567. Despite this seemingly favorable ruling, the appellant
still came away unsatisfied, for even though the decision established its right to attach the hus-
band's share of the surplus, the court held that this right did not arise "until the property was
converted into another form of estate at the time of final sale under foreclosure." Id. at 519, 279
S.E.2d at 569. Thus, although the appellant's tax lien was orignally filed prior in time to the liens
of two of the seven other creditors, it became junior to each of the seven because it was the last to
attach to an interest in the surplus. See 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 931 (1971), for a discussion of
priority of liens generally.
26. It is important to note that Lovell and In re Foreclosure specifically reject only the use of
the involuntary conversion rule for the particular facts in those cases, not the overall validity of
the rule; indeed, neither Myers nor Perry has been overruled, and there is no reason to believe
they will be.
27. See C. Moynihan, The Law of Real Property 234-35 (1962). One author suggests that the
chief policy reason for maintaining the entirety estate is that "It]here is in North Carolina proba-
bly no other rule of property which does so much to solidify the marital status." Lee, supra note 3,
at 70. Clearly, however, if the marriage is already unsteady, the imposition of entirety characteris-
tics on the funds which arise following conversions by the court cannot help to "solidify" the
marriage, and indeed may operate to aggravate matters.
28. See note 5 supra.
29. See 4A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property 623, 697 (P. Rohan ed. 1979); Grilliot &
Yocum, Tenancy by the Entirety: An Ancient Fiction Frustrates Modem Creditors, 17 Am. Bus.
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the entirety estate,30 combined with the North Carolina courts' tradition of
leaving major policy changes to the legislature,3 1 make further judicial inroads
into the scope of tenancy by the entirety uncertain at best.
B. Eminent Domain32
North Carolina's eminent domain procedures long have been much
maligned, and rightly so. 33 The criticism stems mainly from the confusion
generated by the presence of eighteen different statutory condemnation proce-
dures34 plus a host of other procedures carried on local code books.35 The
result of this procedural overkill is an unwieldy and often inequitable system
36
that seldom is correctly applied and even more rarely understood.
In an effort to correct this situation, the General Assembly has repealed
the entirety of G.S. Chapter 40 and replaced it with Chapter 40A, entitled
simply "Eminent Domain." 37 The revision essentially replaces the eighteen
different procedures with only two, which are to be used by all private as well
as public condemnors for any purpose included in the statute, thus eliminating
the need to peruse several volumes to locate the applicable law. Furthermore,
LJ. 341 (1979); Ritter, A Criticism of the Estate by the Entirety, 5 U. Fla. L. Rev. 153 (1952);
Wilkerson, Creditors' Rights Against Tenancies by the Entirety, 11 Tenn. L. Rev. 139, 147 (1953).
30. Approximately 90% of married couples in North Carolina select this form of co-owner-
ship when home-buying. Lee, supra note 3, at 69; Porter, supra note 2, at 1008.
31. In Turlinglon v. Lucas the North Carolina Supreme Court wrote that it had "more than
once suggested the abolition of the estate by the entireties to the Legislature." 186 N.C. 283, 287,
119 S.E. 366, 368 (1923).
32. Eminent domain has been defined by the North Carolina Supreme Court as the right of
the state or of a person acting for the state to use, alienate, or destroy property of a citizen for the
ends of public utility. Wissler v. Yadkin River Power Co., 158 N.C. 465, 466, 74 S.E. 460, 461
(1912).
33. As early as 1908, the supreme court wrote that "[t]he provisions of the [eminent domain]
statute regarding the mode of procedure and rules of practice are indefinite and obscure." Aber-
nathy v. S. & W. Ry., 150 N.C. 80, 84, 63 S.E. 180, 183 (1908). For an extensive analysis of the
particular problems with the eminent domain statutes, see Phay, The Eminent Domain Procedure
of North Carolina: The Need for Legislative Action, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 587 (1967). Indeed, many of
the provisions of the new bill seem to be in direct response to some of Phay's well-supported
criticisms.
34. The reason for the exceptionally high number is, according to Phay, "largely a reflection
of dissimilar judgments as to what is more important-protection of personal property or adminis-
trative expediency," a policy consideration that lies at the very heart of the concept of eminent
domain. Phay, supra note 33, at 589. Arguably, it is wise for the State to demonstrate caution in
this area, for inroads on the sanctity of a man's home have always been viewed with hostility by
the general populace.
35. These local laws were enacted primarily to simplify condemnation procedures authorized
by the general law. Unfortunately, this duplicity can lead to conflicts between powers granted to a
condemnor by the two laws. See, e.g., Town of Clinton v. Johnson, 174 N.C. 286, 93 S.E. 776
(1917).
36. The tendency evidenced by North Carolina lawmakers has been to add new procedures
without bothering to remove or even amend previously existing ones. The result is that a single
condemnor may utilize any one of a number of different procedures to condemn identical types of
property for identical purposes. It is not surprising, therefore, that consistency among award judg-
ments has not been a hallmark of North Carolina eminent domain proceedings-although admit-
tedy part of this problem is inherent in the valuation process appraisers employ to arrive at the
amount awarded.
37. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-1 to -69 (Cum. Supp. 1981). This action comes in the wake of
similar moves by Oregon (1971), Pennsylvania (1964), and Virginia (1961).
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the new bill supplies guiding principles that should aid appraisers in reaching
their determination of what constitutes just compensation. This change should
operate to produce more uniform and predictable judgments, a situation long
sought by both condemnors and condemnees.
The statute is divided into four articles. The first deals with general prin-
ciples and definitions. Perhaps the most significant definition is that of "prop-
erty" in G.S. 40A-2(7): "any right, title, or interest in land, including leases
and options to buy or sell, . . .rights of access, rights-of-way, easements,
water rights, air rights, and any other privilege or appurtenance in or to the
possession, use, and enjoyment of land." 38 This encompassing language is
characteristic of the new law's attempt to streamline condemnation proceed-
ings by eliminating the potential for quibbling over the technical wording of
its provisions.
G.S. 40A-3, titled "By whom right may be exercised," replaces G.S. 40-2,
and unlike the old section, is broken down into three categories: private con-
demnors, local public condemnors (cities and counties), and other public con-
demnors. In addition, the bill expressly states the purposes for which these
classes of condemnors shall have the authorized power of eminent domain.
39
G.S. 40A-4 removes the procedural necessity of attempting to acquire the
38. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2(7) (Cum. Supp. 1981). This language represents a clear expan-
sion of the definition of property recited in early North Carolina cases, where "property" and
"land" were used interchangeably. See, e.g., Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N.C. 490,
120 S.E. 46 (1923); Clifton v. Duplin Highway Comm'n, 183 N.C. 211, 111 S.E. 176 (1922).
39. The bill neither increases nor decreases the number of condemnors, nor the purposes for
which condemnation may be used. The following are the authorized private condenors and the
purposes for which they are given the power of eminent domain:
1) Corporations, bodies politic or persons ... for the construction of railroads,
power generating facilities, substations, switching stations, microwave towers, roads, al-
leys, access railroads, turnpikes, street railroads, plank roads, hamroads, canals, tele-
graphs, telephones, electric power lines, electric lights, public water supplies, flumes,
bridges, and pipelines or mains originating in North Carolina for the transportation of
petroleum products, coal, gas, limestone or minerals.
2) School committees or boards of trustees or of directors of any corporation hold-
ing title to real estate upon which any private educational institution is situated, to ob-
tain a pure and adequate water supply for such institution.
3) Franchised motor vehicle carriers or union bus station companies .. for the
purpose of constructing and operating union bus stations: Provided, that this subdivision
shall not apply to any city or town having a population of less than 60,000.
4) Any railroad company... for the purposes of: constructing union depots; main-
taining, operating, improving or straightening lines or of altering its location; construct-
ing double tracks; constructing and maintaining new yards and terminal facilities or
enlarging its yard or terminal facilities; connecting two of its lines already in operation
not more than six miles apart; or constructing an industrial siding ordered by the Utili-
ties Commission .... [need citation to bill].
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
The following are the authorized purposes for which local public condemnors are given the
power of eminent domain:
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desired land by purchase prior to initiating a condemnation action.40 This
provision continues a trend begun in several recent municipal charters.4 1 Al-
though the purpose of the "unable-to-acquire" prerequisite was to minimize
condemnation suits, it is questionable whether a substantial number of suits
were dismissed on that basis; indeed, the proof required to establish an inabil-
ity to purchase historically has been held to be very slight.42 Thus, this section
will probably not increase the number of condemnation actions, but will work
to reduce the time and money required for a condemnor to initiate such a
proceeding.
G.S. 40A-6 provides for the reimbursement by the condemnor of the pro
rata portion of real property taxes paid by the condemnee allocable to a period
1) Opening, widening, extending, or improving roads, streets, alleys, and sidewalks
.... The provisions. . . shall not apply to counties.
2) Establishing... or improving any of the public enterprises listed in G.S. 160A-
311 for cities, of G.S. 153A-274 for counties.
3) Establishing, enlarging, or improving . . . recreational facilities.
4) Establishing ... or improving storm sewer and drainage systems and works.
5) Establishing. . . or improving hospital facilities, cemeteries, or library facilities.
6) Constructing. . . or improving city halls, fire stations, office buildings, court-
house jails and other buildings for use by any department, board, commission or agency.
7) Establishing drainage programs ....
8) Acquiring designated historic properties ....
9) Opening... or improving public wharves.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
The bill also authorizes the exercise of the power of eminent domain for "other" public
condemnors:
1) A sanitary district board ....
2) The board of commissioners of a mosquito control district ....
3) A hospital authority ....
4) A watershed improvement district ....
5) A housing authority ....
6) A corporation ....
7) A commission .....
8) [A water and sewer] authority ....
9) A [metropolitan water] district ....
10) A [metropolitan sewerage] district ....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-3(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
40. For cases in which the courts made private negotiation a prerequisite to condemnation,
see Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. King, 259 N.C. 219, 130 S.E.2d 318 (1963); Allen v. Wilmington
& W.R.R., 102 N.C. 297, 9 S.E. 4 (1889).
41. See, e.g., Charter of Greensboro, Law of June 18, 1959, ch. 1137, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws
1257, and Amendment to High Point City Charter, Law of June 16, 1959, ch. 1032, 1959 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1056.
42. Often all that was necessary was a statement by the condemnor that the owner would not
sell. See, e.g., Red Springs City Bd. of Educ. v. McMillan, 250 N.C. 485, 108 S.E.2d 895 (1959).
More recently, the court of appeals reached different results in two cases involving a condemnoer's
failure to allege his inability to obtain the land through purchase even though the cases had very
similar fact patterns. Compare North Carolina Highway Comm'n v. Matthis, 2 N.C. App. 233,
163 S.E.2d 35 (1968) (allegation of attempt to acquire property through negotiation not necessary
if defendant admits plaintiffs authority to condemn) with City of Charlotte v. Robinson, 2 N.C.
App. 429, 163 S.E.2d 289 (1968) (allegation of attempt to acquire property through negotiation is
condition precedent to plaintiff's having authority to condemn property). This comparison high-
lights two problems with the requirement: first, the inconsistent weight courts have placed on this
requirement; and second, the amount of extraneous appellate litigation it breeds. See Whitman,
Survey of Recent Developments in the North Carolina Law of Eminent Domain, 48 N.C.L. Rev.
767, 768-69 (1970).
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subsequent to vesting of title in the condemnor. G.S. 40A-7 allows a con-
demnor to acquire an entire parcel of land or building even when a proposed
project requires only a portion thereof.43 G.S. 40A-8 allows the court in its
discretion to award a property owner who successfully initiates or defends an
action against a condemnor the costs incurred in the litigation and the prepa-
ration therefor, as well as any damages suffered from the inability to transfer
title from the date of filing the complaint. Under G.S. 40A-13, the condemnor
shall pay all court costs regardless of outcome. G.S. 40A-9 allows a property
owner to remove any structure or fixture from the property providing it is not
inconsistent with the purpose for which condemnation was made. If the con-
demnee fails to remove the structure after its value has been deducted from
the compensation paid for the land, the condemnor may remove it and the cost
of removal is charged against the condemnee. G.S. 40A-10 permits con-
denmed property to be sold as surplus property if it is no longer needed for the
purpose for which it was condemned. G.S. 40A-11 grants condemnors the
authority to enter upon lands, but not structures, prior to the filing of the peti-
tion or complaint, for the purpose of surveys, borings, examinations and
appraisals.44
Articles 2 and 3 of Chapter 40A concern the procedural aspects of emi-
nent domain; the former for private condemnors, the latter for local public
condeimnors. To commence a condemnation action by a private condemnor, a
petition is filed with the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the
land is located, either by the condemnor or the property owner. This petition
must contain a description of the property,45 a statement of condemnor's in-
tention in good faith46 to conduct the public business authorized by its charter,
and the specific intended use of the property. As in old G.S. 40-12, a summons
must be served, along with a copy of the signed and verified petition, on all
persons who have an interest in the proceeding, at least ten days prior to the
hearing.47
At the hearing before the clerk of the superior court, all interested parties
have the right to show cause against the granting of the petition for a condem-
43. This provision is only applicable when the condemnor can prove in the petition that 1) a
partial taking would substantially destroy the economic value or utility of the remainder, or
2) economy in the expenditure of public funds will be promoted by taking the entire parcel; or
3) the interest of the public will best be served by acquiring the entire parcel.
44. This provision overturns the rule forbidding entry until the compensation for the land
was paid. See, e.g., City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth, 283 N.C. 316, 196 S.E.2d 231 (1973); State
v. Wells, 142 N.C. 590, 55 S.E. 210 (1906).
45. The petition is invalid without the description. See, e.g., Hughes v. North Carolina High-
way Comm'n, 275 N.C. 121, 165 S.E.2d 321 (1969); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Creasman, 262
N.C. 390, 137 S.E.2d 497 (1964).
46. "[O]nce the public purpose is established, the necessity or expediency of the taking is a
legislative, and not a judicial question." Airport Auth. v. Irvin, 36 N.C. App. 662, 245 S.E.2d 390,
appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 548, 248 S.E.2d 726 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 (1979). Theexception to this rule is that "upon specific allegations tending to show bad faith.. by the
condemnor, the issue raised becomes the subject of judicial inquiry as a question of fact to be
determined by a judge." City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 690, 190 S.E.2d 179, 185
(1972).
47. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-23 (Cum. Supp. 1981) permits service to be made by publication if
a party's residence is unknown.
1982] PROPERTY IAW 1427
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
nation proceeding. If sufficient cause is not shown, G.S. 40A-25, as did re-
pealed G.S. 40-16, gives the clerk authority to appoint three commissioners to
control the proceeding; these commissioners must be both disinterested in the
rights of and unrelated to, the parties. As before, they must be residents of the
county in which the property in question hes.
48
Once sworn to conduct a fair and impartial appraisal of the property, the
commissioners view the premises, hear proofs and allegations of the parties,
and reduce the testimony to writing. After testimony is closed, a majority of
the commissioners is to award just compensation and report to the clerk within
ten days. 49 Significantly, the commissioners are to determine just compensa-
tion in accordance with principles established in Article 4 of the new bill;50
repealed Chapter 40 gave no indication of how the appraisal process was to be
conducted, which led to wide variances among counties.
G.S. 40A-28 gives any party the right to file exceptions to the report
within twenty days of its filing. The clerk shall hear these exceptions and may
then direct a new appraisal, modify or confirm the report. The clerk's final
judgment may be appealed by any party to the superior court within ten days.
Once in one superior court, G.S. 40A-29 permits the amount of compensation
to be determined by a jury, subject to waiver by all parties.
Notwithstanding the filing of exceptions or of notice of appeal, the con-
demnor may, by depositing the amount appraised with the clerk at the time
the commissioners' report is filed, take possession of and hold the property in
the manner sought by the condemnation action. If, on appeal, the judge re-
fuses to condemn, the condemnor must surrender possession and his deposit is
refunded to him.
51
Condemnations by local public condemnors are regulated by Article 3 of
Chapter 40A, which is similar to the provisions regulating condemnation by
the State Department of Transportation contained in G.S. 136-9. This type of
condemnation action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, in the supe-
rior court of the county in which the property is located, containing a "decla-
48. The wording of this section, although basically the same as G.S. 40-16, is perhaps in
response to Phay's observation that some superior court clerks have followed the practice of al-
lowing each party to name one of the three commissioners, leaving the appointment of the third to
the clerk. Phay, supra note 33, at 610. This practice usually resulted in the clerk's appointee
serving as an arbitrator between the other two. The new statute should alleviate this problem, by
expressly requiring the commissioners to be not merely disinterested, but disinterested "in every
way," as well as being "unrelated," a requirement not appearing in the old statute.
49. The form of the report is dictated by G.S. 40A-27.
50. See text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
51. The remainder of Article 2 contains no major changes from prior law. G.S. 40A-30, al-
lowing for the appointment of a guardian or trustee for an individual lacking the power of sale
(e.g., infant, inebriate) to represent that individual's interest in the condemnation proceeding, is
essentially the same as G.S. 40-22. G.S. 40A-31, directing the court to determine who is entitled to
the payment by the condemnor when there are adverse claims to it, basically parallels G.S. 40-23.
G.S. 40A-32, which gives the court authority to appoint an attorney to represent an interested but
unknown party, tracks G.S. 40-24. G.S. 40A-33, which provides that a voluntary conveyance of
the property in issue has no effect on the proceedings, is essentially the same as G.S. 40-26. Fi-
nally, G.S. 40A-34, allowing a condemnor to cure a defective title in the acquisition of property, is
substantially the same as G.S. 40-27.
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ration of taking declaring that property therein is thereby taken for the use of
the condemnor." 52 G.S. 40A-40 requires, however, that notice be given to the
property owner at least thirty days prior to filing. In addition, a sum of money
equal to the condemnoer's estimate of just compensation is to be paid into the
court.5 3 In the event a public condemnor takes land without filing a complaint
containing a declaration of taking, the property owner may institute an action
for compensation within twenty-four months of the date of the taking.
54
When the condemner's complaint seeks to acquire property for storm
sewers, drainage programs, water systems, solid waste collection and disposal
systems, or road construction or improvement, title and the immediate right to
possession vest in the condemnor upon the filing of the complaint.55 When
the condemnation is for any other statutorily authorized purpose,56 title vests
either upon the filing of any answer by the property owner that does not chal-
lenge the condemnation, or the failure of the property owner to answer within
120 days.
57
G.S. 40A-48 allows for either the condemnor or the property owner to
request the clerk to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation. If
the clerk grants such a request, he will appoint three commissioners in the
same manner as in a private condemnation; the duties of these commissioners
are also the same.
The final article in G.S. Chapter 40A concerns the determination of just
compensation. Chapter 40 directed the commissioners to determine just com-
pensation but provided no guidance on acceptable procedures. In general,
G.S. 40A-63 provides that the amount of compensation shall reflect the value
of the property immediately prior to the filing of the complaint, whether the
taking is public or private.58 G.S. 40A-64 provides that the measure of com-
52. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-41 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
53. G.S. 40A-44 allows the condemnee to apply to the court for the disbursement of this
money without prejudicing his rights in any further proceedings to determine just compensation;
this procedure is allowed, however, only when there is no dispute as to the title.
54. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-51 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
55. This is not the case, however, if an action for injunctive relief has been filed.
56. See note 39 supra.
57. Failure to answer within 120 days constitutes an admission that the amount deposited is
just compensation, and serves as a waiver of any further proceedings to determine just compensa-
tion. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-46 (Cure. Supp. 1981). G.S. 136-107 and G.S. 146-24 were also
amended to allow for a 120-day period in which a property owner may file an answer in the
condemnation proceedings outlined in those sections. Law of April 24, 1981, ch. 245, 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 213 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 136-107, 146-24(c) (Cum. Supp. (1981)).
58. The specific date of valuation is the day of the filing of a petition or complaint. Repealed
G.S. 40-17 contained no provision as to date of valuation, although the courts determined it to be
the "date of taking," a dangerously ambiguous phrase. See West Carolina Power Co. v. Hayes,
193 N.C. 104, 136 S.E. 353 (1927).
A recent case in the court of appeals, Greensboro-High Point Airport Auth. v. Irvin, 54 N.C.
App. 355, 283 S.E.2d 171 (1981), provides a good example of how this vague concept can be
manipulated in the courts. In this case, the petition to condemn was filed in 1975, but no money
was deposited with the clerk. After five years of appeals, the date of taking was finally deemed to
be the date of filing. The owners of the land appealed, and argued for higher compensation, citing
the inequity of being paid in 1980 dollars when the value of the land was measured in 1975 dollars
that, because of inflation, were worth more. The court agreed, and ordered a new trial.
Another recent case concerning a court's interpretation of "date of taking" was Cochran v.
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pensation is to be the fair market value of the property.59 Just compensation is
not to include the value of any timber, buildings, or permanent fixtures the
owner is allowed to remove, but the cost of removal shall be a compensable
item. The determination of the fair market value of the property is not to
include an increase or decrease in value before the date of valuation caused by
1) the proposed improvement or project for which the property is taken; 2) the
reasonable likelihood that the property would be acquired for that improve-
ment or project; or 3) the condemnation proceeding in which the property is
taken.60 The use of these standardized evaluation procedures will certainly
result in the increased uniformity of awards among counties, one of the pri-
mary faults of the procedures under the old law.
C Restrictive Covenant&s6
In 1981 there were significant legislative and judicial responses to the re-
cent trend toward establishment of group homes62 for mentally handicapped
City of Charlotte, 53 N.C. App. 390, 281 S.E.2d 179 (1981). In this inverse condemnation action
the date of taking was determined to be the time the defendant took a flight easement over the
plaintiff's land, not the date the complaint was filed. Because compensation is to be assessed at the
time of taking, the determination of that date is crucial to the action. The frequent difficulty in
assessing that date is apparent in this case, in which the number of flights over the plaintiffs land
increased significantly between the court determined date of taking and the commencement of the
action.
Cases such as these will be eliminated by the new statute, as there is no room for flexibility in
establishing the date of taking. While this may result in occasional inequities, the advantage of
having a hard-and-fast rule clearly outweighs that consideration.
59. If less than the entire tract is taken, the compensation is the greater of the fair market
value of the property taken, and the amount by which the fair market value of the entire tract
before the taking exceeds the fair market value of the remainder after the taking. Under the
approach adopted in this section, the compensation award cannot be less than the value of the
property taken considered separately. This procedure eliminates the possibility of the owner
receiving no award when the remainder after taking is more valuable than the entire property
before taking, a situation conceivable under the conventional "before and after" approach used in
several state and federal condemnation procedures. See Unif. Eminent Domain Code § 1002
Comment (1974). The method previously utilized in North Carolina was the "value plus damage"
approach, in which the compensation awarded was the sum of the fair market value of the land
taken, plus any damage to the remainder, reduced by any special benefits received, See Stamey v.
Burnsville, 189 N.C. 39, 126 S.E. 103 (1925). The new formula takes into account the potential
damage to the remainder, but eliminates the possibility that "special benefits" could be interpreted
to include the situation where value is added to the remainder by severance.
60. This provision is intended to protect both parties from market abnormalities caused by
the prospect of the condemnation action. Unif. Eminent Domain Code § 1005 comment (1974).
G.S. 40A-66 does state that the fair market value of the remainder afterpartial taking shall reflect
any increase or decrease in value caused by the proposed project. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-66 (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
61. Additional Developments: In Snug Harbor Property Owners' Ass'n v. Curran, 55 N.C.
App. 199, 284 S.E.2d 752 (1981), the court held a restrictive convenant requiring a $35 annual fee
for the "maintenance and improvement of Snug Harbor and its appearance, sanitation, easements,
recreation areas and parks" to be unenforceable. The property was not described with sufficient
particularity and no standard was given by which maintenance was to be judged; the covenants
were, therefore, too vague to be enforced by the court. See Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48
N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178 (1980).
62. This discussion is limited to group homes for mentally handicapped persons. The group
home concept has been applied to other groups, such as juvenile delinquents, alcoholics, criminals
on parole, and the elderly. While many of the factors used in a determination of whether these
group homes violate restrictive covenants may be similar, each group presents issues distinct from
those of any other group.
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persons. 63 The group home concept is an attempt to provide the "least restric-
tive alternative" for these persons64 through a family-like environment 65 in
which the residents participate in daily household chores and other activities
associated with a traditional family. These persons often are afforded the op-
portunity to be productive by having a job in the community.
Resistance to group homes has taken various forms. 66 Zoning ordinances
that delineate usage and structural restrictions often exclude group homes
from residential areas. Restrictive covenants, however, have been the primary
mechanism for blocking group homes. In JT Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Famiy
Homes of Wake County, Inc. ,67 the North Carolina Supreme Court examined
the validity of these covenants. At issue was whether a group home for men-
tally handicapped adults was residential or institutional. The court concluded
that the home was residential, and therefore did not violate restrictive cove-
nants in the deed that limited the use of the property to "residential purposes"
and limited the structure to a "single-family dwelling." 68
In Hobby a city zoning ordinance 69 permitted7" the establishment of a
group home in a residential area. Although not a decisive factor in the imme-
diate decision, there also existed a statute expressing the State's policy that
handicapped citizens should have the same right as other citizens to live in
residential areas and group homes.71 The court did not reach the issue of the
validity of the restrictive covenants under the statute or the zoning ordinance,
but rather decided that the facts of the particular case fell outside the scope of
the restrictive covenant prohibitions in the deed.
72
63. It should be noted that "mentally handicapped" includes both "mentally retarded" and
"mentally disturbed." Comment, The Constitutional Right to Treatment Services for the
Noncommitted Mentally Disabled, 14 U.S.F.L. Rev. 675, 678 (1980). The mentally retarded need
habilitation, while the mentally disturbed need medical treatment. Id. at 679 n.16. The right to
treatment for both groups is essentially the same. Id. at 678 & n.15. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168 (1976) for a definition of of "handi-
capped person."
64. See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Note, Mental
Health--e.'nnhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman: Back to the Drawing Board for the
Developmentally Disabled, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1115 (1982).
65. Browndale Int'l Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182, 208 N.W.2d 121 (1973) (the
home attempted to duplicate family life).
66. Group homes have often been met with fierce resistance from neighboring property own-
ers. See Boyd, Strategies in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements for Retarded Citizens:
Parens Patrae Meets Police Power, 25 Vill. L. Rev. 273, 288 (1980); Comment, Zoning and Com-
munity Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded-Boon or Bust? 7 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 64, 69
(1980); Comment, Zoning the Mentally Retarded Into Single-Family Residential Areas: A Grape
of Wrath or the Fermentation of Wisdom, 1979 Ariz. St. L.J. 385, 391 (1979); Note, A Review of
the Conflict Between Community-Based Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded and Restrictive
Zoning, 82 W. Va. L. Rev. 669, 670 (1980).
67. 302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1981).
68. Id. at 74, 274 S.E.2d at 181.
69. Raleigh, N.C., Code § 24-2(38)(c) (1959).
70. Such an ordinance merely removes an obstacle to the establishment of a group home, but
does not affirmatively create a right for such a home to exist. The home is still presumably subject
to existing restrictive covenants or any other pertinent considerations that may exist. See Haskell
v. Gunson, 391 Pa. 120, 137 A.2d 223 (1958).
71. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168-9 (1976).
72. 302 N.C. at 75, 274 S.E.2d at 182.
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To determine whether the group home should be characterized as "resi-
dential" or "institutional," the Hobby court looked to the substance rather
than the form of the home. The court decided that the home was primarily
residential based on a number of factors. A major issue was whether the resi-
dents of the home merely existed as separate individuals in the same house, or
whether they were living together and performing as an integrated family-type
unit.73 When the residents' only connection with each other is that they all
coincidentally happen to eat and sleep together under the same roof, as in a
boarding house, courts frequently label the house "institutional. ' 74 By con-
trast, in Hobby the residents were involved in sharing household chores such
as cleaning, cooking and shopping, much like the members of a traditional
family.75 A married couple who managed the home served as surrogate par-
ents to the residents.
Another issue considered by the court was whether therapy or care of any
nature was provided on the premises. If therapy were provided, then the pre-
sumption would be stronger that the home should be classified as institu-
tional.76 In Hobby, there were no specific therapeutic, educational or
vocational programs being performed at the home.
The primary motivation behind the establishment of the group home, to
provide a healthy atmosphere for rehabilitation, was also a factor considered
by the Hobby court, 7 7 although the precise weight given to this factor is uncer-
tain from the opinion.78 The court also considered the function of the admin-
73. In Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974), two married couples lived
together in a single-family residential zone. The two families shared all household tasks, An
ordinance defined "family" to preclude occupancy of a single-family residential dwelling by four
or more persons, unless related by blood. The court held the ordinance unconstitutional as an
equal protection violation, not supported by any rational basis related to a legitimate legislative
objective. See also Browndale Int'l Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182, 208 N.W.2d 121
(1973), where an ordinance defined "family" as any number of blood-related people, or five or less
unrelated people living together as a "single-housekeeping unit."
74. See Andrews v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 349 Mo. 927, 163 S.W.2d 1024 (1942); Deitrick v.
Leadbetter, 175 Va. 170, 8 S.E.2d 276 (1940).
75. The Hobby court had to decide whether the home was "residential," and not whether the
residents comprised a "family." For a good survey of possible definitions of "family," see Sulli-
van v. Walburn, 9 N.J. Misc. 280, 154 A. 617 (1931).
76. See Browndale Int'l Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182,208 N.W.2d 121 (1973),
involving a "therapeutic home" for emotionally disturbed children. Psychiatric and medical care
were provided on the premises. The court held that the home was not a single-family dwelling.
See also Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421,288 N.W.2d 815 (1980), involving a home for retarded
adults. No "care" or "therapy" was provided at the home. In holding that the home did not
violate the covenant, the court noted that such a home, when used for care, treatment or therapy,
is not considered to be used primarily for residential living purposes; if such conditions existed,
the home would violate the restrictive covenant.
77. Courts are concerned with the use made by the owner of the premises, and not with the
use made by the residents. Andrews v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 349 Mo. 927, 163 S.W.2d 1024
(1942). The "residence" of people in a boarding house is to be distinguished from whether the
house is used for "residential purposes." Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779
(1972).
78. The court at one point in its decision denied that the economic basis upon which the
home was established was a factor influencing the decision, 302 N.C. at 72, 274 S.E.2d at 180, but
later discussed the importance of whether compensation for services was a primar or incidental
motivation, 302 N.C. at 73, 274 S.E.2d at 180. But cf. Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288
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istrators of the home79 in its effort to characterize the home as either
residential or institutional.80 In Hobby, the administrators were a married
couple who acted as surrogate parents. They were the heads of the household,
and worked together with the residents to perform daily household chores.
Because the official title of the supervisor's position was not controlling, the
court looked at the substance of the role rather than the form.8 1
Additional factors relevant to this determination, not explicitly consid-
ered by the Hobby court, have been enumerated by courts in other jurisdic-
tions. These factors include: 1) whether or not the residents' placement in the
home was voluntary;82 2) whether the residents' stay was temporary or perma-
nent;83 3) whether the number of residents at the home was compatible with
the surrounding neighborhood;8 4 and 4) whether there was an express public
N.W.2d 815 (1980) (although a home for retarded adults was run for profit, the court held that it
did not violate restrictive covenants similar to those in Hobby).
79. See Browndale Int'l Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182,208 N.W.2d 121 (1973).
In Browndale the court held that a "therapeutic home" for emotionally disturbed children violated
an ordinance restricting the home to a single-family dwelling. Although surrogate parents worked
at the home, they were not intended to act as substitutes for the children's real parents. A few staff
employees were also employed at the home. The court noted that a "therapeutic home" differs
from a "foster home" in that in the latter, the surrogate parents act as substitutes for the biological
parents of the children living there, and in the former, the actual parents do not live at the home.
80. When the function of the supervisor tends to be more like a manager of a commercial
enterprise, rather than the head of the household, courts will probably be more likely to label the
home "institutional." Courts may tend to view the supervisor as a manager when he/she has the
responsibility of supervising other employees, or when he/she has to be concerned with maintain-
ing a profit or with other fiscal responsibilities.
81. 302 N.C. at 71, 274 S.E.2d at 179.
82. In Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980), property was purchased
for the purpose of establishing a non-institutional home for retarded adults. The home was chal-
lenged on the basis of restrictive covenants very similar to those in Hobby. The eight mentally
retarded adults were volunteer residents of the home. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the covenants were not violated. It appears from the decision that whether the residents were
voluntarily or involuntarily placed in the home might be an important distinction; if involuntarily
placed, the home would be more like an institution, and therefore would violate the covenant "for
residential purposes only."
See Browndale Int'l Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182, 208 N.W.2d 121 (1973).
Some children were involuntarily place in a home for emotionally disturbed children. The court
held that the home violated an ordinance because it was not a single-family dwelling.
83. In Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980), the court noted that the
intention of the home was to provide a permanent residence, as distinguished from a boarding
house, where there is merely temporary residence. In Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100
Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972), the California Court of Appeals held that a group home for mentally re-
tarded people violated restrictive covenants. The owner of the house stated that no more than six
such people were living at the house "at any given time." An important factor in the decision was
the transient nature of the clientele, as indicated by the "at any given time" language. See also
Comment, Zoning the Mentally Retarded, supra note 66. One purpose of zoning ordinances is
"keeping transients out of stable family neighborhoods." Id. at 391-92. The author suggests that
the transiency involved in group homes is not the kind of transiency intended to be prohibited by
zoning ordinances. Id. at 394-95. See, e.g., City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313
N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974). See also Boyd, supra note 66, at 293 (permanent or tempo-
rary placement of residents is one factor determining whether the residents qualify as a "family").
84. Courts generally have not mentioned this consideration as a factor in their opinions be-
cause the maximum number of residents allowed in a group home has already been prescribed by
a statute or ordinance. When the legislature has not set the limit, courts should be more inclined
to find the home "institutional" as the number of residents increases. If a large number of resi-
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policy supporting these homes.8 5
In addition to considering whether the restrictive covenant limiting use to
residential purposes was violated, the Hobby court also interpreted the portion
of the restrictive covenant86 that required the building on the lot to be a "sin-
gle-family dwelling." 87 At issue was whether the covenant was intended to be
merely a structural restriction, or also a usage restriction.88 The court held
that "a provision in a restrictive covenant as to the character of the structure
which may be located upon a lot does not by itself constitute a restriction of
the premises to a particular use." 89
The court observed that the covenant limited the number of stories for the
building, the size of the garage and the number of outbuildings. The covenant
was primarily concerned with structural restrictions, and thus did not appear
to be intended to limit the use of the lot to a "single-family," particularly since
a usage restriction had already been provided by the "residential purposes"
covenant. 90 The house had not been altered in any way to change its appear-
ance as a typical suburban home. The court concluded that the phrase "sin-
gle-family dwelling" was not intended to add meaning to the phrase "for
residential purposes," but was solely concerned with structural restrictions. 91
The court suggested that "a restrictive covenant may be so clearly and
unambiguously drafted that it regulates the utilization of property through a
structural limitation." 92 If a court were to hold that a structural restriction
also was intended to impose a usage restriction, the court would then be posed
with the problem of determining the intended use of a "single-family"
dwelling.
On June 12, 1981, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a stat-
dents is present at the home, it is clear that a family-like, non-institutional setting can no longer be
said to exist.
G.S. 168-21(2) provides that a "family care home" shall consist of "not more than six resident
handicapped persons." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168-21(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981). In Hobby a city ordi-
nance provided that a family care home consists of "two (2) or more, but not more than five (5)
unrelated persons, excluding supervisory personnel, who because of a physical disability, develop-
mental disability, or mental retardation need a substitute home." Raleigh, N.C., Code § 10-2002
(1980).
85. Justice Huskins, in his dissent in Hobby, took into consideration a state statute, G.S. 168-
9, which supported the rights of handicapped people. However, he concluded that the restrictive
covenants did not discriminate against handicapped people, and that the covenants validly pro-
hibited the group home. See Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972);
Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980).
86. "No building shall be erected, altered, placed, or permitted to remain on any building
unit other than one detached single-family dwelling not to exceed 2 1/2 stories in height, a private
garage for not more than three cars and outbuildings incidental to residential use ... ." 302
N.C. at 66, 274 S.E.2d at 176.
87. See generally Schwarzschild v. Welborne, 186 Va. 1052, 45 S.E.2d 152 (1947) (court sug-
gests that a "single-family dwelling" is more than a "dwelling").
88. See generally Annot., 155 A.L.R. 1007 (1945) (whether a structural limitation is also a use
limitation).
89. 302 N.C. at 75, 274 S.E.2d at 181.
90. Id. at 65-66, 274 S.E.2d at 176.
91. Id. at 74-75, 274 S.E.2d at 181.
92. Id. at 75, 274 S.E.2d at 182.
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ute93 that apparently codifies the Hobby decision. The statute reaffirms the
public policy of North Carolina in providing handicapped people with a nor-
mal residential environment 94 and provides that "[a] family care home 95 shall
be deemed a residential use of property for zoning purposes."' 96 Also, any
covenant or restriction in a deed or other instrument relating to the sale, lease,
use or transfer of property "which would permit residential use of property but
prohibit the use of such property as a family care home shall, to the extent of
such prohibition, be void as against public policy . ... 97 The decision in
Hobby and the subsequent codification of that decision by the legislature were
intended to ensure the right of handicapped people to live normal lives in
residential environments. However, the statute leaves some ambiguities that
must be resolved.
There may be litigation over what qualifies for the statutory protection
accorded a family care home. G.S. 168-21(2) attempts to define a "family care
home," but these guidelines may raise as many questions as they answer. For
instance, the statute describes a family care home as "a home with support and
supervisory personnel. . in a family environment. . . ." The use of paid
employees conflicts with the idea of a family environment. The courts are left
to decide how many employees can be present at the home before the home
loses its family-like atmosphere.
The statute also leaves unanswered the question whether a family care
home is a residential use in relation to restrictive covenants. The statute ex-
pressly states that such a home is a residential use for purposes of zoning ordi-
nances, but only implies that such a home is a residential use for purposes of
restrictive covenants. The legislature may have decided not expressly to char-
acterize the family care home as residential for purposes of restrictive cove-
nants because it was concerned with possible challenges to the statute similar
to challenges to parallel statutes in other jurisdictions: voiding existing cove-
nants might impair private property and contractual rights in violation of the
United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution.98
93. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 565, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 834 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 168-20 to -23 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
94. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168-20 (Cure. Supp. 1981).
95. A "family care home" is defined in G.S. 168-21(2).
96. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168-22 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
97. Id. § 168-23.
98. See Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972); Crowley v. Knapp,
94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980). See also U.S. Coast. art. I, § 10.
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D. Warrant of Habitabili&P9
In Strong v. Johnson100 the court of appeals held that "a person who in-
herits a dwelling may seek recourse for defects which his predecessor would
have been entitled to pursue."' 01 The case is significant because it represents
the first time a North Carolina court has extended the implied warranty of
habitability in sales of new homes to a party other than the initial vendee.10 2
At the same time, however, the Strong court expressly refused to intimate
whether implied warranty protection should be granted to subsequent pur-
chasers of property subsequent to the original vendee. 0 3
In 1974 defendant in Strong conveyed a lot to plaintiffs sister and con-
structed a dwelling on it. Plaintiff inherited the property when his sister died
in 1977. In 1978, the residence was damaged by fire, allegedly caused by
faulty construction of the fireplace. 1°4 Plaintiff fied suit, alleging breach of
implied warranty. The trial judge, however, granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff was not the initial vendee of
the property and therefore lacked standing.105
The court of appeals reversed. After reviewing the decisions establishing
the implied warranty in North Carolina and the policy reasons for recognizing
this remedy, the court concluded there was no reason the warranty should not
extend to one who inherits a new home from the original vendee.0 6 The court
then analogized the situation in the case to other instances in which devisees
are entitled to assert causes of action in place of the decedent.' 0 7 Finally, the
99. Additional developments: The 1981 General Assembly rewrote G.S. 1-50(5), which
provides a six-year statute of limitations for actions to recover damages arising out of a defective
or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property. The amendment provides for an outside
limitation of six years from the later of the "specific last act or omission of the defendant giving
rise to the cause of action or substantial completion of the improvement." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
50(5)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Within this outside limitation, G.S. 1-52(16), which provides for a
three-year limitation period for actions accruing at the time a defect is or should have been
discovered, continues to operate. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
Prior to this amendment, the court of appeals had found the outside limitation period to be 10
years. See Strong v. Johnson, 53 N.C. App. 54, 58, 280 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1981). As authority for this
statement, the court cited G.S. 1-52(16), which in addition to the three-year limitation mentioned
above, provides that "no cause of action shall accrue more than 10 years from the last act or
omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action." The 1981 amendment provides that
it shall apply to the exclusion of G.S. 1-52(16). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(g) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
I00. 53 N.C. App. 54, 280 S.E.2d 37 (1981).
101. Id. at 58-59, 280 S.E.2d at 40. Though this language is ambiguous, it appears to extend
protection both to the devisee of the initial vendee and to subsequent devisees as well.
102. For a discussion of the nature of the implied warranty as adopted in North Carolina, see
Note, Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Quality in New Housing Sales: New Protection for the
North Carolina Homebuyer, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 1090, 1094-95 (1975).
103. 53 N.C. App. at 59, 280 S.E.2d at 40.
104. Id. at 54, 280 S.E.2d at 38.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 57, 280 S.E.2d at 40.
107. Id. at 58, 280 S.E.2d at 40. Among the situations mentioned was that in which an injury
to devised property occurs after the testator's death. See Paschal v. Autry, 256 N.C. 166, 123
S.E.2d 569 (1962). The court of appeals sought to harmonize the Strong facts with such a situation
by noting that although the injury in Strong occurred before the testator's death, the cause of




court, citing the North Carolina Constitution, stated that to deny plaintiff a
right of action against the builder-vendor would deny him any remedy at
all.
108
The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the implied warranty in
home sales in Hartley v. Ballou.10 9 As articulated in that case, the implied
warranty extended only to the "initial vendee" of the property. 110 Although
one commentator has suggested that such a restriction is due to judicial reluc-
tance to initiate changes in a long dormant area,11' courts generally base their
refusal to extend implied warranty protection beyond the initial vendee on the
lack of privity between subsequent purchasers and the builder-vendor. 112 Ig-
noring this lack of privity is said to raise the possibility that the builder-vendor
will be held liable to parties with whom he has not bargained or established
any contractual expectations. 113 In addition, courts distinguish the marketing
of manufactured goods, a context in which the privity requirement has been
substantially eroded, from the sale of homes, noting that homes are neither
marketed by a number of intermediate sellers nor likely to change owners fre-
quently.114 On the other hand, supporters of extended implied warranty pro-
tection argue that as American society becomes increasingly mobile, it is
reasonable for a builder-vendor to expect the home to be resold to subsequent
purchasers. 1 5 Moreover, since the implied warranty is intended to protect an
innocent vendee against latent defects-including flaws that may not become
evident for some time--to deny protection merely because a plaintiff was not
108. 53 N.C. App. at 58, 280 S.E.2d at 40. The court cited N.C. Const. art. I, § 18, which
provides that "every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall
have remedy by due course of law." Extended to its logical conclusion, the court's reliance on this
provision would completely vitiate the notion of caveat emptor.
109. 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
110. [ln every contract for the sale of a recently completed dwelling, and in every con-
tract for the sale of a dwelling then under construction, the vendor, if he be in the busi-
ness of building such dwellings, shall be held to impliedly warrant to the initial vendee
that, at the time of the passing of the deed or the taking of possession by the initial
vendee (whichever first occurs), the dwelling, together with all its fixtures, is sufficiently
free from major structural defects, and is constructed in a workmanlike manner, so as to
meet the standard of workmanlike quality then prevailing at the time and place of con-
struction ....
Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
111. See Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in North Carolina Revisited, 58 N.C.L.
Rev. 1055, 1064 (1980).
112. See, e.g., Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977); Duncan v.
Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978); Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d
907 (S.D. 1979). See also, Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 231-32, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621-
22 (1976) (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
113. See Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 231-32, 342 N.E.2d 619, 622 (1976)
(DeBruler, J., dissenting) (expectations of a subsequent purchaser, and presumably his willingness
to sue to enforce those expectations, are shaped not by the prospective defendant-the builder-
vendor-but by the intermediate seller).
114. Coburn v. Lenox Homes Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 572-73, 378 A.2d 599, 601 (1977); Brown v.
Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907, 910 (S.D. 1979). Note that judges making this point are thus substan-
tially precluded from advancing the argument that abolishing the privity requirement would sub-
ject the builder-vendor to multiple exposure.
115. See, e.g., Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Terlinde v.
Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo.
1979).
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the first purchaser would be an arbitrary distinction.' 1 6
If Strong is viewed as an extension of Hartley, it will be difficult to limit
the blanket of warranty protection merely to devisees. The main fear of oppo-
nents of extending the implied warranty-that it will render the builder-ven-
dor liable to parties with whom he has not dealt-is justified whether the
plaintiff is a devisee or a subsequent purchaser." 7 Thus the upholding of
Strong could presage the adoption of a more inclusive warranty theory.
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted two measures of rele-
vance to real estate vendees in 1981. The first of these is an addition to G.S.
87-1. 118 That statute, which defines "general contractor," is one of several
provisions providing for licensing of contractors 19 in order to protect the pub-
lic from incompetent builders. 120 If one defined as a general contractor is un-
licensed by the state, he is barred from enforcing his construction contracts. 121
The 1981 amendment provides for an exemption from the definition of general
contractor for anyone who constructs a building on his own land where the
building is intended for his use after completion. 122 The amendment provides
a statutory deterrent to the type of evasion of G.S. 87-1 recently identified in
Roberts v. Heffner. 123 In that case, defendants, who were unlicensed builders,
contracted to build a house for plaintiffs at a cost above the statutory limit of
$30,000 beyond which the builder is defined as a general contractor. 124 The
house was to be built on defendants' land and later conveyed to plaintiffs.
When plaintiff subsequently barred defendants from asserting claims under
the contract, defendants argued that the G.S. 87-1 prohibition should not be
applied to a builder who constructs a building on his own land. 125 The court
of appeals disagreed, stating that "a builder, who is unable or unwilling to
obtain a general contractor's license from the State of North Carolina, should
116. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
117. Obviously there are factors that distinguish the devisee from a purchaser. The former has
not paid for the property; he is more likely to be a member of the vendee's family; arguably, the
class of devisees is smaller than the class of subsequent purchasers. Reliance on such factors,
however, would make the implied warranty doctrine even more arbitrary regarding subsequent
purchasers than it is now.
118. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 87-1 (1981) provides:
For the purpose of this Article any person or firm or corporation who for a fixed
price, commission, fee or wage, undertakes to bid upon or to construct or who under-
takes to superintend or manage, on his own behalf or for any person, firm or corporation
that is licensed as a general contractor pursuant to this Article, the construction of any
building, highway, public utilities, grading or any improvement or structure where the
cost of the undertaking is thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) or more, shall be deemed to
be a "general contractor" engaged in the business of general contracting in the State of
North Carolina.
119. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 87-I to -15.2 (1981).
120. See Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 130, 177 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1970) (judicial
definition of general contractor).
121. Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, 274 N.C. 264, 162 S.E.2d 507 (1968).
122. "This section shall not apply to any person or firm or corporation who constructs a build-
ing on land owned by that person, firm or corporation when such building is intended for use by
that person, firm or corporation after completion." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 87-1 (1981).
123. 51 N.C. App. 646, 277 S.E.2d 446 (1981).
124. See supra note 118.
125. 51 N.C. App. at 653, 277 S.E.2d at 450.
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not be allowed to thwart the plain intent of § 87-1 by the artifice of contracting
to build a residence for another on the builder's land."'126 The result would be
the same under the new amendment because defendants did not construct the
house for their own use.
The General Assembly also enacted a substantial body of legislation pro-
viding for the licensing and regulation of the mobile home industry.' 27 Most
importantly, the legislation creates several warranties, each lasting a minimum
of twelve months. 128 These warranties run from the manufacturer, the dealer,
the set-up contractor and the supplier of components within the home, thus
providing the purchaser with extensive protection against manufacturing de-
fects and damages occurring during installation.' 29
E. Foreclosure
In two 1981 decisions, the court of appeals refused to expand the applica-
bility of North Carolina's anti-deficiency judgment statutes. 130 In American
Foods, Inc. v. Goodson Farms, Inc. 13 1 the court held that the protections pro-
vided by the statute were not available to defendants who had no record title
in the property conveyed. Plaintiff had contracted to sell defendant Goodson
Farms 859 acres of farmland, unharvested crops, certain machinery and in-
ventory. 132 Pursuant to the purchase agreement, defendant Goodson Farms
formed a corporation known as Lewis Nursery, Inc.133 The property was then
conveyed to Lewis Nursery and a note payable to plaintiff was executed by the
new corporation, Goodson Farms, and by Goodson individually.' 34 The note
was secured by a deed of trust on the real estate, and the machinery and inven-
tory were pledged as further security.' 35 On the makers' subsequent default,
plaintiff brought action on the note and foreclosed on the property, which it
126. Id.
127. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-143.8 to -143.23 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See this Survey, Commercial
Law-Legislative Developments, at 1269.
128. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-143.16 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
129. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-143.23 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides that other remedies are not
excluded by the new law. For a discussion of other possible rights of action, see B. Hodes & G.
Roberson, The Law of Mobile Homes 303-08 (3d ed. 1974).
130. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 45-21.36, -21.38 (1976). These statutes were enacted in 1933 to pro-
vide relief for mortgagors whose land was being sold at depressed prices. The statutes were in-
tended to protect purchasers from being compelled to pay for their property's depreciated value
through a deficiency judgment after having lost their property by foreclosure. See Ross Realty
Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E.2d 271 (1979). See also Currie &
Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Liens: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
1960 Duke L.J. 1.
131. 50 N.C. App. 591, 275 S.E.2d 184, disc. rev. denied, 303 N.C. 180, 280 S.E.2d 459 (1981).
132. Id. at 593, 275 S.E.2d at 185.
133. How the corporation was formed is unclear from the opinion. The court noted that the
purchase agreement provided for plaintiff to capitalize the corporation. Id. Later in the opinion,
however, the court indicated that defendant Goodson financed the corporation. Id. at 597, 275
S.E.2d at 188. Briefs presented by both parties suggest that Goodson formed Lewis Nursery, Inc.
in order to retain an exclusive right to the established operating name of the farm. See Plaintiff-
Appellant's Brief at 3, Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 2.
134. 50 N.C. App. at 593, 275 S.E.2d at 186.
135. Id.
19821 1439
NORTH CROLIN. LAW RE VIEW
repurchased at the foreclosure sale.' 3 6 Defendants responded that they were
protected by G.S. 45-21.38, which prohibits deficiency judgments on purchase
money transactions 137 and by G.S. 45-21.36, which attempts to defeat or offset
deficiency judgments by requiring mortgagees to account for the value of
property on which they foreclose and then purchase themselves.' 38
The court rejected both arguments, distinguishing a recent case139 in
which G.S. 45-21.38 had been held applicable. 140 First, in American Foods the
note failed to meet the statutory requirement of showing on its face that it was
a purchase money instrument.141 Second, the collateral in this case consisted
of more than just real estate.' 42 Finally, the court stressed that since the con-
veyance had been made to Lewis Nursery alone, defendants had no record
title interest in the land plaintiff acquired by foreclosure. 43 The court dis-
agreed with defendants' contention that they were entitled to protection under
G.S. 45-21.36, and held that the statute was intended to benefit only persons
who held a property interest in the mortgaged property. 144
The American Foods decision represents sound statutory construction.
Nevertheless, the court's emphasis on the necessity for the party seeking to
invoke the anti-deficiency judgment statute to have a property interest in the
real estate should not preclude the court from recognizing the possibility that
this requirement could be employed to circumvent the purposes of the statute.
When, as in this case, the holder of record title is merely a nominal purchaser
and the co-makers are actually providing the funds for the property, a court
should consider extending protection. 145 Such a course would serve the inter-
136. Id.
137. In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees under powers of sale
contained in any mortgage or deed of trst... to secure to the seller the payment of the
balance of the purchase price of real property, the mortgage or trustee or holder of the
notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to a deficiency
judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust or obligation secured by the same:
Provided, said evidence of indebtedness shows upon the face that it is for balance of
purchase money for real estate....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.38 (1976).
138. When any sale of real estate has been made by a mortgagee. . . at which the mort-
gagee... becomes the purchaser and takes title either directly or indirectly, and there-
after such mortgagee.. . shall sue for and undertake to recover a deficiency judgment
against the mortgagor, trustor or other maker of any such obligation whose property has
been so purchased, it shall be competent and lawful for the defendant against whom
such deficiency judgment is sought to allege and show as matter of defense and offset,
but not by way of counterclaim, that the property sold was fairly worth the amount of
the debt secured by it at the time and place of sale or that the amount bid was substan-
tially less than its true value, and, upon such showing, to defeat or offset any deficiency
judgment against him, either in whole or in part ....
Id. § 45-21.36.
139. Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C.'366, 250 S.E.2d 271 (1979).
140. 50 N.C. App. at 595, 275 S.E.2d at 187.
141. 50 N.C. App. at 596, 275 S.E.2d at 187. This ruling illustrates the need for careful draft-
ing on the part of the purchase-money mortgagor.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 597, 275 S.E.2d at 187. See First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 44 N.C.
App. 261, 263-64, 261 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1979).
145. See, e.g., Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 230 Cal. App. 2d 106,40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1964)
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ests of fairness and prevent a creditor from skirting the anti-deficiency judg-
ment statute merely by manipulating the structure of the transaction.
In Reavis v. Ecological De., Inc. 146 the court ruled that recovery of attor-
ney's fees by a foreclosing vendor from a defaulting purchaser did not consti-
tute a deficiency judgment in violation of G.S. 45-21.38. The court defined a
deficiency under the statute as "an indebtedness which represents the balance
of the original purchase price for the real estate not recovered through foreclo-
sure."'14 7 Since attorney's fees do not fall within that definition, their recovery
could not be precluded by G.S. 45-21.38. The court stressed that defendant, a
corporation actively involved in land purchases, agreed to the stipulations in
the purchase-money notes providing for payment of attorney's fees on de-
fault.148 While recognizing that such clauses have long been considered
against public policy, the court noted that G.S. 6-21.2 specifically authorizes
provisions in promissory notes obliging debtors to pay reasonable attorney's
fees. 149 The court found no exception in G.S. 6-21.2 for purchase-money
instruments.
150
The court of appeals held in Gore v. Hill' 51 that G.S. 45-21.21, which
limits the period for which a foreclosure sale may be postponed, did not pro-
vide a basis for a purchaser of property at such a sale to have the sale declared
invalid. Plaintiff in Gore alleged that the property he bought at the foreclosure
sale was described as consisting of 128 acres. When he later attempted to sell
the property, it was discovered there were only 48.40 acres. 152 Asserting that
the foreclosure sale had been postponed for longer than the twenty days (ex-
cluding Sundays) authorized under G.S. 45-21.21, plaintiff sought to have the
sale rendered void.153 The court refused to do so. The court stated that G.S.
45-21.21 was one of several provisions designed to provide procedural due
process for mortgagors and not to offer protection for purchasers such as
plaintiff.154 Rather, as purchaser at a foreclosure sale, plaintiff acted subject to
the doctrine of caveat emptor. 155
(individuals who organized the corporation which took title to property and and who executed a
note and deed of trust to vendor held to be "purchasers" and within protection of the anti-defi-
ciency judgment statute). See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 554 (1973).
146. 53 N.C. App. 496, 281 S.E.2d 78 (1981).
147. Id. at 499, 281 S.E.2d at 80.
148. Id.
149. Id. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.2 (1981).
150. 53 N.C. App. at 499-500, 281 S.E.2d at 80.
151. 52 N.C. App. 620, 279 S.E.2d 102 (1981).
152. Id., 279 S.E.2d at 103.
153. Id. at 620-21, 279 S.E.2d at 103.
154. Id. at 622, 279 S.E.2d at 104. See Albemarle Realty & Mortgage Co. v. Peoples Bank, 34
N.C. App. 481, 238 S.E.2d 622 (1977) for a statement of the purposes of G.S. 45-21.16 to -21.33.
See also, North Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank v. Moss, 215 N.C. 445, 2 S.E.2d 378 (1939).
155. 52 N.C. App. at 622, 279 S.E.2d at 104. The court cited Buckman v. Bragaw, 192 N.C.
152, 134 S.E. 422 (1926) as authority for this statement. Relief may nevertheless be granted upon a
showing of fraud, mutual mistake, mistake by one party induced by fraud of another, or undue
influence. See Phipps v. Wyatt, 199 N.C. 727, 155 S.E. 721 (1930).
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F Landlord/Tenant
Both the North Carolina Supreme Court and General Assembly clarified
the rights of tenants and landlords when premises are repossessed for nonpay-
ment of rent.15 6 The supreme court acted first, in Spnks v. Taylor, '5 7 uphold-
ing a lessor's right of peaceful, self-help reentry of premises forfeited for
nonpayment of rent.158 The court narrowly defined peaceful reentry as an
eviction to which the tenant makes no objection; when the tenant objects, the
landlord must resort to the courts. 159
Shortly after the Spinks decision, the General Assembly barred landlord
self-help in residential tenancies.1 60 The General Statutes now require land-
lords to resort to summary ejectment procedures 161 in all cases of eviction,
dispossession, or removal from residential premises. As an aid to landlords,
the General Assembly shortened the period lessors must wait before asserting
a lien on personal property left by a vacating tenant to twenty-one days after
expiration of the paid rental period. 162 Finally, the enactment granted tenants
recovery of actual damages for a lessor's failure to follow the statutory eject-
ment and lien procedures, but excluded recovery of punitive damages, treble
damages or damages for emotional distress.'
63
In Kent v. Humphries'64 the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled
longstanding precedent and adopted the majority view that entrance by a ten-
ant under a void lease followed by the landlord's acceptance of rent creates a
periodic tenancy rather than a tenancy at will. 165 In Kent a tenant entered
into possession of commercial premises on a five-year oral lease. Notwith-
156. See Note, Landlord-Tenant---Spinks v. Taylor and G.S. 42-26: Abolition of Self-Help
Eviction in North Carolina, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 885 (1982).
157. 303 N.C. 256, 278 S.E.2d 501 (1981).
158. Id. at 262, 278 S.E.2d at 504.
159. Id. at 263, 278 S.E.2d at 505. Plaintiff tenant's verified complaint alleged the lessor had
refused her admission to the premises to retrieve her personal belongings. "A refusal by the land-
lord to permit a tenant to enter the premises, for whatever purposes, would elevate the taking to a
forceful taking and subject the landlord to damages." 303 N.C. at 264, 278 S.E.2d at 506 (citing
Reader v. Purdy, 41 Ill. 279 (1866)). Therefore, the court reversed the allowance of summary
judgment for the landlord and remanded for a trial on the question whether the landlord had
refused entry. Id. at 266, 278 S.E.2d at 507.
160. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 566, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 835 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 42-25.6 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
161. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-26 to -36.1 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
162. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 566, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 835 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 44A-2(e) (Cum. Supp. 1981)). The prior period had been 60 days. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44A-
2(e) (1976). Unlike the requirement of resort to ejectment proceedings, this change applies to both
residential and nonresidential tenancies.
The Act also codified case law that distress and distraint-a lessors right to seize a tenant's
personal property in satisfaction of the tenant's obligations-are not the law of North Carolina.
Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 566, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 835 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §
42-25.7 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). See Hall of Odom, 240 N.C. 66, 81 S.E.2d 129 (1954); Dalgleish v.
Grandy, 1 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 249 (1800).
163. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 566, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 835 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 42-25.9 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
164. 303 N.C. 675, 281 S.E.2d 43 (1981).




standing an oral covenant to the contrary, the landlord began operating his
plastics and fiberglass manufacturing plant nearby, finally forcing the tenant
to vacate her premises because of air pollution. 166 On appeal from a grant of
summary judgment for the landlord on the plaintifrs claim for nuisance, the
court of appeals ruled "with regret" that the five-year oral lease created only a
tenancy at will.1 67 Although the landlord had accepted monthly rents, bind-
ing precedent168 dictated this result.
169
The supreme court also was "troubled by the equities of this rule." 170
Calling it "patently unfair" that the plaintiff would have "only the barest of
legal rights as a tenant at will" 17 1 under the existing rule, the court decided
that the intent and expectations of the parties in such circumstances are more
consistent with a periodic tenancy: "By the payment of and acceptance of
such rent, the parties have given further indication of their intention to be
bound by the invalid lease, and the periodic tenancy provides a measure of
security to their expectations."' 172 Accordingly, the court adopted the "better
reasoned and more fundamentally fair" majority rule that "When a tenant en-
ters into possession under an invalid lease and tenders rent that is accepted by
the landlord, a periodic tenancy is created."' 173 As a result, plaintiff tenant
"clearly had a sufficient property interest to maintain a claim in nuisance."'
174
The court's decision did not place North Carolina fully within the main-
stream. While it is the majority view that a periodic tenancy results from the
circumstances of Kent, the predominant view within the majority is that "an
166. 303 N.C. at 679, 281 S.E.2d at 44-45. As the appeal was from the allowance of summary
judgment for the defendant landlord, the plaintiffs allegations are stated as facts.
167. 50 N.C. App. 580, 586, 275 S.E.2d 176, 181 (1981). The five-year term of the lease clearly
required a writing. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22-2 (1965).
168. See, e.g., Davis v. Lovick, 226 N.C. 252, 37 S.E.2d 680 (1946); Maimey v. Norvell, 179
N.C. 628, 103 S.E. 372 (1920).
169. Notwithstanding precedent, the court of appeals ruled that the defendant landlord could
not assert his common-law right to terminate the tenancy at will as a defense to the plaintiffs
claim of nuisance. 50 N.C. App. at 587, 275 S.E.2d at 181-82. Applying an estoppel theory to the
landlord's claim, the court determined that "[e]ven as a tenant at will, plaintiffs payment of rent
in advance should secure for her a sufficient property right in the premises, at least for the period
for which defendant accepted the rent, to support her nuisance claim." Id. at 587-88, 275 S.E.2d at
182. The supreme court's subsequent holding renders this creative analysis unnecessary.
In addition, the court of appeals ruled for the plaintiff that the invalidity of the lease under
G.S. 22-2 did not bar her claims of fraud, unfair trade practices and nuisance. Id. at 583, 275
S.E.2d at 179. The supreme court affirmed, noting the long standing rule that connected claims
are not barred by the statute lest the statute shield frauds. 303 N.C. at 679, 281 S.E.2d at 46.
170. Id. at 678, 281 S.E.2d at 46.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property, § 2.3 comment d (1977)).
173. Id. The court expressly overruled the contrary precedent of Davis and Mauney, supra
note 168, and Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65 (1945), to the extent of any
inconsistency.
174. 303 N.C. at 679. In Vernon v. Kennedy, 50 N.C. App. 302, 273 S.E.2d 31 (1981), another
case concerning periodic tenancies, the court of appeals ruled that a tenant who had held over and
been accepted by the landlord as a periodic tenant on the same terms as the former lease was not
entitled to exercise an option to purchase contained in the former lease. The option in the original
lease was specifically applicable to the term of that lease; the tenant sought to exercise it after a
five-year periodic tenancy. The decision is consistent with North Carolina precedent and the gen-
eral rule. See Atlantic Prod. Co. v. Dunn, 142 N.C. 471, 55 S.E. 299 (1906); Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d
470, 489-95 (1967).
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invalid term of years automatically creates a year to year tenancy. . . even
though the rent is calculated on a monthly basis." 175 The supreme court ruled
that "[t]he period of the tenancy is determined by the interval between rental
payments. In this case a month-to-month tenancy was created."' 176 Had the
court followed the majority, landlords would have to endure significantly
longer unwanted tenancies. 177 The court left unclear whether the interval was
determined with reference to the interval of actual payments or provisions of
the void lease.178
Kent embodies a significant developmeiit in the evolution of tenant rights
in North Carolina.' 79 The decision gives tenants who have paid rent but
whose tenancy could be ended by the landlord at will' 80 the protection of a
definite property interest to assert against the landlord and a right to statutory
notice before termination of the tenancy.18' The old rule of tenancy at will
persists, however, when the tenant has not paid rent.
175. Restatement (Second) of Property § 2.3 reporter's note (1977). Cf. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Land-
lord and Tenant § 49 (1970) (yearly period ordinarily arises when terms of void lease reserved
annual rent or annual rent payable in installments).
176. 303 N.C. at 679, 281 S.E.2d at 46.
177. Not only would the period of tenancy arising by operation of law be longer, but a land-
lord would be able to terminate the tenancy only at the end of an annual term after having given
at least one month's notice. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-14 (1976).
178. In fight of the court's emphasis on the equities arising from the tenant's actual payment of
rent, it is unlikely the court intended to embrace the view of some courts that the period on which
rent is calculated in the void lease determines the period of the tenancy. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Property, § 2.3 reporter's note (1977); 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant §§ 49-50
(1970). In addition, the court of appeals held, 50 N.C. App. at 584-85, 275 S.E.2d at 180, and the
supreme court noted with approval, 303 N.C. at 679, 281 S.E.2d at 46, that the statute of frauds
voided the oral lease completely, not just the term of duration. On the other hand, the supreme
court quoted with seeming approval language of the Restatement referring to payment and ac-
ceptance of rent as indicative of the intent of the parties to be bound by the void lease and its
specified payment intervals. 303 N.C. at 678, 281 S.E.2d at 46. In Kent the void oral lease, an
unsigned written lease, and actual payment all were on a monthly basis. Record at 3, 8, 43, 61, 65.
179. See Note, supra note 156.
180. There is some authority in North Carolina that even a tenancy at will requires some
notice or demand before the courts are open to the landlord. Carson v. Baker, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.)
220 (1833).
181. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-14 (1976). Where there is no proper notice, the tenancy may
continue indefinitely. See Goler Metropolitan Apartments, Inc. v. Williams, 43 N.C. App. 648,
260 S.E.2d 146 (1979).
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G. Recording182
In Hill v. Pinelawn Memorial Park, Inc. 183 the North Carolina Supreme
Court prevented an unduly harsh application of North Carolina's "pure
race"'184 recording statute.185 Hill concerned an action by the first purchaser
of a specific burial crypt against the seller memorial park and the second pur-
chaser. The first purchasers never recorded their interest but began monthly
installments on their contract in October 1972. In February 1974, the second
purchasers entered into an installment sales contract for the same crypt and
completed payment in February 1976. In February 1977, the first purchasers
discovered the subsequent sale. When their tender of the balance on their
installment contract and demand for a deed was rejected, the first purchasers
brought an action seeking specific performance and damages against both the
memorial park and the subsequent purchaser.'
8 6
After service of summons, defendant purchasers discovered they had no
deed. Upon request, the memorial park executed a deed to them which was
recorded prior to trial. Subsequently, the trial court directed the jury that the
second purchasers were not innocent purchasers for value and ordered the
second purchasers to deliver a quitclaim deed to the first purchasers.
187
The court of appeals reversed the order on the theory that the case turned
"upon when defendants acquired a protected interest in the crypt."' 88 The
court of appeals determined that the second purchasers "were purchasers for
value. . . since it is undisputed that [they] paid substantial monies as a down
payment."' 8 9 Therefore, the second purchasers were entitled to statutory pri-
ority by having recorded a deed prior to the first purchasers; any notice they
182. Additional Developments in Recording: In 1981 the General Assembly simplified the
requirements for conveyances of condominiums. Law of June 8, 1981, ch. 527, 1981 N.C. Sess.
Laws, Ist Sess. 799 (repealing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47A-14 (1976)). Prior to repeal, G.S. 47A-14 had
required conveyances of condominiums to refer to the declaration of unit ownership filed
pursuant to G.S. 47A-2 and to state restrictions on the unit's use and the percentage of undivided
interest in common areas and facilities. Conveyances of condominium units, whether executed
before or after the October 1, 1981 effective date of the legislation, need comply only with the
general requirements for conveyances of real property. Law of June 8, 1981, ch. 527, 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 799 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47A-14.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
The General Assembly also added a requirement that building plans for condominiums
submitted pursuant to G.S. 47A-15 meet certain standards of size, permanence and
reproducibility. Law of June 16, 1981, ch. 587, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 858 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47A-15(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
183. 304 N.C. 159, 282 S.E.2d 779 (1981).
184. J. Webster, Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina § 370 (P. Hetrick rev. ed. 1981).
185. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-18 (1976).
186. 304 N.C. at 160-61, 282 S.E.2d at 780-81.
187. Id. at 162, 282 S.E.2d at 781. The trial court also awarded compensatory and punitive
damages against the memorial park and ordered it to convey a warranty deed. Id.
188. 50 N.C. App. 231, 237, 275 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1981).
189. Id. at 238, 275 S.E.2d at 842. This statement indicates that a party achieves the status of a
purchaser for valuable consideration for purposes of G.S. 47-18 upon making a substantial invest-
ment, without reference to completion of the transaction. The supreme court rejected this inter-
pretation. See text accompanying note 194 infra. It is interesting to note that the court of appeals
consistently used the statutory phrase "purchasers for value" in its discussion instead of the "inno-
cent purchasers for value" used by both the trial court and the supreme court.
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may have had was immaterial under the pure race statute.190 Because title
was in the second purchaser and protected by the statute, there was no interest
in either defendant which the court could order defendants to convey to
plaintiffs.' 9 '
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, noting that "fo]ur registra-
tion statute does not protect all purchasers, but only innocent purchasers for
value."'192 The court observed that in determining whether a party claiming
the benefit of the registration statute is entitled to its protection, North Caro-
lina precedent requires the party to have no knowledge of litigation involving
the disputed property: "While actual notice of another unrecorded convey-
ance does not preclude the status of innocent purchaser for value, actual notice
of pending litigation affecting title to the property does preclude such sta-
tus."' 19 3 Because defendant second purchasers clearly had actual notice of the
suit prior to recording their deed, the issue was whether they had achieved
status as purchasers within the meaning of G.S. 47-18 prior to service of the
summons. In the court's view, "[t]he interest which the [second purchasers]
wished to acquire was title to crypt 'D', so the crucial point in time is the time
they acquired title."'194 The title passed on delivery of the deed, not at the
time the second purchasers entered their contract with the memorial park or
even at the time they completed payment.' 95 Having been served with sum-
mons, they had actual notice of the suit prior to "the crucial point in time" of
receiving their deed and could not claim to be innocent purchasers.'
96
The decision correctly declined to apply the "race" registration statute
when its purpose of protecting subsequent purchasers and lien creditors who
rely on public land records 197 conflicts with the more fundamental policy of
protecting the efficacy of judgments.' 98 The supreme court refused to define
an innocent purchaser as one who perfects a mere equitable claim prior to
receiving notice of litigation concerning the real property. The court's deter-
mination that conveyance of title is crucial to innocent purchaser status under
190. Id.
191. Id. at 236, 238, 275 S.E.2d at 841-42.
192. 304 N.C. at 165, 282 S.E.2d at 783.
193. Id. (citing Lawing v. Jaynes, 285 N.C. 418, 206 S.E.2d 162 (1974)). The court also dis-
cussed the doctrine of 1ispendens and the role of G.S. 1-118 in providing constructive notice of
pending litigation to bar the operation of G.S. 47-18. G.S. 1-118 provides that a properly indexed
notice of litigation pending with respect to specific real property constitutes constructive notice of
the litigation to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of the real property. The court ob-
served that the enactment of G.S. 1-118 with respect to constructive notice did not preclude a
finding that actual notice of litigation negated innocent purchaser for value status. 304 N.C. at
165, 282 S.E.2d at 782-83.
194. Id., 282 S.E.2d at 783.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 166, 282 S.E.2d at 783.
197. Id. at 163, 282 S.E.2d at 782 (citing Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N.C. 62, 47 S.E.2d 528
(1948); Grimes v. Guion, 220 N.C. 676, 18 S.E.2d 170 (1942)).
198. Id. at 163-64, 282 S.E.2d at 782 (citing Rollins v. Henry, 27 N.C. 342 (1878)). The doc-
trine of ispendens binds a person who buys property that is the subject of an action by the results
of the action if the person has actual or constructive notice of the action. If buyers could disregard




the doctrine" of lispendens assures that the court, rather than the parties, will
resolve the conflicting equitable claims.
H. Easements
In Ward v. Sunset Beach and Twin Lakes, Inc. 199 the court of appeals
applied traditional easement principles to an unusual fact situation to reach a
fair result. Plaintiff's beach lots had been submerged by erosion that took a
significant portion of Sunset Beach over the years 1955 through 1967.200 In
1970, the corporate successor to plaintiffs grantor filled the eroding inlet and
opened a new inlet, reclaiming part of the submerged lands.20 1 Defendant
conceded on appeal that plaintiffs title to the lots revived when the land was
reclaimed, but asserted that the plaintiffs easement over other reclaimed lands
originally dedicated and used as a road had ceased because of the
submersion.
202
The court of appeals held that plaintiffs reclaimed land retained the ap-
purtenant easement across the reclaimed lands, now beach strand, which had
been Main Street.203 The easement had not been used while submerged, but
nonuse does not constitute abandonment under North Carolina precedent.
2°4
The dedication of the street by defendant's predecessor had never been with-
drawn205 and plaintiff had relied on access to her lots when purchasing the
land, so defendant was estopped from denying the existence of an easement
over the location of the former street.
206
The decision produced a fair result on the facts of this case. Plaintiff
regained her easement, but it is of little use because of its location and the
destruction of the road.207 On the other hand, defendant, under no duty to
rebuild the road or to have reclaimed plaintiff's land,208 remains un-
reimbursed for the cost of reclamation.209 Thus, both parties are in a position
199. 53 N.C. App. 59, 279 S.E.2d 889 (1981).
200. Id. at 60, 279 S.E.2d at 890.
201. Id. at 61, 279 S.E.2d at 891.
202. Id. at 63, 279 S.E.2d at 892.
203. Id. The court relied on City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 111. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (1897), which
held that land subject to a dedication as a park prior to erosion by Lake Michigan remained under
the dedication when reclaimed. 53 N.C. App. at 63-65, 279 S.E.2d at 892-93.
204. Nonuse must be accompanied by such other acts and conduct clearly inconsistent with
ones rights to constitute waiver or abandonment. See Miller v. Teer, 220 N.C. 605, 18 S.E.2d 173
(1942). The court added dictum that plaintiff would have an easement over the former street to
the extent necessary for reasonable access even if the easement had been abandoned. 53 N.C.
App. at 63 n.l, 279 S.E.2d at 892 n.1 (citing Potter v. Citation Coal Corp., 445 S.W.2d 128 (Ky.
1969)).
205. 53 N.C. App. at 62, 279 S.E.2d at 892.
206. Id. at 65-66, 279 S.E.2d at 893-94 (citing Home Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Town of
Carolina Beach, 216 N.C. 778, 787, 7 S.E.2d 13, 19 (1940); Green v. Miller, 161 N.C. 25, 30, 76
S.E. 505, 507 (1912)).
207. 53 N.C. App. at 62, 279 S.E.2d at 891-92. The court refused to grant an alternate ease-
ment by necessity. Id. at 66, 279 S.E.2d at 894.
208. Id. at 63, 279 S.E.2d at 892. The defendant had counterclaimed for $22,000 in reclama-
tion expenses. Record at 7.
209. Record at 7.
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to negotiate a settlement.
In Waters v. North Carolina Phosphate Corp.210 the court of appeals ap-
plied the doctrine of visible easements to contracts for the sale of land. The
court extended precedent that a visible easement, not expressly excepted in a
conveyance warranting tide free from encumbrances, does not constitute
breach of covenant of title.211 Defendant vendee in this action for specific
performance of a contract for sale of land free of encumbrances was presumed
to have known of a visible burden on the land in the form of an easement for a
power line at the time of entering the contract.
Z Land Use
Two new laws of particular significance to North Carolina Indians were
passed by the 1981 General Assembly, opening for the first time a formal ave-
nue of cooperation between archaeologists and Indian communities. The two
acts, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act212 and the Unmarked
Human Burial and Human Skeletal Remains Protection Act,213 serve to re-
solve the serious ethical conflict between the need for scientific investigation
through excavations and the concerns of those view such actions as a desecra-
tion of their ancestral heritage.
214
Prior to the passage of these bills, the only North Carolina law pertaining
to archaeological excavation was Chapter 70 of the General Statutes, titled
"Indian Antiquities," which was not repealed by the new statute. These few
provisions are patently inadequate standing alone because they do not entitle
Indians to be consulted upon the discovery of Indian remains, 215 do not allow
professional archaeologists to examine unintentionally discovered skeletal re-
mains,216 and do not prohibit the destruction or sale of artifacts or remains
found on private lands. 217 These problems were resolved in the new bills,
which essentially ask Indians to permit scientific analysis, and request that
archaeologists recognize Indians' wishes to have the bones of their ancestors
treated with dignity and respect.
218
210. 50 N.C. App. 252, 273 S.E.2d 517 (1981).
211. See Goodman v. Heilig, 157 N.C. 6,72 S.E. 866 (1911); Tise v. Whitaker-Harvey Co., 144
N.C. 508, 57 S.E. 210 (1907); Ex parte Alexander, 122 N.C. 727, 30 S.E. 336 (1898).
212. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 70-10 to -25 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
213. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 70-26 to -40 (Cur. Supp. 1981).
214. Although archaeological excavations have been going on since the early 1900's, reaction
did not become heated until the number of grave desecrations reached a significant level in recent
years. See H.R. Rep. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1709, 1710.
215. In fact, no provision is made for the consultation of anyone.
216. Prior to the passage of the new act, unintentionally discovered remains were to be ex-
amined by a licensed funeral director pursuant to G.S. 65-13.
217. G.S. 70-1 does, however, "urge" private land owners to refrain from the destruction of
Indian relics located on their property although no penalty is provided.
218. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 70-10 to -20 (Cum.
Supp. 1981), protects archaeological finds made on state owned lands by calling for an individual
to obtain a permit from the State before conducting an archaeological investigation on public
land. Substantial penalties are also established for the violation of this provision.
The Unmarked Skeletal Remains Protection Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 70-26 to -40 (Cure.
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The General Assembly also initiated the Coastal Beach Access Pro-
gram,2 19 which authorizes the State to acquire2 20 land situated near the ocean
in an effort to provide improved public access to the beaches.221 Priority is
given to acquiring lands that, due to the adverse effects of storms, flooding and
erosion, are unsuitable for the placement of permanent structures. Land may
not be acquired, however, from a property owner who has held it for less than
two years.
J Zoning=
In a case of first impression, the North Carolina Court of Appeals faced
the issue whether a change in the type of ownership of real estate will destroy
the property's classification under a zoning ordinance as a prior nonconform-
ing use. In Graham Court Assocs. v. Town Council223 the owners of a small
apartment complex, use of which was valid under municipal zoning ordi-
nances as a prior nonconforming use,224 wished to convert the apartments to
condominiums. 225 The town council denied the request of petitioner, who
then sought injunctive relief. The trial court granted the injunction, finding
Supp. 1981), is the more significant of the two acts. It requires a person knowing of unmarked
human burial sites, located on public or private lands, to notify the county medical examiner. Id.
§ 70-29(a). If the remains are discovered during construction or agricultural work, the work must
stop. Id. § 70-29(b). If the examiner determines that the remains warrant, he must notify the
Chief Medical Examiner, who must then notify the Chief Archaeologist, who in turn must deter-
mine whether the remains merit scientific analysis. If it is determined that the remains are Indian,
the North Carolina Commission of Indian Affairs is to be consulted. Id. § 70-32. The Commis-
sion and the Chief Archaeologist are then to prepare a written agreement concerning the disposi-
tion of the remains. Id. § 70-32(c). If the remains are not Indian, notice of the find must be
published to determine the next of kin who, once contacted, must prepare a written agreement
with the Chief Archaeologist regarding the disposition of the remains. Id. § 70-33.
219. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 113A-134.1 to -134.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
220. By its numerous references to the "purchase" of property by the state, the statute does not
appear to establish any independent right of eminent domain. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-24
(Cum. Supp. 1981) wherein procedures for "purchase" and for "condemnation" are separately
stated.
221. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-134.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Only property that will benefit the
general public is permitted to be acquired.
222. In a related area, the North Carolina General Assembly and judiciary both acted to ease
restrictions on the operation of family care homes for the mentally retarded. For a full discussion,
see this Survey, Property Law-Restrictive Covenants, at 1430.
In Wenco Management Co. v. Town of Carrboro, 53 N.C. App. 480,281 S.E.2d 74 (1981), the
court of appeals held an amendment to a local zoning ordinance, effectively prohibiting
restaurants with drive-in windows, unconstitutional as being an "arbitrary and unduly
discriminatory interference with plaintiffs property rights," lacking any relation to valid police
power objectives. Id. at 484, 281 S.E.2d at 76. While changes in local ordinances are permitted by
G.S. 160A-385, this particular amendment was passed in direct response to the proposed
construction of a drive-in window, arbitrarily singling out the plaintiffs intended use.
223. 53 N.C. App. 543, 281 S.E.2d 418 (1981).
224. The apartment complex was nonconforming with regard to the size of the side yards,
number of parking spaces, and number of permissible units. Id. at 545, 281 S.E.2d at 419.
In another case concerning nonconforming uses, Atkins v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53
N.C. App. 723, 281 S.E.2d 756 (1981), the court of appeals held that the Board could not authorize
a nonconforming use that did not exist prior to the date specified in the restrictive ordinance. See
1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 6.10 (2d ed. 1976).
225. These conversions are partially regulated by the Unit Ownership Act. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 47A-1 to -28 (1976).
1982] PROPERTY LAW 1449
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
that the town council lacked the authority to require the petitioner to apply for
a special use permit before exercising its right to sell the property as condo-
miniums. The court of appeals affirmed, emphasizing that zoning ordinances
regulate only the use of land, not the manner in which it is owned. Clearly, a
change in use would have required a special use permit; however, a change in
manner of ownership is not deemed to be a change in use-that is, owner-
occupation does not differ in use from tenant-occupation. As the court pointed
out, after this change in ownership, "the same buildings will be on the prem-
ises in question and the use to which they are put will also remain the
same."226
This decision has great import due to an ever-increasing number of les-
sors desiring to convert their rental units to condominiums. As a result of this
decision, it is probable that any successful opposition to conversions must
come from public pressure227 asserted by the tenants themselves, and not from
zoning actions by local governments.
K Wills, Trusts and Estates
1. Construction
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Livengood228 the court of appeals ex-
amined a will in which testator had inconsistently provided for the corpus of
his testamentary trust to be distributed to his nieces and nephews in equal
shares per stirpes.229 Under a per capita construction, argued for by appel-
lants, each of the six remainderman, including the appellee, would have re-
ceived a one-sixth share. Under the per stirpes construction ultimately
adopted by the court, the corpus was split into three stocks, with appellants
each receiving a one-ninth share and appellee receiving a one-third share.
Although the court of appeals recognized substantial support for a per
capita construction,2 30 the court concluded it was bound by the testator's man-
ifestation of a contrary intent by the insertion of the "per stirpes" language.
226. 53 N.C. App. at 549, 281 S.E.2d at 421 (citing Bridge Park Co. v. Borough of Highland
Park, 113 N.J. Super. 219, 222, 273 A.2d 397, 398-99 (1971)).
227. Town councils must be careful not to be overly receptive to public pressure, however. In
Harts Book Stores, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 53 N.C. App. 753, 281 S.E.2d 761 (1981), the court of
appeals reversed the Raleigh Board of Adjusters denial of a request for a special use permit to
establish an adult book store, when the only basis for the denial was opposition by the residents of
the adjoining neighborhood. If an application for a permit meets all conditions required by ordi-
nance, to deny it based solely on public opposition is an unlawful and unconstitutional exercise of
legislative power. See Jackson v. Board of Adjustment, 275 N.C. 155, 165, 166 S.E.2d 78, 85
(1969).
228. 54 N.C. App. 198, 282 S.E.2d 512 (1981).
229. Testator's trust provided for income to his two sisters and one sister-in-law for life. One
sister left three surviving children, appellants in the action. Another left only one child, the appel-
lee in the action. The remaining sister left two surviving children who were not parties to the suit.
230. The court noted "the proposition that if persons designated in a will stand in equal de-
grees of relationship to the testator, and the devise or bequest enures to the benefit of all of them, a
division per capita is indicated, prima facie." 54 N.C. App. at 200, 282 S.E.2d at 513. The will in
Livengood contained language that could support a per capita division: the corpus was to be




The court refused to follow a line of cases holding that the per stirpes language
merely regulates the distribution of the gift, substituting on a representative
basis children of a nephew or niece who died prior to distribution.2 31 Such a
construction would have permitted a per capita distribution to the remainder-
men, but the court distinguished those cases by noting that they involved wills
containing specific language indicating an intent to preserve the first taker's
share.232 Here, there was no language from which the court could infer that
intention.
The court also noted that the mother in each family of nieces and neph-
ews had received a life income interest in the trust, finding in this fact a pre-
sumption that the children of each life tenant were to take equally only that
share in which the parent life tenant had an interest.
233
The Livengood result, though arguably inequitable, 234 is well-founded.
The court of appeals was bound to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the
will23 and could not disregard the per stirpes language. 236 Per stirpes indi-
cates a division into stocks or roots; 237 thus the court faced the not uncommon
dilemma238 of determining where that division should take place. As a gen-
eral rule, the stocks begin at the first level of takers, 239 in this case, the parents
of the nieces and nephews.240
2. The Rule in Shelley's Case
Application of the four-hundred-year-old Rule in Shelley's Case 24 1 was
the central issue in Jones v. Stone.242 In that case the testator (grandfather of
the litigants) had devised a life interest of one-tenth of his real property to his
231. See, e.g., Roberts v. Northwestern Bank, 271 N.C. 292, 156 S.E.2d 229 (1967); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bryant, 258 N.C. 482, 128 S.E.2d 758 (1963); Dew v. Shockley, 36 N.C. App.
87, 243 S.E.2d 177, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 9 (1978).
232. 54 N.C. App. at 200,282 S.E.2d at 514. Roberts v. Northwestern Bank, 271 N.C. 292, 156
S.E.2d 229 (1967), involved no such language, however, and in that respect it is indistinguishable
from Livengood and stands in stark contrast to the court's holding.
233. Id. at 201-02, 282 S.E.2d at 514 (citing Restatement (Second) of Property § 301, comment
j, at 1649-50 (1941)).
234. Suppose, for example, that the three sisters had died leaving only one child surviving
between them. Under the court's analysis, that child would take only a one-third share, with the
remaining two-thirds falling into the residuary. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-42 (c)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
Is it not more likely that the testator would have intended that child to take the entire amount?
235. See, e.g., North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Goode, 298 N.C. 485, 489, 259 S.E.2d 288, 291
(1979).
236. See, e.g., In re Will of Wilson, 260 N.C. 482, 485, 133 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1963).
237. See, e.g., Walsh v. Friedman, 219 N.C. 151, 161, 13 S.E.2d 250, 256 (1941).
238. For cases involving litigation over the level of division see, e.g., Maud v. Catherwood, 67
Cal. App. 2d 636, 155 P.2d 111 (1945); Balch v. Stone, 149 Mass. 39, 20 N.E. 322 (1889).
239. Lombardi v. Blois, 230 Cal. App. 2d 191, -, 40 Cal. Rptr. 899, 907 (1964).
240. The "first taker" is the one who is "the first to come into the possession . Archer v.
Jacobs, 125 Iowa 467, 473, 101 N.W. 195, 197 (1904).
241. The Rule derived its name from the case of Wolfe v. Shelley, I Co. Rep. 93(b), 76 Eng.
Rep. 206 (C.B. 1581). There is evidence, however, that the Rule was firmly established long
before. See, e.g., Provost of Beverly's Case, Y.B. 40 Edw. 3, f. 9ab (1367). See Webster, A Relic
North Carolina Can Do Without-The Rule in Shelley's Case, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 3, 4 n.4 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Webster].
242. 52 N.C. App. 502, 279 S.E.2d 13 (1981).
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son, "the same to be divided among his heirs at law." The son devised this
share to his only son excluding his two daughters. The daughters claimed an
equal share in the property under the terms of their grandfather's will. Their
brother claimed that the father had become vested with fee simple title to the
land by operation of the Rule in Shelley's case, and that he had received this
title by his father's devise.
243
After discussing the history,244 policy justifications, 245 and criteria for ap-
plication of the Rule in Shelley's Case,246 the court of appeals reached the
crux of the matter: did the added words "to be divided among" take the de-
vise out from under the Rule? The court held that they did, ruling that the
additional words resulted in a failure of one of the requirements of the Rule-
that the word "heirs" be used in its technical sense, indicating an indefinite
succession of persons from generation to generation.247 The court cited with
approval one commentator's view that the Rule can be evaded by "some slight
contextual language in the dispositive instrument that will indicate to the court
that the words. . . 'heirs of the body' mean less than the whole body of heirs
who would take in indefinite succession." 248 Apparently the words "to be di-
vided among" provided a sufficient indication. In addition, the court noted
precedent stretching back to 1848 involving similar language, when the court
had held that the words "to be equally divided" barred application of the
Rule.24
9
Both the result and the rationale of Jones seem sound. The words "to be
divided among his heirs" indicate an intent that the generation after the life
tenant share in the property.250 In effectuating that intent, the court was faced
243. Id. at 503-04, 279 S.E.2d at 14.
244. Id. at 506-07, 279 S.E.2d at 15-16.
245. The court noted that the Rule "prevents the tying up of real estate during the life of the
first taker, facilitates its alienation a generation earlier, and at the same time, subjects it to the
payment of the debts of the ancestor." Id. at 507, 279 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting Benton v. Baucom,
192 N.C. 630, 632, 135 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1926)). For an indictment of the acceleration of alienabil-
ity argument, see Webster, supra note 241, at 21-27. Webster points out that so long as a testator
avoids the rule, he is perfectly free to tie up the alienability of his land beyond the first taker.
246. Application of the Rule requires the presence of five factors:
(1) there must be an estate of freehold in the ancestor, (2) the ancestor must acquire that
estate in the same instrument containing the limitation to his heirs; (3) the words "heirs"
or "heirs of the body" must be used in the technical sense meaning an indefinite succes-
sion of persons, from generation to generation; (4) the two interests must be either both
legal or both equitable; and (5) the limitation to the heirs must be a remainder in fee or
in tail.
52 N.C. App. at 507,279 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting White v. Lackey, 40 N.C. App. 353, 356, 253 S.E.2d
13, 15-16 (1979)).
247. Id. at 511-12, 279 S.E.2d at 18-19.
248. Webster, supra note 241, at 13.
249. Ward v. Jones, 40 N.C. (I Ired. Eq.) 400 (1848).
250. The court also looked to the testator's scheme of distribution in arriving at its holding.
He had used the word "equally" in every other dispositive provision of his will. This language
clearly barred an application of the Rule. See text accompanying note 249 supra. Respondent
argued that the deletion of this word in the clause at issue mandated an application of the Rule.
The court dismissed this contention, looking instead to the intent of the testator in his use of the
word "heirs." Construing the will as a whole, the court found that the word "heirs" in the ques-
tioned provision had not been used in the technical sense.
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with an intent defeating doctrine-the Rule in Shelley's Case.25 1 By strictly
construing the requirement that the word "heirs" be used in its technical sense,
the court was able to place a just result within the parameters of the Rule.
One wonders, however, how long this judicial statesmanship will continue
to be necessary. North Carolina remains one of the few states where the Rule
continues in full force. The North Carolina Supreme Court repeatedly has
indicated that it is unwilling to change the Rule by "judicial fiat," and that
such a move must be made by the legislature.252 Perhaps after 401 years, it is
time for the General Assembly to lay the Rule to rest.
3. Marital Property
In today's mobile society, it is not uncommon for a husband and wife who
have been domiciled in a community property state to move to a jurisdiction
that has a different system of allocating marital interests in property. Such a
move can deprive the surviving spouse of a substantial property interest.2 53 In
enacting legislation in 1981 aimed at protecting a surviving spouse from the
loss of this preexisting property right,2 54 North Carolina became one of six
states2' 5 to adopt the Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at
Death Act.
256
The Act applies to personal property, wherever situated, that was either
community property under the laws of another jurisdiction, was acquired with
the proceeds from that community property, or is in any way traceable to that
community property.Z 7 Real property in North Carolina is subject to the Act
if it was acquired with the proceeds from, or was exchanged for, property that
was community property under the laws of another jurisdiction.258 The Act
also applies on a proportionate basis.259 Thus, if husband and wife sell their
California condominium for $75,000 with the wife applying the proceeds to
purchase a $100,000 North Carolina farm, 75% of the real property would be
subject to the Act.
If property is subject to the terms of the Act, half of it passes at death by
251. For a discussion of how the Rule frustrates a grantors intent, see Webster, supra note
241, at 7-9.
252. See, e.g., Riegel v. Lyerly, 265 N.C. 204, 209, 143 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1965), and cases cited
therein. This attitude still prevails. The petition for discretionary review in Jones v. Stone was
denied. 304 N.C. 195, 285 S.E.2d 99 (1981).
253. For a more complete discussion of the problem, see Lay, Migrants from Community
Property States-Filling the Legislative Gap, 53 Cornell L.Q. 832 (1968); McClanahan, Property
Problems of the Migrant Client-A Statutory Solution, I I 1 Tr. & Est. 950 (1972).
254. Both constitutional and choice of law considerations have been suggested as justifications
for the proposition that property rights remain unaltered by a change in domicile. See Comment,
The Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act, 65 Ky. L.J. 541, 546-47
(1976).
255. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-20-101 to -20-111 (1973); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 510-21 to -30
(1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 391.210 to -.260 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §§ 557.261 to -.271 (1977) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 112.705 to -.775 (1977).
256. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 31C-1 to -12 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
257. Id. § 31C-l(1).
258. Id. at § 31C-1(2).
259. Id. at § 31C-1.
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operation of the statute to the surviving spouse and is not suject to testamen-
tary disposition by the decedent or by distribution under the laws of intestate
succession. The remaining half of the property is subject to such
disposition.
260
Although the Act has been criticized as an attempt to "bring in commu-
nity property by the back door,"261 it actually has a very limited scope. The
Act is intended to have "no effect on the rights of creditors extending credit
before the death of a spouse; neither does it affect the rights of spouses or other
persons prior to the death of a spouse." 262 In short, the Act "is designed solely
to cover dispositive rights at death."263 The Act is further limited because
there is no affirmative duty upon the personal representative of the decedent to
investigate whether any property of the decedent is subject to the Act. The
surviving spouse must make a written demand before any burden falls on the
personal representative.
264
Two problem areas that may face North Carolina courts in interpreting
the new Act have been identified by commentators. 265 The first concerns the
division of property if the community property is so commingled with the non-
community property that it is indistinguishable, 266 because the Act makes no
provision for this situation. The second concerns the situation in which
spouses hold as joint tenants with right of survivorship property that was for-
merly held as community property. Should a court infer that the parties have
agreed to a severance of the community merely by looking to the form in
which they hold title?267 Despite the problems the new Act may create, how-
260. Id. at § 31C-3.
261. Bartke, Marital Sharing-Why Not Do It By Contract?, 67 Geo. L.J. 1131, 1145 n.91
(1979).
262. Unif. Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act, Commissioners' Prefa-
tory Note, 8 U.L.A. 61, 61 (1972). In some community property states, creditors cannot reach the
assets of the community. See, e.g., Mulcahy v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 783, 785 (S.D. Tex.
1966); Stone v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 201, 202 (W.D. Wash. 1963); Hirales v. Boegen, 61
Ariz. 210, 212, 146 P.2d 352, 353 (1944). The new Act poses no such impediment to creditors,
263. Unif. Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act, supra note 262, at 62.
264. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31C-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981). This provision has been described as "star-
tling," because "one of the principal duties of a personal representative is to identify the property
of the decedent for succession and tax purposes." Bartke, supra note 261, at 1146 n.92.
265. For an excellent analysis of the Act, see Comment, supra note 254. The author also iden-
tifies a third problem-does the dower or curtesy right of the surviving spouse attach to the dece-
dent's half of the property? As recommended by the framers of the Act, North Carolina's version
specifically provides that neither the laws of intestate succession nor dower apply to that portion.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31C-3 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
266. Three solutions have been suggested. First, the court might characterize all of the prop-
erty as community property. Second, they might look solely to the form in which the property is
held to determine its character. Finally, they might protect only those property interests the
spouses had when they entered the state. See Comment, supra note 254, at 556-57. It seems,
however, that if a court can determine what assets the couple had when they entered the state, they
might just as easily trace the course of that property with no indistinguishable commingling of
assets.
267. Nothing in the Act bars such an inference, but one commentator suggests that it would be
wiser to "find that no severance in community interests occurs except where expressly agreed by
the spouses." Comment, supra note 254, at 561.
It seems wiser to hold that the parties have chosen to sever the community. The ostensible
purpose of the Act is to protect a surviving spouse from the loss of a preexisting property right. As
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ever, it is a commendable step toward a solution to a very real problem.
In other action involving marital rights, the General Assembly rewrote
G.S. 29-14268 of the Intestate Succession Act, which deals with the share of the
surviving spouse, for the second time in three years.
The newest version provides that real and personal property should be
treated separately in determining the share of the surviving spouse. 269 Under
the amended statute, real property is now apportioned on a straight fractional
basis with the size of the share dependent on whether the intestate has left any
issue or parents surviving.270 In this respect, the statute is a return to the 1959
Act. This development represents a departure from the rules of the 1979
amendments, which govern the treatment of personal property;271 under that
version, the survivor was entitled to a certain specific dollar minimum, with
the remainder apportioned depending on whether there were issue or parents
surviving.272 The revised section does away with the "election provision" of
the 1979 amendment, which allowed the spouse "to elect to take his or her
share wholly in personal property, wholly in real property," or in such pro-
portions as he or she chose.
2 73
The General Assembly also amended G.S. 39-13.4,274 which deals with
conveyances by a spouse under a deed of separtion, to provide that such a
conveyance passes title free of any marital rights of the other spouse.
275
4. Rights of Adoptees
The North Carolina adoption statute,276 once described as a "clear and
simple rule,"' 277 required additional interpretation in 1981.278 In Crumpton v.
ajoint tenant, the survivor will take the entire property, thus the purpose of the Act will not have
been thwarted.
268. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-14 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
269. For a summary of the 1979 amendments, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1979-Property, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1509, 1529 (1980).
270. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-14(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
271. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-14 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (current version at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-14(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1981)).
272. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-14 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (current version at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-14(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1981)).
273. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-14(e) (1979 Cum. Supp.) (current version at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-14
(Cum. Supp. 1981)).
274. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-13.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
275. The amendment added the language that a conveyance under a deed of separation "shall
pass such title free and clear of all rights in such property and free and clear of such interest in
property that the other spouse might acquire solely as a result of the marriage, including any
rights arising under G.S. 29-30 [the North Carolina "dower" provision]."
276. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-23 (1976). The statute describes the legal effects of the entry of every
final order of adoption. Section (1) establishes the adoptee's right to inherit "by, through, and
from" his adoptive parents. Section (2) relieves the natural parents of all legal duties to their
child. Section (3) clarifies the adoptee's inheritance rights in his adoptive family, establishing his
right to share in class gifts and intestate shares. Section (4) provides for the situation where a
potential adoptive parent dies before a final order is entered.
277. Comment, A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1955, 33 N.C.L. Rev.
513, 522 (1955). At that time, the statute consisted only of subsection (1).
278. The statute has provoked frequent litigation. See, e.g., Peele v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 200
S.E.2d 635 (1973) (adopted child may inherit from or through her adoptive parents); Stoney v.
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Mitchell279 the North Carolina Supreme Court faced the lingering question
whether a child adopted out of his original family might take under an instru-
ment granting a remainder to "issue."'280 The question had been decided neg-
atively in 1976 by the court of appeals, 28 1 but the supreme court had vacated
that judgment as improvidently granted.282 After the impediments noted by
the supreme court were removed,283 the question once again was brought
before that court.
Crumpton concerned the division of a quaiter share of the proceeds from
a sale of land. A 1941 deed conveyed a life estate to grantor's daughter with
the remainder to her issue. Two of the life tenant's grandchildren were
adopted away from their father, the life tenant's son, after his death. Upon the
life tenant's death, the two adopted children claimed a part of the quarter
share, arguing that they were still the life tenant's "issue. ' '284 The court of
appeals285 held that the two adoptees were not entitled to a share, and they
appealed. The supreme court held that the General Assembly:
in enacting G.S. 48-23. . . contemplated that upon a final order of
adoption a complete substitution of families would take place with
the adopted child becoming the child of his adoptive parents and a
member of their family, likewise, the legal relationship with the
child's natural parents and family would by virtue of the adoption
order be completely severed.
286
Although state lawmakers did not specifically provide in G.S. 43-23 that the
word "issue" does not contemplate children taken from their natual parents
after they had been adopted, the court held that the legislative intent behind
the statute supported that result. The court noted, however, that an adopted
child still might take as "issue" of her natural family if such an intent plainly
appears on the face of the instrument.
2 87
MacDougall, 28 N.C. App. 178, 220 S.E.2d 368 (1975) (the words "my issue" do not represent a
clear intention to exclude adopted person).
279. 303 N.C. 657, 281 S.E.2d 1 (1981).
280. The supreme court had decided the converse of this issue several years earlier in Peele v.
Finch, where it held that children adopted into a family take as "issue" of that family. 284 N.C.
375, 200 S.E.2d 635 (1973).
281. Crumpton v. Crumpton, 28 N.C. App. 358, 221 S.E.2d 390 (1976).
282. Crumpton v. Crumpton, 290 N.C. 651, 227 S.E.2d 587 (1976). The court noted:
Many events may obviate the need to determine the question answered by the... Court
of Appeals: (I) The life tenant is still living. Respondent appellants and those claimingthrough them may not survive her. (2) Before her death the General Assembly may
speak more specifically to the precise situation here .... (3)... It is highly conceiva-
ble that appellants and appellees .. could reach an amicable settlement before their
contingent interest vests at the death of the life tenant.
Id. at 656, 227 S.E.2d at 592.
283. The life-tenant, Ruth Crumpton, died in 1979. No action had been taken by the General
Assembly, nor lad appellants and appellees reached a settlement. See note 282 supra.
284. In Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572,75 S.E.2d 632 (1953), the North Carolina Supreme
Court defined "issue" as meaning "all persons descended from a common ancestor." Id. at 581,75
S.E.2d at 638.
285. That opinion was apparently not reported.
286. Crumpton v. Mitchell, 303 N.C. 657, 663, 281 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1981) (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 665, 281 S.E.2d at 6.
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The Crumpton result is consistent with the view that adopted children
should not receive a double inheritance benefit because of their adoption.
288
Under certain circumstances, however, a double benefit may be justified. Con-
sider, for example, the situation in which "one parent has died, the other has
remarried, and the children aged ten or twelve have been adopted by a step-
parent." 289 Close familial ties most likely exist between these children and the
parents of the deceased. Under these circumstances, "depriving them of par-
ticipation in class gifts made by the will of a natural grandparent who knew
and loved them is cruel and unfair."290 The sweeping language of Crumpton,
however, would preclude consideration of extraneous evidence of the grand-
parents' intent in this situation.
Several states have recognized this problem. 291 Pennsylvania, for exam-
ple, has a unique statute providing that an adopted child is no longer consid-
ered the issue of his natural parents, "except in distributing the estate of a
natural kin, other than the natural parent, who has maintained a family rela-
tionship with the adopted person. '2 92 North Carolina courts also should con-
sider familial realities before holding as a per se rule that, absent a clear
contrary intent on the face of the instrument, adopted children can no longer
take as "issue" of their natural families.
5. Caveats, Attorney's Fees and Procedure
As a result of legislative enactment, a trial court must now make a specific
finding that a caveat proceeding has "substantial merit" before awarding at-
torneys' fees.2 9 3 The amendment to G.S. 6-21(2) apparently was prompted by
the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in In re Will ofRidge.294 In that
case, when construing the prior statute, which required a finding that a pro-
ceeding was without substantial merit before denying attorney's fees, 2 9 5 the
court "fail[ed] to find any statutory requirement that a specific finding as to
whether or not the case [is] without substantial merit be made .... "296 The
Ridge court then awarded attorney's fees to the caveators, despite the trial
court's failure to make a specific finding of a lack of substantial merit.
297
288. See Note, Adoption-Cutting Off the Right to Succeed to Property Given to Natural Par-
ents' "Children", 41 Mo. L. Rev. 259, 266 (1976).
289. 2 L. Simes & A. Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 738, at 108 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Matter of Tracy, 464 Pa. 300, 346 A.2d 750 (1975); In re Benner's Estate, 109
Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257 (1946); In re Estate of Zastrow, 42 Wis. 2d 390, 166 N.W.2d 251 (1969).
292. 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2108 (Purdon Supp. 1981). The official comment to the section
notes that this "limited exception... recognizes that family relationships frequently continue for
grandparents and others where an adoption may have occurred after the death or divorce of a
parent." Id.
293. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21(2) (1981).
294. 302 N.C. 375, 275 S.E.2d 424 (1981).
295. That statute provided in pertinent part, "[l]n any caveat proceeding under this subdivi-
sion, if the court finds that the proceeding is without substantial merit, the court may disallow
attorney's fees for the attorneys for the caveators." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21(2) (1979 Cum. Supp.)
(current version at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21(2) (1981)).
296. 302 N.C. at 379, 275 S.E.2d at 426 (emphasis in original).
297. The court of appeals had vacated the trial court's award of attorney's fees due to the
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Under the amended statute, a heavier burden is imposed upon would-be chal-
lengers to a will. A borderline case such as Ridge,298 which might not have
been entirely "without substantial merit," almost certainly would not rise to
the more stringent "having substantial merit" test. Because the awarding of
attorney's fees is a discretionary determination, the requirement of a positive
finding should aid the appellate court in determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion.299 It may' also tend to discourage meritless caveats.
In a related development, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
trial court may properly award attorney's fees under G.S. 6-21(2) 300 in a pro-
ceeding to establish the right to dissent under a will. In In re Estate of Kirk-
man30 1 the court found that the statute had been "enacted to ensure that
parties having meritorious challenges to a will. . . would not be discouraged
from pressing these claims by the spectre of incurring legal fees."'30 2 Noting
that establishing the right to dissent may be a "complex, time-consuming and
expensive" 30 3 procedure, the court held that right to fall within the purview of
G.S. 6-21(2).
In other procedural devlopments concerning the law of wills, trusts and
estates, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that before a caveat to a will
will be allowed, the will must actually be offered for probate.3° 4 The General
Assembly also amended the "living will" 30 5 and the self-proving wil 3 0 6 stat-
lower court's failure to specifically find whether the proceeding was without "substantial merit."
The court of appeals held that "without such a finding we cannot determine whether the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in awarding the counsel fees." In re Will of Ridge, 47 N.C.
App. 183, 186, 266 S.S.2d 766, 767 (1980).
298. Caveators in Ridge originally filed three challenges to the will. They later dropped their
claims of lack of testamentary capacity and mistake and ultimately failed at trial on the undue
influence claim. The trial judge, commenting on the merits of the action, noted, "It is... not
obviously the strongest case, but I think it was brought in good faith. . . ." 302 N.C. at 381, 275
S.E.2d at 428. The presence or absence of good faith should not be the measure of the merit of a
caveat. It it were, the most legally deficient claim might have substantial merit if brought in the
right state of mind.
299. See supra note 297.
300. That statute states that the court may award attorney's fees in "any action or proceeding
which may require the construction of any will or trust agreement, or fix the rights and duties
thereunder .. " N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21(2) (1981).
301. 302 N.C. 164, 273 S.E.2d 712 (1981).
302. Id. at 168-69, 273 S.E.2d at 716.
303. Id. at 168, 273 S.E.2d at 716.
304. In In re Will of Lamb, 303 N.C. 452,279 S.E.2d 781 (1981), the North Carolina Supreme
Court dismissed as fatally defective a caveat to a foreign will that had not yet been offered for
probate in North Carolina. After the caveators' jurisdictional challenge to the Virginia will had
failed, they filed a caveat in North Carolina, where the entire estate was apparently situated. Both
the trial court and the court of appeals allowed the challenge, resting their decisions on the fact
that the will had been recorded under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-27 (1976). In re Will of Lamb, 48 N.C.
App. 122,268 S.E.2d 831 (1980). The supreme court reversed, requiring actual probate of the will,
not mere recordation, holding that "a caveat may not be entered to the recordation of an exempli-
fication or authenticated copy of a will and foreign order of probate that has been allowed, filed
and recorded in the office of the clerk, but can only be entered to the probate of such will." 303
N.C. at 461, 279 S.E.2d at 787. Endorsing strict procedural compliance, the court then noted that
caveators were free to offer the will for probate, and then properly enter the caveat. Id.
305. In an action only tangentially related to wills in the legal sense, the General Assembly
eased requirements concerning the witnessing of a "living will," which allows a terminally ill
patient to state his desire not to have his life prolonged by artificial means. One now may be a
witness so long as he does "not know or have a reasonable expectation" that he will take either
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under the declarant's will or by intestate succession. Unamended, the statute stated an objective
test: would the witness be entitled to any part of the declarant's estate or intestate share? If so, he
was disqualified. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-321(c)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
306. The General Assembly amended the self-proving will statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-11.6
(Cum. Supp. 1981) to remove any lingering doubts as to whether both a signed will and a signed
affidavit are required to make a will self-proving. The statute had provided that "[i]n addition to
the procedures for the execution of a will set out in G.S. 31-3.3 [a normal attested written will], a
[will can be self-proved]." Although 1979 amendments had supposedly created a one-step method
allowing a will to be "simultaneously executed, attested, and made self-proved," this statutory
language indicated to some that compliance with the requirements for an attested written will
were still a prerequisite. Now the statute provides simply that "[any" will may be self-proved.
This amendment should remove any vestige of the requirement that both the will and the affidavit
be signed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-11.6 (Cum. Supp. 1981). For a summary of the problems prior to
the 1979 amendments, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1979-Property, 58
N.C.L. Rev. 1509, 1528-29 (1980).
307. The 1981 General Assembly reacted to a supreme court opinion that had held an execu-
tor's general notice to creditors under G.S. 28A-14-1 fatally defective because it failed to name a
day after which claims against the estate would be barred. The court in Anderson v. Gooding, 300
N.C. 170, 265 S.E.2d 201 (1980), found the notice ineffective to begin the running of the six-month
statute of limitations for bringing claims against the estate. The Gooding court based their deci-
sion on fairness to creditors who might have erroneously assumed that they had six months from
the publication date to file their claims when they actually had six months from the date of the
first notice.
The General Assembly has ameliorated the harshness of that result by an amendment vali-
dating any notice to creditors that fails to name a cut-off date under limited circumstances. The
amendment applies only to notices published between October 21, 1975 and March 16, 1981. It
does not affect any pending litigation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-14-1.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Presum-
ably, the legislature's intent was to protect those executors who, prior to the Gooding decision, had
not dated their notices.
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X. TAXATION 1
4. Inheritance Tax: Definition of "Debts of Decedent"
In In re Kapoor2 the supreme court defined "debts of decedent" for pur-
poses of the state inheritance tax.3 A husband had agreed to maintain a
$150,000 life insurance trust for his former wife as part of a separation agree-
ment.4 After the husband's death, the executor of his estate sought to have the
$150,000 classified as a "debt of the decedent," which would qualify for a de-
duction under G.S. 105-9. 5 The court of appeals held that the phrase included
only debts accruing prior to decedent's death and concluded that, while the
life insurance premiums would be a debt of decedent, they had been paid in
full and therefore no debt existed.6 The supreme court reversed, holding that
the former wife relinquished her marital rights not for premium payments but
for the amount that the policy would pay upon the death of the insured.
7
The court reasoned that had the husband not paid the premiums, the for-
mer wife could have sued his estate for $150,000; thus the amount of the
"debt" was $150,000, and the life insurance premiums were simply the vehi-




There were several statutory amendments affecting taxation during 1981.
1. Additional Developments in Tax Law: In Carolina-Atlantic Distribs. Inc. v. Teachy's
Insulation, Inc., 51 N.C. App. 705, 277 S.E.2d 460 (1981), a seller who failed to collect North
Carolina sales tax from a buyer and then paid it himself to the Department of Revenue was
barred from subsequently collecting the tax from the buyer under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-164.7
(1979).
In Midrex Corp. v. Lynch, 50 N.C. App. 611,274 S.E.2d 853, cert. denied on other grounds,
303 N.C. 181, 280 S.E.2d 453 (1981), the court of appeals followed generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) in holding that in computing the state intangibles tax the term "acounts
payable" does not include customer advances on construction projects. It is unclear whether
North Carolina courts will continue to follow GAAP or be amenable to alternative interpretaions
of accounting terms. In Great Southern Media v. McDowell County, 304 N.C. 427,284 S.E.2d 457
(1981), the supreme court defined "general purpose newspapers" used for publication of tax liens
under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-597, 105-369(d) (1979). General purpose newspapers must have
general appeal, and greater than a de minimis number of subscribers; subscriber residences must
not be limited to a single area of the taxing unit, and the newspaper must be available to anyone
wishing to subscribe. Id. at 441, 284 S.E.2d at 467.
2. 303 N.C. 102, 277 S.E.2d 403 (1981).
3. The North Carolina statutory scheme for inheritance taxes, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-2 to -
32 (1979) allows an estate certain deductions. Id., § 105-9. Specifically, deductions for "debts of
the decedent" are permitted under § 105-9(4).
4. 303 N.C. at 108-09, 277 S.E.2d at 408.
5. See supra note 3.
6. 47 N.C. App. 500, 501, 267 S.E.2d 418, 419 (1980), rev'd, 303 N.C. 102, 277 S.E.2d 403
(1981).
7. 303 N.C. at 109, 277 S.E.2d at 408-09.
8. Id. Justice Meyer dissented, disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that the separa-
tion agreement was a contract creating an obligation that survived the death of the husband. Id.
at 112, 277 S.E.2d at 410 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
The state installment gain provisions 9 were reformulated to conform to the
federal Internal Revenue Code provisions as amended by the Installment
Sales Revenue Act of 1980.10 The installment sales method allows payments
made over a period of time greater than one year to be included in income on
a proportional basis. The major changes in the new North Carolina method
are elimination of the requirement that no more than thirty percent of the
selling price be received in a single year and elimination of the $1000 mini-
mum sale price for casual sales of personal property. 1
The General Assembly also passed bills creating two new allowable tax
credits. State taxpayers may now take a seven percent credit on a maximum of
$4000 spent on employment-related expenses for child care (a maximum of
$2000 per dependent up to the $4000 limit).12 Individual and corporate tax
credits are now allowed for installation of energy saving devices, including
construction of photovoltaic equipment facilities, olvine facilities, methane gas
facilities, wind energy devices, solar heaters and hydroelectric generators.
13
C Property Tax
In Appeal of McElwee 14 appellants contested the present use valuation of
their 22,000 acres of forest land as determined by the Property Tax Commis-
sion.1 s Proper application for present use valuation had been made.' 6 In
North Carolina present use valuation is available for qualifying agricultural,
horticultural and forest land.17 Property not exempt or excluded' s is subject to
9. Law of February 25, 1981, ch. 46, §§ 1-4, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws. Ist Sess. 24 (codified at
N.C. Gen. StaL § 105-142(f) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
10. Pub. L. No. 96-471, §§ 1-6, 94 Stat. 2247 (1981).
11. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-1335 142(f) (1979) (amended 1981).
12. Law of July 9, 1981, ch. 899, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1335 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-151.11 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
The language of the new North Carolina provision closely tracks that of the federal statutory
scheme, which allows a maximum $2400 credit for a qualified dependent or $4800 for two or more
qualified dependents. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 124(b)(1), 97 Stat. 172, 197-98 (1982) (to be codified at
I.R.C. § 44A(d)). Qualified dependents under both statutory schemes include dependent handi-
capped adults or spouses in addition to children under the age of 15. LR.C. § 44A(c) (1982); N.C.
Gen. Stat. §151.11(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
13. Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 921, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1403 (to be codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-130.28 to -.33); Law of July 10, 1981, ch. 921, § 2, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist
Sess. 1403 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-151.7 to .10 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
14. 304 N.C. 68, 283 S.E.2d 285 (1981).
15. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-277.2(5) (1979), which defines the standard for present use
value appraisal as follows:
the price estimated in terms of money at which the property would change hands be-
tween a willing and financially able buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell, assuming that both of them have reasonable knowledge of
the capability of the property to produce income in its present use and that the present
use of the property is its highest and best use.
16. G.S. § 105-277.4 requires the filing of an application with the tax supervisor of the county
in which the property is located showing clearly that the property comes within one of the present
use classes outlined in G.S. 105-277.3. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-277.3, -277.4 (1979).
17. Id. § 105-277.3.
18. Id.
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normal appraisal at market value 19 under the general property tax statute.20
The county had hired an appraisal company to reappraise all real prop-
erty in the county.21 Value schedules for the appraisal of separate properties
were developed by the company and were adopted by the county Board of
Commissioners. Notice was published twenty-seven months before the reap-
praisal date. After the county appraised appellants' property at market value,
appellants filed a complaint with the County Board of Equalization and Re-
view. Subsequently, the Property Tax Commission and the court of appeals
affirmed the county's action, 22 but the supreme court reversed and remanded
for a new determination of the present use value of appellants' property.
23
Citing In re Appeal of Amp, Inc.,24 the supreme court reiterated the
grounds for appellate review of administrative agency decisions, including
those of the Property Tax Commission.25 Review begins with a presumption
of the correctness of tax assessments, but the presumption of correctness is
rebuttable if "competent, material and substantial" evidence is produced to
show: "(1) Either the county tax supervisor used an arbitrary method of valua-
tion; or (2) the county tax supervisor used an illegalmethod of valuation; AND
[sic] (3) the assessment substantially exceeded the true value in money of the
property.
'26
In examining the county's action, the court noted that all property being
appraised must "be actually visited" 27 and proper notice of the new valuation
schedules must be given.28 The court held that adequate notice was not given
when notice was printed in the smallest possible print twenty-seven months
before the date of revaluation.29 In addition, all property under appraisal did
not receive an on-site visit. "The legislative directive is crystal clear: all prop-
19. See id. § 105-283 (1979), which defines the standard for market value appraisal of
property:
All property, real and personal, shall as far as practicable be appraised or valued at its
true value in money. When used in this Subchapter, the words "true value" shall be
interpreted as meaning market value, that is, the price estimated in terms of money at
which the property would change hands between a willing and financially able buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of all the uses to which the property is adapted and for which it is
capable of being used.
20. The Machinery Act subjects all property, both real and personal, to taxation and contains
provisions for the appraisal and assessment of property as well as the assessment of property taxes.
Id. §§ 105-207 to -395.
21. See id. § 105-286, which provides for a schedule for the general reappraisal of real prop-
erty in counties throughout the state.
22. 51 N.C. App. 163, 169, 275 S.E.2d 865, 869 (1981).
23. 304 N.C. 68, 93, 283 S.E.2d 115, 130.
24. 287 N.C. 547, 215 S.E.2d 752 (1975).
25. The supreme court found N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-345.2 (1979) to be the appropriate judi-
cial review statute for appeals from the Property Tax Commission. 304 N.C. at 74, 283 S.E.2d at
120.
26. 287 N.C. at 563, 215 S.E.2d at 762 (emphasis in original).
27. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-317(b)(2) (1979).
28. G.S. 105-317(c) provides the proper means for giving notice of the valuation schedules.
Id. § 105-317(c).
29. 304 N.C. at 80, 283 S.E.2d at 123.
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erty being reappraised by a county must receive an on-site visit and observa-
tion by the appraiser." 30 Because the county's revaluation violated clear
statutory provisions, it was in error. In addition, the court found the county
action to be arbitrary because no rules for appraisal were developed31 and
because a complete consideration of the factors that could affect value32 was
not given.
In a second property tax case, the court of appeals interpreted another
property tax statute,33 which provides that once a foreign corporation estab-
lishes a business situs in the state, the tax situs for all of its property is its
principal place of business. In In re Appeal of Plushbottom & Peabody Ltd 
34
the court held that the tax situs of tangible personal property of a foreign cor-
poration is unaffected by shipment from its tax situs in the state for a finishing
process to be performed outside the state.35 The temporary absence of the
tangible property on the tax date does not affect its taxability within the
state.
36
D. Unemployment Tax: Church Employee Exemption
In Begley v. Employment Security Commission37 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals examined the unemployment tax liability for persons employed by
a church school. Plaintiff contended that the "church employee" exemption
from unemployment tax liability38 should cover the church school employees
as well. The court of appeals held that since "[c]hurch officials.. . are re-
sponsible for the operation, administration, and employment of the schools"
39
and church schools are part of the church, the school's employees are also
church employees. The test was found to be met, and plaintiff was held not
30. Id. at 82, 283 S.E.2d at 124.
31. G.S. 105-317(b)(1) (1979) requires the tax supervisor to develop rules for appraising real
property. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-317(b)(1) (1979).
32. See id. § 105-317(a)(1), which lists factors to be considered in determining the true value
of land. Factors enumerated include advantages and disadvantages as to location, zoning, water-
power, water privileges; mineral, quarry, or other valuable deposits; fertility; adaptability for agri-
cultural, timber-producing, commercial, industrial, or other uses; past income, probable future
income, and any other factors that may affect its value.
33. See id. § 105-304(c)(2).
34. 51 N.C. App. 285, 276 S.E.2d 505, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 314, 281 S.E.2d 653 (1981).
35. Id. at 292, 276 S.E.2d at 510. The court interpreted G.S. 105-304(f)(4), which states: "In
applying the provisions. . . the temporary absence of tangible personal property from the place at
which... property is to be listed shall not affect the application of the rules established ....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-304(f)(4) (1979).
36. 51 N.C. App. at 293, 276 S.E.2d at 511.
37. 50 N.C. App. 432, 274 S.E.2d 370 (1981).
38. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-8(6)(k)(15) (1981). The statute provides that the term "employ-
ment" for unemployment tax purposes shall not include "services performed. . . in the employ of
a church. ... "
39. 50 N.C. App. at 437, 274 S.E.2d at 374 (emphasis in original).
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liable for the unemployment tax.40
MARIE LOUISE JOSEPH
H. VAUGHN RAMSEY
40. The court also held that when plaintiff makes a payment under protest pursuant to G.S.
96-10(f) (1981), the trial court may award prejudgment interest on the amount of the protested
payment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-10(f) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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XI. TORTS'
1. Additional Developments: a. Statutes: The North Carolina General Assembly made a
number of statutory changes in 1981 in the area of tort law. Law of May 5, 1981, ch. 327, § 1, 1981
N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 369 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5 (Cum. Supp. 1981)) provides for
interest to be paid on compensatory damages in noncontract actions from the time the action is
instituted until the time judgment is satisified, assuming no liability insurance is present. In
noncontract actions in which liability insurance covers the claim, interest will be payable from the
time of the verdict until the time the. judgment is paid. Id. The former version of this statute
made no distinction between claims covered by liability insurance and those that were not.
Further, it provided only that interest would be allowed until judgments were paid, but did not
specify when interest could begin to accrue.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-480.1 to .3 (Cum. Supp. 1981), a new provision, makes available low-
level aid for victims of sex offenses. Under the statute, a victim of rape or other sex offenses may
apply for up to $500 in reimbursement for costs of medical examinations and treatment following
an assault. The funds are not available to applicants who wait more than 72 hours to report the
assault to police, however, unless there is good cause for the delay. The funds, paid by the
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, are administered by the Governor's Crime
Commission and will be disbursed directly to the examining doctor or hospital Appeals from
applicants who are refused assistance will be heard by the Wake County Superior Court. Law of
July 10, 1981, ch. 931, § 2, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1429 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 143B-480.1 to .3 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
Another new provision is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.16 (Cum. Supp. 1981), which provides that
no law may require a claimant to notify a local government of a claim as a condition precedent to
filing the suit. G.S. § 20-154(b) was amended to indicate that violation of the turn signal statute is
not negligence per se. Law of June 17, 1981, ch. 599, § 4, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 871
(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-154(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
Finally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99C-1 to -5 (Cum. Supp. 1981), effective October 1, 1981, sets forth
the duties of skiers and ski area operators. The statute provides that violation of these duties
constitutes negligence to the extent that the violation proximately causes injuries. Law of July 10,
1981, ch. 939, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1441 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99C-1 to -5 (Cum.
Supp. 1981)).
b. Cases: In Noell v. Winston, 51 N.C.App. 455, 276 S.E.2d 766, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 515,
281 S.E.2d 652 (1981), the supreme court dismissed plaintiff attorney's claim that his county bar
association maliciously interfered with his right to practice law by deleting his name from
appointment rosters in indigent cases. Plaintiff sought to recover both on due process grounds and
on a theory of actionable trespass against property rights. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-1 (1979).
Neither theory was found to support a valid cause of action. 51 N.C. App. at 457, 276 S.E.2d at
768.
In Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981), the supreme
court held that a store owner could be held liable for injuries resulting from the intentional
criminal acts of third parties. Plaintiff was assaulted in a shopping mall parking lot, an area in
which twenty-nine incidents of crime had previously been reported. The court imposed a duty to
protect or warn invitees "where circumstances existed which gave the owner reason to know that
there was ... a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons which endangered the safety"
of his invitees. Id. at 638-39, 281 S.E.2d at 38 (citing Restatement (Second). of Torts § 344
comment f (1965)). For a more complete analysis of the case, see Note, Tort Law-Foster v.
Winston-Salem Joint Venture! Duty of Mall Owners to Take Measures to Protect Invitees from
Criminal Acts, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1126 (1982).
The well-settled duty of a proprietor to his invitee was likewise given stringent application by
the supreme court in Norwood v. Sherwin Williams Co., 303 N.C. 462, 279 S.E.2d 559 (1981).
Defendant storekeepers were held liable for injuries plaintiff sustained when she stumbled over a
poorly lit and awkwardly placed floor display. The display, and other "impulse" purchase items,
had been placed to keep customers' attention at eye level. The court of appeals, adopting
defendant's argument that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to keep a proper
lookout, denied recovery. 48 N.C. App. 535, 269 S.E.2d 277 (1980). The supreme court reversed,
explicitly disagreeing "with both the statement of the [contributory negligence] rule and its
application to the evidence adduced at trial." 303 N.C. at 468, 279 S.E.2d at 563. The court held
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent only if in the exercise of ordinary care she should have
seen the danger. In so holding, the court delivered a clear warning to proprietors that "[w]hen a
merchant entices a customer's eyes away from a hazardous condition, 
we do not think he s ould
be heard to complain when his efforts succeed." Id. at 469, 279 S.E.2d at 564.
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A. Products Liability2
1. Dangerous Chemicals
In Ziglar v. EL DuPont de Nemours & Co.3 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals discussed in detail the duty of care required of a manufacturer in
producing, packaging and labeling dangerous chemicals. The court reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for DuPont, holding that it was a
jury question whether DuPont had been negligent in any of those three areas. 4
Summary judgment for the retailer who sold the chemical was upheld.5
In Ziglar a farm laborer died shortly after drinking insecticide manufac-
tured by DuPont. The insecticide was in its original package, an opaque
container similar to a milk carton, and was colorless, like water.6 A warning
label appeared on the exterior of the container, along with first-aid instruc-
tions.7 The decedent apparently mistook the insecticide for a jar of water her
employer had provided for his field workers.
After the worker consumed the insecticide, the farmer read the first aid
instructions on the label and, as suggested, tried to induce vomiting by forcing
the decedent to drink a mixture of salt and water. The search for salt and
water took about eight minutes, and the decedent became unconscious shortly
thereafter.8 The farmer then drove the decedent to a nearby doctor's office.
The doctor administered an antidote, also as instructed by the chemical label,
but the decedent died soon afterwards in a hospital.9
The court held that the plaintiff had established enough evidence to pres-
ent three possible theories of liability to the jury. The court ruled that there
were material issues of fact whether DuPont exercised "the utmost caution" in
the production of a dangerous substance,10 whether the label warnings were
2. In Strickland v. Dri-Spray Div. Equip. Dev., 51 N.C. App. 57, 275 S.E.2d 503 (1981), a
products liability case, the court held that when equipment design poses an obvious hazard, there
is no duty to warn.
3. 53 N.C. App. 147, 280 S.E.2d 510 (1981).
4. Id. at 150, 280 S.E.2d at 513.
5. Id. A retailer has a duty to warn a purchaser of any hazard associated with the use of a
product he sells. Plaintiff must show the following in order to prove negligence by the retailer:
(I) that the supplier had actual or constructive knowledge of a particular hazard, and (2) that the
retailer knew or should have known that the purchaser would not recognize this danger himself.
Id. at 151, 280 S.E.2d at 513. In Ziglar the purchaser was a farmer experienced in the use of toxic
chemicals, including this one; the court held that the plaintiff did not establish that the retailer
knew that the label warnings were inadequate. Id. at 151,280 S.E.2d at 513, 514. This duty of the
retailer is well established in North Carolina. See, e.g., Stegall v. Catawba Oil Co., 260 N.C. 459,
133 S.E.2d 138 (1963); Davis v. Sioo, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354, cert. denied, 301
N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980); Cockerham v. Ward, 44 N.C. App. 615, 262 S.E.2d 651, cert.
denied, 300 N.C. 195, 269 S.E.2d 622 (1980).
The question of the farmer's liability in Ziglar was apparently outside the scope of this
lawsuit.
6. 53 N.C. App. at 148-49, 280 S.E.2d at 512.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 158, 280 S.E.2d at 517.
9. Id.'at 149, 280 S.E.2d at 512.
10. Id. at 154,280 S.E.2d at 515 (citing Davis v. Sioo, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354,
cert. denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980)). The court warned that the "utmost caution"
standard should not be confused with strict liability, which North Carolina has not adopted in tort
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adequate to reach all those who might reasonably be expected to come into
contact with the chemical,11 and, finally, whether the product's first aid in-
structions were ambiguous or incomplete.
12
In what appears to be a case of first impression in North Carolina dealing
with first aid instructions on product labels, the Ziglar court, by allowing the
issue to go to the jury, indicated that a manufacturer may have a duty to pro-
vide these instructions, or at least that when the attempt is made, the instruc-
tions must be complete and clear. 13 For instance, the court noted that the
instructions may have been incomplete, because they emphasized giving vic-
tims salt water, rather than inducing vomiting quickly by whatever means
available. 14 Similarly, the instructions to physicians included only the anti-
dote for victims of mild chemical poisoning and not the treatment for those
stricken more severely.
15
While the manufacturer's duty in packaging and labeling dangerous
chemicals recognized in Ziglar appears to follow the products liability law in
other states, the case provides the first careful discussion of the duty by a
North Carolina court.
claims. Id. at 154 n.5, 280 S.E.2d at 515 n.5. The strict liability theory was most recently rejected
in Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980). See discussion of strict
liability at notes 23, 24, 38-40 infra. In ruling that there was a jury issue concerning the manufac-
turer's alleged negligence in producing and packaging the insecticide, the court pointed out that
the manufacturer had changed the design of the bottle and had tinted the insecticide browirafter
the accident. 53 N.C. App. at 155, 280 S.E.2d at 516. In North Carolina, evidence of repairs made
after an accident are not admissible to show negligence. 2 D. Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence
§ 180, at 58-59 (H. Brandis rev. 1973). Evidence of later repairs may be admitted for other pur-
poses, including showing that the alleged condition existed at the time of the accident, demonstrat-
ing that a certain person had a duty to repair, contradicting photographic evidence of conditions
at the time of the accident, or contradicting evidence that the repairs were made before the acci-
dent. Id. at 59 n.12.
The Ziglar court did not make clear whether it mentioned the later repairs to show negligence
of the manufacturer, or for one of the permissible reasons. Any mistake by the court appears
minor. The court held that there was sufficient evidence on two other grounds to take the case to
the jury, 53 N.C. App. at 160, 280 S.E.2d at 519, thus omission of the evidence of later repairs
would not have resulted in a drastic change in the outcome of the decision.
11. 53 N.C. App. at 155, 280 S.E.2d at 516 (citing Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp., 271
N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967)). See Fowler v. Gen. Elec. Co., 40 N.C. App. 301, 252 S.E.2d 862
(1979); Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 643, 653
(1978). The court noted that the label in Ziglar was 4/17 inches high and included a skull and
crossbones symbol the same size. There was no evidence, however, that the decedent could read.
53 N.C. App. at 156, 280 S.E.2d at 516.
12. 53 N.C. App. at 158, 280 S.E.2d at 517. The court cited no North Carolina cases for the
proposition that the duty to include first aid instructions is part of the manufacturer's duty to
warn. Apparently this is the first time the court of appeals has dealt with tie question. Likewise,
while the duty of a manufacturer to label dangerous products has been the subject of a number of
cases and articles, the issue of first aid instructions does not appear to have been widely discussed.
13. Id. at 160-61, 280 S.E.2d at 519. "There is substantial authority that the manufacturer
must give both adequate directions for use and adequate warning of potential danger." 1 L.
Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 8.05[1], at 186.4-.4(l) (1960). See, e.g., Twerski,
Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design
Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 495 0976); Medici v. The Dalton Schools,
Inc., 43 A.D.2d 677, 349 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1973).
14. 53 N.C. App. at 158, 280 S.E.2d at 517.
15. Id. at 158-59, 280 S.E.2d at 518.
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2. Crashworthiness
Two federal courts of appeals reached opposite conclusions in 1981 when
they tried to predict whether the North Carolina Supreme Court would recog-
nize the so-called "crashworthiness" doctrine in products liability cases.
Under the crashworthiness theory, a manufacturer may be held liable for inju-
ries In an accident caused by a defective product design, even if the defect that
enhanced or caused the injury is not related to the cause of the original acci-
dent.16 More specifically, the issue of crashworthiness arises when a plaintiff
is injured in a "second collision"--that is, when he or she comes into contact
with some part of the vehicle after the initial crash between the vehicle and
some other object.
In Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A. G. 17 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit predicted that North Carolina would recognize the crashworthiness
theory. But in a case decided soon afterwards, Wilson v. FordMotor Co.,18 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion.
Seese and Wilson are the latest in a series of federal court decisions that have
reached conflicting predictions about North Carolina's stance on the
crashworthiness doctrine.19 Neither the North Carolina Supreme Court nor
the North Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled on the crashworthiness
doctrine.
20
In Seese, four of the five passengers in a Volkswagen microbus were hurt
when the car was forced off the road and turned over.2 1 The four injured
passengers were all thrown from the vehicle, and one of the four died from his
injuries. Plaintiffs claimed that their injuries were exacerbated because of the
vehicle's defectively designed window retention system, and sued on the basis
of strict liability, breach of warranty and failure to design a crashworthy
vehicle.
2 2
Plaintiffs succeeded in the district court on both the strict liability and
crashworthiness theories23 On appeal, the Seese court rejected plaintiffs'
strict liability claim24 and the breach of warranty claim, 25 but recognized the
16. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 646 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing this area of
tort law and referencing cases and legal commentary on the subject); Golden, Automobile
Crashworthiness-The Judiciary Responds When Manufacturers Improperly Design Their Cars,
46 Ins. Couns. J. 335 (1979).
17. 648 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1981).
18. 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981).
19. Cases predicting that North Carolina would reject the crashworthiness doctrine are Simp-
son v. Hurst Performance, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 445 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Alexander v. Seaboard Air
Line R.R., 346 F. Supp 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Bulliner v. General Motors Corp., 54 F.R.D. 479
(E.D.N.C. 1971). Two recent cases have predicted that North Carolina would allow the doctrine.
See Sealey v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. Supp. 475 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales,
438 F. Supp. I (E.D.N.C. 1976).
20. Sealey v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. Supp. 475, 478 (E.D.N.C. 1980). See note 19 supra.
21. 648 F.2d at 835-36.
22. Id. at 836, 838.
23. Id. at 835.
24. Id. at 837. North Carolina rejected the strict liability theory of tort in Smith v. Fiber
Control Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980). It should be noted that the Smith decision,
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crashworthiness cause of action. The court noted the absence of state court
rulings on the issue'and the split among federal courts in the state.26 Because
of the lack of precedent, "a prediction as to the law North Carolina would
adopt can only be based on the greater persuasiveness of one of the conflicting
theories, with an eye to the nationwide trend in judicial and legislative law-
making." 27 Arguing that the view rejecting crashworthiness is "outdated and
repudiated, '28 the court stated that it was "convinced that North Carolina is
more likely to follow the enlightened rule. . . [and recognize the crashworthi-
ness doctrine]." 29
A strong dissent30 argued for remand of the case to the district court to
determine which damages awarded by the jury were based on the crashworthi-
ness doctrine and which were based on strict liability, the theory disallowed by
the court of appeals' majority.31 The dissent noted that while the jury consid-
ered the potential liability of the defendants separately under the two theories,
it awarded the damages in a single lump sum.
32
In Wilson v. Ford Motor Co. 33 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld a lower court decision predicting that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina would not recognize the crashworthiness doctrine.34 The Wilson
court noted the Seese decision, but concluded that it was unlikely that North
Carolina would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine because of the North Car-
olina Supreme Court's recent rejection of the doctrine of strict liability in tort
handed down after the district court opinion in Seese, was the first case in which the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court had discussed strict liability in more than 15 years.
25. 648 F.2d at 838. The court noted that the Seese claim was filed 27 months before North
Carolina's Products Liability Act, became effective on Oct. 1, 1979. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B (1979).
Thus, the act did not apply.
In Indiana, New York and Massachusetts, the breach of implied warranty action has been
used as a substitute for strict liability. Note, Products Liability-Warranties--The Uniform Com-
mercial Code Provides An Alternative Remedy to Strict Liability in Tort Regarding Injuries Suf-
fered From a Defective Product Without Requiring Privity, 13 St. Mary's L.J. 196 (1981). In a
breach of warranty action, the plaintiff must plead only that the product did not live up to the
standard of performance promised by the manufacturer, negligence is not an issue. Because the
Seese court determined that North Carolina's Products Liability Act did not apply, it declined to
determine if North Carolina courts would rule that the breach of warranty action was the
equivalent of strict liability.
Defendant-manufacturer argued both at trial and on appeal that evidence should have been
admitted to show that plaintiffs were not using their seatbelts at the time of the accident. The trial
court excluded the evidence and the court of appeals upheld the decision, ruling that North Caro-
lina courts do not recognize non-use of seatbelts as evidence of plaintiffs contributory negligence.
648 F.2d at 842-43. See Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968). On appeal, the
automaker argued that it was attempting to introduce the seatbelt evidence as part of its efforts to
prove that the car was crashworthy. 648 F.2d at 853-54 (Adams, J., dissenting). However, the
majority in See.re apparently believed that the Miller rule stands for the proposition that seatbelt
evidence is not admissible for any reason whatsoever.
26. See note 19 supra.
27. 648 F.2d at 841.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 850 (Adams, J., dissenting).
31. See note 24 supra.
32. 648 F.2d at 851.
33. 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981).
34. Id.
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cases. 35 The court also based its decision on the lower court's "careful review"
of the conflicting cases in the crashworthiness area.
36
The district court decision in Wilson was apparently based on two factors.
First, the court noted that at the time of the district court's decision only one
federal court had predicted North Carolina would recognize the crashworthi-
ness theory.37 Second, the court emphasized that its duty is is to predict North
Carolina law, not to adopt a view that a majority of federal judges believe is
wisest.
38
The court of appeals' reliance on North Carolina's rejection of strict lia-
bility in tort as a reason for predicting that the state would also reject the
crashworthiness doctrine is confusing at best. If the court was suggesting that
the doctrines of crashworthiness and strict liability are similar, and therefore
any rejection of strict liability eliminates acceptance of the crashworthiness
theory, the decision seems hard to justify. The imposition of strict liability
represents a policy decision by the courts that a manufacturer-tortfeasor who
injures another; however innocently, is better able to bear the burden of the
victim's injuries than the victim himself.39 Strict liability thus deals with the
allocation of damages and compensation of injuries. Crashworthiness, on the
other hand, deals with the question of duty. The theory provides that a manu-
facturer may be held liable for defectively designed products that enhance in-
jury in a crash, even though the defect did not cause the initial collision.
Courts accepting the theory have made the policy decision that a manufac-
turer has a duty to design a product that will be reasonably safe during a
collision, but it must be determined in each case whether this duty has been
breached. The two theories, crashworthiness and strict liability, thus do not
seem to be so related that rejection of one necessarily entails rejection of the
other. Indeed, earlier cases based on crashworthiness provided for liability of
the manufacturer only for defects that were the result of design negligence.
40
Of course, it is possible that the Wilson court merely recognized that
North Carolina has frequently lagged behind its sister states in adopting new
theories in the products liability field, and therefore predicted that it was un-
likely that a North Carolina court would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine-
a doctrine that is less widely accepted than the strict liability theory.4'
35. Id.; see note 24 supra.
36. Id.
37. Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., No. ST-C-80-2, slip op. at 4 (W.D.N.C. April 9,1980). Sealey
v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. Supp. 475 (E.D.N.C. 1980), which also predicted that North Carolina
would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine, had apparently not been decided when the lower court
decided Wilson.
38. Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., No. ST-C-80-2, slip op. at 5 (W.D.N.C. April 9, 1980).
39. "The problem [of strict liability] is dealt with as one of allocating a more or less inevitable
loss to be charged against a complex and dangerous civilization, and liability is imposed upon the
party best able to shoulder it .... [There is a moral point of view in that the rule provides] that
one who innocently causes harm should make it good." W. Prosser, supra note 16, at 495.
40. "[Earlier cases] were decided on the basis of general negligence principles. Shortly after
these decisions there was a shift [to strict liability]." Golden, supra note 16, at 345..
41. "North Carolina is not among those jurisdictions noted for producing landmark decisions
on products liability law. Until the adopting of the new Product Liability Act, this jurisdiction
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The Wilson court's view of the limited role of the federal court in predict-
ing state law is undoubtedly the correct posture for the court to take. Judging
from the language of the Seese opinion, it appears that the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals based its decision at least in part on the majority's view that the
more liberal theory was wisest.4 2 On the other hand, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that the overwhelming trend in products liability is toward recogni-
tion of the crashworthiness theory and that it is only a matter of time before
North Carolina adopts the doctrine as well. On that ground, the opinion of
the court in Seese seems the better reasoned of the two.
3. Breach of Warranty and Tort
In Gillespie v. American Motors Corp.4 3 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals discussed some of the differences between tort and breach of warranty
actions that seem to confuse a number of courts.44 Plaintiffs in Gillespie had
purchased a 1976 Cherokee Jeep from defendants in mid-December 1975.
Within two weeks, plaintiffs noticed that excessive gas fumes collected inside
the vehicle whenever they drove it.4a They made numerous trips to defend-
ant's dealership to have the problem remedied, but without success. Mean-
while, plaintiffs began experiencing a variety of minor illnesses, which they
eventually linked to the gas fumes 46 On December 18, 1979, nearly four years
after they bought the car, plaintiffs filed suit, alleging negligence, strict liability
and breach of warranty of merchantability.47
The district court dismissed all three claims, apparently believing that a
three-year tort statute of limitations governed and had run before plaintiffs
filed their suit.4 8 The court of appeals reversed and remanded on several
grounds. First, it held that the trial court was mistaken in its choice of the
applicable statute of limitations for the tort causes of action 4 9 Second, it held
held onto theories with more consistency and vigor than most other states." B. Finberg & E.
Hightower, Products Liability: The Law in North Carolina § 1-11, at 9 (1980) (citations omitted).
Strict liability in tort is now apparently recognized in all states but Alabama, Wyoming,
North Carolina, Virginia, Utah and Michigan. Massachusetts and Ohio, while not expressly rec-
ognizing strict liability, have apparently used the breach of warranty cause of action in the same
way. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § [21 (1960 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
42. The court described the trend toward adopting the crashworthiness cause of action as
more persuasive and enlightened and referred to the opposing view as "outdated and repudiated."
648 F.2d at 841.
43. 51 N.C. App. 535, 277 S.E.2d 100 (1981).
44. In addition to having difficulties distinguishing between negligence and warranty causes
of action, courts also sometimes confuse the breach of warranty action with strict liability, a con-
cept that is not recognized in North Carolina but often surfaces in tort cases in other states. 2 L.
Frumer & M. Friedman, § [1] [d] supra note 41, at 1; see Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C.
669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980).
45. 51 N.C. App. at 536, 277 S.E.2d at 101.
46. Id. at 538, 277 S.E.2d at 102. Plaintiffs testified that they did not link their illness with the
gas fumes for more than two years.
47. Id. at 536, 277 S.E.2d at 100-01.
48. Id. at 536, 277 S.E.2d at 101. Although the court of appeals' opinion is not clear on this
point, the trial court apparently held that a three-year torts statute of limitations governed all three
of the plaintiffs' claims.
49. The court of appeals held that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15(b) (repealed 1979) applied to the
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that the jury and not the court should decide when the plaintiffs should have
"discovered" the defect in the car, and thus when the statute of limitations
began to runP0 Third, the court noted that the statute of limitations provided
in the North Carolina Sales Act51 controls in breach of warranty actions. Be-
cause the plaintiffs had filed within the four-year period provided by the Sales
Act, their. breach of warranty claim was not time-barred.
52
The trial court's confusion over the different standards governing tort and
breach of warranty actions is common. At least part of the difficulty in distin-
guishing the theories arises from their common origin 53 and their conjunctive
use by plaintiffs in many products liability cases. There are a number of im-
portant differences between the breach of warranty and negligence claims,
however, and courts and practitioners would do well to note the court of ap-
peals' clarification of some of those differences in Gillespie.
B. Loss of Consortium
In June 1980 the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized in Nicholson
v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, Inc. 54 that "a spouse may maintain a
cause of action for loss of consortium due to the negligent actions of third
parties so long as that action for loss of consortium is joined with any suit the
action, since that statute, although repealed effective October 1, 1979, was applicable when the
plaintiffs bought the car. Under that statute a claimant had three years to file suit from the time
the action accrues:
Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action... having as an essential
element bodily injury to the person or a defect in or damage to property which
originated under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not readily appar-
ent to the claimant at the time of its origin, is deemed to have accrued at the time the
injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have been discovered by
him, whichever event first occurs....
51 N.C. App. at 538, 277 S.E.2d at 101-02 (quoting from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15 (b)).
The court further held that the successor to N.C. Gen. Stat § 1-15(b), N.C. Gen. Stat. § I-
50(6) (1979), could extend the time within which plaintiffs could assert their rights, provided their
claim would not have been totally barred under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15(b). 51 N.C. App. at 538,
277 S.E.2d at 101-02.
50. 51 N.C. App. at 538, 277 S.E.2d at 102. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15(b) provided that the cause
of action accrues when the claimant discovered or should have discovered the defect. See note 48
supra.
51. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-725(l)-(2) (1965 & Cum. Supp. 1981) provides as follows:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years
after the cause of action has accrued....
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is
made except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods
and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action
accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
52. 51 N.C. App. at 539, 277 S.E.2d at 102. The court cited Styron v. Loman-Garrett Supply
Co., 6 N.C. App. 675, 171 S.E.2d 41 (1969), where it was decided that a cause of action for breach
of warranty does not "accrue" at the date of sale if the seller later attempts to repair the damage or
defect caused by the alleged breach. Rather, the cause accrues when the repair attempts finally
cease and it becomes clear that the seller no longer intends to remedy the breach, even though the
product still does not comply with the warranty.
53. "The seller's warranty is a curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and con-
tract, unique in the law. ... W. Prosser, supra note 16, at 634.
54. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
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other spouse may have instituted to recover for his or her personal injuries." 55
The decision overruled longstanding North Carolina case law which held that
no cause of action for loss of consortium existed.5 6 In 1981 the supreme court
in Cox v. Haworth57 considered whether and to what extent the new rule al-
lowing recovery for loss of consortium applied to claims arising prior to the
Nicholson decision.
In Cox plaintiff wife filed suit alleging that defendants negligently per-
formed a myelogram on her husband in 1978. She further alleged that the
myelogram procedure left her husband permanently paralyzed and as a result
she suffered the loss of his general companionship and conjugal society.58 The
superior court dismissed plaintiff's action because at the time of the alleged
acts of negligence no claim for loss of consortium was recognized in North
Carolina.59 The supreme court certified the case for discretionary review and
held that the Nicholson decision should be given retrospective application. 60
The court adopted a balancing approach in determining whether to apply
its holding in Nicholson retroactively. The court adopted a presumption of
retroactivity, which may be rebutted by compelling reasons against its applica-
tion.61 Mindful of the interplay of countervailing interests, the court observed
that "the question of retroactivity is one of judicial policy, and should be de-
termined by a consideration of such factors as reliance on the prior decision,
the degree to which the purpose behind the new decision can be achieved
solely through prospective application, and the effect of retroactive application
on the administration of justice."62 In this case, the arguments made by de-
fendant physician that he justifiably relied on prior case law, that the purpose
behind Nicholson could be achieved fully through prospective application and
that retroactive application would be unduly burdensome on the administra-
tion of justice were found unpersuasive.63 The court placed special emphasis
on the Nicholson court's overriding concern that fair compensation be made
"to those injured by the wrongful conduct of others when the conduct impairs
the service, society, companionship, sexual gratification and affection that is a
55. Id. at 304, 266 S.E.2d at 823.
56. See, e.g., Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945) (no cause of
action for loss of wife's consortium); Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307
(1925) (no cause of action for loss of husband's consortium). For an historical overview of the
development of the loss of consortium cause of action, see Popescul, Action Per Quod Consortium
Amisit, 43 Sask. L. Rev. 27 (1979). For a brief introduction to current American practice in the
area, see Belli & Wilkinson, Loss of Consortium: Academic Addendum or Substantial Right?, 16
Trial, Feb. 1980, at 20, 20 (attorney should make an effort to "include consortium counts when-
ever possible").
57. 304 N.C. 571, 284 S.E.2d 322 (1981).
58. Id. at 572, 284 S.E.2d at 323.
59. Id. On direct appeal of the superior court's dismissal of plaintifrs husband's claim
against defendant hospital, the court of appeals affirmed. Because the privately retained Dr. Ha-
worth could not be considered an agent of the hospital, the doctrine of res ondeat superior did not
apply and defendant hospital had no duty to warn plaintiff of the nature of the medical procedure
to be performed. See 54 N.C. App. 328, 283 S.E.2d 392 (1981).
60. 304 N.C. at 576, 284 S.E.2d at 326.
61. Id. at 574, 284 S.E.2d at 324.
62. Id. at 573, 284 S.E.2d at 324.
63. Id. at 575, 284 S.E.2d at 325.
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vital part of the marital relationship.""
Because the policy behind Nicholson was to compensate the loss of a legit-
imate interest, retroactive application was deemed necessary to protect those
injured prior to the June 1980 Nicholson decision.65 Cox thus reflects the
court's full commitment to the view that those suffering loss of consortium
deserve compensation, regardless of any additional burden upon underinsured
defendants or possible complication of the administration of justice.
C Mental Distress
In Dickens v. Puryear66 the supreme court made it clear that the tort of
intentional infliction of mental distress does not require a plaintiff to prove an
element of physical injury, as had been suggested in the 1979 decision in Stan-
back v. Stanback.67 In so holding, the Dickens court expressly disapproved
dictum in Stanback that suggested a plaintiff "must show some physical injury
resulting from the emotional disturbance" in order to recover under the theory
of intentional infliction of mental distress.
68
Plaintiff in Dickens alleged that he was beaten to the point of semi-con-
sciousness and threatened with death unless he left the state of North Caro-
lina.69 Plaintiff further alleged that he suffered severe and permanent
emotional distress as a result of defendant's acts.70 The court of appeals
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that plain-
tiff's claim was for assault and battery and was therefore barred by the one-
year statute of limitations.71 Carefully distinguishing the elements of assault
and battery from those of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
supreme court reversed and remanded, noting that "[ilf 'physical injury'
means something more than emotional distress or damage to the nervous sys-
tem, it is simply not an element of the tort of intentional infliction of mental
64. Id. (citing Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 300, 266 S.E.2d
818, 821 (1980)).
65. The court's holding followed the majority rule. See, e.g., Ryter v. Brennan, 291 So. 2d 55
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Shepherd
v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 384 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1964). But see Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284
Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969) (recognition of cause of action for loss of consortium limited to
future cases).
66. 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).
67. 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979). For initial survey treatment of the Stanback deci-
sion, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1979-Torts, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1561,
1568-69 (1980).
68. 297 N.C. at 198, 254 S.E.2d at 623. The court's reassessment of its decision in Slanback
was motivated in part by its consideration of the instructive analysis presented by Professor Rob-
ert G. Byrd in Recovery for Mental Anguish in North Carolina, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 435 (1980). 302
N.C. at 448, 276 S.E.2d at 332. See also Note, Torts: An Analysis of Mental Distress as as Element
of Damages and as a Basis of an Independent Cause of Action When Intentionally Caused, 20
Washburn LJ. 106 (1980).
69. 302 N.C. at 439-40, 276 S.E.2d at 327.
70. Id. at 440, 276 S.E.2d at 328.
71. 45 N.C. App. 696, 699, 263 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1980). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54(3)(1969) pro-




In Stanback the court seemingly had adopted the minority view that
physical injury must accompany emotional distress in order to constitute a
valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 73 The court explic-
itly liberalized the requirements for recovery in Dickens, however, when it
observed that the dictum in Stanback "arose from our effort to conform the
opinion to language in some of our earlier cases the holdings of which led
ultimately to our recognition in Stanback of tort [sic] of intentional infliction
of mental distress." 74
Dickens thus clears the confusion created by Stanback and offers a clear
outline of the elements of the tort of emotional distress. The tort consists of
(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does
cause, (3) severe emotional distress to another.7 5 Recovery is allowed not only
for the emotional distress so caused, but also for bodily harm proximately re-
sulting from the distress.76
D. Liability Without Privily
In 1981 the court of appeals reaffirmed its recent recognition of a tort
cause of action for the negligent performance of a contractual duty owed to
another in the case of Alva v. Cloninger.77 Plaintiffs in Alva sought to recover
damages for economic loss from defendant real estate appraiser on alternative
theories of contract and tort.78 Defendant had been hired by NCNB Mort-
gage Corporation to appraise a house, which plaintiffs subsequently
purchased. Although defendant delivered an appraisal that noted "no visible
major problems" with the house,79 plaintiffs became aware of serious struc-
tural defects almost immediately upon moving into the house some four
months after the appraisal.80 Because plaintiffs failed to establish that they
were intended third party beneficiaries of the appraisal contract between
NCNB and defendant, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of
recovery on the contract claim.
81
72. 302 N.C. at 448, 276 S.E.2d at 332.
73. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment k (1965).
74. 302 N.C. at 449, 276 S.E.2d at 333 (emphasis in original). See, e.g., Crews v. Provident
Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967) (allowing recovery where plaintiff suffered acute
angina and high blood pressure in addition to mental distress); Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C.
732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965) (recognizing cause of action where plaintiff fell and fractured hip as
result of emotional disturbance); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625
(1936) (holding that damages for mere fright are not recoverable).
75. 302 N.C. at 452, 276 S.E.2d at 335. The tort may also exist where defendant's actions
indicate a reckless indifference to the likelihood that they will cause severe emotional distress. Id.
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).
76. 302 N.C. at 452-53, 276 S.E.2d at 335.
77. 51 N.C. App. 602, 277 S.E.2d 535 (1981). See generally Survey of Developments of North
Carolina Law, 1979-Torts, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1561, 1564-67 (1980); Survey of Developments of
North Carolina Law, 1980-Torts, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1239, 1244-46 (1981).
78. 51 N.C. App. at 603, 277 S.E.2d at 536.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 604, 277 S.E.2d at 537.
81. Id. at 608-09, 277 S.E.2d at 539. The court explicitly adopted the reasoning of the Re-
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Plaintiffs found strong support in recent North Carolina case law8 2 for
their alternative theory of tort recovery, and the court of appeals ruled that the
trial court "erred in directing a verdict for defendant on plaintiffs' tort
claim."83 In holding that there was evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that defendant should have reasonably foreseen and expected that
plaintiffs would rely on the appraisal report, the court adopted the rationale of
the 1980 case of Howell v. Fisher.8 4 The Alva court firmly rejected the notion
that lack of privity between plaintiffs and defendant barred plaintiffs' recovery
in tort, stating that "a third party, not in privity of contract with a professional
person, may recover for negligence which proximately causes a foreseeable
economic injury to him."85
Because recognition of this tort claim is relatively recent in North Caro-
lina,8 6 the court was careful to limit its decision by emphasizing that plaintiffs'
reliance was readily foreseeable-plaintiffs were named as "Borrowers" on de-
fendant's work order, and had paid the fee for defendant's services.87 Thus,
while contractual privity is clearly rejected as a prerequisite for recovery in





G.S. 1-539.21 creates a cause of action for a minor child against his or her
statement (Second) of Contracts § 133 (1973), which suggests that the appropriate analysis in third
party beneficiary cases is to determine "whether the parties to the contract intended to confer a
benefit directly upon the person so claiming, or whether the benefit to the tlaimant was merely
incidental" Here, the court concluded that plaintiffs' evidence did not show that they were "'in-
tended beneficiaries."' 51 N.C. App. at 608, 277 S.E.2d at 539 (quoting Howell v. Fisher, 49 N.C.
App. 488, 493, 272 S.E.2d 19, 23 (1980)).
82. See, e.g., Browning v. Maurice B. Levien & Co., 44 N.C. App. 701, 262 S.E.2d 355 (1980)
(architect hired by lending agency to certify stages of construction held liable to borrower-owner
of structure); Quail Hollow East Condominium Ass'n v. Donald J. Scholz Co., 46 N.C. App. 288,
265 S.E.2d 617 (1980) (homeowner, as foreseeable ultimate purchaser, may recover from architect
for faulty design or supervision of construction).
83. 51 N.C. App. at 613, 277 S.E.2d at 542.
84. 49 N.C. App. 488, 272 S.E.2d 19 (1980). In Howell, defendant $eologist had been em-
ployed by a corporation to prepare mining feasibility studies. Plaintiffs relied on these studies and
invested in the corporation, which became insolvent. Plaintiffs contract claim was dismissed be-
cause the status of intended beneficiary was not proved, but the court did recognize a cause of
action in tort based on defendant's negligence. Privity was held not to be a "threshold obstacle to
plaintiffs' claim." Id. at 493, 272 S.E.2d at 23.
85. 51 N.C. App. at 610,277 S.E.2d at 540 (citing Howell v. Fisher, 49 N.C. App. at 494,272
S.E.2d at 23-24).
86. See note 82 supra.
87. 51 N.C. App. at 611, 277 S.E.2d at 540.
88. In addressing the question of damages in this case, the court indicated in dictum that the
proper measure is the decrease in market value--"that is, the difference in market value of what
defendant certified plaintiffs were getting and what they actually got." Id. at 613, 277 SE.2d at
542. That difference, according to plaintiffs' expert witness, was some $16,000. Id. at 606, 277
S.E.2d at 538.
89. Additional Developments: Developments in statutory immunity in 1981 included N.C.
Gen Stat. § 7A-550 (1981), which expanded the grant of civil and criminal immunity to "[a]nyone
who . . . cooperates with the county department of social services . . . in the [Screening of
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parent, notwithstanding the parent-child relationship, for damages caused by
the parent's operation of a motor vehicle.90 In Snow v. Nixon91 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals clearly articulated the scope of this statutory au-
thorization and its effect on the common-law doctrine of parent-child immu-
nity. In Snow plaintiff sued through her mother and guardian ad litem to
recover for injuries allegedly suffered when she was struck by defendant's car
immediately after having been dropped off from her mother's car.92 Defend-
ant brought a third party complaint for contribution against plaintiff's mother,
alleging that plaintiffs injuries resulted from the mother's negligent supervi-
sion of plaintiff while operating a motor vehicle.93 Because G.S. 1-539.21 par-
tially abolished parent-child immunity in North Carolina,94 the sole issue on
appeal was whether plaintiff's mother owed plaintiff a duty, that is, whether
injury "arose out of her mother's operation of a motor vehicle so as to fall
within the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. §1-539.21."
95
The court of appeals found no North Carolina cases that defined the
"scope of the exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine found in [the
statute]." 96 Therefore, the court employed a traditionally strict statutory con-
Juvenile Abuse and Neglect] program." Law of May 28, 1981, ch. 469, 1981 Sess. Laws, 1st Sess.
733 (codified at N.C. Gen Stat. § 7A-550 (1981)). The screening program requires that any person
or institution "who has cause to suspect that any juvenile is abused or neglected shall report the
case... to the Director of the Department of Social Services." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-543 (1981).
See also Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1979-Family Law, 58 N.C.L.
Rev.,1471, 1493-1508 (1980) (new Juvenile Code adopted in 1979 to ensure juvenile's rights
through formal hearings and full use of dispositional alternatives).
Immunity was also granted to physicians reporting cancer diagnoses under the Cancer
Control Program. Law of May 8, 1981, ch. 345, 1981 Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 381 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 130-186.20 (1981)). The statute specifically provides that "[a]ny physician, medical
facility or their employees who make a report [of cancer diagnosed in the course of professional
consultation] to the Cancer Control Registry of the Department .of Human Resources shall be
immune from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed for so
doing." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130-186.20 (1981). The grant of immunity should operate to encourage
compliance with reporting procedures and assist the Department of Human Resources in the
prevention and treatment of cancer. See id. § 130-186.15.
Waiver of governmental immunity was made possible for any "area mental health, mental
retardation, and substance abuse authority.., from liability for damage by reason of death or
injury to person or property caused by the negligence or tort of any agent, employee, or board
member." Law of June 10, 1981, ch. 539, 1981 Sess. Laws, 1st Sess., 810 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 122-35.40B (1981)). The act of purchasing insurance is deemed to waive the immunity, and
liability may be incurred "only with respect to a claim arising after. . . liability insurance" has
been procured. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-35.40B(a), (e). Cf. Edwards v. Akion, 52 N.C. App. 688,
279 S.E.2d 894 (1981) (involving N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-485(a) (1976), which authorizes cities to
waive immunity from civil liability in tort by purchasing liability insurance), discussed at notes
114-21 and accompanying text infra.
90. "The relationship of parent and child shall not bar the right of action by a minor child
against a parent for personal injury or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor
vehicle owned or operated by such parent" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See
also Berman, Time to Abolish Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 4 Nova L.J. 25 (1980); Comment,
Parental Immunity, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 319 (1981).
91. 52 N.C. App. 131, 277 S.E.2d 850 (1981).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See note 90 supra.
95. 52 N.C. App. at 132, 277 S.E.2d at 851.
96. Id. The constitutionality of the statute, however, had been upheld previously. See
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struction, "taking the words in their natural and ordinary meaning, '97 in order
to clarify the exact import of the phrase "arising out of the operation of a
motor vehicle." 98 Relying on the holding in Colson v. Shaw9 9 that the opera-
tor of an automobile has a duty to allow his passengers to unload in a safe
place, the court concluded that the allegedly negligent acts of the mother fell
within the meaning of "arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle," and
thus defendant had stated a cause of action for contributory negligence.'
00
Snow thus gave a broad reading to the scope of G.S. 1-539.21, thereby hinting
at the virtual abolishment of parental immunity in every phase of automobile
transport.
2. Municipal Defendants
In Jones v. City of Greensboro10 1 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
recognized a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against both indi-
vidual and municipal defendants. Plaintiff in Jones had parked her car at the
Greensboro Coliseum Complex when two uniformed police officers asked her
to move it. The officers were employed as lot attendants in an off-duty capac-
ity, but they were wearing their police uniforms at the time.10 2 When plaintiff
refused to move her car, she was forcibly removed to a squad car and taken to
a magistrate's office, where she was served with a warrant and released.
103
Plaintiff subsequently instituted an action against the city of Greensboro, the
Greensboro Police Department, the Greensboro Coliseum Complex, and the
officers as individualsY°4
Although plaintiffs original pleading made no explicit mention of section
1983, she urged on appeal that the pleading nonetheless stated a valid claim
under the statute and therefore should not have been dismissed in the lower
court. 10 5 Section 1983 imposes liability upon "[e]very person, who under color
Ledwell v. Berry, 39 N.C. App. 274, 249 S.E.2d 862 (1978) (statute does not create arbitrary classi-
fication in violation of equal protection).
97. 52 N.C. App. at 133, 277 S.E.2d at 852 (citing Jones v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 15 N.C.
App. 515, 518, 190 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1972)).
98. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
99. 301 N.C. 677, 273 S.E.2d 243 (1981). In Colson a five-year-old child jumped out of de-
fendant driver's car and was hit by an oncoming vehicle. Although the court of appeals found no
North Carolina cases imposing a duty of care to aid persons alighting from a vehicle, it relied on
precedent established in other states to hold for the first time that "the operator must at least allow
his passengers to unload in a safe place and may not stop his car in a manner likely to create a
hazard to those alighting." Id. at 680, 273 S.E.2d at 246. Confining its holding to the facts of case,
the Colson court held that the youthful age of plaintiff, the heavy street traffic, and the darkness
combined to create a jury question as to breach of duty. Id.
100. 52 N.C. App. at 135, 277 S.E.2d at 852.
101. 51 N.C. App. 571, 277 S.E.2d 562 (1981). See generally Comment, Executive Immunity
for Constitutional Torts after Butz v. Economou, 20 Santa Clara L. Rev. 453 (1980) (approving
governmental liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a risk-spreading device).
102. 51 N.C. App. at 573, 277 S.E.2d at 565.
103. Id. at 587, 277 S.E.2d at 573.
104. Id. at 577, 277 S.E.2d at 568. Plaintiffs claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, as-
sault, and libel were held barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 583, 277 S.E.2d at
570.
105. Id. at 592, 277 S.E.2d at 576.
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of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State" deprives
any other person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws. .... "106
In allowing plaintifi's section 1983 claim, the court of appeals employed a
liberal construction of the rules of substance and procedure in pleading, and
noted that "when the allegations give sufficient notice of the wrong of which
plaintiff complains, the incorrect choice of the legal theory upon which the
claim is bottomed should not result in dismissal if the allegations are sufficient
to state a claim under some legal theory."10 7 The court noted that municipali-
ties have been held to be "persons" under section 1983,108 and that state courts
may rightfully maintain concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts under the
statute.10 9 The court remanded for a determination whether the city's permit-
ting off-duty officers engaged in part-time employment to wear city uniforms
constituted a violation of section 1983 on the facts of the case. Plaintiff's suc-
cess on remand will thus depend in part on her ability to prove misrepresenta-
tion to the public of police authority and a subsequent denial of rights under
color of law or custom as contemplated by section 1983.
In another 1981 decision the court of appeals recognized civil liability of a
municipality under a state statute in the case of Edwards v. Akion." 0 Plaintiff
in Edwards was assaulted by a city sanitation employee in the course of a
dispute between the two concerning refuse collection.' On appeal, plaintiff
alleged error in the trial court's granting summary judgment for the city, and
contended that municipal liability existed under G.S. 160A-485, which pro-
vides for waiver of municipal immunity.1
1 2
Because immunity is waived under the statute only to the extent that the
city is indemnified by its insurance contract,' 13 the court found it necessary to
determine whether contractual indemnity for "all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of... bodily injury...
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. Im 1979).
107. 51 N.C. App. at 593, 277 S.E.2d at 576 (citing Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254
S.E.2d 611 (1979)).
108. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (analysis of
statute's legislative history compels conclusion that Congress intended municipalities to be in-
cluded among those to whom § 1983 applies). Although the court in Jones also found the individ-
ual police officer defendants amenable to suit, the police department and the coliseum complex, as
component parts of the city, were held immune under § 1983. 51 N.C. App. at 593, 277 S.E.2d at
576.
109. See, e.g., Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C. App. 80, 243 S.E.2d 156, disc. reh. denied and
appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 471,246 S.E.2d 12 (1978) (because phrase "original jurisdiction" does
not contemplate "exclusive jurisdiction," state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts to entertain § 1983 claims).
110. 52 N.C. App. 688, 279 S.E.2d 894 (1981).
111. Id. at 696, 279 S.E.2d at 899.
112. Id. at 690, 279 S.E.2d at 896. N.C. Gen. Stat. §160A-485(a) (1976) specifically provides
that "[a]ny city is authorized to waive its immunity from civil liability in tort by the act of
purchasing liability insurance." For a general overview of municipal tort liability, see Berger,
MunicipafTort Liability: A Legislative Solution Balancing the Needs of Cities and Plaintiffs, 16
Urb. L. Ann. 305 (1979).
113. N.C. Gen. Stat. §160A-485(a) (1976).
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caused by an occurrence" included coverage for intentional torts. 114 Noting
that "the courts are... inclined to hold in favor of coverage" where no spe-
cific exclusionary clause is found, the court held that the acts of the sanitation
worker were an "occurrence" as contemplated by the terms of the insurance
policy. 115 In the city's voluntary waiver of immunity by the purchase of insur-
ance, the majority discerned a clear intent on the part of the municipality to
protect victims from the tortious acts of its employees. 116
The court therefore reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for the city and held that the policy in question covered "intentional torts com-
mitted by a City employee, when neither expected nor intended by the City, if
these actions were committed within the scope of the employee's duties."' 1 7 By
emphasizing in dictum that "scope of employment" is to be liberally con-
strued, "especially where the business involves a duty to the public," 118 the
court revealed a solicitude for the interests of tort victims and increases the
likelihood of recovery under § 160A-485.
F Releases
In 1981 three cases reached the court of appeals in which tort victims who
intended to release particular tortfeasors from liability executed instruments
which instead purported to release anyone involved.1 9 In each case, the court
held that a release executed under circumstances amounting to fraud or mu-
tual mistake of fact may be reformed to reflect the intention of the parties.120
In Cunningham v. Brown12 1 plaintiff, a passenger on a motorcycle driven
by her husband was injured in an accident with an automobile driven by the
defendant. In exchange for $4,975 from her husband's insurance company,
she executed an instrument releasing her husband and any other person, firm,
or corporation. . . from any and all claims" resulting from the accident.' 22
In her later action against defendant, the trial court entered summary judg-
ment against plaintiff, based on the claim that defendant had been released
from liability.'2
114. 52 N.C. App. at 691, 297 S.E.2d at 896.
115. Id. at 691-92, 692,279 S.E.2d at 896, 897. See generally Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1027 (1954)
(discussing "assault" as an "accident" within coverage clause).
116. 52 N.C. App. at 693, 279 S.E.2d at 897.
117. Id. (emphasis in original). The question whether defendant employee was acting within
the scope of his employment at the time of the assault is to be determined by the jury. Likewise,
under plaintiffs second theory of recovery, the jury is to determine whether the city negligently
failed to supervise the activities of its employee, thereby incurring statutory liability. Id. at 698,
279 S.E.2d at 900.
118. 52 N.C. App. at 698, 279 S.E.2d at 900.
119. Cunningham v. Brown, 51 N.C. App. 264,276 S.E.2d 718 (1981); McBride v. Johnson Oil
& Tractor Co., 52 N.C. App. 513, 279 S.E.2d 117 (1981); Peede v. General Motors Corp., 53 N.C.
App. 10, 279 S.E.2d 913 (1981). A fourth case dealing with releases from tort liability, Macklin v.
Dowler, 53 N.C. App. 488, 281 S.E.2d 164 (1981), is discussed at note 123 infra.
120. The court in Cunningham considered both fraud and mutual mistake, while the McBride
and Peede courts considered only mutual mistake.
121. 51 N.C. App. 264, 276 S.E.2d 718 (1981).
122. Id. at 269, 276 S.E.2d at 723.
123. Id. at 266, 276 S.E.2d at 721. At common law a release of one joint tortfeasor operated as
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The court of appeals conceded that on its face the instrument would re-
lease anyone involved in the accident from liability.1 24 It reasoned, however,
that "[a] release, like any other contract, is subject to avoidance by a showing
that its execution resulted from fraud or mutual mistake of fact."'125 The court
held that the trial judge improperly refused to admit plaintiffs affidavit alleg-
ing facts constituting fraud. It explained that extrinsic evidence is not barred
by the parol evidence rule when a party tries to demonstrate fraud or mutual
mistake. The court reversed the summary judgment because the affidavit
126
presented sufficient evidence of fraud and mutual mistake of fact1 27 to estab-
lish a genuine issue of fact as to the scope of the release.
The court of appeals followed Cunningham in both McBride v. Johnson
Oil & Tractor Co. 128 and Peede v. General Motors Corp. 129 to reach the same
a release of all, even if its terms provided otherwise. See, e.g., Simpson v. Plyler, 258 N.C. 390, 128
S.E.2d 843 (1963). Under the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ lB-4 (1969), however, a release given to one tortfeasor only discharges others if its terms so
provide. Brown's defense rested on the notion that the instrument specifically released her from
liability.
In Macklin v. Dowler, 53 N.C. App. 488, 281 S.E.2d 164 (1981), a case concerning the Uni-
form Contribution Act, a veterinarian's receptionist was bitten after her employer allegedly or-
dered her to help load dogs into a car. The veterinarian claimed he was released from liability by
the receptionist's instrument releasing the dog's owner. He argued that G.S. IB-4 was not applica-
ble because he was secondarily liable, while the statute only applies to tortfeasors who are jointly
and severally liable. The court rejected his argument, holding that G.S. 1B-4 applies whenever
two or more persons are liable for the same injury.
124. The court applied North Carolina law even though the release was executed in Massa-
chusetts, reasoning that the relevant law is the same in each state. Thus it avoided the question of
whether the general North Carolina rule of lex loci contractus should yield to the Restatement
position that the law of the place of the injury applies when determining the validity of a release.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 170 (1971). Cunningham v. Brown, 51 N.C. App. at
268-69, 276 S.E.2d at 722-23.
125. 51 N.C. App. at 269, 276 S.E.2d at 723. This is not a novel position. See, e.g., Ward v.
Heath, 222 N.C. 470, 24 S.E.2d 5 (1943) (fraud); Cheek v. Southern Ry., 214 N.C. 152, 198 S.E.
626 (1938) (mutual mistake). In Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C. App. 616, 220 S.E.2d 97 (1975), cert.
denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976), however, the court was faced with similar circum-
stances and did not consider fraud or mistake. In Battle the trial court granted summary judg-
ment for one defendant after plaintiff executed an instrument releasing two named defendants and
"all other persons" from liability. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting plaintiff's claims that
the instrument was only intended to release the named defendants, and that the words releasing
others were mere surplusage. It reasoned, "Where from the terms of the release, it must be appar-
ent to the claimant that its execution forecloses further compensation from any source, the result is
one voluntarily accepted by the claimant himself." Id. at 619, 220 S.E.2d at 99 (quoting Bonar v.
Hopkins, 311 F. Supp. 130, 134 (W.D. Pa. 1969)).
126. Cunningham's affidavit included claims that she thought she was signing a receipt for the
check, and that the insurance adjuster told her their dealings would not affect her claims against
Brown. Cunningham v. Brown, 51 N.C. App. at 265-66, 276 S.E.2d at 721.
127. Only fraud was raised by the appellant. The court considered the mistake issue sua
sponte, holding that the failure of the parties to achieve the intended result in their instrument
could be a mutual mistake of fact permitting reformation, rather than a mistake of law for which
relief is normally unavailable. Id. at 271-74, 276 S.E.2d at 724-26.
128. 52 N.C. App. 513, 279 S.E.2d 117 (1981). The court refused to overrule Battle. See note
128 supra. Instead it distinguished Battle as not involving a claim of mutual mistake, not seeking
reformation, and not supported by affidavits. Id at 515, 279 S.E.2d at 119.
The McBride court also reversed a dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints against the intended
releasee, noting that he was a necessary party to the actions for reformation. Id. at 520, 279 S.E.2d
at 122.
129. 53 N.C. App. 10, 279 S.E.2d 913, cert denied, 304 N.C. 196, 285 S.E.2d 100 (1981). In
permitting the reformation of the release, the court also noted that the provisions of the release
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conclusion on very similar facts.130
In Johnson v. Dunlap131 the court of appeals considered the effect of a
subsequent release on the validity of a prior release. Plaintiff signed a release
exculpating defendant from possible liability before he entered the pit area of
defendant's racetrack. After suffering serious injuries, he signed a second re-
lease in exchange for $1,500. The court of appeals reversed a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for defendant, holding that defendant
waived his rights under the first release when he presented the second release
to plaintiff for execution.132 Since there was evidence that plaintiff was men-
tally incompetent when he signed the second release, the JNOV was improper.
G. Res psa Loquiur1
33
In Arey v. Board of Light & Water Commission134 the court of appeals
held that a res ipsa loquitur instruction is not appropriate when a sudden
sewer obstruction causes sewage to back up into a home. After noting the split
in authority among states, 135 the court reasoned that the instruction is inap-
propriate because a sewer system is not in the exclusive control of a municipal-
ity, and it is unreasonable to expect a municipality to insure against sewer
back-ups.136
could only affect plaintiffs tort claim, and would not apply to his claim under breach of warranty.
Id. at 17, 279 S.E.2d at 918.
130. Note that in all three of these cases the defendant tortfeasor was trying to avoid liability
based on releases negotiated and paid for by third-party tortfeasors. The inequity of defendants
escaping liability while injured parties remain less than fully compensated clearly supports the
court's liberal application of reformation principles.
131. 53 N.C. App. 312, 280 S.E.2d 759 (1981).
132. The court held that even if there were no waiver, the jury could find that the first release
was ineffective, based on evidence that plaintiffhad not seen nor had a chance to read that release
before signing it. Judge Clark repeated the principle that "[r]eleases which exculpate persons
from liability for negligence are not favored by the law." Id. at 317, 280 S.E.2d at 763.
133. In Hyder v. Weilbaecher, 54 N.C. App. 287, 283 S.E.2d 426 (1981), the court of appeals
held that a res ipsa loquitur instruction was proper when it could be inferred from the evidence
that a surgeon left an eight and one-half inch wire in his patient's jugular vein. The court held
that the trial judge's instruction was insufficient because it told the jury that the principle of res
&psa loquitur "carries the question of negligence to the jury," but failed to explain that 'Tfurnishes
or would be some evidence, in the absence of explanation of the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care." Id. at 291, 283 S.E.2d at 428-29 (emphasis in original).
The court also held that expert testimony was not necessary to establish the standard of care
of the surgeon, noting that "'some results are so far out of the ordinary as to permit the jury,
without the aid of experts, to find negligence."' Id. at 292, 283 S.E.2d at 429 (quoting Byrd, Proof
of Negligence in North Carolina (pt.I), 48 N.C.L. Rev. 452, 465 (1970)).
134. 50 N.C. App. 505, 274 S.E.2d 268 (1981).
135. CompareTalcott v. New York, 58 A.D. 514,69 N.Y.S. 360 (1901) (resxpsaloqultur appli-
cable); Vitucci Importing Co. v. City of Seattle, 72 Wash. 192, 130 P. 109 (1913) (prima facie case);
with Shipley v. City of Spearfish, 89 S.D. 559, 235 N.W.2d 911 (1975); Reich v. Salt Lake City
Suburban Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 29 Utah 2d 125, 506 P.2d 53 (1973) (res 6psa loquitur
inapplicable).
136. The court limited its opinion to cases involving sudden obstructions where there are no
circumstances from which negligent design or construction can be inferred, and where the city has
no prior notice of malfunctions. 50 N.C. App. at 509, 274 S.E.2d at 270-71 (1981).
1482 [Vol. 60
H. Minors
In 1981 two key statutes revised an expanded causes of action relating to
minors. The stautory provision pertaining to damages recoverable from par-
ents for a tort to property committed by their child, G.S. 1-538.1,137 was re-
written both to broaden the scope of the remedy available and to increase the
amount of damages recoverable. Recovery for property damage originally
was limited to $500 from "the parents of any minor under the age of eighteen
(18) years, living with its parents, who shall maliciously or wilfully destroy
property" belonging to plaintiff.138 The 1981 amendment increases the
amount recoverable to $1000 from "the parents of any minor who shall mali-
ciously or willfully injure [plaintifi] or destroy the real or personal property [of
plaintiff]."' 139 By imposing vicarious liability upon parents, the Act originally
was designed to stimulate proper parental supervision as an aid in the control
of juvenile delinquency.140 The 1981 expansion of parental liability evidences
a continuing belief in the value of the statute's deterrent effects.
Deterrence of youthful misbehavior was also evident in the enactment of
two new sections of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.' 4 1 Section
115C-398 imposes liability upon students for damage caused to school build-
ings, furnishings or textbooks. 142 Section 115C-399 imposes liability upon
anyone willfully damaging or trespassing upon a school bus."13 The require-
ment of notice to parents in the event of willful damage to school property'
44
and the direct imposition of student liability should operate to help preserve
school property.
I Damages145
Although a trial judge has discretionary power to set aside a jury's award
137. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-538.1 (1969).
138. Id.
139. Law of May 18, 1981, ch. 414, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 486 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §1-538.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981)) (emphasis added). Parents whose custody or control has been
_removed by court order or contract are still not liable under the amended Act, however. Id.
140. See General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963). For a
general overview of the statute, see Ligon, Statutory Comment, Parental Responsibility Statute, 40
N.C.L. Rev. 619 (1962) (common law denial of parental liability abrogated by statute in majority
of states).
141. Law of May 21, 1981, ch. 423, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 510 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 115C-1 to -583 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
142. The statute specifically provides: "Students may be liable for damage to school build-
ings, furnishings and textbooks pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 115C-523, 115C-100 and 14-
132." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115-398 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
143. The statute specifically provides: "Any person who willfully trespasses upon or damages
a school bus may be liable pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 14-132.2." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-
399 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The 1981 amendments to the Education Act also provide for recovery up
to $600.00 by any pupil injured or killed "while boarding, riding on, or alighting from a school
bus operated by any local school administrative unit." Law of June 15, 1981,_ch. 576, 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 844 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-257 to -259 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
144. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-523 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (teacher or principal shall report child's
acts to parent; if parent then refuses to pay cost of repair, teacher or principal shall report the
offense to superintendent of schools).
145. In 1981 the General Assembly made three unrelated statutory changes in the damages
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of damages in a personal injury case 146 that power is not without limits.147 In
Worthington v. Bynum 148 the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized
those limits when it reinstated a jury verdict in a personal injuries case, hold-
ing that the trial judge had abused his discretion in setting aside the verdict. 149
The jury had awarded plaintiffs substantial damages for injuries they suffered
in a car wreck.150 On motion of defendant, however, the trial judge set aside
the verdict.' 5 ' Conceding that it is extremely unusual for an appeals court to
overturn a trial judge's decision setting aside a jury verdict, the court of ap-
peals said this outcome is nevertheless required when the trial judge abuses his
or her discretion.'
52
Judge Whichard agreed with the result reached by the majority but ar-
gued that the "abuse of discretion" test was inappropriate. 153 Rather, an ap-
peals court should consider whether the trial judge followed the standard of
Howard v. Mercer154 in determining damages. Howard held that the test for
granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict and order a new trial on the
damage issue should be whether the jury verdict was within the maximum
limit of a reasonable range. If the jury verdict was within that range, then the
motion should be denied. When the trial judge fails to apply this standard,
Judge Whichard argued, he becomes subject to reversal for error, but not on





area that are worthy of note. First, the maximum amount a plaintiff may recover in a wrongful
death action for medical expenses of the decedent was raised from $500 to $1,500. The change
was made by Law of May 28, 1981, ch. 468, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 733 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 28A-18.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
Second, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-295 was amended to increase the tort claim settlement
authority of the North Carolina Attorney General from $3,000 to $5,000. Law of April 2, ch. 166,
1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 142 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-295 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
Finally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-2 1.4 was amended to provide that attorneys' fees may be taxed as
court costs against a plaintiff in any civil action brought against a principal or school teacher for
corporal punishment of a student, upon a finding that the action was without substantial merit.
Law of May 13, 1981, ch. 381, §1, 1981 Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 424 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-
21.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
146. N.C.R. Civ. P. 59, for example, sets out nine instances in which a trial court can set aside
a jury verdict and grant a new trial.
147. See generally Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173
(1979); Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetter That
Binds Judges, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 359 (1975).
148. 53 N.C. App. 409, 281 S.E.2d 166 (1981).
149. Id. at 412, 281 S.E.2d at 170.
150. Id. at 410, 281 S.E.2d at 168. One plaintiff was awarded $175,000; the other was awarded
$150,000.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 410-11, 281 S.E.2d at 168-69.
153. Id. at 419, 281 S.E.2d at 173 (Whichard, J., concurring).
154. 36 N.C App. 67, 243 S.E.2d 168 (1978).
155. 53 N.C. at 419, 281 S.E.2d at 173 (Whichard, J., concurring).
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